

THE

RELIGION

Holliston (W.) OF

NATURE

DELINEATED.

Ἐνιοὶ φεύγοντες τὴν Δεισδαιμονίαν ἐμπέτλουν εἰς Ἀθεότητά  
τραχεῖαν καὶ ἀντίτυπον, ὑπερπηδῆσαντες Ἐν Μέρει  
κειμένην τὴν Εὐσέβειαν. Plutarch.

Χαίρειν ἔν ἑάσας τὰς Τιμὰς τὰς τῶ πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων,  
τὴν Ἀληθείαν σκοπῶν, περάσσομαι τῷ ὄντι ὡς ἀν δύνωμαι βέλ-  
τιστος ὢν καὶ ζῆν, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθνήσκω, ἀποθνήσκω. Plato.



L O N D O N :

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22 Nov 1860

THE

RELI GION

MA TION





# Advertisement.



*Few copies of this book, tho not originally intended to be published, were printed off in the year 1722. but, it being transcribed for the press hastily, and corrected under great disadvantages, many errata and mistakes got into it, which could not all be presently observed. With a great part of them*



## Advertisement.

*therefore still remaining four or five of the copies were afterwards given away ; and some more, taken from the printing-house, passed through hands unknown to the author, and he supposes were sold privately. There has, beside, been some talk of a piratical design upon it: and if that should take effect, both it and he might suffer extremely. For these reasons he has thought fit to reprint it himself, more correctly, with some small alterations (in things not essential to the main design) and some additions. Tho he cannot but be apprehensive, that still there may be many things, which have escaped his eye, or his attention.*



*The*



## *The Religion of Nature delineated.*

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To *A. F.* Esq;

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WAS much surpris'd, *SIR*, when (some time ago) you so importunately desired *my thoughts* upon these questions,

I. *Is there really any such thing as natural religion, properly and truly so called?*

II. *If there is, what is it?*

III. *How may a man qualify himself, so as to be able to judge, for himself, of the other religions profess'd in the world; to settle his own opinions in disputable matters; and then to enjoy tranquillity of mind, neither disturbing others, nor being disturbed at what passes among them?*

With what view you did this; whether in expectation of some little degree of satisfaction; or merely to try my abilities; or (which I rather think) out of kindness



ness to amuse me at a time, when I wanted something to divert melancholy reflexions, I shall not venture to guess. I shall only say, that could I have foreseen in due time, that such a task was to be imposed upon me, I might have been better prepared for it. I might have marked what was suitable to my purpose in those books, which I have read, but shall scarce ever return to read any more: many more I might have read too, which, not wanting them for my own conviction, I have neglected, and now have neither leisure nor patience to peruse: I might have noted what the various occurrences and cases, that happen in life, suggested: and, in general, I might have placed more of my time on such parts of learning, as would have been directly serviceable to me on the present occasion.

However, as I have not spent my days without *thinking* and reflecting seriously within my self upon the articles and duties of *natural religion*, and they are *my thoughts* which you require, I have attempted, by recollecting old meditations, and consulting a few scattered papers, in which I had formerly for my own use set down some of them (briefly, and almost solecistically), to give an answer to the *two first* of your questions, *together*: tho I must own, not without trouble in adjusting and compacting loose sentiments, filling up vacuities, and bringing the *chaos* into the shape of something like a system.

Notwithstanding what I have said, in a treatise of *natural religion*, a subject so beaten and exhausted in all its parts, by all degrees of writers, in which so many notions will inevitably occur that are no one's property, and so many things require to be proved, which can scarce be proved by any other but the old arguments (or not so well), you must not expect to find *much* that is new. Yet *something* perhaps you may. That, which is advanced in the following papers, concerning the nature of *moral good and evil*, and is the prevailing thought that runs thro them all, I never met with any where. And even as to those matters, in which I have been prevented by others, and which perhaps may be common, you have them, not as I took them from any body, but as they used to appear to me in my walks and solitudes. So that they are indeed *my thoughts*, such as have been *long mine*, which I send you; without any regard to what others have, or have not said: as I persuade my self you will easily perceive. It is not hard to discern, whether a work of this kind be all of a piece; and to distinguish the genuine hand of an author from the false wares and patch-work of a plagiarist. Tho after all, it would be madness in a man to go out of his right way, only because it has been frequented by others, or perhaps is the high road.

Sensible how unfinished this performance is, I call it only a *Delineation*, or rude draught. Where I am defective, or trip, I hope you will excuse a friend, who

(5) Where is Vir here then if there be nothing within our own Power? Cicero. There is a power given to Every M if He be but Willing to incline himself

who has now passed the threshold of old age; and is, upon that and other accounts, not able to bear much study or application. And thus I commit to your candor what follows: which, for the sake of order and perspicuity, I have divided into *sections*, and *propositions*.

## SECT. I. Of Moral Good and Evil.

THE foundation of religion lies in that difference between the acts of men, which distinguishes them into *good, evil, indifferent*. For if there is such a difference, there must be religion; & *contra*. Upon this account it is that such a long and laborious inquiry hath been made after some general *idea*<sup>a</sup>, or some *rule*<sup>b</sup>, by comparing the fore said acts with which it might appear, to which kind they respectively belong<sup>c</sup>. And tho men have not yet agreed upon any one, yet one certainly there must be<sup>d</sup>. That, which I am going to propose, has always seemd to me not only evidently true, but withal so obvious and plain, that perhaps for this very reason it hath not merited the notice of authors: and the use and application of it is so easy, that if things are but fairly permitted to speak for themselves their own natural language, they will, with a moderate attention, be found *themselves* to proclaim their own rectitude or obliquity; *that is*, whether they are disagreeable to it, or not. I shall endeavour by degrees to explain my meaning.

*Religion proceeds.*

I. That act, which may be denominated morally good or evil, must be the act of a being capable of distinguishing, choosing, and acting for himself<sup>e</sup>: or more briefly, of an intelligent and free agent. Because in proper speaking no act at all can be ascribed to that, which is not indued with these capacities. For that, which cannot di-

*Acts morally Good or Evil must proceed from an Intelligent & free Agent*

<sup>a</sup> So, in Plato, Socrates requires of Euthyphro not ἢ τι ἢ δύο διδάξαι τὸ πολλῶν ὁρίων ἀλλ' ἐκείνο αὐτὸ εἶδος, ὃ πάντα τὰ ὅσια ὅσια ἐστὶ, κτλ. And again, ταύτῃ τοίνυν με αὐτὴν διδάσκει τὴν ἰδίαν τίς ποτὶ εἶναι ἢ αἰς ἐκείνῳ ἀποδιδόντων, & χροῦμαι αὐτῇ παραδειγματι, ὃ μὲν αὐτοῖσιν ἦ, ἀνὰ ἢ σὺ ἢ ἄλλός τις πράττει, φῶ ἔστιον εἶναι ὃ δ' ἐν μὴ τοῖσιν, μὴ φῶ. *Posce exemplar honesti.* Luc. <sup>b</sup> Οἶδ' ὅτι τὸ γ' αἰσχρὸν, κακόν τ' καλὸν μανθάνω. Eurip. *Adsit Regula, peccatis qua poenas irroget aquas,* says Horace. Now by the same rule, by which punishments are justly proportiond, crimes must be distinguishd among themselves; and therefore much more, crimes from no-crimes, and crimes from good actions. So that it is at bottom a rule which can do this, that is required. <sup>c</sup> Formula quaedam constituenda est: quam si sequemur in comparatione rerum, ab officio nunquam recedemus. Cic. <sup>d</sup> Πῶς εἶόν τε ἀτίκμαστα εἶναι καὶ ἀνυπόστατα τὰ ἀνυπακούστα ἐν ἀνθρώποις; ἔστι δὲ [κακόν τις] Arrian. <sup>e</sup> Ubi virtus, si nihil situm est in ipsis nobis? Cic. הוא עמוד התורה והמצוה - הוא עמוד לדרך טובה - נחונה אדם רצה להשות עצמו לדרך טובה. Maim. הרשות היא הבחירה. Nabh. Ab.

B. 2.

stinguish,

<sup>a</sup> One or 2 particulars, & multitude of things are just & right; but to show him of Right Pattern itself by which every thing is just & good becomes so. And again "Show me of Right Pattern or Image, that I may see at last of a thing it is, & when I look upon it I make use of it as of Right Pattern, I may be able to affirm, that an action performed by you or any other Person, if it be of such a sort is just & good; & if it be not of such a sort, then I cannot affirm it to be so." <sup>b</sup> Enquire after of Right Pattern of virtue & vice. He that has been taught by Rule of virtue, Eurip. "We ought to have some Rule whereby Punishment may be proportiond to crimes. Horace. There ought to be some Rule established: which if we follow in comparing things with each other, we shall never fall short of our duty &c." <sup>c</sup> How is it possible if those things are necessary for us to know or to do, who are such, as they can have no certainty of knowing or having or doing? <sup>d</sup> This is the support of Law & Commandment to Maimon. This power is what we call, and will call, Nabh. Ab.



stinguish, cannot choose: and that, which has not the opportunity, or liberty of choosing for itself, and acting accordingly, from an internal principle, acts, if it acts at all, under a necessity incumbent *ab extra*. But that, which acts thus, is in reality only *an instrument* in the hand of something which imposes the necessity; and cannot properly be said *to act*, but *to be acted*. The act must be the act of an agent: therefore not of his instrument.

A being under the above-mentioned inabilities is, as to the morality of its acts, in the state of inert and passive matter, and can be but a *machine*: to which no language or philosophy ever ascribed *ἦδῃ* or *mores*.

II. *Those propositions are true, which express things as they are: or, truth is the conformity of those words or signs, by which things are expressed, to the things themselves.* Defin.

III. *A true proposition may be denied, or things may be denied to be what they are, by deeds, as well as by express words or another proposition.* It is certain there is a

- ① meaning in many acts and gestures. Every body understands weeping<sup>a</sup>, laughing, shrugs, frowns, &c. these are a sort of universal language. Applications are many times made, and a kind of dialogue maintaind only by casts of the eye  
 ② and motions of the adjacent muscles<sup>b</sup>. And we read of feet, that *speak*<sup>c</sup>; of a  
 ③ philosopher, who *answerd* an argument by only getting up and walking<sup>d</sup>; and of  
 ④ one, who pretended to *express* the same sentence as many ways by gesticulation,  
 ⑤ as even Cicero himself could by all his *copia* of words and eloquence<sup>e</sup>. But these instances do not come up to my meaning. There are many acts of *other* kinds, such as constitute the character of a man's conduct in life, which have *in nature*, and would be taken by any indifferent judge *to have a signification*, and *to imply some proposition*, as plainly to be understood as if it was declared in words: and therefore if what such acts declare to be, is not, they must *contradict truth*, as much as any false proposition or assertion can.

If a body of soldiers, seeing another body approach, should fire upon them, would not this action declare that they were enemies; and if they were *not* enemies, would not this military language declare what was *false*? No, perhaps it may be said; this can only be called a mistake, like that which happend to the *Athenians*

<sup>a</sup> Lacryma pondera vocis habent. Ov. <sup>b</sup> Oculi, supercilia, frons, vultus denique totus, qui sermo quidam tacitus mentis est, &c. Cic. Nutu signisque loquuntur. Ov. Est actio quasi sermo corporis. Cic. & sim. pass. <sup>c</sup> אִישׁ אֶחָד מִלְּהֵן בִּרְגִלּוֹ. Prov. <sup>d</sup> Τὸν κατὰ τὴν κινήσεως λόγον σιωπῶν, πρὸς τὴν αἰσθησίν. Sext. Emp. <sup>e</sup> So Menedemus reproved luxury by eating only olives. Diog. L. And others are mentiond by Plutarch, who did ἀνδρὶ φωνῆς ἂν οὐκ ἐπαύθη. <sup>f</sup> Macrob.

a/1) Tears have force of words. Ovid. b/2) The eyes, & eye brows & indeed of whole countenance are in a kind of tacit speech of mind. i.e. They (Pyramus & Thisbe) speak to each other by signs. "Every action is a sort of speech of body." Cic. & often repeated by him. c/3) A wicked man speaks by his deed. & Heb. Prov. d/4) "Without saying any thing openly or argument about motion, he got up & walked about. And others are mentioned by Plutarch who declared w<sup>t</sup> they had to say without making use of words."

in the attack of *Epipolæ*<sup>a</sup>, or to the *Carthaginians* in their last incampment against *Agathocles* in *Africa*<sup>b</sup>. Suppose then, instead of this firing, some officer to have said they were enemies, when indeed they were friends: would not that sentence affirming them to be enemies be false, notwithstanding he who spoke it was mistaken? The truth or falshood of this affirmation doth not depend upon the affirmer's knowledge or ignorance: because there is a *certain* sense affixt to the words, which must either agree or disagree to that, concerning which the affirmation is made. The thing is the very same still, if into the place of *words* be substituted *actions*. The salute here was in *nature* the salute of an enemy, but should have been the salute of a friend: therefore it implied a falsity. Any *spectator* would have understood this action as I do; for a declaration, that the other were enemies. Now what is to be understood, has a meaning: and what has a meaning, may be either *true* or *false*: which is as much as can be said of any verbal sentence.

When *Popilius Lænas* solicited to have *Cicero* proscribed, and that he might find him out and be his executioner<sup>c</sup>, would not his *carriage* have sufficiently signified to any one, who was ignorant of the case, that *Tully* either was some very bad man, and deserved capital punishment; or had some way grievously injured this man; or at least had not saved his life, nor had as much reason to expect his service and good offices upon occasion, as he ever had to expect *Tully's*? And all these things being false, were not his behaviour and actions *expressive* of that which was false, or *contradictions to truth*? It is certain he acted as if those things had been true, which were not true, and as if those had not been true which were true (in this consisted the fault of his ingratitude): and if he in words had said they were true or not true, he had done no more than *talk as if* they were so: why then should not to act as if they were true or not true, when they were otherwise, contradict truth as much as to say they were so, when they were not so?<sup>d</sup>

A pertinacious *objector* may perhaps still say, it is the business of soldiers to defend themselves and their country from enemies, and to annoy them as opportunity permits; and self-preservation requires all men not only barely to defend themselves against aggressors, but many times also to *prosecute* such, and only such, as are wicked and dangerous: therefore it is *natural* to conclude, that they are enemies against whom we see soldiers defending themselves, and those men wicked and dangerous, whom we see prosecuted with zeal and ardor. Not that

<sup>a</sup> Where we find φίλος τε φίλοις, ἢ πολίτας πολίταις εἰς χεῖρας ἀλλήλοις ἰλθόντας. *Thucyd.* <sup>b</sup> Τὸς δικαίους ὡς πολεμικοὺς ἠμούνοντο. *Diod. S.* <sup>c</sup> *Val. Max.* <sup>d</sup> Ἀνθρώποισιν οὐκ ἔστιν ποτὶ τὸ πράγμα τῶν γλῶσσῶν ἰσχύει πλῆρον. *Eurip.* Quasi intersit, audiam, an videam. *Cic.*

a (1) Where we find that Friends & Fellow Citizens fell into each other's hands. *Thucyd.* those

b (2) They revenged themselves upon their own People as if they had been their Enemies.

d (3) There never could be any necessity that Men's Tongues should be of more Force to declare their Intentions than their Actions. *Eurip.* "as if there were any difference whether I hear you or see you & Cicero."



those acts of defending and prosecuting *speaking* or signify so much : but conjectures are raised upon the *common sense*, which mankind has of such proceedings. *Ans.* If it be *natural* to conclude any thing from them, do they not *naturally* convey the notice of something to be concluded ? And what is conveying the *notice* of any thing but *notifying* or signifying that thing ? And then again, if this signification is *natural* and founded in the *common* principles and sense of mankind, is not this more than to have a meaning which results only from the use of some *particular* place or country, as that of language doth ?

If *A* should enter into a compact with *B*, by which he *promises* and engages never to do some certain thing, and after this he does that thing : in this case it must be granted, that his act *interferes* with his promise, and is *contrary* to it. Now it cannot interfere with his promise, but it must also interfere with the truth of that *proposition*, which says there was such a promise made, or that there is such a compact subsisting. If this proposition be true, *A* made such a certain agreement with *B*, it would be denied by this, *A* never made any agreement with *B*. Why ? Because the truth of this latter is *inconsistent* with the agreement asserted in the former. The formality of the denial, or that, which makes it to be a denial, is this *inconsistence*. If then the behaviour of *A* be *inconsistent* with the agreement mentiond in the former proposition, that proposition is as much denied by *A*'s behaviour, as it can be by the latter, or any other *proposition*. Or thus, If one proposition imports or contains that which is *contrary* to what is containd in another, it is said to *contradict* this other, and denies the existence of what is containd in it. Just so if one act imports that which is *contrary* to the import of another, it *contradicts* this other, and *denies its existence*. In a word, if *A* by his actions denies the engagements, to which he hath subjected himself, his actions deny them ; just as we say, *Ptolomy* by his writings denies the motion of the earth, or his writings deny it <sup>a</sup>.

When the question was asked, *Whose sheep are these ?* the answer was, *Ægon's : for he committed them to my care* <sup>b</sup> (he uses and disposes of them as his). By this act *Dametas* understood them to be *his* ; and if they had *not* been his, but *Alphondas's* or *Melibæus's*, *Ægon*, by an act very intelligible to *Dametas*, had expressed what was not true. What is said here is the stronger, because he, who has the *use* and *disposal* of any thing, has *all* that he can have of it ; and *v. v.* he who has the *all* (or property) of any thing, must have all the *use* and *disposal* of it. So that a man cannot more fully proclaim any thing to be *his*, than by *using* it, &c. But of this something more hereafter.

<sup>a</sup> Ἡμεῖς τ' ἀνέμενον βιβλία Πλάτωνος ἀντιᾶς φαρῶν Πλάτωνι κλ. *Plut.*  
<sup>a</sup> (1) "He who buys Plato's Books, we say, buys Plato."

<sup>b</sup> *Virg. & Theocr.*

In the Jewish history we read, that when *Abimelek* saw *Isaac* sporting <sup>a</sup> with <sup>a</sup> *Rebekah*, and taking conjugal liberties <sup>b</sup>, he presently knew her to be *Isaac's* <sup>b</sup> wife; and if she had not been his wife, the case had been as in the preceding instance. If it be objected, that she might have been his mistress or a harlot; I answer, that so she might have been, tho *Isaac* had told him by words that she was his wife. And it is sufficient for my purpose, and to make acts capable of contradicting truth, if they may be allowed to express things as plainly and determinately as words can. Certainly *Abimelek* gave greater credit to that information which passed through his eye, than to that which he received by the ear <sup>c</sup>; and to what *Isaac* did, than to what he said. For *Isaac* had told him, that she was not his wife, but his sister <sup>d</sup>.

A certain author <sup>e</sup> writes to this purpose, "If a soldier, who had taken the oath to *Cæsar*, should run over to the enemy, and serve him against *Cæsar*, and after that be taken; would he not be punished as a deserter, and a perjured villain? And if he should plead for himself, that he never denied *Cæsar*; would it not be answered, *That with his tongue he did not deny him, but with his actions (or by facts) he did?*" And in another place, "Let us, says he, suppose some tyrant command a Christian to burn incense to *Jupiter*, without adding any thing of a verbal abnegation of *Christ*: if the Christian should do this, would it not be manifest to all, that *by that very act he denied him*;" (and I may add, consequently denied those propositions which affirm him to be the *Christ*, a teacher of true religion, and the like <sup>f</sup>)?

When a man lives, as if he had the estate which he has not, or was in other regards (all fairly cast up) what he is not, what judgment is to be passed upon him? Doth not his whole conduct breath untruth? May we not say (if the propriety of language permits), that he *lives a lye*?

In common speech we say some actions are insignificant, which would not be sense, if there were not some that are significant, that have a tendency and meaning. And this is as much as can be said of articulate sounds, that they are either significant or insignificant <sup>h</sup>.

משמש משמו. *Rashi*. <sup>b</sup> Only נשוק וחיבוק according to *Alshek*. <sup>c</sup> ὅτι τὸ τυχεῖν ἢ ἀνθρώποις ἢ θεῶν ἀπιστοῦσα ἐμφανισμῶν. *Herod*. <sup>d</sup> That instance of *Menelaus* and his guest *Alexander*, in *Arrian*, might be subjoind to this. Εἰ τις αὐτὸς εἶδε φιλοφρονεῖν ἀλλήλους, ἠπίσταντο ἂν τῷ λόγῳ εἶναι φίλους αὐτοῦς. <sup>e</sup> *De Dupl. Mart*. <sup>f</sup> Something like this is that in one of *Greg. Naz.*'s orations. When some Christians, who had been insnared by *Julian*, asked, πῶς χρεῖσθαι ἐρημίᾳ; they were answered ὅτι κατὰ τὸ πνεῦμα ἐθυμιάσατε. <sup>g</sup> τὰ ψευδῆ πράγματα διώκων. *Chrys*. καὶ τοιοῦτος ἀνδρὸς καὶ γέλας, καὶ βῆμα ποδὸς ἀναγίγναι δεῖ αὐτῶν, as *Basil* speaks: and therefore greater things must do it more. <sup>h</sup> As that *Blatru ap. Diog. L. in v. Zen*. ὡς ὁ λόγος ἔχει καὶ οὐκ ἔχει νόημα ὅλως. *It*

a) In Bed speaker b) Only kissing & embracing Her. c) It usually do not give so much credit to their say as to their eye d) If any one saw them behaving each other in a friendly manner, he would not believe a person who should say they were not friends e) How have we denied X? — you have offered incense on my altar! f) Pursuing things that are false. Says. May Habit of a Man, or his laugh or the of his foot will discover who he is as Basil speaks



It may not be improperly observed by the way, that the *significancy* here attributed to mens acts, proceeds not always from nature, but sometimes from custom and agreement among people<sup>a</sup>, as that of words and sounds mostly doth. Acts of the latter kind may in different times and places have different, or even contrary significations. The generality of *Christians*, when they pray, take off  
 \* b their hats: the *Jews*, when they pray<sup>b</sup> or say any of their *Berakoth*, put them on. The same thing which among *Christians* denotes reverence, imports irreverence among the *Jews*. The reason is, because covering the head with a hat (if it has no influence upon one's health) is in itself an *indifferent* thing, and people by usage or consent may *make* it interpretable either way. Such acts seem to be adopted into their language, and may be reckond part of it. But acts of the former kind, such as I chiefly here intend, have an *unalterable* signification, and can by no agreement or force ever be made to express the contrary to it. *Ægon's* treating the flock, and disposing of it as if it was his, can by no torture be brought to signify, *that it was not his*. From whence it appears, that *facts* express more  
 c strongly, even than *words* themselves<sup>c</sup>; or to contradict any proposition by facts is a fuller and more effectual contradiction, than can possibly be made by words  
 de only<sup>d</sup>. *Words* are but *arbitrary signs*<sup>e</sup> of our ideas, or indications of our  
 + f thoughts (that word, which in one language denotes *poverty*<sup>f</sup>, in another denotes *riches*<sup>g</sup>): but *facts* may be taken as the effects of them, or rather as the  
 g thoughts themselves produced into act; as the very conceptions of the mind brought

<sup>a</sup> Αἰγύπτιοι — τὰ ποτὰ πάντα ἔμπαντι τοῖσι ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις ἐξήσαντο ἡδὲ τε καὶ νόμους, κτλ.

Herod. <sup>b</sup> — מנולח בראש — יעמר בחפלה — לא יעמר בחפלה. Maim. & al. pass. <sup>c</sup> Θεὸν ὁμολογῶν ἰδεῖναι, τοῖς ἔργοις ἀρεῖναι. Epist. ad Tit. And τὸ ἔργοις ἀρεῖναι Θεὸν ὡς τὸ ἐπεὶ ἐν φόρῳ.

Chrys. <sup>d</sup> Λόγῳ ἔργῳ σκῆ. Plut. Res loquitur ipsa: quæ semper valet plurimum. Cic. Quid verba audiam, cum facta videam? Id. Αὐτὰ βοᾷ τὰ πράγματα, καὶ τῇ φωνῇ σιωπᾷ. Bas. <sup>e</sup> This we

know. For they are different to different nations; we coin them, as we please, &c. Φύσις ἢ ἐνομάτων ἰδὲν ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἡγεῖναι σύμβολον. Arist. And tho *Plato* seems to be of another mind, yet when *Crasylus*,

says 'Ονόματι ὁρετόν ἡ εἰναι ἰσχύς ἢ ἔστιν φύσις πεφυκυῖαν, it is much to be questiond whether any thing,

more be meant than this, that some names of things are more natural or proper than others. For he says

that this rectitude of names is the same καὶ Ἑλλήσι καὶ βαρβάροις; that it is [only] such as is sufficient δηλῶν.

εἶον ἰσχυρὸν ἐστὶ ἢ ὄντων; such as may render them κατὰ τὸ δυνάστον ὁμοῖα — τοῖς πράγμασιν. &c. That *lepidum* & *festivum* argumentum, which *P. Nigidius*. ap. *A. Gell.* makes use of to shew, cur videri possint

verba esse naturalia magis quam arbitraria, deserves only to be laughd at. <sup>f</sup> ריש Hebr. <sup>g</sup> ריש Kesh

Arab. So *Ab. Ezra* observes that עבד in Heb. is to will, in *Arab.* to nill (tho in *Arab.* the word is

written עבד); and in another place, that the same word even in the same language sometimes signifies

רבר והפכו, a thing and its contrary. And every one knows, that the greater part of our words

have different senses and uses. עגון in Arabic, according to *Giggeius* and *Golinus*, has 70 or 80, and

some (two at least) contrary the one to the other.

a The Agyptians have established a great many laws, customs, quite contrary to those of other people  
 b He that prays must not have his head uncovered whilst he is praying & Maimon. & elsewhere  
 c They profess to know God but in works they deny him. And to deny by our works is worse than to deny him by our words  
 d words are only images of our ideas. The things speak itself with an always of very great force. To signify my  
 hearing words is not the same as to hear. The things themselves speak altho you are silent with your voice. Bas.  
 e. The names of things are found in nature, but are only artificial signs — That is, properly of nature is found in nature of very thin  
 It is much more questionable whether any thing more be meant — Only such as is sufficient to signify whatever thing it is. Such as may render it at  
 f. This is possible. f. Heb. Kesh

Abah

Gnison

forth, and grown to maturity; and therefore as the most natural and express representations of them. And, beside this, they bear certain *respects* to things, which are not arbitrary, but as determinate and immutable as any *ratio's* are in mathematics. For the facts and the things they respect are *just what they are*, as much as any two given quantities are; and therefore the respects interceding between those must be as *fixt*, as the *ratio* is which one of these bears to the other: that is, they must remain the same, and always speak the same language, till things cease to be what they are.

I lay this down then as a fundamental maxim, *That whoever acts as if things were so, or not so, doth by his acts declare, that they are so, or not so*; as plainly as he could by words, and with more reality. And if the things are otherwise, his acts contradict *those propositions*, which assert them to be as they are<sup>a</sup>.

IV. No act (whether word<sup>b</sup> or deed) of any being, to whom moral good and evil are imputable, that interferes with any true proposition, or denies any thing to be as it is, can be right. For,

1. If that proposition, which is false, be wrong<sup>c</sup>, that act which implies<sup>c</sup> such a proposition, or is founded in it, cannot be right: because it is the very proposition itself in practice.

2. Those propositions, which are true, and express things as they are, express the *relation* between the subject and the attribute as it is; that is, this is either affirmed or denied of that according to the nature of *that relation*. And further, this relation (or, if you will, the nature of this relation) is determin'd and fixt by the natures of the things themselves. Therefore nothing can interfere with any proposition that is true, but it must likewise interfere with nature (the nature of the relation, and the natures of the things themselves too), and consequently be *unnatural*, or *wrong in nature*. So very much are those gentlemen mistaken, who by *following nature* mean only complying with their bodily inclinations, tho in opposition to truth, or at least without any regard to it. Truth is but a conformity to nature: and to follow nature cannot be to combat truth<sup>d</sup>.

<sup>a</sup> This is ποιῶν ψεῦδος. Apocal. Plato uses the same way of speaking. Ψεῦδος, says he, μηδὲν μὴτε λόγῳ μὴτε ἔργῳ πράξει. The contrary to this is in Aristotle ἀληθείαν ὁμοίως ἐν λόγοις καὶ πράξεσιν; and ἐν βίῳ ἀληθεύειν. And in S. B. הלכה באמת, and דרך אמת. <sup>b</sup> Actum generale verbum est, five verbis five re quid agatur. Justin. Dig. <sup>c</sup> As it must be, because ὁρθεῖν ἢ ἀλλοθεῖν αἰ. Soph. <sup>d</sup> Τῷ λογικῷ ζῳῇ ἢ αὐτῇ πράξει κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶ καὶ κατὰ λόγον (that is, according to truth, which it is the office of reason to discover). Anton. Nunquam aliud natura, aliud sapientia dicit. Juv.

<sup>a</sup> To act a lye Reveal — No M. Sh<sup>d</sup> tell a lye either by word or Deed. the contrary is in Arist: To perform Truth both in words & in Deeds. And to live up to truth. And in S.B. To walk in Truth. First way off Truth.. <sup>b</sup> An Act is a Gen<sup>l</sup> Expression, & signifies any thing it is acted up by word or Deed. Justin. Dig. <sup>c</sup> Truth is always right. <sup>d</sup> — An Action which is done according to Nature, or according to Reason, is the same in a creature endued with Reason — Nature never dictates, One thing, & Reason a diff<sup>t</sup> thing



3. If there is a supreme being, upon whom the existence of the world depends; and nothing can be in it but what He either causes, or permits to be; then to own things *to be as they are* is to own what He causes, or at least permits, *to be thus caused or permitted*: and this is to take things as He gives them, to go into His constitution of the world, and to submit to His will, revealed in the books of nature<sup>a</sup>. To do this therefore must be agreeable to His will. And if so, the contrary must be disagreeable to it; and, since (as we shall find in due time) there is a perfect rectitude in His will, certainly *wrong*.

I desire that I may not be misunderstood in respect to the actings of wicked men. I do not say, it is agreeable to the will of God, that what is *ill* done by them, should be *so* done; *i. e.* that they should use their liberty ill: but I say, when they have done this and committed some evil, it is agreeable to His will, that we should allow it to *have been* committed: or, it would be disagreeable to His will, that we should *deny* it to have been committed.

As the owning of things, in all our conduct, *to be as they are*, is direct obedience<sup>b</sup>: so the contrary, not to own things *to be* or *to have been* that are or have been, or not *to be what they are*, is direct rebellion against Him, who is the Author of nature. For it is as much as to say, "God indeed causes such a thing to be, or at least permits it, and it is; or the relation, that lies between this and that, is of such a nature, that one may be affirmed of the other, &c. this is true: but yet to *me* it shall *not* be so: I will not indure it, or act as if it were so: the laws of nature are ill framed, nor will I *mind* them, or what follows from them: even existence shall be non-existence, when my pleasures require". Such an impious declaration as this attends every voluntary infraction of truth.

4. Things cannot be denied to be what they are, in *any instance* or *manner whatsoever*, without contradicting axioms and truths eternal. For such are these: *every thing is what it is; that which is done, cannot be undone*; and the like. And then if those truths be considered as having always subsisted in the Divine mind, to which they have always been true, and which differs not from the Deity himself, to do this is to act not only in opposition to His government or sovereignty, but to His

<sup>a</sup> Ἐδωκεν [ὁ Θεός] ἀντὶ δέλου τὸν κόσμον. Chrys.

<sup>b</sup> What Hierocles says of his ἐγκόσμοις Θεοῖς, is true in respect of every thing. Τὸς Θεῶν νόμῳ κατακολουθάντων ἐστὶ—τὰτο αὐτοὺς εἶναι τίθειαι, ὃ γινώσκει. There is a passage somewhere in S. Iqar. much like this: where it is said (as I remember) that he, who worships an Angel מַצֵּר כִּמְה רִוּחַ שְׁלִיחַ ה' (as being what he is, the messenger of God) is not guilty of idolatry.

<sup>a</sup> for he giveth us the world, as it were for a book to read in

nature

<sup>b</sup> for he governs this world is true in respect of every thing. "He supposing them to be as they are—is paying obedience to law of God."

nature<sup>a</sup> also: which, if He be perfect, and there be nothing in Him but what is most right, must also upon this account be most *wrong*.

Pardon these inadequate ways of speaking of God. You will apprehend my meaning: which perhaps may be better represented thus. If there are such things as *axioms*, which are and always have been immutably true, and consequently have been always *known to God to be so*<sup>b</sup>, the truth of them cannot be denied any way; either directly or indirectly, but the truth of the *Divine knowledge* must be denied too.

5. Designedly to treat things as being what they are not is the greatest possible absurdity. It is to put bitter for sweet, darkness for light, crooked for streight, &c. It is to subvert all science, to renounce all sense of truth, and flatly to deny the existence of any thing. For nothing can be true, nothing does exist, *if things are not what they are*.

To talk to a *post*, or otherwise treat it as if it was a *man*, would surely be reckond an absurdity, if not *distraction*<sup>c</sup>. Why? because this is to treat it as *being what it is not*. And why should not the converse be reckond as bad; that is, to treat a man as a *post*<sup>d</sup>; as if he had no sense, and felt not injuries, which he doth feel; as if to him pain and sorrow were not pain; happiness not happiness. This is what the cruel and unjust often do.

*Lastly*, to deny things to be as they are is a transgression of the great law of our nature, the law of reason. For truth cannot be opposed, but reason must be violated. But of this more in the proper place.

Much might be added here concerning the *amiable nature*<sup>e</sup>, and great *force*<sup>f</sup> of truth. If I may judge by what I feel within my self, the least truth cannot be

• הקב"ה נקרא אמת וכו'. In *Resh. bhokm.* & al. And S. Chrysostom defines truth in the same words, which philosophers apply to the Deity. Ἀλήθεια τὸ ὄντως ὄν. ὡς ἄνθρωπος ὡς ἄνθρωπος—ἔχων is in *Soph.* the character of *Ajax*, when his head was turned, in a fit of raving. And among the monstrous and mad extravagances of C. Caligula one is, that he treated his horse *Incitatus* as a man. Suet.

<sup>a</sup> Horace argues after the same manner. Si quis lectica nitidam gestare amet agnam; Huic vestem, ut nata, paret, &c. Interdicto huic omne adimat jus Prator, &c. Quid, si quis natam pro mutâ devorvet agnâ. Integer est animi? ne dixeris. If it be against truth and nature to use a lamb as a daughter, it will be as much against truth to use a daughter as a lamb.

<sup>b</sup> Καὶ αὐτὸ μὴ ψεύδῃ φαῦλον καὶ ψεκτόν. τὸ ἡ ἀλῆθης καλὸν καὶ ἐπαινετόν. Arist. Est quiddam, quod sua vi nos allicit ad sese, non emolumento captans aliquo, sed trahens sua dignitate: quod genus, virtus, scientia, veritas est. Cic. Γλυκύ η ἀλήθεια a festival saying in *Plut.* O magna vis veritatis, &c. Cic. A good man

אמת האמת טובה. מפני שהוא אמת. Maim.

- a The Holy Being is called Truth — St Chrys. C 2 this defines it "Truth is with both a real existence & contradicted"
- b. Truth is a companion of God. Phil Jud. c. Dealing his words like men.
- c a lie is base & blame-worthy of itself. Truth is beautiful & praise worthy "there is something that wins our affections by its own nature & force. Something that does not catch us by any profit it brings, but attracts us by its sup<sup>r</sup> Excellence; something of this kind is wisdom knowledge. Truth. Ex: Truth is a sweet thing. Plutarch
- f a good man does; Truth bec it is, Truth.



contradicted without much reluctance: even to see other men disregard it does something more than displease; it is *shocking*.

V. *What has been said of acts inconsistent with truth, may also be said of many omissions, or neglects to act: that is, by these also true propositions may be denied to be true; and then those omissions, by which this is done, must be wrong for the same reasons with those assigned under the former proposition.*

Nothing can be asserted or denied by any act with regard to those things, to which it bears no relation: and here no truth can be affected. And when acts *do* bear such relations to other things, as to be declaratory of something concerning them, this commonly is visible; and it is not difficult to determine, whether truth suffers by them, or not. Some things cannot possibly be done, but truth must be *directly* and positively denied; and the thing will be clear. But the cases arising from omissions are not always so well determined, and plain: it is not always easy to know *when* or *how far* truth is violated by omitting. Here therefore more latitude must be allowed, and much must be left to every one's own judgment and ingenuity.

This may be said in general, that when any truth would be denied by acting,  
<sup>a</sup> the omitting to act can deny no truth. For no truth can be contrary to truth<sup>a</sup>. And there may be omissions in other cases, that are silent as to truth. But yet there are *some neglects* or refusals to act, which are manifestly inconsistent with it (or, with some true propositions).

<sup>b</sup> We before <sup>b</sup> supposed *A* to have engaged *not to do* some certain thing, &c. if now, on the other side, he should by some solemn promise, oath, or other act <sup>c</sup> undertake *to do* some certain thing before such a time, and he *voluntarily* <sup>c</sup> omits to do it, he would behave himself as if there had been no such promise or engagement; which is equal to denying there was any: and truth is as much contradicted in this as in the former instance.

Again, there are some ends, which the nature of things and truth require us to aim at, and at which therefore if we do not aim, *nature* and *truth* are denied. If a man does not desire to prevent evils, and to be happy, he denies both his *own* nature and the nature and definition of *happiness* to be what they are. And then further, willingly to neglect the *means*, leading to any such end, is the same as not to propose that end, and must fall under the same censure. As retreating from any end commonly attends the not advancing towards it, and

<sup>a</sup> *Plura vera discrepantia esse non possunt. Cic.*  
<sup>a</sup> *aria. Cic.*

<sup>b</sup> *p. 10.*

<sup>c</sup> *Oblivione volunt-*

*offe voluntary non est culpa*  
*that*

<sup>a</sup> *He that never do anything, he cannot be inconsistent with truth. Cic.*

that may be considerd as an act, many omissions of this kind may be turned over to the *other side*<sup>a</sup>, and brought under the foregoing proposition.

It must be confest there is a *difficulty* as to the means, by which we are to consult our own preservation and happiness; to know what those are, and what they are with respect to us. For our abilities and opportunities are not equal: some labor under disadvantages invincible: and our ignorance of the true natures of things, of their operations and effects in such an irregular distemperd world, and of those many incidents, that may happen either to further or break our measures, deprive us of certainty in these matters. But still we may judge as well as we can, and do what we can<sup>b</sup>; and the neglect *to do this*<sup>c</sup> will be an omission within the reach of the proposition.

There are omissions of other kinds, which will deserve to be annumerated to these by being either *total*, or *notorious*, or upon the score of some other *circumstance*. It is certain I should not deny the *Phœnisæ* of *Euripides* to be an excellent *drama* by not reading it: nor do I deny *Cibil-menâr* to be a rare piece of antiquity by not going to see it. But should I, having leisure, health, and proper opportunities, read nothing, nor make any inquiries in order to improve my *mind*, and attain such knowledge as may be *useful* to me, I should then deny my mind to be what it is, and that knowledge to be what it is. And if it doth not appear precisely, into what kind of studies this respect to truth will carry a man preferably to all others, how far it will oblige him to continue his pursuit after knowledge, and where the discontinuance begins to be no offence against truth, he must consult his own opportunities and genius, and judge for himself *as well as he can*<sup>c</sup>. This is one of those cases which I said before were not so well determind.

If I give nothing to this or that poor body, to whom I am under no particular obligation, I do not by this deny them to be *poor*, any more than I should deny a man to have a squalid beard by not shaving him, to be nasty by not washing him, or to be lame by not taking him on my back.

*Many things* are here to be taken into consideration (according to the next proposition): perhaps I might intrench upon truth by *doing* this; and then I cannot by *not doing* it<sup>d</sup>. But if I, being of ability to afford now and then something in charity to the poor, should yet *never* give them any thing at all,

<sup>a</sup> In the Civil Law he is said to *act*, who *does* omit. *Qui non facit quod facere debet, videtur facere adversus ea que non facit.* Dig. <sup>b</sup> *Est quodam prodire tenus.* Hor. <sup>c</sup> *Disces quamdiu voles: tamdiu autem velle debebis, quoad te, quantum proficias, non poenitebit,* says Cicero to his son. <sup>d</sup> *Nulla virtus virtuti contraria est.* Sen.

a. He who does to do what he ought to do, is not to be said to do those things which he does not do. *Thigzst I should*  
 b. It is something to go, tho' it be but a little way, or to make a small progress. Hor.  
 c. You may learn as long as you please, & you ought to please as long as you are not uneasy at any improvement of self. Cic. to his son.  
 d. No one virtue can be contradictory to any other virtue. Sen.



I should *then* certainly deny the condition of the poor to be what it is, and my own to be what it is : and thus truth would be injured. So, again,

If I should not say my prayers at such a certain *hour*, or in such a certain *place* and *manner*, this would not imply a denial of the existence of God, His providence, or my dependence upon Him : nay, there may be reasons perhaps against *that particular* time, place, manner. But if I should *never* pray to Him, or worship Him at all, such a *total* omission would be equivalent to this assertion, *There is no God, who governs the world, to be adored* : which, if there is such a being, must be contrary to truth. Also *generally* and *notoriously* to neglect this duty (permit me to call it so), tho not quite always, will *favor*, if not directly proclaim the same untruth. For certainly to worship God after this manner is only to worship him *accidentally*, which is to declare it a great accident that he is worshipped at all, and this approaches as near as it is possible to a *total* neglect. Beside, such a sparing and *infrequent* worshiper of the Deity betrays such an habitual disregard of Him, as will render every religious act insignificant and null.

Should I, in the last place, find a man grievously hurt by some accident, fallen down, alone, and without *present* help like to perish ; or see his house on fire, nobody being near to help, or call out : in this extremity if I do not give him my assistance immediately, I do not do it *at all* : and by this refusing to do it according to my ability, I deny his case to be what it is ; human nature to be what it is ; and even those desires and expectations, which I am conscious to my self I should have under the like misfortune, to be what they are.

VI. *In order to judge rightly what any thing is, it must be considered not only what it is in it self or in one respect, but also what it may be in any other respect, which is capable of being denied by facts or practice : and the whole description of the thing ought to be taken in.*

If a man steals a horse, and rides away upon him, he may be said indeed by riding him to use him as a *horse*, but not as *the horse of another man*, who gave him no licence to do this. He does not therefore consider him as being what he is, unless he takes in the respect he bears to his true owner. But it is not necessary perhaps to consider what he is in respect to his color, shape or age : because the thief's riding away with him may neither affirm nor deny him to be of any particular color, &c. I say therefore, that those, and *all* those properties, respects, and circumstances, which may be contradicted by practice, are to be taken into consideration. For otherwise the thing to be considered is but im-

imperfectly surveyd; and the whole compass of it being not taken in, it is taken not as being what it is, but as what it is *in part* only, and in other respects perhaps as being *what it is not*.

If a *rich* man being upon a journey, should be robbed and stript, it would be a second robbery and injustice committed upon him to take from him part of his then character, and to consider him only as a rich man. His character completed is a *rich man robbed and abused*, and indeed at that time a *poor* man \* and distressed, tho able to repay afterwards the assistance lent him. a

Moreover a man in giving assistance of any kind to another should consider what *his own* circumstances are, as well as what the *others* are <sup>b</sup>. If they do not permit him to give it, he does not by his forbearance deny the other to want it: but if he should give it, and by that deny his own or his family's circumstances to be what they are, he would actually contradict truth. And since (as I have observed already) all truths are consistent, nor can any thing be true any further than it is compatible with other things that are true; when both parties are placed in a *right* light, and the case *properly* stated for a judgment, the latter may indeed be truly said to want assistance, but not the assistance of the former: any more than a man, who wants a guide, may be said to want a blind or a lame guide. By putting things thus may be *truly* known what the latter is with respect to the former. b

The case becomes more difficult, when a man (A) is under some *promise* or *compact* to assist another (B), and at the same time bound to consult his own happiness, provide for his family, &c. and he cannot do these, if he does that, *effectually*. For what must A do? Here are not indeed opposite *truths*, but there are truths on opposite *sides*. I answer: tho there cannot be two incompatible duties, or tho two inconsistent acts cannot be both A's duty at the same time (for then his duty would be an impossibility); yet an obligation, which I will call *mixt*, may arise out of those *differing* considerations. A should assist B; but *so*, as not to neglect himself and family, &c. and *so* to take care of himself and family, as not to forget the other engagement, *as well and honestly as he can*. Here the *importance* of the truths on the one and the other side should be diligently compared: and there must in such cases be always some *exception* or *limitation* understood. It is not in man's power to promise

\* עני באותה שעה: according to that determination in a case something like this, which occurs in Talm. Mass. Phe. <sup>b</sup> Utrique simul consulendum est. Dabo egenti; sed ut ipse non egeam, &c. Sen. Ita te aliorum miserescat, ne tui alios misereat. Plaut.

*absolutely.*

a/ Poor at that particular Time

b/ Regard is to be had to both at same Time; I will give to one in want, yet so that I may <sup>not</sup> want myself. Sen.

c/ Take Pity of Others, but do it in such a Manner as not to stand in need of the Pity of Others your. Plaut.



*absolutely.* He can only promise as one, who may be *disabled* by the weight and incumbency of truths not then existing.

I could here insert many instances of *partial* thinking, which occur in authors: but I shall choose only to set down one in the margin <sup>a</sup>.

<sup>b</sup> In short, when things are truly estimated, *persons* concerned, *times*, *places* <sup>b</sup>, *ends* intended <sup>c</sup>, and *effects* that naturally follow, must be added to them.

VII. *When any act would be wrong, the forbearing that act must be right: likewise when the omission of any thing would be wrong, the doing of it (i. e. not omitting it) must be right.* Because *contrariorum contraria est ratio*.

VIII. *Moral good and evil are coincident with right and wrong.* For that cannot be good, which is wrong; nor that evil, which is right.

IX. *Every act therefore of such a being, as is before described, and all those omissions which interfere with truth (i. e. deny any proposition to be true, which is true; or suppose any thing not to be what it is, in any regard <sup>d</sup>) are morally evil, in some degree or other: the forbearing such acts, and the acting in opposition to such omissions are morally good: and when any thing may be either done, or not done, equally without the violation of truth, that thing is indifferent.*

I would have it to be minded well, that when I speak of acts inconsistent with truth, I mean any truth; any true proposition whatsoever, whether containing matter of speculation, or plain fact. I would have every thing taken to be *what in fact and truth it is* <sup>e</sup>.

<sup>a</sup> Sextus Emp. seems to be fond of that filthy saying of Zeno, in relation to what is storied of Jocasta and Oedipus: *μὴ ἄτοπον εἶναι τὸ μορῖον τῆς μητρός τρίψαι, κλ.* any more, than to rub with the hand any other part of her, when in pain. Here only *τρίψαι* is considered; as if all was nothing more, but *barely τρίψαι*; but this is an incomplete idea of the act. For *τρίψαι* ὁ μορῖον is more than *τρίψαι* by it self: and *τρίψαι* ὁ μορῖον ἢ μητρός is still more: and certainly *τρίψαι τὴν χεῖρα τῇ χειρὶ* is a different thing from *τρίψαι τὸ μορῖον τοῦ μορῖου*, &c. He might as well have said, that to rub a *red hot* piece of iron with one's bare hand is the same as to rub one that is *cold*, or any other innocent piece of matter: for all is but *τρίψαι*. Thus men, affecting to appear free-thinkers, shew themselves to be but half-thinkers, or *less*: they do not take in the whole of that which is to be considered.

<sup>b</sup> *Sunt res quadam ex tempore, & ex consilio, non ex sua natura consideranda. — Quid tempora petant, aut quid personis dignum sit, considerandum est, &c.* Cic. <sup>c</sup> Οὐ λέγεις φιλόπονον ἢ ἀγὰ παιδισκάριον ἀγροπύρρα. Arr. *Amico agro aliquis affidet: probamus. at hoc si hereditatis causâ facit, vultur est, cadaver expectat.* Sen.

<sup>d</sup> Οὐ ᾗ εἰς ἀνθρώπους εἰς τρέπον. Chrys. <sup>e</sup> Τὸ κρᾶτισον ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἀνάδικα, καὶ ὁ ἕνατος ὅπου ἢ πομπῆς τὸ ψεύδον. Bas.

<sup>b</sup> Some things are to be considered not as they are in their own nature, but the particular time & intention are to be taken into consideration. — We are to consider what times require, & what is proper for such such persons &c.

<sup>c</sup> You will not say that a person is industrious, because he once watched all night with his father. Arr. A man watches with a sick friend: it is allowed to be a good action; but if he did it in order to make him his heir, he is a villain.

<sup>d</sup> Watched for Carcase. Sen

<sup>e</sup> There are more ways than one of denying a thing. Chrys.

<sup>f</sup> Of all good things in the world truth is the best, & falsehood is the utmost boundary of all evil. Bas.

It may be of use also to remember, that I have added those words *in some degree or other*. For neither all evil, nor all good actions are equal<sup>a</sup>. Those truths which they respect, tho they are equally true, may comprise matters of very different importance<sup>b</sup>; or more truths may be violated one way than another<sup>c</sup>: and then the crimes committed by the violation of them may be equally (one as well as the other) said to be crimes, but not *equal crimes*<sup>d</sup>. If A steals a *book* from B which was pleasing and useful to him, it is true A is guilty of a crime in not treating the book as being what it is, the book of B, who is the proprietor of it, and one whose happiness partly depends upon it: but still if A should deprive B of a *good estate*, of which he was the true owner, he would be guilty of a much greater crime. For if we suppose the book to be worth to him one pound, and the estate 10000*l.* that truth, which is violated by depriving B of his book, is in effect violated 10000 times by robbing him of his estate. It is the same as to repeat the theft of one pound 10000 times over: and therefore if 10000 thefts (or crimes) are more, and all together greater than one, one equal to 10000 must be greater too: greater than that, which is but the 10000th part of it, sure. Then, tho the convenience and innocent pleasure, that B found in the use of the *book*, was a degree of happiness: yet the happiness accruing to him from the *estate*, by which he was supplied not only with necessaries, but also with many other comforts and harmless enjoyments, vastly exceeded it. And therefore the truth violated in the former case was, *B had a property in that, which gave him such a degree of happiness*: that violated in the latter, *B had a property in that, which gave him a happiness vastly superior to the other*. The violation therefore in the latter case is upon this account a vastly greater violation than in the former. Lastly, the truths violated in the former case might end in B, those in the latter may perhaps be repeated in them of his family, who subsist also by the *estate*, and

<sup>a</sup> Notwithstanding that paradox of the Stoics, "Οτι ἴσα τὰ ἀμαρτήματα, καὶ τὰ κατὰ νόμους, *Ap. Cic. Plut. Diog. L. & al.* which might easily be confuted from their own words in Cicero. For if sinning be like passing a line, or limit; that is, going over or beyond that line: then, to sin being equal to going beyond that line, to go more (or farther) beyond that line must be to sin more. Who sees not the fallity of that, *nec bono viro meliorem, — nec forti fortiozem, nec sapiente sapientiozem posse fieri?* And so on. *Nullum inter scelus & erratum discrimen facere* (as S. Hier. expresses their opinion: if that epistle to Celantia be his) is to alter or destroy the natures of things. <sup>b</sup> Sure that Wiseman was but a bad accountant, who reckoned, τὴν μεγίστην εἶναι ἀποβάν, δραχμὴν μίαν ἐκδοβληκάναι. *Ap. Plut.*

<sup>c</sup> This is confessed in Cic. *Illud interest, quod in servo necando, si ad sit injuria, semel peccatur: in patris vita violanda multa peccantur, &c. Multitudine peccatorum prestat, &c.*

<sup>d</sup> This may serve for an answer to Chrysippus, and them who say, ἡ ἀληθὺς ἀληθὺς μᾶλλον σὺν ἔστιν, ἢ ψεῦδος ψεῦδος. ἔσως ἔσθ' ἀπάτη ἀπάτης ἢ ἀμαρτήματα ἀμαρτημάτων, κλ. *Ap. Diog. L.*

a/ Paradox of Stoics "That all sins are Equal, & all Duties Equal" — Who sees not the fallity of that.

"That it is impossible for a Good M to be better — or a Strong M to be stronger, or a Wise M wiser?"

And so on. "to make no difference between Horrid & Pleasing Mistakes" is to alter destroy the Things  
b/ bad account who reckoned that He who knows away a greater Estate, knows away but a Drachm in Plutarch.  
d/ That if no one Truth be greater than another Truth, nor no one Falsehood greater than another Falsehood; then neither is there no one Sin greater than another. in Plutarch.



are to be provided for out of it. And these truths are very many in respect of every one of them, and all their descendents. Thus the degrees of evil or guilt are as the *importance* and *number* of truths violated<sup>a</sup>. I shall only add, on the other side, that the value of good actions will rise at least in proportion to the degrees of evil in the omission of them: and that therefore they cannot be *equal*, any more than the opposite evil omissions.

But let us return to that, which is our main subject, the *distinction* between moral good and evil. Some have been so wild as to deny there is any such thing: but from what has been said here, it is manifest, that there is as certainly moral good and evil as there is *true* and *false*; and that there is as natural and immutable a difference between *those* as between *these*, the difference at the bottom being indeed the same<sup>b</sup>. Others acknowledge, that there is indeed moral good and evil; but they *want* some *criterion*, or mark, by the help of which they might know them asunder. And others there are, who pretend to have *found* that rule, by which our actions ought to be squared, and may be discriminated; or that *ultimate end*, to which they ought all to be referred<sup>c</sup>: but what they have advanced is either false, or not sufficiently guarded, or not comprehensive enough, or not clear and firm<sup>d</sup>, or (so far as it is just) reducible to *my* rule. For

e They, who reckon nothing to be good but what they call *honestum*<sup>e</sup>, may denominate actions according as that is, or is not the cause<sup>f</sup> or end<sup>g</sup> of them: but then what is *honestum*<sup>h</sup>? Something is still wanting to measure things by, and to separate the *honestum* from the *inhonestum*.

i They who place all in *following nature*<sup>i</sup>, if they mean by that phrase acting according to the natures of things (*that is*, treating things as being what they

<sup>a</sup> *Quæis paria esse ferè placuit peccata, laborant Cum ventum ad verum est: sensus moresque repugnant, Atque ipsa utilitas.* Hor.

<sup>b</sup> Therefore they, who denied there was either good or evil (Φύσις ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν), were much in the right to make thorough work, and to say there was nothing in nature either true or false. V. Sext. Emp. & Diog. L.

<sup>c</sup> *Quod* [extremum, s. ultimum bonorum] *omnium philosophorum sententiâ tale debet esse, ut ad id omnia referri oporteat: ipsum autem nusquam.* Cic.

<sup>d</sup> There was among the old philosophers such an uncertainty and variety of opinions concerning the *fixes bonorum & malorum*, that if Varro computes rightly, the number might be raised to 288. S. Aug.

<sup>e</sup> *Quod honestum est, id bonum solum habendum est.* Cato ap. Cic. <sup>f</sup> *Qui* [omnes] *per multa ob eam unam causam faciunt — quia honestum est.* Cic.

<sup>g</sup> It is commonly placed among ends: and is considered as such in those ways of speaking; *honestum esse propter se expetendum*, Cic. *Finem bonorum esse honestè vivere*, ib. and the like.

<sup>h</sup> To say, *Quod laudabile est, omne honestum est*, or any thing like that, is to say nothing. For how shall one know what is truly laudabile?

<sup>i</sup> Τίλξις (Ζήνων) τὸ ὁμολογεῖν ὡς (αὐτὸν ἀποκρίσας) τῇ φύσει εἶναι, ὅτι ἐστὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν εἶναι. "Αὐτὸν ᾧ πρὸς ταῦτα ὁμολογεῖν ἔστιν. Diog. L.

a/ They who would have all things equal, labor under great difficulty, when they come to Death; for they find it contrary to Reason, to Morality, & to the Interest of Mankind.

c/ That which is ultimately good or final good according to the Opinion of all Philosophers must be something which all other things ought to be referred, but itself referred to nothing. i.e. That which is truly honest & valuable upon its own account, is the only thing that ought to be esteemed really good.

And they are those who say that the perfection of all good is to be virtuous, & that is to live virtuously for Nature leads us to that. Diog. 9. sect. 1.

And they are those who say that the perfection of all good is to be virtuous, & that is to live virtuously for Nature leads us to that. Diog. 9. sect. 1.

in nature are, or according to truth) say what is right. But this does not seem to be their meaning. And if it is only that a man must follow his own nature<sup>a</sup>, since his nature is not purely rational, but there is a part of him, which he has in common with brutes, they appoint him a guide which I fear will mislead him, this being commonly more likely to prevail, than the rational part. At best this talk is loose.

They who make *right reason*<sup>b</sup> to be the law, by which our acts are to be judged, and according to their conformity to this or deflexion from it call them *lawful* or *unlawful*, good or bad, say something more particular and precise. And indeed it is true, that whatever will bear to be tried by right reason, is right; and that which is condemned by it, wrong. And moreover, if by right reason is meant that which is found by the right use of our rational faculties, this is the same with truth: and what is said by them, will be comprehended in what I have said. But the manner in which they have delivered themselves, is not yet explicit enough<sup>c</sup>. It leaves room for so many *disputes* and *opposite right-reasons*,<sup>c</sup> that nothing can be settled, while every one pretends that *his* reason is right. And beside, what I have said, extends farther: for we are not only to respect those truths, which we discover by reasoning, but even such *matters of fact*, as are fairly discovered to us by our senses. We ought to regard things as being what they are, which way soever we come to the knowledge of them.

They, who contenting themselves with superficial and transient views, deduce the difference between good and evil from the *common sense* of mankind<sup>d</sup>, and certain *principles*<sup>e</sup> that are born with us<sup>f</sup>, put the matter upon a very *infirm*<sup>e, f</sup> foot. For it is much to be suspected there are no such *innate* maxims as they pretend, but that the impressions of education are mistaken for them: and beside that, the sentiments of mankind are not so *uniform* and *constant*, as that we may safely trust such an important distinction upon them<sup>g</sup>.

<sup>a</sup> *Vivere ex hominis natura*. Cic. It is true he adds, *undique perfectâ & nihil requirente*: but those words have either no meaning, or such as will not much mend the matter. For what is *natura undique perfectâ & nihil requirens*? Beside, moral religion doth not consist in following nature already perfect, but by the practice of religion we aim at the perfecting of our natures.

<sup>b</sup> Celebrated every where. <sup>c</sup> Τὸ μὲν ἐν ἑταυ διαγίσασθαι τὰς ἀγαθὰς πράξεις, τὰς κατὰ τὸ ὀρθὸν γινωσκόμενος λόγον, καὶ τὰς πονηρὰς τὴν ἀντίον, ἀληθεῖς μὲν, ὅτι ἔστι ἡλικανὸν τὰς πράξεις σημειῖναι. Andr. Rh.

<sup>d</sup> *Nec solum jus & injuria a natura dijudicatur, sed omnino omnia honesta & turpia. Nam communis intelligentia nobis notas res efficit, easque in animis nostris inchoavit, ut honesta in virtute ponantur, in vitiis turpia.*

Cic. Κεκτημένα φύσει [ὁ Χρύσιππος] εἶναι αἰσθάνει καὶ πρόληψιν. Diog. L.

<sup>e</sup> They are usually called *principia naturæ*, *lex* (or *leges*) *naturæ*, *προλήψεις*, *κοινὰ*, or *φυσικαὶ ἵποιαι*, νόμοι φυσικοὶ, &c.

<sup>f</sup> The set of these practical principles (or a habit flowing from them) is, what, I think, goes by the name of *Synteresis*.

<sup>g</sup> *Unaqueque gens hoc legem naturæ putat, quod didicit.* Hieron.

a/ To live agreeably to Nature of Man" Cic. It is true he adds D 2 "Every way perfect & wanting They, nothing c/ To define good actions thus, viz. that they are done according to right Reason, & bad actions contrary, is indeed true, but is not sufficient to declare the Nature of them by showing what actions are truly such. v/ d/ Not only right & wrong are diff. in Nature of things, but all sorts of honest or base actions are so likewise: For common sense makes us understand things, & lays first foundations of them in our minds, in such a manner, that we make honest things to consist in their being virtuous, & base things to consist in their being vicious (Cic. Chrysippus says that sensation & reflection are the Rules by which we form our Judgment of things." Diog. Laert. Every Nation thinks that to be the Law of Nature, which they have been taught: Hieron.



- They, who own nothing to be good but *pleasure*, or what they call *jucundum*,  
 a. b. nothing evil but *pain*<sup>a</sup>, and distinguish things by their tendencies to *this* or *that*<sup>b</sup>,  
 c. do not agree in what this pleasure is to be placed<sup>c</sup>, or by what methods and act-  
 ings the most of it may be obtained. These are left to be questions still. As  
 men have different tastes, different degrees of sense and philosophy, the same  
 thing cannot be pleasant to *all*: and if particular actions are to be proved by  
 this test, the morality of them will be very uncertain; the same act may be  
 of *one* nature to one man, and of *another* to another. Beside, unless there be  
 some strong *limitation* added as a fence for virtue, men will be apt to sink into  
 d. gross voluptuousness, as in fact the generality of *Epicurus's* herd have done<sup>d</sup>  
 (notwithstanding all his talk of temperance, virtue, tranquillity of mind, &c.);  
 and the bridle will be usurped by those appetites which it is a principal part  
 of all religion, *natural* as well as any other, to curb and restrain. So these  
 men say what is intelligible indeed: but what they say is false. For not all  
 e. pleasures, but only such pleasure as is *true*, or happiness (of which afterwards),  
 may be reckoned among the *finis*, or *ultima bonorum*.  
 f. He<sup>e</sup>, who, having considered the two extremes in mens practice, in condemn-  
 ing both which the world generally agrees, places virtue in the *middle*, and seems to  
 raise an idea of it from its situation at an equal distance from the opposite extremes<sup>f</sup>,

<sup>a</sup> Under which word these delicate men comprehend labor. When *Epicurus*, in *Lucian*, is asked, Κα-  
 κὸν ἢ γῆ τ' ὀνόν; he answers, Ναί. And *Mindyrades* (Σμυρδεδίδης, ap. *Herod.* δὲ ἐπὶ πλείστον δὲ χλιδῆς εἰς ἀ-  
 νῆς ἀπὶ κίετο) proceeded so far in his aversion to labor, that *ejus latus alieno labore condoluit*—: *qui cum*  
*vidisset fodientem, & alius rastrum allevantem, lassum se fieri* (ὄργμα λαβὼν, in *Athen.*) *questus vernis*  
*illum opus in conspectu suo facere*. Sen.

<sup>b</sup> Ad hac [voluptatem, & dolorem] & qua sequamur,  
 & qua fugiamus, refert omnia [*Aristippus*]. Cic.

<sup>c</sup> Velim definias, quid sit voluptas: de quo  
 omnis hac questio est. Cic. The disputes about pleasure between the *Cyrenaics*, *Epicurus*, *Hieronymus*,  
 &c. are well known: whether the end was pleasure of body or mind: whether it was *voluptas* in mo-  
 tu, or in statu (*stabilitate*); *qua suavitate aliqua naturam ipsam movet*, or *qua percipitur, omni dolo-*  
*re detracto*; ἢ ἐν κινήσει, or ἢ καταστηματικῇ, &c. Cic. *Diog. L.* & al.

<sup>d</sup> Negat *Epicurus* ju-  
 vunde vivi posse, nisi cum virtute vivatur. Cic. But for all that their pleasures have not continued  
 to be always like those in the little gardens of *Gargettus*. Nor indeed do they seem to be very vir-  
 tuous even there. For *Epicurus* not only had his *Leontium* (or, as he amorously called her, Λεοντί-  
 ριον,) a famous harlot; but she πᾶσι τοῖς Ἐπικουρείοις συνῆν ἐν τοῖς κήποις. *Athen.* And in his book περὶ  
 τίλης he is said to have written thus, Οὐδ' ἔγωγε ἔχω τι νόσω τὰ γὰρ ἀδὸν, ἀφαιρῶν μὲ τὰς ἀλγὺν χυλῶν (χι-  
 λῶν, *Athen.*) ἡδονῆς, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ καὶ τὰς δι' ἀφροδισίων, κλ. See this and more in *Diog. L.*

<sup>e</sup> St.  
*ferom* uses the plural number, as if this was the prevailing notion in his time. *Philosophorum sententia*  
 est, μεσότητις ἀρετῆς, ὑπερβολῆς κακίας εἶναι.

<sup>f</sup> Ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἀμαρτανῶν, καὶ ἡ ἐλάττωσις φησὶ, τὸ  
 μῖσον ἐπαινεῖ. — Ἐστὶν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐξ ἑξ προμετρίων, ἐν μεσότητι ἔσθαι, κτλ. Μεσότης δὲ, δύο κακίων  
 καὶ ὑπερβολῶν. ἢ καὶ ἑκάστη. *Arist.* Perhaps *Pythagoras* (and after him *Plato*, and others),  
 when he said (ap. *Diog. L.*) τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀρμονίαν εἶναι, might have some such thought as this.

a. / We thought Labor an evil; He answers, No. And *Mindyrades* in *Herod.* (a man who carried luxury to the highest degree) could  
 proceeded so far in his aversion to labor, that it gave him pain in his side to see another in labor — b. / He saw easily one dipping one's self  
 a heavy keel, he complained that it made him weary & molest him in his side, & forbad any more work in his sight.  
 c. / *Aristippus* referred every thing to Pleasure & Pain, & he pursued or avoid.  
 d. / Pleasure of Body or Mind. We it was such Pleasures arose from Motion or a fixed state: such as putting one into a pleasing position  
 Motion, or such as we feel, when we are free from all pain, a Pleasure that consists in Motion, or a fixed state.  
 e. / There is nothing which is esteem'd good if you take away Pleasure which arises from eating & drinking & women. / *St. Hieron* tells us it is of Opinion of  
 the Stoicks, that Virtue consist in the Middle, & Vices in extreme. / *St. Hieron* says it is a fine & a good defect is blame-worthy, but the  
 Medium is commendable. — *Virgil* then is a Habit of our own procuring, & consists in the Middle. Both middle is better & therefore, / One of these is of Pleasure  
 Those who said the virtue was a kind of Harmony might have some such thought as this.

could only design to be understood of such virtues, as have extremes. It must be granted indeed, that whatever declines in any degree toward *either* extreme; must be so far wrong or evil; and therefore that, which equally (or nearly) divides the distance, and declines *neither* way, *must be right*: also, that this notion supplies us with a good *direction* for common use in many cases. But then there are several obligations, that can by no means be derived from it: scarce more than such, as respect the virtues couched under the word *moderation*. And even as to these, it is many times difficult to discern, which is the *middle point*. This the author himself was sensible of<sup>b</sup>.

And when his master *Plato* makes virtue to consist in such a *likeness to God*, as we are capable of (and God to be the great *exemplar*), he says what I shall not dispute. But since he tells us not how or by what means we may attain this likeness, we are little the wiser in point of practice: unless by it we understand the practice of truth, God being *truth*, and doing nothing contrary to it<sup>d</sup>.

Whether any of those other *foundations*, upon which morality has been built, will hold better than these mentiond, I much question. But if the *formal ratio* of moral good and evil be made to consist in a conformity of mens acts to the *truth of the case* or the contrary, as I have here explaind it, the *distinction* seems to be settled in a manner undeniable, intelligible, practicable. For as what is meant by a *true proposition* and *matter of fact* is perfectly understood by every body; so will it be easy for any one, so far as he knows any such propositions and facts, to compare not only *words*, but also *actions* with them. A very little skill and attention will serve to interpret even these, and discover whether they *speake truth*, or not<sup>e</sup>.

X. *If there be moral good and evil, distinguishd as before, there is religion; and such as may most properly be styled natural.* By religion I mean nothing else but an obligation to do (under which word I comprehend acts both of body and mind. I say, *to do*) what ought not to be omitted, and to *forbear* what ought not to be

<sup>a</sup> When he says, it must be taken *ἕως ἄν ὁ ἑρμῆς λόγος προσέξῃ*, it is not by that ascertaind. See before.

<sup>b</sup> Οὐδ' ῥά τινος διορίσαι τὸ πᾶς, καὶ τίσι, καλ. Therefore R. *Albo* might have spared that censure, where he blames him for expressing himself too generally, when he says, כִּמּוֹ שְׂרָאוֹי, וּבְמִקּוֹם הִרְאוֹי without telling him what that *manner, time, place* is.

<sup>c</sup> That man, says he, cannot be neglected, who endeavours *δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἐπιτηδεύων ἀρετὴν, εἰς ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀνδραγαθῶς ὁμοιωθῆναι θεῷ*. And in another place, our *φυγὴ ἐνθέου* is *ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν*. St. *Augustin* seems to agree with him, in that sentence of his, *Religionis summa est imitari quem colis*.

<sup>d</sup> Πυθαγόρας ἐρωτηθεὶς, τί ποίσειν ἀνδραγαθὸς θεῷ ὁμοίον, ἔφη, εἰαν ἀληθεύωσι. Stob.

<sup>e</sup> There is certainly not that difficulty or perplexity in morality, which *Cicero* seems to suppose, when he says, *Consuetudo exercitatioque capienda, ut boni ratiocinatiores officiorum esse possimus*.

a according to Direction of right Reason b It is not easy to determine particular manner of particular Persons.

c he generally, as he says, after a due manner, in a convenient time, & in a proper place. done.

d That M cannot be neglected who endeavours, as to make him a Righteous M, by labouring after virtue, that He may be as like God as it is possible for a M to be. And in another place, our fleeing from thence is being like unto God so far as we can be.

e Pythagoras being asked, what it was that any M. could do like God does, answered, speak the Truth & Hol.

f Cicero says, That Use & Exercise are necessary to make us good Reasoners about what is our Duty.



done. So that there must be religion, if there are things, of which some ought not to be done, some not to be omitted. But that there are such, appears from what has been said concerning moral good and evil: because that, which to omit would be evil, and which therefore being done would be good or well done, ought certainly by the terms *to be done*; and so that, which being done would be evil, and implies such absurdities and rebellion against the supreme being, as are mentioned under proposition the IVth. ought most undoubtedly *not to be done*. And then since there is *religion*, which follows from the distinction between moral good and evil; since this distinction is founded in the respect, which mens acts bear to truth; and since no proposition can be true, which expresses things otherwise than as they are in nature: since things are so, there must be religion, which is founded in nature, and may upon that account be most properly and truly called the *religion of nature* or *natural religion*; the great *law* of which religion, the law of nature, or rather (as we shall afterwards find reason to call it) of the Author of nature is,

XI. *That every intelligent, active, and free being should so behave himself, as by no act to contradict truth; or, that he should treat everything as being what it is.*<sup>a</sup>

*Objections* I am sensible may be made to almost any thing<sup>b</sup>; but I believe none to what has been here advanced but such as may be answered. For to consider a thing as being *something else* than what it is, or (which is the same) not to consider it as being what it is, is an absurdity indefensible. However, for a *specimen*, I will set down a few. Let us suppose some gentleman, who has not sufficiently considered these matters, amidst his freedoms, and in the gaiety of humor, to talk after some such manner as this. "If every thing must be treated as being what it is, what rare work will follow? For, 1. to treat my *enemy* as such is to kill him, or *revenge* my self soundly upon him. 2. To use a *creditor*, who is a spend-thrift, or one that knows not the use of money, or has no occasion for it, as *such*, is not to pay him. Nay further, 3. If I *want money*, don't I act according to truth, if I take it from some body else to supply my own wants? And more, do not I act contrary to *truth*, if I do *not*? 4. If one, who plainly appears to have a *design* of killing another, or doing him some great mischief, if he can find him, should ask me where he is, and I know where he is; may not I, to save life, say I do not know, tho that be false? 5. At this rate I may not, in a *frolick*, break a glass, or burn a book: because forsooth to use these things as being what they

<sup>a</sup> What it is in nature. כפי מה שהוא, to use Maim's words. And thus that in *Arrianus* is true, Νῦν δὲ συντακὸς ἐστὶν ἑστῶς, τὸ ἀπολαύειν τῆς φύσεως πραγμάτων. *Omni in re quid sit veri, videre & tueri debet. Cic.* This is indeed the way of truth.

<sup>b</sup> Because there is scarce any thing, which one or other will not say. *Quid enim potest dici de illo, qui nigram dixit esse nivem, &c. Laet.*

a. Wt it is in nature. "according to wt thing is, "The rule of life is, to do whatever is agreeable to nature. We ought to find out & maintain wt is true about every thing. &c. This is indeed the way of truth. b. Wt can we say of a Man that affirms Black to be white &c. Laetant

“ are, is to drink out of the one, not to break it ; and to read the other, not  
“ burn it. *Lastly*, how shall a man *know* what is true : and if he can find out  
“ truth, may he not want the *power* of acting agreeably to it ? ”

To the *first* objection it is easy to reply from what has been already said. For if the objector's enemy, whom we will call E, was *nothing more* than his enemy, there might be some force in the objection ; but since he may be considered as something else beside that, he must be used according to what he is in other respects, as well as in that from which he is denominated the objector's (or O's) enemy. For E in the first place is a *man* ; and as such may claim the benefit of common humanity, whatever that is : and if O denies it to him, he wounds truth in a very sensible part. And then if O and E are *fellow-citizens*, living under the same government, and subject to laws, which are so many common covenants, limiting the behaviour of one man to another, and by which E is exempt from all private violence in his body, estate, &c. O cannot treat E as being what he is, unless he treats him also as one, who by common consent is under such a protection. If he does otherwise, he denies the existence of the foresaid laws and public compacts : contrary to truth. And beside, O should act with respect to *himself* as being what he is ; a man himself, in such or such circumstances, and one who has given up all right to *private revenge* (for that is the thing meant here). If truth therefore be observed, the result will be this. O must treat E as *something compounded* of a man, a fellow-citizen, and an enemy, all three : *that is*, he must only prosecute him in such a way, as is agreeable to the statutes and methods, which the society have obliged themselves to observe. And even as to *legal prosecutions*, there may be many things still to be considered. For E may shew himself an enemy to O in things, that fall under the cognizance of law, which yet may be of moment and importance to him, or not. If they are such things, as really affect the *safety* or *happiness* of O or his family, then he will find himself obliged, in duty and submission to truth, to take refuge in the laws ; and to punish E, or obtain satisfaction, and at least security for the future, by the means there prescribed. Because if he does not, he denies the *nature* and *sense* of happiness to be what they are ; the obligations, which perhaps we shall shew hereafter he is under to his *family* <sup>a</sup>, to be what they are ; a *dangerous* and *wicked* enemy to be dangerous and wicked ; the *end* of laws, and society itself, to be the safety and good of its members, by preventing injuries, punishing offenders, &c.

\* *Conveniet cum in dando munificum esse, tum in exigendo non acerbum : — à litibus verò quantum liceat, & nescio an paulo plus etiam quam liceat, abhorrentem. — Habenda est autem ratio rei familiaris, quam quidem dilabi sine flagitiosum est. Cic.*

a/ It is but Reasonable that We sh<sup>d</sup> be liberal in giving, & not averse in our Demands: which We sh<sup>d</sup> be averse to any contention, as far as is lawful, may I don't know, if We sh<sup>d</sup> not go a little further. — But we must have regard to our own Private Interests, for it is a wicked thing in us to hurt them &c.



which it will appear to be, when that matter comes before us. But if the enmity of E rises not beyond *trifling*, or *more tolerable* instances, then O might act against truth, if he should be at more charge or hazard in prosecuting E than he can afford, or the thing lost or in danger is worth; should treat one that is an enemy in little things, or a *little* enemy, as a *great* one; or should deny to make some allowances, and *forgive* such peccadillo's, as the common frailty of human nature makes it necessary for us mutually to forgive, if we will live together. *Lastly*, in cases, of which the laws of the place take *no notice*, truth and nature would be sufficiently observed, if O should keep a vigilant eye upon the steps of his adversary, and take the most *prudent* measures, that are compatible with the character of a private person, either to assuage the malice of E, or prevent the effects of it; or perhaps, if he should only *not* use him as a friend<sup>a</sup>. For this if he should do, notwithstanding the rants of some men, he would cancel the natural differences of things, and confound truth with untruth.

The debtor in the *second* objection, if he acts as he says there, does, in the first place, make himself the *judge* of his creditor, which is what he is not. For he lays him under a heavy sentence, an incapacity in effect of having any estate, or any more estate. In the *next* place, he arrogates to himself more than can be true: that he perfectly *knows*, not only what his creditor and his circumstances *are*, but also what they ever *will* be hereafter. He that is now weak, or extravagant, or very rich, may for ought he knows become otherwise. *And*, which is to be considered above all, he directly denies the money, which is the creditor's, to be the creditor's. For it is *supposed* to be owing or due to him (otherwise he is no creditor): and if it be due to him, he has a right to it: and if he has a right to it, *of right* it is his (or, it is *his*). But the debtor by detaining it uses it, as if it was his own, and therefore *not* the other's; contrary to truth. To pay a man what is *due* to him doth not deny, that he who pays may think him extravagant, &c. or any other truth; that act has no such signification. It only signifies, that he who pays *thinks* it due to the other, or that it is his: and *this* it naturally doth signify. For he might pay the creditor without having any other thought relating to him, but would not *without this*.

*Ans. to objection the 3d.* Acting according to truth, as that phrase is used in the objection, is not the thing required by my rule; but, so to act that *no truth* may be *denied* by any act. Not taking from another man his money by violence is a forbearance, which does not signify, that I do not want money, or which denies any truth. But taking it *denies* that to be his, which (by the supposition)

<sup>a</sup> Τὸν φίλοντ' ἐπὶ δαῖτα καλεῖν, ἢ εἰ ἔχθρον ἰᾶσθαι. Hes. *Twice y<sup>e</sup> I dine to supper but let y<sup>e</sup> Enemy alone.* 15

is his. The former is only as it were silence, which denies nothing : the latter a direct and loud assertion of a falsity ; the former what can contradict no truth, because the latter does. If a man wants money through his own extravagance and vice, there can be no *pretence* for making another man to pay for his wickedness or folly. We will suppose therefore the man, who wants money, to want it for *necessaries*, and to have incurred this want through some *misfortune*, which he could not prevent. In this case, which is put as strong as can be for the objector, there are ways of expressing this want, or acting according to it, without trespassing upon truth. The man may by honest *labor* and industry seek to supply his wants ; or he may apply as a *suppliant*<sup>a</sup>, not as an enemy or robber, to such as can afford to relieve him ; or if his want is very pressing, to the first persons he meets, whom truth will oblige to assist him according to their abilities : or he may do *any thing but* violate truth<sup>b</sup> ; which is a privilege of a vast scope, and leaves him many resources. And such a behaviour as *this* is not only agreeable to his case, and expressive of it in a way that is natural ; but he would deny it to be what it is, if he did not act thus. If there is no way in the world, by which he may help himself without the violation of truth (which can scarce be supposed. If there is no other way) he must e'en take it as his fate<sup>c</sup>. Truth will be truth, and must retain its character and force, let his case be what it will. Many things might be added. The man, from whom this money is to be taken, will be proved *sect. vi.* to have a right to *defend* himself and his, and not suffer it to be taken from him ; perhaps he may stand as much in need of it, as the other, &c.

*Ans. to obj. the 4th.* It is certain, in the *first* place, that nothing may willingly be done, which in any manner promotes *murder* : whoever is accessory to that, offends against *many* truths of *great* weight. 2. You are not obliged to answer the *furioso's* question. Silence here would contradict no truth. 3. No one can tell, in strict speaking, where another is, if he is not within his view. Therefore you may *truly* deny, that you know where the man is. *Lastly*, if by not discovering him you should endanger your life, (and *this* is the hardest circumstance, that *can* be taken into the objection), the case then would be the same, as if the inquirer should say, " If you do not murder such a one, I will murder you." And then be sure you must not commit murder ; but must defend your self against this, as against other dangers, against Banditi, &c. as well as you can. Tho' merely to deny truth by words (I mean, when they

<sup>a</sup> Τὸ πένθος οὐκ ἐμολογῶν τινὲς αἰχρὸν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀναφύγων ἕγω αἰχρὸν. Thucyd. γ' ἐδὶν ἐπιδεῖ. Hes.

<sup>b</sup> For ἕγω

<sup>c</sup> Summ cuique incommodum ferendum est potius, quam de alterius commodis detrahendum. Cic. According to Plato, a man should choose to die πρὸς τὸ ἀδικεῖν.

*Handwritten notes:*  
 a/ For a poor man not to be a thing to be poor is a base thing: but for him not to endeavour to  
 others is a better skill. Thucyd.  
 Every thought to bear with it is rather than to give others of their advantages



are not productive of facts to follow ; as in judicial transactions, bearing witness, or passing sentence) is not equal to a denial by *facts*; tho an *abuse* of language is allowable in this case, if ever in any ; tho all sins against truth are not equal, and certainly a little trespassing upon it in the present case, for the good of all parties <sup>a</sup>, as *little* a one as any ; and tho one might look on a man in such a fit of rage as mad, and therefore talk to him not as a *man* but a *mad* *man*: yet truth is *sacred* <sup>b</sup>, and there are other ways of coming off with innocence, by giving timely notice to the man in danger, calling in assistance, or taking the advantage of some seasonable incident <sup>c</sup>.

The 5th *objection* seems to respect *inanimate* things, which if we must treat according to what they are, it is insinuated we shall become obnoxious to many *trifling* obligations ; such as are there mentiond. To this I *answer* thus. If the *glass* be nothing else but an useful drinking-glass, and these words fully express what it is, to treat it accordingly is indeed to drink out of it, when there is occasion and it is truly useful, and to *break* it designedly is to do what is wrong <sup>d</sup>. For that is to handle it, as if it neither was useful to the objector himself, nor could be so to any one else ; contrary to the description of it. But if there be any *reason* for breaking the glass, then something is wanting to declare fully what it is. As, if the glass be *poisoned*: for then it becomes a *poisoned drinking-glass*, and to break or destroy it is to use it according to this *true* description of it. Or if by breaking it any thing is to be obtaind, which more than countervails the loss of it, it becomes a *glass with that circumstance*: and then for the objector to break it, if it be his own, is to use it according to what it is. - And if it should become by some circumstance *useless* only, tho there should be no reason for breaking it, yet if there be none against it, the thing will be indifferent and matter of liberty. This answer, *mutatis mutandis*, may be adapted to other things of this kind ; *books*, or any thing else. As the usefulness or excellence of some books renders them worthy of immortality, and of all our care to secure them to posterity <sup>e</sup>; so some may be used more like what they are, by tearing or burning them,

*Thus a Physic doctor says, Sick men - There is nothing shocking in it.*

<sup>a</sup> Οὐτα καὶ ἰατρὸς νοσήντα ἔπαυται. — καὶ δαυὶν ἔδιν. Max. Tyr.

<sup>b</sup> To that question, Si

quis ad te confugiat, qui mendacio tuo possit à morte liberari, non es mentiturus? S. *Austin* answers in the negative, and concludes, *Restat ut nunquam boni mentiantur.* — Quanto fortius, quanto excellentius dices, nec prodam, nec mentiar.

<sup>c</sup> In such pressing cases, under imminent danger, the world is wont to make great allowances. Οὐκ ἀγχοῦν ἡγῆ δῆτα τὰ ψάδῃ λέγοντες — Οὐκ, ἐν τῷ σωθῆναι καὶ τὸ ψάδῃ φέρεται. Soph.

Even they, who say השח שיחה בטלה עובר במעשה מ'ע לרבר. אבל לשים שלום מותר, say also המשקר כאלו עובר ע'ע, אמת אפילו במילי רעלמא. רחה אבימלך ברברים כפי צורך השעה, S. *Hared* (& al. pass.). And *Ab. Ezra* says of *Abraham*, רחה אבימלך ברברים כפי צורך השעה.

In short, some have permitted, in desperate cases, mendacio tanquam veneno uti. Sext. Pythag. אומר לשבר כליו בחמתו וכן. S. *Hhas*.

<sup>e</sup> Who doth not detest that thought of Caligula de Romeri carminibus abolendis, &c? Suet. than

*It is forbidden - to break your own vessels in your anger.*

than by preserving or reading them: the number of which, *large enough already*, I wish you may not think to be increased by this, which I here send you.

Here *two* things ought to be regarded. 1. That tho to act against truth in any case is wrong, yet, the degrees of guilt varying with the importance of things, in some cases the importance one way or t'other may be so little as to render the crime *evanescent* or *almost* nothing <sup>a</sup>. And, 2. that *inanimate* beings cannot be considered as capable of wrong treatment, if the respect they bear to living beings is separated from them. The drinking-glass before mentiond could not be considered as such, or be what it *now* is, if there was no drinking animal to own and use it. Nothing can be of any importance to that thing it self, which is void of all life and perception. So that when we compute what such things are, we must take them as being what they are *in reference* to things that have life.

The last and most material *objection*, or *question* rather, shall be *answerd* by and by. In the mean time I shall only say, that if in any particular case truth is inaccessible, and after due inquiry it doth not appear *what*, or *how* things are, then this will be true, *that the case* or thing under consideration is *doubtful*: and to act agreeably unto this truth is to be not opinionative, nor obstinate, but modest, cautious, docile, and to endeavour to be *on the safer side*. Such behaviour shews the case to be as it is. And as to the want of *power* to act agreeably to truth, that cannot be known till trials are made: and if any one doth try, and do his endeavour, he may take to himself the satisfaction, which he will find in sect. IV.

## SECT. II. Of Happiness.

**T**HAT, which demands to be next considered, is *happiness*; as being in it self most considerable; as abetting the cause of truth; and as being indeed so nearly allied to it, that they cannot well be parted. We cannot pay the respects due to one, unless we regard the other. Happiness must not be denied to be what it is: and it is by the practice of truth that we aim at that happiness, which is true.

In the few following propositions I shall not only give you my *idea* of it, but also subjoin some *observations*, which tho perhaps not necessary here, we may sometime hereafter think no loss of time or labor to have made *en passant*: such as

<sup>a</sup> The Stoics must certainly therefore be much too scrupulous, when they affirm (if they were in earnest), that ἡδὴ τὸ δάκτυλον ὡς ἔτυχε σαρμὴν τῇ σοφῇ ὁ λόγος ἐπιτέλει. Clem. Alex. Especially since this is, at least ordinarily, a thing perfectly indifferent by pr. ix.

E 2

men

*Handwritten notes:*  
 "Is it not then a base thing to say, it is false? No not if the Nality will save anything." Soph. even Thucydides  
 "The Sto who speaketh falsehood happiness itself in itself." etc. "but it is a positive Precept. speak Truth in  
 Common Discourse." etc. "A Lyar is a base thing." "and so, that it is better to preserve Peace - than to  
 have of Liberty." "That He who is a Liberator, without Liberty, as, the necessity of it, is required."



men of science would call, some of them *porismata*, or corollaries, and some *scholia*, I shall take them as they fall in my way promiscuously.

I. *Pleasure is a consciousness of something agreeable, pain of the contrary: & v. v. the consciousness of anything agreeable is pleasure, of the contrary pain.* For as nothing, that is agreeable to us, can be painful at the same time, and as such; nor any thing disagreeable pleasant, by the terms; so neither can any thing agreeable be for that reason (because it is agreeable) not pleasant, nor any thing disagreeable not painful, in some measure or other.

Obf. 1. *Pleasures and pains are proportionable to the perceptions and sense of their subjects, or the persons affected with them.* For consciousness and perception cannot be separated: because as I do not perceive what I am not conscious to my self I do perceive, so neither can I be conscious of what I do not perceive, or of more or less than what I do perceive. And therefore, since the degrees of pleasure or pain must be answerable to the consciousness, which the party affected has of them, they must likewise be as the degrees of perception are.

Obf. 2. *Whatever increases the power of perceiving, renders the percipient more susceptible of pleasure or pain.* This is an immediate consequence; and to add more is needless: unless, that among the means, by which perceptions and the inward sense of things may in many cases be heightend and increased, the principal are *reflexion*, and the practice of thinking. As I cannot be conscious of what I do not perceive: so I do not perceive that, which I do not advert upon. That which makes me feel, makes me advert. Every instance therefore of consciousness and perception is attended with an act of advertence: and as the more the perceptions are, the more are the advertences or reflexions, so v. v. the more frequent or intense the acts of advertence and reflexion are, the more consciousness there is, and the stronger is the *perception*. Further, all perceptions are produced in time: time passes by moments: there can be but one moment present at once: and therefore all present perception considered without any relation to what is past, or future, may be looked upon as momentaneous only. In this kind of perception the percipient perceives, as if he had not perceived any thing before, nor had any thing perceptible to follow. But in reflexion there is a repetition of what is past, and an anticipation of that which is apprehended as yet to come: there is a *connexion* of past and future, which by this are brought into the sum, and superadded to the present or momentaneous perceptions. Again, by reflecting we practise our capacity of apprehending: and this practising will increase, and as it were extend that capacity, to a certain degree. Lastly, reflexion doth

doth not only accumulate moments past and future to those that are present, but even in their passage it seems to *multiply* them. For time, as well as space, is capable of indeterminate division: and the finer or nicer the advertence or reflexion is, into the more parts is the time divided; which, whilst the mind considers those parts as so many several moments, is *in effect* rendered by this so much the longer. And to this experience agrees.

Obs. 3. *The causes of pleasure and pain are relative things: and in order to estimate truly their effect upon any particular subject they ought to be drawn into the degrees of perception in that subject.* When the cause is of the same kind, and acts with an equal force, if the perception of one person be equal to that of another, what they perceive must needs be *equal*. And so it will be likewise, when the forces in the producing causes and the degrees of perception in the sentient are *reciprocal*. For (which doth not seem to be considered by the world, and therefore ought the more particularly to be noted) if the cause of pleasure or pain should act but half as much upon A, as it does upon B; yet if the perceptivity of A be double to that of B, the sum of their pleasures or pains will be *equal*. In other cases they will be *unequal*. As, if the *causa dolorifica* should act with the same *impetus* on C with which it acts upon D; yet if C had only two degrees of perception, and D had three, the pain sustained by D would be half as much more as that of C: because he would perceive or feel the acts and impressions of the cause more by so much. If it should act with twice the force upon D which it acts with upon C, then the pain of C would be to that of D as 2 to 6: *i. e.* as one degree of force multiplied by two degrees of perception to two degrees of force multiplied by three of perception. And so on.

Obs. 4. *Mens respective happinesses or pleasures ought to be valued as they are to the persons themselves, whose they are; or according to the thoughts and sense, which they have of them:* not according to the estimate put upon them by other people, who have no authority to judge of them, nor *can* know what they are; may compute by different rules; have less sense; be in different circumstances<sup>a</sup>; or such as guilt has rendered partial to themselves. If that prince, who having plenty and flocks many, yet ravished the poor man's single ewe-lamb out of his bosom, reckoned the poor man's loss to be not greater, than the loss of one of his lambs would have been to him, he must be very defective in moral arithmetic, and little understood the doctrine of proportion. Every

<sup>a</sup> *Tu si hic sis, aliter sentias. Ter. you would be if you were in my circumstances.*  
man's



man's happiness is *his* happiness, what it is to him; and the loss of it is answerable to the degrees of his perception, to his manner of taking things, to his wants and circumstances <sup>a</sup>.

Obs. 5. *How judicious and wary ought princes, lawgivers, judges, juries, and even masters to be!* They ought not to consider so much what a stout, resolute, obstinate, hardend criminal may bear, as what the weaker sort, or at least (if that can be known) the persons immediately concern'd can bear: *that is*, what any punishment would be to them. For it is certain, all criminals are not of the former kind; and therefore should not be used as if they were. Some are drawn into crimes, which may render them obnoxious to public justice, they scarce know how themselves: some fall into them through necessity, strength of temptation, despair, elasticity of spirits and a sudden eruption of passion, ignorance of laws, want of good education, or some natural infirmity or propension, and some who are really innocent, are oppress'd by the iniquity or mistakes of judges, witnesses, juries, or perhaps by the power and zeal of a faction, with which their sense or their honesty has not permitted them to join. What a difference must there be between the sufferings of a poor wretch sensible of his crime or misfortune, who would give a world for his deliverance, if he had it, and those of a sturdy veteran in roguery: between the apprehensions, tears, faintings of the one, and the brandy and oaths of the other; in short, between a tender nature and a brickbat!

Obs. 6. *In general, all persons ought to be very careful and tender, where any other is concern'd.* Otherwise they may do they know not what. For no man can tell, by himself, or any other way, how another may be affected.

Obs. 7. *There cannot be an equal distribution of rewards and punishments by any stated human laws* <sup>b</sup>. Because (among other reasons) the same thing is rarely either the same gratification, or the same punishment to different persons.

Obs. 8. *The sufferings of brutes are not like the sufferings of men.* They perceive by moments, without reflexion upon past or future, upon causes, circumstances, &c.

Time and life without thinking are next neighbours to *nothing*, to no-time and no-life <sup>d</sup>. And therefore to kill a brute is to deprive him of a life, or a remain-

<sup>a</sup> Felicitas cui praeipua fuerit homini, non est humani iudicii: cum prosperitatem ipsam alius alio modo, & suapte ingenio quisque terminet. Pliny.

<sup>b</sup> It is not possible (in Albo's words) לחזק לאיש כדרכיו שיה בשוה ולשער העונשים במרה ובמשקל וכו'.

<sup>c</sup> Inter hominem & belluam hoc maximè interest, quod hac—ad id solum quod adest, quodque praesens est, se accommodat, paululum admodum sentiens praeititum aut futurum, &c. Cic. Nos & venturo torquemur & praeitito. Timoris enim tormentum memoria reducit, providentia anticipat. Nemo tantum praesentibus miser est. Sen. <sup>d</sup> Praesens tempus brevissimum est, adeo quidem, ut quibusdam nullum videatur, &c. Sen. Ὁταν δ' αὐτοὶ μηδὲν μεταβάλλωμεν τῶν ἀγνοῦντων, ἢ λάβωμεν μὴ ἀναμνηστικῶς, ἢ δοκῇ ἡμῶν γινώσκοντες ὁ χρεῖσθαι. Arist.

of no M can judge w<sup>th</sup> the Happiness of ano<sup>r</sup> M consists in, but some make their Happiness to consist in one Thing & some in ano<sup>r</sup> accord<sup>g</sup> to their w<sup>th</sup> Dispositions. Pliny  
It is not possible in albo's words "To Give to Every M accord<sup>g</sup> to Equity, w<sup>th</sup> regard to his way, & his situation  
Punishm<sup>t</sup> by measure & Weight"  
conforms itself to that only w<sup>th</sup> is present & before it, having but a very small sense of w<sup>th</sup> is Past or to come &c. &c. But we torment ourselves w<sup>th</sup> what is to come w<sup>th</sup> w<sup>th</sup> is past, for by our Foresight we anticipate  
& torment of fear, by our Memory we bring back y<sup>e</sup> torment w<sup>th</sup> is past. No M is miserable by y<sup>e</sup> Present Thing y<sup>e</sup>

der of time, that is equal to little more than nothing: tho this may perhaps be more applicable to some animals than to others. That, which is chiefly to be taken care of in this matter, is, that the brute may not be killed unnecessarily; when it is killed, that it may have as few moments of pain as may be<sup>a</sup>; and that no young be left to languish. So much by the way here.

II. *Pain considerd in itself is a real evil, pleasure a real good.* I take this as a *postulatum*, that will without difficulty be granted. Therefore,

III. *By the general idea of good and evil the one [pleasure] is in it self desirable, the other [pain] to be avoided.* What is here said, respects mere pleasure and pain, abstracted from all circumstances, consequences, &c. But because there are some of these generally adhering to them, and such as enter so deep into their nature, that unless these be *taken in*, the full and true character of the other cannot be had, nor can it therefore be known what *happiness* is, I must proceed to some other propositions relating to this subject.

IV. *Pleasure compared with pain may either be equal, or more, or less: also pleasures may be compared with other pleasures<sup>b</sup>, and pains with pains.* Because all the moments of the pleasure must bear some respect or be in some *ratio* to all the moments of pain: as also all the degrees of one to all the degrees of the other: and so must those of one pleasure, or one pain, be to those of another. And if the degrees of intenseness be multiplied by the moments of duration, there must still be some *ratio* of the one product to the other.

That this proposition is true, appears from the general conduct of mankind; tho in some particulars they may err, and wrong themselves, some more, some less. For what doth all this hurry of business, what do all the labors and travels of men tend to, but to gain such advantages, as they think do exceed all their trouble? What are all their abstinences and self denials for, if they do not think some pleasures less than the pain, that would succeed them? Do not the various methods of life shew, that men prefer one sort of pleasure to another, and submit to one sort of pain rather than to have another? And within our selves we cannot but find an indifference as to many things, not caring, whether we have the

עושה צער לבהמה חנם --- בא לרין וכו'. Ab. Ez. אין השם חפץ שתמות בהמה חנם וכו'.

S. Hhas.

<sup>b</sup> The rants of those men, who assert, *μηδὲν ἀφ' ὧν ἡδονὴν ἡδονῆς, μηδὲν ἡδονῶν τι πονεῖν*. "There is no diff<sup>n</sup> in pleasure, *οὐδὲν ἡδονῶν τι πονεῖν*, *ἢ ἀποδίδει*, ap. Diog. L. can surely affect no body, who has sense, or is alive. Nor *οὐδὲν ἡδονῶν τι πονεῖν*, ap. Diog. L. can surely affect no body, who has sense, or is alive. Nor that of the Stoics in Plut. *οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ὁ χρόνος σὺν αὐτῇ προσγινομένη, κτλ.* As if an age was not *really* Pleasure or Pain, but only *seemingly* so. "Not when more than a moment, and (therefore) an age's happiness more than a moment's."

The Present is as short as is possible, inasmuch that some have imagined if we have no succession of thoughts, or if we have, but forget them, then time seems to us to be nothing. Sen. "Not when I take no delight in a Beast who die, if there be no Reason for its Dying" Ab. Ezra. He who puts a Beast to Pain, without a just Reason for so Doing, shall be accountable for it. I Had Nor y<sup>e</sup> of this in Plutarch "Half Continuance of any good makes no addition thereto."



pain with the pleasure obtained by it, or miss the pleasure, being excused from the pain.

V. *When pleasures and pains are equal, they mutually destroy each other: when the one exceeds, the excess gives the true quantity of pleasure or pain.* For nine degrees of pleasure, less by nine degrees of pain, are equal to nothing: but nine degrees of one, less by three degrees of the other, give six of the former *net* and *true*.

VI. *As therefore there may be true pleasure and pain: so there may be some pleasures, which compared with what attends or follows them, not only may vanish into a nothing, but may even degenerate into pain, and ought to be reckoned as pains<sup>a</sup>; and v. v. some pains, that may be annumerated to pleasures.* For the *true quantity of pleasure* differs not from that *quantity of true pleasure*; or it is so much of that kind of pleasure, which is *true* (clear of all discounts and future payments): nor can the *true quantity of pain* not be the same with that *quantity of true or mere pain*. Then, the man who enjoys three degrees of such pleasure as will bring upon him nine degrees of pain, when three degrees of pain are set off to balance and sink the three of pleasure, can have remaining to him only six degrees of pain: and into these therefore is his pleasure finally resolved. And so the three degrees of pain, which any one indures to obtain nine of pleasure, end in six of the latter. By the same manner of computing some pleasures will be found to be the loss of pleasure, compared with greater: and some pains the alleviation of pain; because by undergoing them greater are evaded<sup>b</sup>. Thus the natures of pleasures and pains are varied, and sometimes transmuted: which ought never to be forgot.

Nor this neither. As in the sense of most men, I believe, a *little* pain will weigh against a *great deal* of pleasure<sup>c</sup>: so perhaps there may be some pains, which exceed all pleasures; *that is*, such pains as no man would choose to suffer for any pleasure *whatever*, or at least any that we know of in this world. So that it is possible the difference, or excess of pain, may rise so high as to become immense: and then the pleasure to be set against that pain will be but a point, or cypher; a quantity of no value.

VII. *Happiness differs not from the true quantity of pleasure, unhappiness of pain. Or, any being may be said to be so far happy, as his pleasures are true, &c.* That cannot

<sup>a</sup> *Nocet (fit noxa) empti dolore voluptas.* Hor. And—*multo corrupta dolore voluptas.* Id. when that Pompey mention'd by Val. Max. by burning his finger escaped the torture.

<sup>b</sup> As

<sup>c</sup> *Bona*

*malis paria non sunt, etiam pari numero: nec latitia ulla minimo maerore pensanda.* Plin.

*a/ Pleasure y is procured by Pain is so much real Hurt Hor. & pleas is half as much by much*

*c Good things are not Equal to evil things, tho they were same in Number, Nor is any Joy Equivalent to least sorrow. Plin.*

be the happiness of any being, which is bad for him : nor can happiness be disagreeable. It must be something therefore, that is both agreeable and good for the possessor. Now present pleasure is for the present indeed agreeable ; but if it be not true, and he who enjoys it must pay more for it than it is worth, it cannot be for his good, or good for him. This therefore cannot be his *happiness*. Nor, again, can that pleasure be reckond happiness, for which one pays the full price in pain : because these are quantities which mutually destroy each other. But yet since happiness is something, which, by the general idea of it, must be desirable, and therefore agreeable, it must be some kind of pleasure<sup>a</sup> : and this, from what has been said, can only be such pleasure as is true. That only can be both agreeable and good for him. And thus every one's happiness will be as his true quantity of pleasure.

One, that loves to make *objections*, may demand here, whether there may not be happiness without pleasure : whether a man may not be said to be happy in respect to those evils, which he escapes, and yet knows nothing of : and whether there may not be such a thing as *negative* happiness. I answer, an exemption from misfortunes and pains is a high privilege, tho we should not be sensible what those misfortunes or dangers are, from which we are deliverd, and in the larger use of the word may be styled a happiness. Also, the absence of pain or unhappiness may perhaps be called negative happiness, since the meaning of that phrase is known. But in proper speaking happiness always includes something positive. For mere indolence resulting from insensibility, or joind with it, if it be happiness, is a happiness infinitely diminishd : *that is*, it is no more a happiness, than it is an unhappiness ; upon the confine of both, but neither. At best it is but the happiness of stocks and stones<sup>b</sup> : and to these I think happiness can hardly be in strictness allowd. 'Tis the privilege of a stock to be what it is, rather than to be a miserable being : this we are sensible of, and therefore, joining this privilege with our own sense of it, we call it happiness ; but this is what it is in our manner of apprehending it, not what it is in the stock it self. A sense indeed of being free from pains and troubles is attended with happiness : but then the happiness flows from the *sense* of the case, and is a *positive* happiness. Whilst a man reflects upon his negative happiness, as it is called, and enjoys it, he makes it positive : and perhaps a sense of immunity from the afflictions and miseries every where so obvious to our observation is one of the *greatest* pleasures in this world.

<sup>a</sup> Οἰόμεθα δὲ ὅταν παρρησιάζαι τῇ ἡδονῇ. Arist.

Arist. ap. Diog. L.

<sup>b</sup> Or οἷον κατ' ἴδιον κατὰ φύσιν. Like a Minaduplapp

after we think of Happiness must have some Pleasure mixt w<sup>th</sup> it. VIII. That



VIII. *That being may be said to be ultimately happy, in some degree or other, the sum total of whose pleasures exceeds the sum of all his pains : or, ultimate happiness is the sum of happiness, or true pleasure, at the foot of the account. And so on the other side, that being may be said to be ultimately unhappy, the sum of all whose pains exceeds that of all his pleasures.*

IX. *To make itself happy is a duty, which every being, in proportion to its capacity, owes to itself; and that, which every intelligent being may be supposed to aim at, in general<sup>a</sup>. For happiness is some quantity of true pleasure : and that pleasure, which I call true, may be considered by itself, and so will be justly desirable (according to prop. II, and III). On the contrary, unhappiness is certainly to be avoided : because being a quantity of mere pain, it may be considered by itself, as a real, mere evil, &c. and because if I am obliged to pursue happiness, I am at the same time obliged to recede, as far as I can, from its contrary. All this is self-evident. And hence it follows, that,*

X. *We cannot act with respect to either our selves, or other men, as being what we and they are, unless both are considered as beings susceptible of happiness and unhappiness, and naturally desirous of the one and averse to the other. Other animals may be considered after the same manner in proportion to their several degrees of apprehension.*

But that the nature of happiness, and the road to it, which is so very apt to be mistaken, may be better understood; and true pleasures more certainly distinguished from false; the following propositions must still be added.

XI. *As the true and ultimate happiness of no being can be produced by any thing, that interferes with truth, and denies the natures of things : so neither can the practice of truth make any being ultimately unhappy. For that, which contradicts nature and truth, opposes the will of the Author of nature (whose existence, &c. I shall prove afterwards); and to suppose, that an inferior being may in opposition to His will break through the constitution of things, and by so doing make himself happy, is to suppose that being more potent than the Author of nature, and consequently more potent than the author of the nature and power of that very being himself, which is absurd. And as to the other part of the proposition, it is also absurd to think, that, by the constitution of nature and will of its author,*

<sup>a</sup> This is truly *Bonum summum, quod tendimus omnes*, Lucr. Ἀπαντα ᾧ ὡς ἰπῶν, ἰτίαν χάριν αἰετέμεθα, πλὴν τὴν εὐδαιμονίας· τίλῃ δὲ αὐτῇ. Arist.

any

a/ The chief good wch we all aim at Lucr. "We follow all other things, except Happiness for sake of something else, but that is Half-End" Arist.

any being should be finally miserable only for *conforming* himself to truth, and owning things and the relations lying between them to be what they are. It is much the same as to say, God has made it natural to contradict nature; or unnatural, and therefore punishable, to act according to nature and reality. If such a blunder (excuse the boldness of the word) could be, it must come either through a defect of *power* in Him to cause a better and more equitable scheme, or from some *delight*, which he finds in the misery of his dependents. The former cannot be ascribed to the First cause, who is the fountain of power: nor the latter to Him, who gives so many proofs of his goodness and beneficence. Many beings may be said to be happy; and there are none of us all, who have not many enjoyments<sup>a</sup>: whereas did he delight in the infelicity of those beings, which depend upon Him, it must be natural to Him to make them unhappy, and then not one of them would be otherwise in any respect. The world in that case instead of being such a beautiful, admirable system, in which there is only a *mixture* of evils, could have been only a scene of *mere* misery, horror, and torment.

That either the enemies of truth (*wicked men*) should be ultimately happy, or the religious observers of it (*good men*) ultimately unhappy, is such injustice, and an evil so great, that sure no *Manichean* will allow such a *superiority* of his evil principle over the good, as is requisite to produce and maintain it.

XII. *The genuine happiness of every being must be something, that is not incompatible with or destructive of its nature<sup>b</sup>, or the superior or better part of it, if it be mixt.* <sup>6</sup> For instance, nothing can be the true happiness of a *rational* being, that is inconsistent with *reason*. For all pleasure, and therefore be sure all clear pleasure and true happiness must be something agreeable (pr. I.): and nothing can be agreeable to a reasoning nature, or (which is the same) to the reason of that nature, which is repugnant and disagreeable to reason. If any thing becomes agreeable to a rational being, which is not agreeable to reason, it is plain his reason is lost, his nature depressed, and that he now lifts himself among *irrationals*, at least as to that particular. If a being finds pleasure in any thing *unreasonable*, he has an *unreasonable* pleasure; but a rational nature can like nothing of that kind without a contradiction to itself. For to do this would be to act, as if it was the contrary to what it is. Lastly, if we find hereafter, that whatever interferes with reason, interferes with truth, and to contradict either of them is the same thing; then what has been said under the former proposition, does also confirm this: as what has been said in proof of this, does also confirm the former.

<sup>a</sup> Non dat Deus beneficia. Unde ergo quæ possides? quæ — Sen.  
<sup>b</sup> ἀντὶ κακίας καὶ κακοδαμονίας ἐστὶ. Αἰτ.

<sup>c</sup> Περὶ τὸ παρὰ φύσιν



XIII. *Those pleasures are true, and to be reckoned into our happiness, against which there lies no reason.* For when there is no reason against any pleasure, there is always one for it<sup>a</sup>, included in the term. So when there is no reason for undergoing pain (or venturing it), there is one against it.

*Obs.* There is therefore no necessity for men to torture their inventions in finding out arguments to justify themselves in the pursuits after worldly advantages and enjoyments, provided that neither these enjoyments, nor the means by which they are attained, contain the violation of any truth, by being unjust, immoderate, or the like<sup>b</sup>. For in this case there is no reason why we should not desire them, and a direct one, why we should; viz. because they are enjoyments.

XIV. To conclude this section, *The way to happiness and the practice of truth incur the one into the other*<sup>c</sup>. For no being can be styled happy, that is not ultimately so: because if all his pains exceed all his pleasures, he is so far from being happy, that he is a being unhappy, or miserable, in proportion to that excess. Now by *prop. XI.* nothing can produce the ultimate happiness of any being, which interferes with truth: and therefore whatever doth produce that, must be something which is consistent and coincident with this.

Two things then (but such as are met together, and embrace each other), which are to be religiously regarded in all our conduct, are *truth* (of which in the preceding sect.) and *happiness* (that is, such pleasures, as accompany, or follow the practice of truth, or are not inconsistent with it: of which I have been treating in this). And as that religion, which arises from the distinction between moral good and evil, was called *natural*, because grounded upon truth and the natures of things: so perhaps may that too, which proposes happiness for its end, in as much as it proceeds upon that difference, which there is between true pleasure and pain, which are physical (or *natural*) good and evil. And since both these unite so amicably, and are at last the same, here is one religion which may be called natural upon two accounts.

<sup>a</sup> Τίνας ἡδονῶν καὶ κατὰ λόγον ὁρῶν μεταλαμβάνοντο; Simpl. Rectè facit, animo quando obsequitur suo: quod omnes homines facere oportet, dum id modo fiat bono. Plaut.

<sup>b</sup> Habebit philosophus amplas opes; sed nulli detractas, &c. Sen. Here he seems to confess the folly of the Stoics, who denied themselves many pleasures, that were honest and almost necessary; living in tubs, feeding upon raw herbs and water, going about in a fordid garment, with a rough beard, staff and satchel, &c. <sup>c</sup> Quid rectum sit, apparet: quid expediat, obscurum est: ita tamen, ut — dubitare non possumus, quin ea maximè conducant, quæ sunt rectissima. Cic.

*He does right who follows Dictates of his own mind, as Sect. all may do if they do it in a proper manner.*

*6/a Philosopher wd have large Possessions, but then He wd not have them taken from Him  
c/ It is very Evident w<sup>t</sup> right is, but is very difficult to say w<sup>t</sup> is Expedient, but yet there can be no Doubt, but that those Things w<sup>h</sup> are most right, are most conducive to our Happiness" &c.*

## SECT. III. Of Reason, and the ways of discovering truth.

MY manner of thinking, and an objection formerly<sup>a</sup> made, oblige me in the next place to say something concerning the means of knowing, what is true: whether there are any, that are sure, and which one may safely rely upon. For if there be not, all that I have written is an amusement to no purpose. Besides, as this will lead me to speak of reason, &c. some truths may here (as some did in the former section) fall in our way, which may be profitable upon many occasions; and what has been already asserted, will also be further confirmed.

*How shall a M know what is true*

I. *An intelligent being, such as is mentiond before<sup>b</sup>, must have some immediate objects of his understanding; or at least a capacity of having such.* For if there be no object of his intellect, he is intelligent of nothing, or not intelligent. And if there are no immediate objects, there can be none at all: because every object must be such (an object) either in itself immediately; or by the intervention of another, which is immediate: or of several, one of which must at least be immediate.

II. *An intelligent being among the immediate objects of his mind may have some, that are abstract and general.* I shall not at present inquire, how he comes by them (it matters not *how*), since this must be true, if there is any such thing as a rational being. For that reason is something different from the knowledge of particulars may appear from hence; because it is not confined to particular things or cases. What is reason in one instance, is so in another. What is reasonable with respect to *Quintius*, is so in respect of *Nevius*<sup>c</sup>. Reason is performed in *species*. A rational being therefore must have some of these *species* (I mean specific and abstract ideas) to work with; or some superior method, such as perhaps some higher order of reasoners may have, but we have not.

The knowledge of a particular *idea* is only the particular knowledge of that *idea* or thing: there it ends. But *reason* is something universal, a kind of general instrument, applicable to particular things and cases as they occur. We reason about particulars, or from them; but not *by* them.

<sup>a</sup> The last objection, p. 27.

<sup>b</sup> Sect. I. prop. I.

<sup>c</sup> *Quis hoc statuit, quod aequum sit in Quintium, id iniquum esse in Nevium?* Cic.

*Who has decreed that what is equitable with regard to Quintius, should be unjust with regard to Nevius?*



In fact we find within our selves many *logical, metaphysical, mathematical ideas*, no one of which is limited to any particular, or individual thing: but they comprehend whole *classes* and kinds. And it is by the help of these that we reason, and demonstrate. So that we know from within our selves, that intelligent beings not only may have such abstract *ideas*, as are mentiond in the proposition, but that some *actually have* them: which is enough for my purpose.

III. *Those ideas or objects, that are immediate, will be adequately and truly known to that mind, whose ideas they are.* For *ideas* can be no further the *ideas* of any mind, than that mind has (or may have) a perception of them: and therefore that mind must perceive the whole of them; which is to know them *adequately*.

*Again*, these *ideas* being immediate, nothing (by the term) can intervene to increase, diminish, or any way alter them. And to say the mind does not know them truly, implies a contradiction: because it is the same as to say, that they are misrepresented; *that is*, that there are intervening and misrepresenting *ideas*.

And *lastly*, there cannot be an immediate perception of that, which is not; nor therefore of any immediate object otherwise, than as it is. We have indeed many times wrong notions, and misperceptions of things: but then these things are not the immediate objects. They are things, which are notified to us by the help of organs and *media*, which may be vitiated, or perhaps are defective at best and incapable of transmitting things as they are in themselves, and therefore occasion imperfect and false images. But then, even in this case, those images and *ideas* that are immediate to the percipient, are perceived as they are: and that is the very reason, why the originals, which they should exhibit truly, but do not, are not perceived as *they* are. In short, I only say the mind must know its own *immediate ideas*.

IV. *What has been said of these ideas, which are immediate, may be said also of those relations or respects, which any of those ideas bear immediately each to other: they must be known immediately and truly.* For if the relation be immediate, the ideas cannot subsist without it; it is of their nature: and therefore they cannot be known adequately, but this must be known too. They are in this respect like the *ideas* of whole and part. The one cannot be without the other: nor either of them nor discover that relation, by which the one must be always bigger and the other less.

To say no more, we may satisfy our selves of the truth of this, as well as of the foregoing propositions, from the experiences of our own minds: where we find ma-





2. All those *conclusions*, which are derived through mean propositions, that are true, and by just inferences, will be as true as those, from which they are derived. My meaning is this: every just consequence is *founded in some known truth*, by virtue of which one thing follows from another, after the manner of steps in an *algebraic* operation: and if inferences are so founded, and just, the things inferred must be true, if they are made from true premisses.

Let this be the form of an argument.  $M = P : S = M : \text{ergo } S = P$ . Here if  $S = M$  be false, nothing is concluded at all: because the middle proposition is in truth not  $S = M$ , but perhaps  $S = Ma$ , which is foreign to the purpose. If  $S = M$  be true, but  $M = P$  false, then the conclusion will indeed be a right conclusion from those premisses: but they cannot shew, that  $S = P$ , because the first proposition if it was express'd according to truth would be  $Me = P$ , which is another thing, and has no place in the argument. But if these two propositions are both true,  $M = P$ ,  $S = M$ , then it will not only be rightly concluded, but also true, that  $S = P$ . For the second or middle proposition does so connect the other two, by taking in due manner a term from each of them (or to speak with the *logicians*, by separately comparing the predicate or *major* term of the conclusion with the *medium* in the first proposition, and the subject or *minor* term with it in the second), that if the first and second are true, the third must be so likewise: all being indeed no more than this,  $P = M = S$ . For here the inference is just by what goes before, being founded in some such truth as this, and resulting immediately from the application of it, *Quæ eidem æqualia sunt, & inter se sunt æqualia*; or *Quæ conveniunt in eodem tertio, etiam inter se conveniunt*; or the like<sup>a</sup>. Now if an inference thus made is justifiable, another made after the same manner, when the truth discover'd by it is made one of the premisses, must be so too; and so must another after that; and so on. And if the last, and all the intermediate inferences be as right, as the first is suppos'd to be, it is no matter to what length the process is carried. All the parts of it being locked together by truth, the last result is derived through such a succession of mean propositions, as render its title to our assent not worse by being long.

Since all the forms of true *syllogisms* may be proved to conclude rightly, all the advances made in the *syllogistic* method toward the discovery or confirmation of truth, are so many instances and proofs of what is here asserted. So also are the performances of the *mathematicians*. From some self-evident truths, and a few easie

<sup>a</sup> If men in their illations, or in comparing their *ideas*, do many times not actually make use of such maxims; yet the thing is really the same. For what these maxims express, the mind sees without taking notice of the words.

theorems, which they set out with at first, to what immense lengths, and through what a train of propositions have they propagated knowledge! How numerous are their theorems and discoveries now, so far once out of human ken!

I do not enter so far into the province of the *logicians* as to take notice of the difference there is between the *analytic* and *synthetic* methods of coming at truth, or proving it; whether it is better to begin the disquisition from the subject, or from the attribute. If by the use of proper *media* any thing can be shewd to be, or not to be, I care not from what term the demonstration or argument takes its rise. Either way propositions may beget their like, and more truth be brought into the world.

VIII. *That power, which any intelligent being has of surveying his own ideas, and comparing them; of forming to himself out of those, that are immediate and abstract, such general and fundamental truths, as he can be sure of<sup>a</sup>; and of making such inferences and conclusions as are agreeable to them, or to any other truth, after it comes to be known; in order to find out more truth, prove or disprove some assertion, resolve some question, determin what is fit to be done upon occasion, &c. the case or thing under consideration being first fairly stated and prepared, is what I mean by the faculty of reason, or what intitles him to the epithet rational, Or in short, Reason is a faculty of making such inferences and conclusions, as are mentiond under the preceding proposition, from any thing known, or given.*

The Supreme being has no doubt a direct and perfect intuition of things, with their natures and relations, lying as it were all before Him, and pervious to His eye: or at least we may safely say, that He is not obliged to make use of our operose methods by *ideas* and inferences; but knows things in a manner infinitely above all our conceptions. And as to superior finite natures, what other means of attaining to the knowledge of things they may have, is a thing not to be told by me; or how far they may excell us in this way of finding truth. I have an eye here chiefly to our own circumstances. Reason must be understood, when it is ascribed to God, to be the *Divine* reason; when to other beings above us, to be *their* reason; and in all of them to transcend *ours*, as much as their natures respectively do our nature<sup>b</sup>.

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<sup>a</sup> Under the word *reason* I comprehend the *intuition* of the truth of axioms. For certainly to discern the respect, which one term bears to another, and from thence to conclude the proposition necessarily true, is an act of *reason*, tho performed quick, or perhaps all at once. <sup>b</sup> If many

believed, according to *Socrates ap. Luc.* that *ὅσην ἔχει τὸ μέγεθος ὁ κόσμος τὴν ὑπεροχὴν πρὸς τὸ Σω-*

*crates* *κράτους* (Charophon, so far are  
 3 / So much as Magnitude of World exceeds Bulk of Socrates &  
 their Powers, Reason & Understanding beyond Capacity of One of us



It cannot be amiss to note *further*, that tho a man, who truly uses his rational powers, has abstract and universal ideas, obtained by reflexion ; out of these frames to himself general truths, or apprehends the strength of such, and admits them, when they occur to him ; by these, as by so many standards, measures and judges of things ; and takes care to have the materials, which he makes use of in reasoning, to be rivetted and compacted together by them : yet by a *habit* of reasoning he may come to serve himself of them, and apply them so quick, that he himself shall scarce observe it. Nay, most men seem to reason by virtue of a habit acquired by conversation, practice in business, and examples of others, without knowing what it is, that gives the solidity even to their own just reasonings : just as men usually learn rules in arithmetic, govern their accounts by them all their days, and grow very ready and topping in the use of them, without ever knowing or troubling their heads about the *demonstration* of any one of them. But still tho this be so, and men reason without advert- ing upon general ideas and abstract truths, or even being aware that there are any such, as it were by rule or a kind of rote ; yet such there are, and upon *them* rests the weight of reason as its foundation.

This, *by the way*, helps us to detect the cause, why the generality of people are so little under the *dominion* of reason : why they sacrifice it to their interests and passions so easily ; are so obnoxious to prejudices, the influence of their company, and din of a party ; so apt to change, tho the case remains the very same ; so unable to judge of things, that are ever so little out of the way ; and so conceited and positive in matters, that are doubtful, or perhaps to discerning persons manifestly false. Their reasoning proceeds in that track, which they happen to be got into, and out of which they know not one step, but all is to them *Terra incognita* ; being ignorant of the scientific part, and those universal, unalterable principles, upon which true reasoning depends, and to find which and the true use of them are required *cool* hours and an *honest* application, beside many *preparatives*.

In the *next place* it must be noted, that one may reason truly from that, which is only probable, or even false<sup>a</sup>. Because just inferences may be made from propositions of these kinds : *that is*, such inferences may be made as are founded in certain truths, tho those propositions themselves are not certainly true. But then what follows, or is concluded from thence, will be only probable, or false, according to

πράτες ἢ χαιρεφάντ' εἶδ'·, τηλικῶτον δὲ τὴν δυνάμιν αὐτῆς, καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν, καὶ ἀλόγιον ἀνάλογον ἀλγέ-  
ειν τ' αὖτε ἡμᾶς ἀλγέσειας, what may we think of the God of the world ? Therefore Tully seems to  
express himself too boldly where he writes, *Est—homini cum Deo rationis societas. Inter quos au-*  
*tem ratio, inter eosdem etiam recta ratio communis est.* *That God & man are allied & each*

<sup>a</sup> Upon this account it is, that I add the word *given* at the end of my description of reason.

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the

other by Reason. And wile Reason is in Common to any Persons, right Reason is so to them

the quality of that proposition, or those propositions, from which the inference is made.

Again; it should be observed, that what I have said of reasoning, chiefly belongs to it as it is an *internal* operation. When we are to present our reasonings to others, we must transfer our thoughts to them by such ways as we can. The case is to be stated in a manner suitable to their capacities; a fair narration of matters of fact, and their circumstances, to be made; many times persons and things to be described by proper *diatypoſes*, and the like: all which are additional labor, and take up much room in discourses and books, and are performed by different authors, upon different subjects, and in different kinds of writing, with an infinite variety of methods and forms, according to mens different views and capacities; and many times not without a necessity of some condescensions, ascititious advantages, and even applications to the passions. But notwithstanding this, in strict reasoning nothing is required, but to lay steps in a due order, firmly connected, and exprest properly, without flourish<sup>a</sup>; and to arrive at truth by the *shortest* and *clearest* gradation we are able.

Once more; perhaps disputacious men may say I ascribe the investigation of truth to one faculty, when it is in reality the joint business of several. For when we go about this work, we are forced to make use of subordinate powers, and even external helps; to draw *diagrams*, and put cases in our own imagination; to correct the images there, compound them, divide them, abstract from them; to turn over our memory, and see what has been entered and remains in that register; even to consult books, and use pen and ink. In short, we assemble all such axioms, theorems, experiments and observations, as are already known, and appear capable of serving us, or present themselves upon the opening and *analysis* of the question, or case before us. And when the mind has thus made its *tour*, fetched in materials from every quarter, and set them in its own view; then it contemplates, compares, and methodizes them; gives the first place to this, the second to that, and so on; and when trials do not succeed rightly, rejects some, adopts others, shifts their order, &c. till at last the *series* is so disposed, that the thing required comes up resolved, proved, or disproved by a *just* conclusion from proper premisses. Now in this process there seem to be many faculties concerned; in these acts of circumspection, recollection, invention, reflexion, comparing, methodizing, judging. But what if all this be so? I do not *exclude* the use of such subservient powers, or other helps, as are necessary to the exerting this faculty of reason; nor deny the mind

<sup>a</sup> Simplex & nuda veritas est luculentior; quia satis ornata per se est: adeoque ornamenti extrinsecus additis fucata corrumpitur: mendacium vero specie placet aliena, &c. Lactant.

a / Pure & Naked Truth is so much clearer, but it has ornaments enough of its own. & therefore when it is daubed over with external additional ornaments it is corrupted by them. So if a Lyce is here pleasing, but it appears in shape that is not its own, &c.



matter to work upon. I may allow all the intellectual faculties their proper offices, and yet make reason to be what I have described it to be.

IX. *There is such a thing as right reason: or, Truth may be discovered by reasoning*<sup>a</sup>. The word *reason* has several acceptations. *Sometimes* it is used for that power mentiond in the last proposition; as when we say, *Man is a being indued with reason*. And then the sense of this proposition must be this; that there is such a use to be made of this power, as is right, and will manifest truth. *Sometimes* it seems to be taken for those general truths, of which the mind possesses it self from the intimate knowledge of its own ideas, and by which it is governed in its illations and conclusions; as when we say, *Such a thing is agreeable to reason*: for that is as much as to say, it is agreeable to the said general truths, and that authentic way of making deductions, which is founded in them. And then the sense of this proposition is, that there are such general truths, and such a right way of inferring. Again; *sometimes* it seems to stand only for some particular truth, as it is apprehended by the mind with the causes of it, or the manner of its derivation from other truth: *that is*, it differs not from truth except in this one respect, that it is considerd not barely in itself, but as the effect and result of a process of reasoning; or it is truth with the arguments for our assent, and its evidences about it; as when it is said, *that such or such an assertion is reason*. And then the sense of the proposition is, that there are truths so to be apprehended by the mind. So all comes to this at last; truth (or there are truths, which) may be discovered, or found to be such, by reasoning.

If it were not so, our rational faculties, the noblest we have, would be vain.

*Beside*, that it is so, appears from the foregoing propositions and what we know within our selves. 'Tis certain we have immediate and abstract *ideas*: the relations of these are adequately known to the mind, whose *ideas* they are: the propositions expressing these relations are evidently known to be true: and these truths must have the common privilege and property of all truths, to be true in all the particulars and uses, to which they are applicable. If then any things are notified to us by the help of our senses, or present themselves by any other way or means, to

<sup>a</sup> That way, which some *Sceptics* take to prove the inexistence of truth, has nothing in it, unless it be a contradiction. If any thing, *say they*, is demonstrated to be true, how shall it be known, that that demonstration is true? Εἰ ἐξ ἀποδείξεως, ζητηθῆσι πάλιν, πῶς ὅτι καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀληθὲς ἐστὶ καὶ ὡς εἰς ἄπρον. *Sext. Emp.* Nor do I well comprehend St. *Chrysostom's* meaning, when he says, Τὸ λογισμοῖς δοκεῖν, καὶ ἀληθὲς ἢ, εἴπω πληροφορίαν τῇ ψυχῇ παρέχει, καὶ πίστιν ἰκανήν. For as no man truly believes any thing, unless he has a reason for believing it: so no reason can be stronger than demonstration.

which

Reason  
Its several Acceptations

If by any Demonstration  
how shall we know if this  
is true, or no for ever

That which is demonstrated by Reason, tho it may indeed be true, yet it does not afford suff<sup>t</sup> proof or Conviction of mind

which these truths may be immediately applied, or from whence deductions may be made after the forementioned manner, new truths may be thus collected. And since these new truths, and the numerous descendents, that may spring from their loins, may be used still in the same manner, and be as it were the seed of more truth, who can tell at what undescried fields of knowledge even men may at length arrive? At least no body can doubt, but that much truth, and particularly of that kind, which is most *useful* to us in our conduct here, is discoverable by this method.

They, who oppugn the force and certainty of reason, and treat *right reason* as a *Chimæra*, must argue against reason either with reason, or without reason. In the latter way they do nothing: and in the former they betray their own cause, and establish that, which they labor to dethrone. To prove there is no such thing as *right reason* by any good argument, is indeed impossible: because that would be to shew there is such a thing, by the manner of proving, that there is not.

And *further*, if this proposition be not true, there is no right reasoning in *Euclid*; nor can we be sure, that what is there demonstrated, is true. But to say this I am sure is absurd. Nor do I desire, that this proposition, which I here maintain, should be esteem'd more certain than those demonstrated by him: and so *certain* it must be; because there can be no certainty in them, if this be not true.

The great *objection* against all this is taken from the many instances of false reasoning and ignorance, with which the practices, discourses, writings of mankind are too justly taxed. But, in *answer* to it, I would have it minded, that I do not say, men may not by virtue of their freedom break off their meditations and inquiries prematurely, before they have taken a sufficient survey of things; that they may not be prepossessed with inveterate errors, biassed by interest, or carried violently down with the stream of a sect or fashion, or dazzled by some darling notion or bright name<sup>a</sup>; that they may not be unprovided of a competent stock of *præcognita* and preparative knowledge; that (among other things) they may not be ignorant of the very nature of reasoning, and what it is that gives *finews* to an inference, and makes it just; that they may not want philosophy, history, or other learning requisite to the understanding and stating of the question truly; that they may not have the confidence to pretend to abilities, which they have not, and boldly to judge of things, as if they were qualified, when they are not; that they may not be impotent in their elocution, and misrepresent their own thoughts, by expressing themselves ill, even when within themselves they reason well; that many understandings may not be naturally gross, good heads often indisposed, and the ablest judges sometimes overseen, through inadvertence or haste: I say none of these

<sup>a</sup> *Hand alio fidei promore lapsu, quam ubi falsa rei gravis autor existit. Pliny.*

*a/m being never more easily drawn into a wrong Belief, than wh<sup>y</sup> things.  
Author of a Diabity is a frame Person. Many*



things. The contrary I confess is manifest: and it is in opposition to those errors, which appear in these cases under the name of reason, that we are forced to add the epithet *right*, and to say *right reason* instead of *reason* only; to distinguish it from that, which wrongfully assumes that appellation. Nor, moreover, do I say, that by reasoning the truth is to be discovered in *every* case: that would imply an extent of knowledge, which we cannot pretend to. I only say, that there is such a thing as right reason, and truth discoverable by it.

I might add, that he, whose faculties are intire and sound, and who by a proper exercise of his mind in scientific studies first opens and enlarges its capacity, and renders his intellectuals active and penetrating; takes care to furnish himself with such leading truths, as may be useful to him, and of which he is assured in his own brest; and in treating any subject keeps them still in his eye, so that his discourse may be agreeable to them: I say, such a one is not in much danger of concluding falsely. He must either determin rightly, or soon find, that the subject lies out of his reach. However he will be sensible, that there are many things within his sphere, concerning which he may reason; and that there are truths to be found by this use of his faculties, in which he may securely acquiesce.

Thus that question supposed to be asked p. 27. *How shall a man know, what is true?* is in part answerd. More shall be added by and by: only a proposition or two, which ought not to be omitted, must be first inserted.

X. *To act according to right reason, and to act according to truth are in effect the same thing.* For in which sense soever the word *reason* is taken, it will stand either for truth itself, or for that, which is instrumental in discovering and proving it to be such: and then, with respect to this latter sense, whoever is guided by that faculty, whose office consists in distinguishing and pointing out truth, must be a follower of truth, and act agreeably to it. For to be governed by any faculty or power is to act according to the genuin decisions and dictates of it.

That reason, which is *right* (by the meaning of the words) must conclude *rightly*: but this it cannot do, if the conclusion is not true, or truth.

That is (for so I would be understood), if the principles and premisses from whence it results are true<sup>a</sup>, and certainly known to be so, the conclusion may be taken as certain and absolute truth: but otherwise the truth obtaind at the end of the argument is but hypotheticalal, or only this, that such a thing is so, if such another, or such others are so or so.

<sup>a</sup> That manner of demonstration, in which it has been pretended truth is deduced directly from that which is false, is only a way of shewing, that an assertion is true, because its contradictory is false; founded in that known rule, *Contradictoria nec simul vera, nec simul falsa esse possunt*, &c.

*That Contradictory Propositions can neither be true at the same Time nor false at the same Time &c.*

XI. To be governed by reason is the general law imposed by the Author of nature <sup>a</sup> upon them, whose uppermost faculty is reason: as the dictates of it in particular cases are the particular laws, to which they are subject. As there are beings, which have not so much as sense, and others that have no faculty above it; so there may be some, who are indued with reason, but have nothing higher than that. It is sufficient at present to suppose there may be such. And then if reason be the uppermost faculty, it has a right to controul the rest by being such. As in sensitive animals sense commands gravitation and mechanical motions in those instances, for which their senses are given, and carries them out into spontaneous acts: so in rational animals the gradation requires, that reason should command sense.

It is plain, that reason is of a commanding nature <sup>b</sup>: it enjoins this, condemns that, only allows some other things, and will be paramount (in an old word τὸ ὑπερμονικόν <sup>c</sup>) if it is at all. Now a being, who has such a determining and governing power so placed in his nature, as to be essential to him, is a being certainly framed to be governed by that power. It seems to be as much designed by nature, or rather the Author of nature, that rational animals should use their reason, and steer by it; as it is by the shipwright, that the pilot should direct the vessel by the use of the rudder he has fitted to it. The rudder would not be there, if it was not to be used: nor would reason be implanted in any nature only to be not cultivated and neglected. And it is certain, it cannot be used, but it must command: such is its nature.

It is not in one's power deliberately to resolve not to be governed by reason. For (here the same way of arguing may be used, that was lately) if he could do this, he must either have some reason for making that resolution, or none. If he has none, it is a resolution, that stands upon no foundation, and therefore in course falls: and if he has some reason for it, he is governed by reason. This demonstrates that reason must govern.

XII. If a rational being, as such, is under an obligation to obey reason, and this obedience, or practice of reason, coincides with the observation of truth, these things plainly follow.

<sup>a</sup> Cujus [summi rectoris & domini] ad naturam apta ratio vera illa & summa lex à philosophis dicitur. Cic. Νόμος ἀψεύδης ὁ ὁρθὸς λόγος, ἐξ ᾧ τὸ δύνῃ ἢ δύνῃ διττῶ φασγὸς, ἐν χαρτίδοις ἢ ἐνλαίς ἀψυχες, ἀψύχοις, ἀλλ' ἢ ἀθανάτου φύσεως ἀφασγὸς ἐν ἀθανάτῳ ἀλανία τυπωδύς. Philo Jud. More to this purpose might be easily collected. <sup>b</sup> Λόγος ἐστὶν ἐκὼν Θεῷ. Ph. Jud. <sup>c</sup> Τὸ ὑπερμονικὸν καὶ κυριεῖον τῆς ψυχῆς μέγας. M. Anton. Or as it is in Plutarch, τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνώτατον μέρος. Principatus in Tully, Summus in anima gradus. Tert.

The Reason of the Supreme Lord & Governor, which is accommodated to the Nature of Things, is called the Chief Law. Right Reason is an Unerring Law, not to be defied by any mortal Man, as if it were a thing written upon Paper or Pillars which must decay: But it proceeds from an Immortal Being, & is Itself Immortal; & engraven on an Immortal Soul Phil Jud. Reason is the Image of God. Ph. Jud. The Governing Part of Soul. M. Anton. The Supreme Part of Soul. Plutarch. This Quality is called Tert.



1. That what is said *sect. I. prop. IV.* must be true with respect to such a being for this further cause; because to him nothing can be right, that interferes with reason, and nothing can interfere with truth, but it must interfere with reason. Such a harmony there is between them. For whatever is known to be true, reason either finds it, or allows it to be such. Nothing can be taken for true by a rational being, if he has a reason to the contrary. 2. That there is to a rational being such a thing as *religion* which may also upon this further account properly be called *natural*. For certainly to obey the law, which the Author of his being has given him, is religion: and to obey the law, which He has given or revealed to him by making it to result from the right use of his own natural faculties, must be to him his *natural religion*. 3. A careful observation of truth, the way to happiness, and the practice of reason are in the issue the same thing. For, of the two last, each falls in with the first, and therefore each with other. And so, at last, natural religion is grounded upon this triple and strict alliance or union of *truth, happiness, and reason*; all in the same interest, and conspiring by the same methods, to advance and perfect human nature: and its truest definition is, *The pursuit of happiness by the practice of reason and truth.*

Permit me here again to insert an observation *obiter*.

*Obf.* The *επιτηδειον* of right reason and truth, or that which is to be regarded in judging of right and truth is *private*: that is, every one must judge for himself. For since all reasoning is founded originally in the knowledge of one's own private *ideas*, by virtue of which he becomes conscious of some first truths, that are undeniable; by which he governs his steps in his pursuits after more truths, &c. the *criterion*, or that by which he tries his own reasonings, and knows them to be right, must be the *internal* evidence he has already of certain truths, and the agreeableness of his inferences to them. One man can no more discern the objects of his own understanding, and their relations, by the faculties of another, than he can see with another man's eyes, or one ship can be guided by the helm of another. They must be his *own* faculties and conscience, that must determin him. Therefore to demand another man's assent to any thing without conveying into his mind such reasons, as may produce a sense of the truth of it, is to erect a tyranny over his understanding, and to demand a tribute which it is *not possible* for him to pay<sup>a</sup>. It is true indeed, tho I cannot see with another man's eyes, yet I may be assisted by another, who has better eyes, in finding an object and the circumstances of it; and so men may be *assisted* in making their judgments of things. They may be informed of things, which they did not know before, and which yet require a place among those that are to be

<sup>a</sup> *Religio cogi non potest, verbis potius quam verberibus res agenda est, ut sit voluntas. Lact.*

considerd ;

*Def<sup>n</sup> of Nat<sup>l</sup> Religion*

*The Privilege of Reason & Truth.*

*be forced upon any One.*

*It must be done by words, and by blows, that it may be a thing of force.*

considerd : and they may be directed what to advert principally upon ; how to state the question ; how to methodize their thoughts, and in general how to reason : especially if they want learning, or have only that part of it, which is little conversant in close reflexions, and doth not teach them to reason, or (as the case too often is) teaches them not to reason. But still this is all in order to produce such a light in them, that by it *they* may see and judge for themselves. An opinion, tho ever so true and certain to one man, cannot be transfused into another as true and certain by any other way, but by opening his understanding, and assisting him so to order his conceptions, that he may find the reasonableness of it *within himself*.

To prevent mistakes I pray take notice here, that, tho I say men must judge for themselves, I do not say they must in all cases *act* according to their private and single judgments. In respect of such things, as are private, and concern themselves *only*, or such as are left open and subject to every man's own sense, they may and ought ; only preserving a due deference to them, who differ from them, and are known upon other occasions to have more knowledge and literature than themselves : but when a society is concerned, and hath determin'd any thing, it may be considerd as one person, of which he, who dissents from the rest, is only perhaps a small particle ; and then his judgment will be in a manner absorbed and drown'd in that of the majority, or of them to whom the power of judging is intrusted. But I must not digress too far from the main business, the ways of coming at *truth*.

XIII. *The reports of sense are not of equal authority with the clear demonstrations of reason, when they happen to differ.* It is true, the *ideas* caused by the impression of sensible objects are real ideas, and truly known to the mind as they are in themselves ; and the mind may use them, and reason truly upon them : *that is*, the mind may make a right use of the *ideas*, which it finds in itself. But then whether these are the true *ectypes* of their originals, and drawn to the life, is many times a question ; and many times it is evident they are not. For that which has been anticipated under pr. III. but properly belongs to this, must be acknowledged. They are convey'd through *media* and by instruments susceptible of different dispositions and alterations, and may consequently produce different representations : and these cannot all be right. But suppose those instruments and *media* to be as intire and pure, as when intirest and purest ; yet still there may be in many respects an incapacity in the faculty to notify things just as they are. How mightily are the shape and size of a visible object varied upon us according to its distance, and the situation of the place, from whence the prospect is taken ? Now these things cannot be said of the reports, or rather determinations of reason. For in pure reasoning we use our own ideas for *themselves*, and such as the mind knows them to be, not as representatives of things, that may be falsely exhibited.



exhibited. This *internal* reasoning may indeed be wrongly applied to *external* things, if we reason about them as being what they are not: but then this is the fault not of reason, but of sense, which reports the case wrong; or perhaps of the person, who has not been sufficiently industrious to inform himself.

That same familiar instance of vision proves further, that reason may be applied to *over-rule* and *correct* sense. For when the pictures of objects are pricked out by the pencils of rays upon the *retina* of the eye, and do not give the true figure of those objects (as they not always do, being diversly projected, as the lines proceeding from the several points happen to fall upon that concave surface); this, tho it might impose upon a being, that has no faculty superior to sense, doth not impose upon our reason, which knows *how* the appearance is altered, and *why*. To think the sun <sup>a</sup> is not bigger, than it appears to the eye to be <sup>b</sup>, seems to be the last degree of stupidity. He must be a brute (so far from being a philosopher), who does not know, that the same line (*v. g.* the diameter of the sun) at different distances subtends different angles at the eye. A small matter of reason may serve to confute sense in this and the like cases.

*Obj.* How can *reason* be more certain than *sense*, since reason is founded in abstractions, which are originally taken from sensible objects? *Ans.* Perhaps the mind may by being exercised at first about particular objects by degrees find in itself this *capacity* of considering things by their *species*, making abstractions, &c. which it would not have done, had it never known any of these particulars. But then after it has found this capacity in itself, and attained to the knowledge of abstract and general *ideas*, I do not see why this capacity of reasoning by the help of them may not be used, upon this proficiencie, to censure and correct the advices of sense concerning even such particulars, as first gave occasion to the mind to exert this capacity and raise it self. Is it a new thing for a scholar to make such a progress in learning, as to be able *afterward* to teach the master, from whom he received his first rudiments? May not the modern philosophers correct the ancients, because these first shewd them the way, and led them into the study of nature? If we look impartially into the history of learning, and even of religion, we shall find that truth has generally advanced by degrees, and many times (very many; as if that was the method of introducing knowledge among men) risen out of *fable* and *error*, which gave occasion to those inquiries, by which *themselves* were detected. Thus blind ignorance was succeeded by a twilight of sense: this brightend by degrees: at last the sun as

<sup>a</sup> Tantalus ille—*sol.* Lucr. Poor creature!

<sup>b</sup> Nec nimio solis major rota—*Esse potest, nostris quam sensibus esse videtur.* Lucr. Epicurus autem posse putat etiam minorem esse quam videtur, &c. Cic.

*The Sun is that Small Thing*  
*The Obj. of the sun cannot be much bigger than it appears to our senses.*  
*Epicurus thought it might be less than it appears.*  
*For Nature without any teaching, proceeds upon those general Truths which are contained in, as we begin to know and understand, & confirms & perfects them by Reason.*  
*The facts or Principles of Knowledge are given us by Nature, but should be itself.*  
*If Sense be sound & true, & if every Thing be removed out of the way, that might obstruct or hinder it.*

It were rose upon some parts of the commonwealth of learning, and cleared up many things: and I believe many more will in time be cleared, which, whatever men think, are yet in their *dark* and *uncultivated* state. The understanding, tho it starts from *particulars*, in time makes a further progress, taking in *generals*, and such notions logical, metaphysical, &c. as never could possibly come in by the senses <sup>a</sup>. Beside, further, the *capacity* itself of admitting and considering general *ideas* <sup>a</sup> was originally in the mind, and is not derived from without. The intelligences communicated by sense are only an occasion of using what it had before <sup>b</sup>. Just as a master may, by the exercises he sets, excite the superior capacity of his scholar.

In a word, no man doth, or can pretend to believe his senses, when he has a reason against it: which is an irrefragable proof, that reason is above sense and controlls it. But,

XIV. *The reports of sense may be taken for true, when there is no reason against it* <sup>c</sup>. Because when there is *no* reason *not* to believe, that alone is a reason for believing them. And therefore,

XV. *In this case to act according to them* (i. e. as taking the informations of sense to be true) *is to act according to reason and the great law of our nature*.

Thus it appears that there are *two* ways, by which we may assure our selves of the truth of *many* things <sup>d</sup>; or at least may attain such a degree of certainty, as will be sufficient to determin our *practice*: by *reason*, and by *sense under the government of reason*; that is, when reason supports it, or at least doth not oppose it. By the former we discover speculative truths; by the latter, or both together matters of fact.

XVI. *Where certainty is not to be had* <sup>e</sup>, *probability must be substituted into the place of it*: that is, *it must be considered, which side of the question is the more probable*.

Probability, or that, which in this case may incline one to believe any proposition to be true rather than false, or any thing *to be* rather than *not to be*, or the

<sup>a</sup> *Natura etiam nullo docente profecta ab iis, quorum, ex prima & inchoata intelligentia, genera cognovit, confirmat ipsa per se rationem, & perficit. Cic.* <sup>b</sup> *Semina nobis scientia dedit [naturā] scientiam non dedit. Sen.*

<sup>c</sup> *Si sani sunt [sensus], & valentes, & omnia remouentur, qua obstant & impediunt. Cic.*

<sup>d</sup> *Socrates's saying, ap. Cic. nihil se scire, nisi id ipsum, favours of an affected humility, and must not be understood strictly. But they, who followed, went further (—omnes pene veteres: qui nihil cognosci, nihil percipi, nihil sciri posse dixerunt): and particularly Arcefilas negabat esse quidquam quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum, quod Socrates sibi reliquisset. And thus the absurdity grew to a size, that was monstrous. For no man can act, or even be alive, if he knows nothing at all. Beside, to know that one knows no thing, is a contradiction: and not to know, that he knows even that, is not to know, whether he knows any thing or not; and that is to know for ought he knows.*

<sup>e</sup> *Nec scire fas est omnia. Hor.*

*That he knows nothing but this, that he knew nothing—almost all are affirmed, nothing to be known, nothing perceived, nothing understood, nothing to be certainly known, not so much as to know oneself.*



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contrary, will generally shew itself upon the application of these and such like rules. 1. That may be reckond probable, which, in the estimation of reason, appears to be more agreeable to the constitution of nature. No body can certainly foretell, that *six-ace* will come up upon two dies fairly thrown before *amb-ace*: yet any one would choose to lay the former, because in nature there are twice as many chances for that as for the other. If a strolling wolf should light upon a lamb, it is not evidently known, that he will tear the lamb: but there is such a natural propension in that kind to do it, that no body would much question the event. (This instance might have been taken from amongst men, who are generally as far as they can be, wolves one to another.) If a parent causes his child to be instructed in the foundations of useful learning, educates him virtuously, and gives him his first impulse and direction in the way to true happiness, he will be more likely to proceed and continue in it; than he would be to hit upon it, and continue in it too, if he was left to himself to be carried away by his own passions, or the influence of those people, into whose hands he might fall, the bias of the former lying towards vice, and misery in the end, and the plurality of the latter being either wicked or ignorant or both. So that the advantage in point of probability is on the side of good education <sup>a</sup>. When *Herodotus* writes, that the *Egyptian* priests reported the sun had within the compass of 11340 years twice risen where it now sets, and set where it rises <sup>b</sup>, what is fit to be believed concerning the truth of this relation (as of many others), is easily discernable by this rule. *Herodotus*, possibly delighting in teratological stories, might tell what he never heard: or the passage may be an interpolation; or it may be altered in transcribing: or the priests, who pretended much to a knowledge of great antiquities, might out of mere vanity, to shew what children the *Greeks* were in respect of them, invent such a monstrous relation, and impose it upon them, whom they thought to have not much science among them: or it might be got into their memoirs before their time, who related it to *Herodotus*, and so pass upon posterity, as many other fictions and legends have done. These are such things, as are well known to have happened often. But that the diurnal rotation of the earth about her axis should be inverted, is a phenomenon, that has never been known to happen by any body else, either before or since; that is favoured by no observation; and that cannot be without great

<sup>a</sup> This was the opinion of a wise man. חנוך לנער על פי דרכו גם כי יקין לא יסור ממנה. Prov. For הלימוד בימי הנערות הוא כפתוח על האבן --- והלימוד בימי הזקנה כפתוח על החול. Quid ven. Οὐ μικρὸν ἀμφότερὰ τὸ ἕως ἢ ἕως τοῦ ἐκ νέου ἐθίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάμπαν μᾶλλον ὃ τὸ πᾶν. Arist. <sup>b</sup> Τετράκις ἔλεγον ἐξ ἡδίων ὅτι ἥλιον ἀνατεῖλαι: ὅθῃ τε νῦν καταδύεται ἐνδεῦτε δὲ ἐπαν- τεῖλαι: καὶ ὅθῃ νῦν ἀνατεῖται, ἐνδεῦτα δὲ καταδύεται. a/train up a child in way he shall go by the alteration

1K of Probability

Illustrated by 3 Similes

Surprizing Wonderful x

For learning in days of youth is like growing on a stone, - & learning in days of old age is like marking on glass - It is not a small but a very great advantage, or indeed all if can be, to be accustomed to such & such things from our very youth. Arist. b/ That sun had risen 4 times contrary to what it usually goes. Risen twice where it now sets, & set twice where it now rises

alteration in the mundane system, or those laws by which the motions of the planets, and of our earth among the rest, are governd. That this account then may be false is very consistent with the humor and circumstances of mankind: but that it should be true is very inconsistent with those laws, by which the motions of the celestial bodies seem to be regulated, and tend to persevere in their present courses and directions. It is therefore *in nature* much more probable, that this account is false. The odds are on that side. 2. When any *observation* hath hitherto *constantly* held true, or *most commonly* proved to be so, it has by this acquired an establishd credit; the cause may be presumed to retain its former force; and the effect may be taken as probable, if in the case before us there doth not appear something particular, some reason for exception. No man can demonstrate, that the sun will rise again, yet every one doth, and must act, as if that was certain<sup>a</sup>: because we apprehend no decay in the causes, which bring about this appearance, nor have any other reason to mistrust the event, or think it will be otherwise a few hours hence, than it has been hitherto. There is no apodictical argument to prove, that any particular man will die: but yet he must be more than mad, who can presume upon immortality here, when he finds so many generations all gone to a man, and the same *enemies*, that have laid them prostrate, still pursuing their *victories*. These and such like, tho in strictness perhaps not certainties, are justly current for such. So great is their probability. There are other observations, which, tho not so infallible as those, deserve yet to be thought of, and to have a share in the direction of our judgments. *Ex. gr.* There have been men in the world and no doubt still are, who, having had opportunities of imposing falsities upon mankind, of cheating, or committing other wickedness, have yet in spite of temptation preserved their integrity and virtue: but, since opportunity has so seldom faild to corrupt them who have been in possession of her, and men's interests and passions continue in general the same, it is more probable her charms will still have the same power and effect, which they use to have; which whoever doth not mind, will be wofully obnoxious to be abused by frauds *pious* and *impious*<sup>b</sup>. Briefly, when there is no particular reason for the contrary, what has oftneft happend, may from experience most reasonably be expected to happen again. 3. When neither nature nor other observations point out the probable conjecture to us, we must be determind (if it be necessary for us to be determind at all) by the reports, and sense of them, whom we apprehend, judging with the best skill we

2. K of Probability

Instance of Sun rising again

of Mortality of M

3. K of Probability

עולם כמנהגו הולך.

(המאמין לכל דבר פתי הוא)

פתי יאמין לכל דבר <sup>b</sup>. Prov. (which sure one may convert thus,

have



a. b. c. have<sup>a</sup>, to be most *knowing*<sup>b</sup> and *honest*<sup>c</sup>. Of all these rules the *first* is that which deserves the principal regard: the other two are of use, when nature so utterly excludes us from her bosom, that no opportunity is allowd of making a judgment. *Lastly*, when nature, the frequent repetition of the same event, and the opinion of the best judges concur to make any thing probable, it is so in the highest degree.

It appears from what has been said concerning the nature and foundations of *probability*, that the force of it results from observation and reason together. For here the one is not sufficient without the other. Reason without *observation* wants matter to work upon: and observations are neither to be made justly by our selves, nor to be rightly chosen out of those made by others, nor to be aptly applied, without the assistance of *reason*. Both together may support opinion and practice in the absence of knowledge and certainty. For those observations upon the nature of men and things, which we have made our selves, we know; and our own reasoning concerning them, and deductions from them we know: and from hence there cannot but arise in many cases an internal obligation to give our assent to this, rather than that; or to act one way, rather than another. And as to the observations of others, they may be so cautiously and skilfully selected, as to become almost our own; since our own reason and experience may direct us in the choice and use of them. The remarks and advice of *old men*<sup>d</sup>, who have gone through variety of scenes, lived long enough to see the consequences of their own and other peoples actions, and can now with freedom<sup>e</sup> look back and tell where they erred, are ordinarily sure to be preferred to those of *young* and raw actors. The *gnomæ*, apologues, &c. of *wise men*, and such as have made it their business to be useful spies upon nature and mankind, national *proverbs*, and the like<sup>f</sup>, may be taken as maxims commonly true. Men in their several professions and arts, in which they have been educated, and exercised themselves all their days, must be supposed to have greater knowledge and experience, than others can usually

<sup>a</sup> Statuere enim, qui sit sapiens, vel maximè videtur esse sapientis. Cic.

<sup>b</sup> Non numero hæc

judicantur, sed pondere, as Tully speaks upon another occasion. Therefore I cannot without a degree of indignation find a sort of writers pleasing themselves with having discovered some uncivilized nations, which have little or no knowledge of the Deity, &c. and then applying their observations to the service of atheism. As if *ignorance* could prove any thing, or alter its nature by being general!

<sup>c</sup> Aristotle's known rule is "Ενδοξα τὰ δοκῶντα πᾶσιν, ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις, ἢ τοῖς σοφοῖς" & τέτοις, ἢ τοῖς πᾶσιν, ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις, ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα γνωρίμοις καὶ ἐνδόξοις. But it is not applicable to all cases. <sup>d</sup> Δοκεῖ

μοι χρῆναι παρ' αὐτῶν [πρεσβυτέρων] πυνδάνειον, ὥσπερ τινα ὁδὸν προσηλυτόταν, ἢ καὶ ἡμῶς ἴσως διήσθη πορεύειν, ποία τις ἐστὶ. Plato.

<sup>e</sup> When Sophocles, now grown old, was asked, Πῶς ἔχῃς πρὸς τ' ἀφροδίσια, he answerd, Εὐφύμει, ὦ ἄνδρα περ' ἀσκημέσθαι μὴ τοι αὐτὸ ἀπέφυγον, ὥσπερ λυγλῶντά τινα καὶ ἀγρίον δεσπότην ἀποφυγόν. — παντάπασιν ὅτ' ἔγωγε τοιούτων ἐν τῇ γῆρι πολλὰ εἰρήνη γίνεσθαι καὶ ἰλδοῦσθαι. Plato, &c. al.

<sup>f</sup> Εὐ βραχὺ σφουρίλατον νῦν ἀείχοντα. Plut.

a/ It seems requisite that a M must be honest & wise, in order to determine who is a wise M. b/ These are the judges  
not by number but by weight  
c/ Those things are probable, which seem so to all men, or to most M or to wise M. Or which seem have: so much  
as these vizt to all or to a great many, or to most knowing & those of best reputation. But it is not applicable to all  
d/ I seem best to enquire of old M who have gone over way that you are to go, what sort of a way it is? Plato  
e/ What Relish he had of Women? He answerd "Be quiet I. I flee from them as gladly as I do run away from a mad  
a cruel Master. — There is great ease & freedom from all such things when a M is grown old" Plutarch

have: and therefore, if through want of capacity or honesty they do not either lose, or belie their opportunities and experience, they are in respect of those things, to which they have been bred and inured, more to be relied upon. And, lastly, *histories* written by credible and industrious authors, and red with judgment, may supply us with examples, parallel cases, and general remarks, profitable in forming our manners, and opinions too. And by the frequent perusal of them, and meditation upon them a dexterity in judging of dubious cases is acquired. Much of the temper of mankind, much of the nature and drift of their counsels, much of the course of Divine providence is visible in them.

*Use of History*

To conclude; that we ought to follow *probability*, when certainty leaves us, is plain: because then it becomes the *only* light and guide we have. For unless it is better to wander and fluctuate in *absolute* uncertainty than to follow such a guide; unless it be reasonable to put out our *candle*, because we have not the light of the *sun*, it must be reasonable to direct our steps by probability, when we have nothing clearer to walk by. And if it be reasonable, we are obliged to do it by prop. XI. When there is nothing above *probability*, it doth govern: when there is nothing in the opposite scale, or nothing of equal weight, this in the course of nature must turn the beam. Tho a man, to resume the instance before, cannot demonstrate that *sice-ace* will come up before *ambs-ace*, he would find himself obliged (if he could be obliged to lay at all) to lay on that side: nor could he not choose to do it. Tho he would not be certain of the chance, he would be certain of his own obligation, and on which side it lay.

Here then is another way of discovering, if not *truth*, yet what in practice may be supposed to be truth. *That is*, we may by this way discover, whether such propositions as these be true, *I ought to do this, rather than that; or, to think so, rather than the contrary.*

*Obs.* I have done now what I chiefly intended here. But, over and above that, we may almost from the premisses collect,

*First*, the principal causes of *error*, which I take to be such as these. 1. Want of *faculties*; when men pretend to judge of things above them. As some (straying out of their proper element, and falling into the dark, where they find no *ideas* but their own dreams, come to) assert what they have no reason to assert: so others deny what there is the highest reason to believe, only because they cannot *comprehend it*. 2. Want of due *reflexion* upon those *ideas* we have, or may have: by which it comes to pass, that men are destitute of that knowledge, which is gained by the contemplation of them, and their relations; misapply names, confusedly: and sometimes deal in a set of words and phrases, to which

*The Principal Causes of Error.*



no *ideas* at all belong, and which have indeed no meaning. Of kin to this is, 3. Want of proper qualifications and *προπαιδείματα*. As, when illiterate people invade the provinces of scholars; the half-lettered are forward, and arrogate to themselves what a *modest, studious* man dares not <sup>a</sup>, tho he knows more; and scholars, that have confined themselves to one sort of literature, lanch out into another: unsuccessfully all. 4. Not understanding in what the nature and force of a just *consequence* consists. Nothing more common than to hear people assert, that such a thing follows from such a thing; when it doth not follow: *i. e.* when such a consequence is founded in no axiom, no theorem, no truth that we know of. 5. Defects of *memory* and *imagination*. For men in reasoning make much use of these: memory is upon many occasions consulted, and sometimes draughts made upon the *phantasy*. If then they depend upon these, and these happen to be weak, clouded, perverted any way, things may be misrepresented, and men led out of the way by mis-shapen apparitions. There ought to be therefore a little *distrust* of these faculties, and such proper helps ought to be used, as perhaps the *best judgments* want the most. 6. Attributing too much to *sense*. For as necessary as our senses are to us, there are certainly many things, which fall not within their notice; many, which cannot be exhibited after the manner of sensible objects, and to which no images belong. Every one, who has but just saluted the mathematics and philosophy, must be convinced, that there are many things in nature, which seem absurd to sense, and yet must be admitted. 7. Want of *retirement*, and the practice of thinking and reasoning by our selves <sup>b</sup>. A rambling and irregular life must be attended with a loose and irregular head, ill-connected notions, and fortuitous conclusions. Truth is the offspring of *silence*, unbroken meditations, and thoughts often revised and corrected. 8. The strength of appetites, passions, prejudices. For by these the understanding may be corrupted, or overborn: or at least the operations of the mind must be much obstructed by the intrusion of such sollicitors, as are no retainers to the rational powers, and yet strong, and turbulent. Among other prejudices there is one of a particular nature, which you must have observed to be one of the *greatest* causes of modern irreligion. Whilst some opinions and rites are carried to such an immoderate height, as exposes the absurdity of them to the view of almost every body but them who raise them, not only gentlemen of the *belles lettres*, but even men of common sense, many

<sup>a</sup> *Sicut àμαθία ἢ θράσος, λογισμὸς ὃ ἔχον φέρει (è Thucyd.) ita recta ingenia debilitat verecundia, perversa confirmat audacia. Plin. jun.*

<sup>b</sup> *Ὅταν τι βυλόμεθα ἀκριβὲς νοῆσαι, εἰς ἐρημίαν ἀποδιδέασκομεν, καταμύομεν τὰς ὄψεις, τὰ ὅσα ἐπιφράττομεν, ἀποταττομεθα ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι. Ph. Jud.*

a/ As Ignorance carries Impudence along with it / out of Thucydides / Reputation makes M. Lazzy, so times Modesty weakens great Genius, & Impudence confirms Obstinacy. Plin Jun.  
 b/ When We would consider a Thing very exactly, We retire into some private Place, We wink our Eyes & stop our Ears, & renounce all our Bodily Senses. Ph. Jud.

times see through them; and then out of indignation and an excessive renitence, not separating that which is true from that which is false, they come to deny both, and fall back into the contrary extreme, a contempt of all religion in general <sup>a</sup>.  
 9. Ill stating of a question; when men either put it wrong themselves, or accept it so put from others. A small addition or falsity slipped into the case will ferment, and spread itself: an artificial color may deceive one: an incumberd manner may perplex one. The question ought to be presented before its judge clean, and in its natural state, without disguise or distortion. To this last may be subjoind another cause, nearly allied to it; not fixing the sense of *terms*, and (which must often follow) not rightly understanding what it is, that is to be examin'd and resolv'd.

*Secondly*, the reason why the *many* are commonly in the wrong and so wretchedly misjudge things. The generality of people are not sufficiently prepared, by a proper education, to find truth by reasoning. And of them, who have liberal education, some are soon immerst and lost in pleasures, or at least in fashionable methods of living, rolling from one visit or company to another <sup>b</sup>, and flying from nothing so much as from themselves and the quiet retreats proper for meditation and reasoning: others become involved in business and the intricate affairs of life, which demand their attention, and ingross their time: others fall into a slothful neglect of their studies and disuse of what they have learnt, or want help and means to proceed, or only design to deceive life and gratify themselves with the amusements and sensual parts of learning: and others there are, whose misfortune it is to begin wrong, to begin with the conclusion; taking their opinions from places, where they have been bred, or accommodating them to their situation in the world, and the conditions of that employment, by which they are to get their bread, before they have ever consider'd them; and then making the subsequent business of their lives to dispute for them, and maintain them, right or wrong. If such men happen to be in the right, it is luck, and part of their portion, not the effect of their improvements: and if they happen to be in the wrong, the more they study, and the more learning they get, the more they are confirmed in their errors; and having set out with their backs upon truth, the further they go, the more they recede from it. Their knowledge is a kind of negative quantity, so much worse or less than no knowledge. Of this sort there are many: and very few indeed (with respect to the bulk of mankind), whose determinations and *tenents* were ever in the form of questions: there could not otherwise be so many sects and different denominations of men, as there are, upon

*Want of proper Education  
or Way of Life*

<sup>a</sup> *Aliis nullus est deorum respectus, aliis pudendus.* Plin. Sen. The former part of this observation is in truth the effect of the latter.

<sup>b</sup> *Pudet dicere frequentiam salutandi, &c.* Hieron.

*Some do not worship Gods at all, & others do it in a I Ramaschal manner. the*  
*I am ashamed to relate what sort of visits they make to each other &c. Jeron.*



the face of the earth. The sum of all in a few words is this: many qualifications are requisite in order to judge of some truths, and particularly those which are of *greatest importance*: proper learning and penetration, vacancy from business, a detachment from the interest of all parties, much sincerity and a perfect *resignation* to the government of reason and force of truth; which are things not to be reconciled with the usual ignorance, passions, tumultuary lives, and other circumstances which carry most men transverse.

### Sect. IV. *Of the Obligations of imperfect Beings with respect to their power of acting.*

There remains yet *another* question, supposed also to be proposed by an objector, which must not be forgot; and upon which I shall bestow this very short section. The question was this, *If a man can find out truth, may he not want the power of acting agreeably to it?*

I. *Nothing is capable of no obligation.* For to oblige *nothing* is the same as *not* to oblige.

II. *So far as any being has no power, or opportunity of doing any thing, so far is that being incapable of any obligation to do it: or, no being is capable of any obligation to do that, which it has not power or opportunity to do.* For that being, which has not the faculties or opportunity necessary to the doing of any thing, is in respect of that thing a being utterly unactive, no agent at all, and therefore as to that act nothing at all.

To require or command one to do any thing is to require him to apply a power superior to the resistance to be met with in doing it. To require him to apply such a power is the same as to require that his power of such a kind and degree be applied. But if he has no such power, then his power of that kind and degree is *nothing*: and it is nothing, that is required to be applied. Therefore nothing is required to be done. It is just the same, as if a man was commanded to do something with his third hand, when he has but two: which would be the same as to bid him to do it with *no* hand, or *not* bid him do it.

Without more ado, it is a truth confessed by every body, that no body is obliged to impossibilities.

From hence will follow, after the manner of *corollaries*, the two following propositions.

III. *Inani-*

III. *Inanimate and unactive beings are capable of no obligation: nor merely sensitive of any obligation to act upon principles, or motives above sense.*

IV. *The obligations of beings intelligent and active must be proportionable to their faculties, powers, opportunities; and not more.*

V. *To endeavour may fitly express the use of all the opportunities and powers, that any intelligent and active, but imperfect, being hath to act. For to endeavour is to do what one can: and this as every such being may do, where ever he stands in the scale of imperfects, so none can do more. One may exert his endeavours with greater advantage or success, than another; yet still they are but endeavours.*

VI. *The imputations of moral good and evil to beings capable of understanding and acting must be in proportion to their endeavours: or, their obligations reach, as far as their endeavours may.* This follows again from what has been said: and so does this

VII. and lastly, *They who are capable of discerning truth, tho not all truths, and of acting conformably to it, tho not always or in all cases, are nevertheless obliged to do these, as far as they are able: or, it is the duty of such a being sincerely to endeavour to practice reason; not to contradict any truth, by word or deed; and in short, to treat every thing as being what it is.*

Thus the general duties of rational beings, mentiond in or resulting from the preceding sections, are brought together, and finally fixt under the *correction* or *limitation* in this last proposition. This is the sum of their religion, from which no exemption or excuse lies. Every one can endeavour: every one can do what he can. But in order to that every one ought to be in *earnest*, and to exert himself *heartily*; not stifling his own conscience, not dissembling, suppressing, or neglecting his own powers.

And now *needless* to me seem those disputes about *human liberty*, with which men have tired themselves and the world. The case is much the same, as if a man should have some great reward or advantage offerd to him, if he would get up and go to such a place to accept it, or do some certain thing for it, and he, instead of going or doing any thing, falls into a tedious disquisition about his own *freedom*; whether he has the power to stir, or whether he is not chaind to his seat, and necessitated to sit still. The short way of knowing this certainly is to try. If he can do nothing, no labor can be lost; but if he is capable of acting, and doth not act, the consequences and blame must be justly chargeable upon

*The Force of Disputes  
Concerning Human Liberty*



himself. And I am persuaded, if men would be serious, and put forth themselves<sup>a</sup>, they would find by experience, that their wills are not so universally and peremptorily determin'd by what occurs, nor predestination and fate so rigid<sup>b</sup>, but that *much* is left to their own conduct<sup>c</sup>. Up and try<sup>d</sup>.

Sure it is in a man's power to keep his hand from his mouth: if it is, it is also in his power to forbear excess in eating and drinking. If he has the command of his own feet, so as to go either this way or that or no whither, as sure he has, it is in his power to abstain from ill company and vicious places. And so on<sup>e</sup>.

This suggests a very material thought: that *forbearances*, at least in all ordinary cases, are within our power<sup>f</sup>; so that a man may if he will, forbear to do that, which contradicts truth: but where acting is required, that very often is not in his power. He may want abilities, or opportunities; and so may seem to contradict truth by his omission, which, if his infirmities and disadvantages were taken into the account, and the case was rightly stated, he would be found not to do.

\* Τὰ χρεῖς ἐπιστάμεθα, καὶ γινώσκοντες, οὐκ ἐκπευόμεν δ'. οἱ μὲν ἀργίας ὕπο, καλ. Eurip.

in Arabic is to die: and from hence the word *fatum* seems to come (as many Latin words do from that and other Eastern languages), death, if any thing, being fatal and necessary. Yet it doth not follow, that therefore the time or manner of dying is unmoveably fixt. Οὐ πάντα καθαρῶς εἰδὲ ἀγάρρη-  
δον ἢ ἐμμετρήν ἀπέχει, ἀλλ' ὅσα καθόλου. Plut. Chrysippus ap. A. Gell. seems to explain himself much after the same manner. The ancients moreover seem many times to make fate conditional. *Similis si cura fuisset, Nec pater omnipotens Trojam, nec fata vetabant Stare, &c.* Virg.

What the Pharisees say, according to Josephus, seems to be right. Οἱ μὲν ἐν Φαρισαίοις τινα καὶ ἐ πάντα τῆς ἐμμετρήνης εἶναι λέγουσιν ἔργον, τινὰ δ' ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς ὑπάρχειν, συμβαίνει τε καὶ ἐ γίνεσθαι. R. Albo, in relation to human actions (and the consequent events), explains this opinion thus. מְקַצֵּת מְכַרְחֹת וּמְקַצֵּת מְעוּרְבוֹת מִן הַחֲכָרָה וּבַחֲכָרָה וְכוּ. But for men to charge their own faults upon fate or fortune has been an old practice: ἐπιδοκακίσαντας—ἐπὶ τὴν κοινὴν ἐκείνῃ ἀποδοίαν καταφυγεῖν, καλ. Luc.

<sup>d</sup> *Dimidium facti, qui coepit, habet. sapere aude.* Hor. Aristotle goes further than that old adagial saying (ἀρχὴ ἡμισυ παντός). His words are Δοκεῖ πλέον ἢ τὸ ἡμισυ τῷ παντός εἶναι ἡ ἀρχή.

<sup>e</sup> Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔτα κακῶς συντίταται τῷ ψυχὴν ἐχόντων, ὥστε ἀδελφὸν ἀν-  
τὶ προΐναι πόδας, ἢ φέιν/εἶδεν γλῶτταν, καλ. Plut. That in Tibullus, *Cum bene juravi, pes tamen ipse redit*, is a little poetic folly.

<sup>f</sup> Ὅλως, ὃ πᾶσα ἀρχία καὶ τὸ τυχέσης πρᾶξιός ἐστιν ἐμμετρήν. οἷον.  
ἐ φονεύεις, ἐ μοιχεύεις, καλ. Baf.

c. The Pharisees say something, but all are work of fate, for some are in our own power, & some may by accident not come to pass. R. Albo, thus. "Some events are perfectly free, some of them are forced, & some of them have a mixture of choice & force. But for me to charge their own faults upon fate or fortune has been an old practice. "Voluntary evil-doers have recourse by apology" Lucian.  
d. He that has made a good Beginning has half finished his work. Take courage then to finish it. Hor. Arist goes further than old adagial saying. (The Beginning is half work) in his Sect. are  
e. The Beginning is more than Half of whole Business".  
f. No living creatures are so badly constituted, as that their feet will move, & their tongues speak & they will do that in Tibullus. Who I had directly known to be contrary, yet my feet w<sup>d</sup> come back again" is a little poetic  
g. In general to forbear a thing is very easy. As Hor. thou shalt not kill. Thou shalt not commit adultery.

SECT. V. Truths relating to the Deity. Of his existence, perfection, providence, &c.

I Have shewn in what the nature of *moral good* and *evil* consists; viz. a conformity or disagreement to *truth*, and those things that are coincident with it, *reason* and *happiness*: also, how truth is discovered; by *sense*, or *reason*, or *both*. I shall now specify some of those *truths*, which are of greatest importance and influence, and require more reasoning to discover them; leaving the rest (common matters of fact) to the common ways of finding them. They respect principally either the *Deity*, or *our selves*, or the *rest of mankind*. The first sort are the subject of this section.

I. Where there is a subordination of causes and effects, there must necessarily be a cause in nature prior to the rest, uncaused. Or thus, Where there is a series, in which the existence of one thing depends upon another, the existence of this again upon some other, and so upwards, as the case shall be, there must be some independent being, upon whom it doth originally depend.

If Z (some body) be put into motion by Y, Y by X, and X by W, it is plain that X moves Y, and Y moves Z only as they are first moved, X by W, and Y by X: that Z, Y, X are *moveds*, or rather Z more Y more X, taken together<sup>a</sup>, are *one moved*: that W stands here as the first mover, or author of the motion, unmoved by any other: that therefore without W there would be a *moved* without a *mover*, which is absurd<sup>b</sup>: and lastly, that of what length soever the series may be, the case will be ever the same; - i. e. if there be no *First mover* <sup>c</sup> unmoved, there must be a *moved* without a *mover*.

Further, if W, whom we will suppose to be an intelligent being, and to have a power of beginning motion, hath this power originally in himself and independently of all others, then here not only the first mover in this series, but a *First being* and original cause is found. Because that, which has a power of beginning motion independent of any other, is a *mover independent*; and therefore is independent, or has an independent existence, since nothing can be a mover without being. But if W

<sup>a</sup> Z Y X.

<sup>b</sup> One might with the Στασιώται (so called by Aristotle, ap. S. Emp.) as well deny, that there is any such thing as motion, as say there is motion without a mover; or, which is the same, a first mover.

<sup>c</sup> Πρῶτον μετέωρον. Plata. Ἀρχὴ κινήσεως ἀπάσης. Id. Πρῶτον κινῶν. Arist.

something that first causes an alteration in any thing. - The principle of all motion Plato The first mover. Arist. stationary / Kilon<sup>24</sup>



has not this power independently in himself, then he must receive it from some other, upon whom he depends, and whom we will call V. If then V has a power of *conferring a faculty* of producing motion originally and independently in himself, here will be a *First, independent cause*. And if it can be supposed, that he has it not thus, and that the *series* should rise too high for us to follow it; yet however we cannot but conclude, that there is *some* such *cause*, upon whom this train of beings and powers must depend, if we reason as in the former paragraph. For,

*Universally*, if Z be *any effect whatsoever*, proceeding from or depending upon Y as the *cause* of its existence, Y upon X, X upon W, it is manifest that the existence of all, Z, Y, X does *originally* come from W, which stands here as the Supreme cause, depending upon nothing: and that without it X could not be, and consequently neither Y, nor Z. Z, Y, X, being all effects (or dependents), or rather Z more Y more X *one effect*, without W there would be an effect without a cause. Lastly, let this retrogression from effects to their causes be continued ever so far, the same thing will still recur, and without such a cause as is before mentioned the whole will be an effect without an efficient, or a dependent without any thing to depend upon; *i. e. dependent, and not dependent*.

*Obj.* The *series* may ascend *infinitely*, and for that reason have no *first* mover or cause. *Ans.* If a *series* of bodies moved can be supposed to be *infinite*, then taken together it will be equal to an *infinite body* moved: and this *moved* will not less *require* a mover than a finite body, but *infinitely more*. If I may not be permitted to place a first mover at the top of the *series*, because it is supposed to be infinite, and to have no beginning; yet still there must of necessity be *some* cause or author

\* The greatest men among the ancients denied the possibility of such an ascent. Οὐτε γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐκ τῶν δυνάμεων ἑαυτὸν εἰς ἀπείρου. *Arist.* If there could be such a process, then all the parts of it but the last would be *μῖσα*: and then *ἑπὶ μὲν ἐστὶ τὸ πρῶτον, ὅλως αἰτίον ἑδὲν ἐστὶ, κλ.* To suppose one thing moved by another, this by another, and so *ἐπὶ ἀπείρου*, is to suppose *ὅτι ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον ἑδὲν γὰρ ἕτως ὅτε αὐτὸν εἴηαι ἕτερον ἀνέμνον, μὴ ἕως ἀρχῆς τῆς αὐτοῦ.* *Simpl.* Not only those *Arabian* philosophers called *Hebr.* מדרביר, *Arab.* اَلْمَدَحَلْمُون, but many of the elder *Jews* have agreed with the *Greeks* in this matter, and added arguments of their own. Of the former see *Mor. nebok. & al.* particularly *S. Kozri*: where their first argument seems to be strong (and much the same with the fourth in *S. Emunoth*). אִין הִיה חולף אִין לו ראשית הנה האישים הנמצאים בזמן החולף ער העת הזאת אִין תכלית להם ומה שאין לו תכלית לא יצא אל הפועל. For tho, as *Muscatus* observes, these reasonings of the *Medabberim* [המורה] לא לרצון היו לפניו [המורה] yet most certainly let the *series* of causes and effects be what it will, it is just as long downward as upward; and if they are infinite and inexhaustible one way, they must be so the other too: and then what *Saad. Ga.* says, takes place לא אִין תגיע ההויה אלינו לא נהיה וכו. There is another argument of this kind in *Justin M.* which deserves notice, what stress soever may be laid upon it. Εἰ τὸ μέλλον μέλλει ὁ χρόνος, says he, ἔπω ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ γένος μέλλει ὁ χρόνος πρὸς τὸ γένος μέλλει ἢ ἀπὸ ὅτε ὅτι ἢ τὸ γένος μέλλει ὁ χρόνος.

Rabon Philon. were not agreeable to him

If we had no beginning we could not now exist

If it is impossible for one thing to be moved from another for ever. *Arist.* If there could be such a process of parts of it but last would be *Intermediate ones*. "And then if there be no first, there can be no cause at all." To suppose one thing moved by another, this by another, &c. infinitely, is to suppose "a thing it is impossible, for nothing can either move or be moved in this manner, without any beginning of motion." *Simpl.* — If there be any succession in time, then the number of those M. who existed during that whole succession down to the present time must be infinite, & that which is infinite cannot be the effect of any one thing. — If the future part of time, says he, has no existence, & part of time that is past was future before it was present, then there was a time when the past had no existence.

of the motion<sup>a</sup>, different from all these bodies, because their being (by the *supposition*) no one body in the *series*, that moves the next, but only in consequence of its being moved first itself, there is no one of them that is not *moved*, and the whole can be considered together but as an infinite body moved, and which must therefore be moved by *something*.

The same kind of answer holds good in respect of *all* effects and their causes in general. An *infinite* succession of effects will require an *infinite* efficient, or a cause *infinitely* effective. So far is it from requiring *none*.

Suppose a *chain*<sup>b</sup> hung down out of the heavens from an *unknown* height, and tho every link of it gravitated toward the earth, and what it hung upon was not visible, yet it did not descend, but kept its situation; and upon this a question should arise, *What supported or kept up this chain*: would it be a sufficient answer to say, that the *first* (or lowest) link hung upon the second (or that next above it), the *second* or rather the *first and second together* upon the *third*, and so on *ad infinitum*? For what holds up the *whole*? A *chain* of *ten* links would fall down, unless something able to bear it hinderd: one of *twenty*, if not staid by something of a yet greater strength, in proportion to the increase of weight: and therefore one of *infinite* links certainly, if not sustained by something *infinitely* strong, and capable to bear up an infinite weight. And thus it is in a *chain* of causes and effects<sup>c</sup> tending, or as it were *gravitating*, towards some end. The last (or lowest) depends, or (as one may say) is *suspended* upon the cause above it: this again, if it be not the first cause, is suspended as an effect upon something above it, &c.<sup>d</sup> And if they should be infinite, unless (agreeably

<sup>a</sup> Aristotle himself, who asserts the eternity of motion, asserts also the necessity of a first and eternal mover.

<sup>b</sup> Σεισὴν χρυσέην ἐξ ὑψόθεν.—Hom. Aurea de celo—funis is mentioned too by Lucr.

<sup>c</sup> אי אפשר שישתלשל ענין מעלה ועלול אל בלתי תכלית. S. Iggar.

<sup>d</sup> The chain must be fastend αὐτὴ πρὸν οὐλόμηνον. Invenietur, says Macrobius, pressius intuenti à summo

Dec usque ad ultimam rerum facem—connexio: & hac est Homeri catena aurea, quam pendere de celo in terras Deum jussisse commemorat. This matter might be illustrated by other similitudes

(even שלשלת הקבלה might serve for one): but I shall set down but one more: and in that indeed the motion is inverted, but the thing is the same taken either way. It occurs in *Hhob. halleb.*

and afterward in *Resh. hhokm.* Suppose a row of blind men, of which the last laid his hand upon the shoulder of the man next before him, he on the shoulder of the next before him, and so on till the foremost grew to be quite out of sight; and some body asking, what guide this string of blind men had at the head of them, it should be answered, that they had no guide, nor any head, but one held by another, and so went on, *ad infin.* would any rational creature accept this for a just answer? Is it not to say, that infinite blindness (or blindness, if it be infinite) supplies the place of sight, or of a guide?

lowest Drops that are. This is Chain w<sup>h</sup> he tells you God down from Heaven to earth.

Rel Chain of Cabala

Simile +



to what has been said) there is some *cause* upon which all hang or depend, they would be but an infinite effect without an efficient: and to assert there is any such thing, would be as great an *absurdity*, as to say, that a finite or *little* weight wants something to sustain it, but an infinite one or the *greatest* does not.

II. *A Cause or Being, that has in nature no superior cause, and therefore (by the terms) is also unproduced, and independent, must be self-existent: i. e. existence must be essential to him; or, such is his nature, that he cannot but be.* For every being must either exist of itself, or not of itself: that which exists not of itself must derive its existence from some other, and so be *dependent*: but the Being mentiond in the proposition is supposed to be *independent*, and *uncaused*. Therefore He must exist, not *this* way, but the *other*. The root of His existence can be sought for no where, but in His own nature: to place it any where else is to make a cause *superior* to the *Supreme*.

III. *There must be such a Being.* For (beside what has been said already) if there was not at least *one* such Being, *nothing* could be at all <sup>b</sup>. For the *universe* could not produce itself <sup>c</sup>; nor could any *part* of it produce itself, and then produce the rest: because this is supposing a thing to *act* before it is.

\* So Aristotle says of the First mover, Οὐκ ἐνδεχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔστι, &c. And after him the Arabic philosophers, Maimonides, Albo, & al. pass. teach all that God exists necessarily. מן השקר העררו: to suppose him not to be implies a falsity; or, He cannot be supposed not to be. This seems to be the import of that name, by which God calls himself in Moses's history; אֲדֹנָי אֲדֹנָי; or in one word, אֲדֹנָי; which in the mouth of one who speaks of Him in the third person is יהוה or יהוה. So Philo explains it; Εἶναι πῶσα. So Abarbanel; אֲנִי אֲדֹנָי בְּעֹבוֹר שְׁמִי אֲדֹנָי כִּי; adding moreover, that it shewd God to be not, like other beings, אִיפְשָׁרִי הַמְצִיאוֹת, but מְחֻיֵּב הַמְצִיאוֹת מִצַּד עַצְמוֹ, a *Necessary being*. And so R. L. b. Gersth. יורה זה השם שהוא הנמצא אשר ימצא מעצמותו. I omit others, who write after the same manner. There have been even Heathens, who seemd to think, that some such name as this belonged to the Deity, and for the same reason. For as אֲדֹנָי and thence יהוה are used above, so Plutarch says, that in addressing to Him the second person Εἴ (תהיה, or תהוה) is αὐτοτελὴς ὁ Θεὸς προσαγορεύουσιν καὶ προσφώνουσιν: and that by this compellation we give Him ἀλγὰ καὶ ἁψυδὴ καὶ μόνω μόνω προσάγαγοντες καὶ εἶναι προσαγορεύουσιν. Ἡμῶν γὰρ ὅτι ἔντας ὁ εἶναι μέτεστιν ἑμῶν it is τὸ εἶναι καὶ ἀγεννητὸν καὶ ἀφθαρτόν that is ἔντας ὁ. <sup>b</sup> Something must be מְחֻיֵּב הַמְצִיאוֹת, otherwise לא יהיה. <sup>c</sup> This needs no demonstration. But there is a very old one in S. Emun. and after in Hhob. halleb. עושה את עצמו אל ימלט מאחר משני דברים שעשה את עצמו קודם היותו או אחר היותו ושניהם אי אפשר וכו'.

## IV. Such

So Abarbanel. I am *be* I am; nor my Existence does not depend upon any thing without me, but is from myself. adding moreover that it shewd of *be*, not like other beings "a being" might or might not exist" but *be* Existence flows necessarily from *be* a Necessary being and so R. L. b. Gersth. off & shews this, for it supposes a Being that exists of itself or from its own nature. Hence Jehovah He shall be are used above. So Plutarch says of 2<sup>d</sup> Person "Thou shalt be" is not complete Appellation of God. That thereby we give Him a Name certain, & only title that is peculiar to self-existent Being. Self-Existence does not belong to any of us. It is that which is Eternal w<sup>th</sup> never had any beginning, such is incorruptible. He who makes *be* must be said to do one or other of these two things. Viz. Either to have made *be* before he *be* or else to have made *be* after he *be*. Either of which is impossible.

IV. *Such a Being, as is before described, must not only be eternal, but infinite.* *Eternal* He must be, because there is no way, by which such a Being can either *begin* or *cease* to be, existence being of His essence. And *infinite* He must be, because He can be *limited* by no other as to his existence. For if there was any being able to limit Him, He must be *inferior* to that being. He must also in that case be *dependent*: because he must be beholden to that being for his being *what He is*, and that He is not confined within *narrower* limits. Beside, if His *presence* (whatever the manner of it is) was any where excluded, He would not be *there*: and if *not there*, He might be supposed to be *not elsewhere*: and thus he might be supposed *not to be at all*. But such a Being, as is described in the II. prop. cannot so much as be *supposed not to be*.

V. *Such a Being is above all things, that fall under our cognizance: and therefore his manner of existence is above all our conceptions.* For He is a *necessary* existent: but nothing within our comprehension is of this kind. We know no being, but what we can *imagine not to be* without any contradiction or repugnance to nature: nor do we know of any beside this Supreme being himself. For with respect to Him indeed we know, *by reasoning*, that there *must be* One being who cannot be supposed not to be; just as certainly as we know there is any thing at all: tho we cannot know *Him*, and how he exists. Adequate ideas of eternity <sup>a</sup> and infinity are above us, us finites <sup>b</sup>.

<sup>a</sup> What relation or analogy there is between *time* (a flux of moments) and *eternal* (unchangeable) existence; how any being should be not older *now*, than he was 5000 years ago, &c. are speculations attended with insuperable difficulties. Nor are they at all cleared by that of *Timæus ap. Plat.* Ὡς ποτ' αἰδίου παράδειγμα τ' ἰδανικὸν κόσμον ὁδὴ ἀεὶ ὡς πρὸς παράδειγμα τ' αἰῶνα ὁδὴ χρόνον συν κόσμῳ ἰδαμικὴν γένηται; or that in *Philo*, Αἰὼν ἀναγράφεται ἑνὶ νοτὲ βίῳ κόσμου, ὡς αἰδίου χρόνον. Many philosophers therefore have thought themselves obliged to deny, that God exists in *time*. Τό, τ' ἦν, τό, τ' ἔστι, χρόνος γεγενῆσθαι εἶδη, φέροντες λαβδάνομα ἐπὶ τὴν αἰδίου εἰσίν, σὺν ὁρθῶς, κλ. *Plato*. "Ἐστιν ὁ Θεὸς, καὶ φάναι, ὅτι καὶ ἔστιν αἰὼνα χρόνον ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ αἰῶνα τὸ αἰνιγμένον, ὅτι ἄχρονον ὁ αἰὼν τὸν, ὅτι ὁ πρότερον, ἔστιν ἔστιν, ὅτι ὕστερον ἔστιν νῦν ἔστιν τὸ αἰὼν πεπλήρωται, κλ. *Plut.* והוא וזמן וזמן וזמן יתעלה אין יחס בינו ובין הזמן וכו'. *Maim.* אינו מצוי בזמן. *Id.* *Albo* has a whole Chapter to shew תחת הזמן נופל תחת הזמן שיהי אינו נופל תחת הזמן, or that תחת הזמן נופל תחת הזמן, or that תחת הזמן נופל תחת הזמן. In short, they reckon (to use *R. Gedal's* words) שזמן האמת הוא נברא והמשך אינו קרוי זמן. And so what they say, doth not include all the present difficulty, *time* in their use of the word being confined to the duration of this world, which according to them is new. Yet see b. 2. c. 19. הש"י נברא שזמן עליו שיש לו יותר זמן היום ממה שהיה לו בימי ריוד וממה שהיה לו כשברא העולם

<sup>b</sup> Οἶδα μὲ πολλὰ καὶ ἐπιτάμνω τὸ αὐτὸν τὸ πρόσωπον. — ὅτι ἀναρχὸς ἐστὶν [ὁ Θεός], καὶ ἀγέννητος, καὶ ἀίδιος, οἶδα. τὸ δὲ πᾶς οὗτος οἶδα. *So Chrysostom.* οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμετέραν ἀνθρώπων ἀντιλήψιν, ἀλλὰ ἡμετέραν ἀνθρώπων ἀντιλήψιν. *K* was before world was. But of time it is reckoned by motion of the world, & is called the order, or succession of time, not absolute time. In short they reckon time of time properly so called, is created by motion of the world, & is called the order, or succession of time, not absolute time. Beside key name (Jehovah) it is not possible to affirm concerning him, that he is older today, than he was yesterday, or that he was when he first created this world.



In inquiring after the causes of things, when we find (or suppose) this to be the cause of that, another thing to be the cause of this again, and so on, if we can proceed, it may always be demanded with respect to the last cause that we can comprehend, *What is the cause of that?* So that it is not *possible* for us to terminate our inquiries of this kind but in something, which is to us *incomprehensible*. And therefore the Supreme cause must certainly be such<sup>a</sup>. But tho it is impossible for us to have an adequate notion of his manner of existence, yet we may be sure that,

VI. *He exists in a manner, which is perfect.* For He, who exists of himself, depends in no regard upon any other, and (as being a Supreme cause) is the fountain of existence to other beings, must exist in the *uppermost* and *best* manner of existing. And not only so, but (since He is *infinite* and *illimited*) He must exist in the best manner *illimitedly* and *infinitely*. Now to exist thus is infinite goodness of existence; and to exist in a manner *infinitely good* is to be *perfect*.

VII. *There can be but One such Being*<sup>b</sup>. That is, as it appears by prop. III. that there must be at least *one* independent Being, such as is mentiond in prop. I. so now, that in reality there is *but One*<sup>c</sup>. Because his manner of existence being perfect and *illimited*, that manner of being (if I may speak so) is *exhausted* by Him, or belongs solely to Him<sup>d</sup>. If any other could partake with Him in it, He must want what that other had; be *deficient* and *limited*. Infinite and illimited inclose all<sup>e</sup>.

If there could be *two* Beings each by himself *absolutely* perfect, they must be either of the *same*, or of *different* natures. Of the *same* they cannot be; because thus, *both* being *infinite*, their existences would be *coincident*: that is, they would be but the *same* or *one*. Nor can they be of *different* natures: because if their natures were *opposite* or *contrary* the one to the other, being equal (infinite both and every where meeting the one with the other), the one would just *destroy* or be

<sup>a</sup> Simonides had good reason still to double upon Hiero the number of days allowd for answering that question, *Quid, aut quale sit Deus?* Ap. Cic. <sup>b</sup> *Nec viget quidquam simile aut secundum.* Hor.

<sup>c</sup> In Mor. neb. Maimonides having proved, that there must be some Being, who exists necessarily, or whose existence is necessary ברחיית עצמו, proceeds from this necessity of existence to derive incorporeity, absolute simplicity, perfection, and particularly unity, המחווייב המציאות אי אפשר בו השניות כלל לא דומה ולא הפך וכו' <sup>d</sup> Therefore by Plato He is called 'O ōs, the One.

<sup>e</sup> *Deus, si perfectus est, — ut esse debet, non potest esse nisi unus, ut in eo sint omnia.* If there could be more Gods than one, *tantum singulis deerit, quantum in ceteris fuerit.* Lact. *Everyone wd want w<sup>y</sup> other be.*

the

c. This impossibility of Number 2 can be applied to that w<sup>h</sup> necessarily exists, there is nothing y<sup>e</sup> can be compared to it, nor no Reverse of it.

the *negation* of the other<sup>a</sup>: and if they are supposed to be only different, not opposite, then if they differ as *disparates*, there must be some *genus* above them; which cannot be: and however they differ, they can only be said at most to be beings perfect in their *respective kinds*. But this is not to be *absolutely* perfect; it is only to be perfect in *this* or *that* respect: and to be only thus implies imperfection in *other* respects.

What has been here said is methinks sufficient to ruin the *Manichean* cause and exclude the *independent principle of evil*. For if we cannot account for the existence of that *evil*, which we find by experience to be in the world, it is but one instance out of many of our ignorance. There may be reasons for it, tho we do not *know* them. And certainly no such experience must make us deny *axioms* or *truths* equally certain<sup>b</sup>. There are, beside, some things relating to this subject, which deserve our attention. For as to *moral* good and evil, they seem to depend upon our selves<sup>c</sup>. If we do but endeavour, *the most* we can, to do what we ought, we shall not be guilty of *not doing* it (sect. IV.): and therefore it is our fault, and not to be charged upon any other being<sup>d</sup>, if guilt and *evil* be introduced by *our* neglect, or abuse of our own liberty and powers<sup>e</sup>. Then as to *physical* evil; without it much physical *good* would be lost, the one necessarily interfering the other<sup>f</sup>. Some things *seem* to be evil, which would not appear to be such, if we could see through the *whole* contexture of things<sup>g</sup>. There are not *more* evil than good things in the world, but surely more of the *latter*<sup>h</sup>. Many evils of *this* kind, as well as of the *former*, come by our own *fault*; some perhaps by way of *punishment*; some of *physic*<sup>i</sup>; and some as the *means* to happiness, not otherwise to be obtained. And if there is a future state, that which seems to be wrong *now* may be rectified *hereafter*. To all which more may yet be added. As, that *matter* is not capable of perfection; and therefore where that is concern'd, there *must be* imperfections, and consequently evils<sup>k</sup>. So that to ask, why God permits evil, is

<sup>a</sup> As light and darkness are. Δύο ὅς ἐξισάζοντα ἀλλήλοις κατ' ἐναντιώσιν φθαρτικά ἐστὶ πάντως τῆς ἀλλήλων συστάσεως. *Bas.* There can be no such law between them, as is said to be among the Hea-then deities. Θεοῖσι δ' ὅσ' ἔχει νόμος. Οὐδὲν ἀπαντῶν βέλεια προδυμῇ τῇ τ' δέλοισι, κλ. *Enrip.*  
<sup>b</sup> Ἀπόλιν ἢ ἀλῆθει, ἐπὶ οὐ δυσυχίς. *Id.* <sup>c</sup> Ψυχὴν ἔχεις ἀντιθέσιν. — ἔ. ὅς κατὰ γένος. *Id.*  
<sup>d</sup> Ἀπολιν ἢ ἀλῆθει, ἐπὶ οὐ δυσυχίς. *Id.* <sup>e</sup> Ὡς αὐτὸς εἰ κύριος, τῶν τῶν ἀρχῶν  
<sup>f</sup> ἀμαρτανίς, ἔτι κατὰ τύχην πορνείας, κλ. *Cyr. Hier.* <sup>g</sup> Ὡς αὐτὸς εἰ κύριος, τῶν τῶν ἀρχῶν  
<sup>h</sup> μὴ ζητήσεως ἐπέσθεν. *S. Bas.* <sup>i</sup> Μὴ? God extinguish sun, moon, and stars, because some people worship them? *Mishn.* Αὐτὲ τῶ ἐλοφύς αἰτία, Θεὸς ἀναίτιος. *Max. T.* <sup>k</sup> Ἡ δὲ ψα μὲ σά-  
ματι παρμακιδόξω ἰδὼν ποτὲ, κλ. *Max. T.* This observation might be extended a great way. If there was, *v. g.* no such thing as *poverty*, there could be no *riches*, or no great benefit by them; there would be scarce any arts or sciences, &c. Ἄν ὅς ἀνάγκη τὴν πέναν, τ' βίς τὴν συστάσιν ἀνῆλς ἀπασαν, κλ. *Chrys.* <sup>l</sup> Τὰ μίση πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ὅλον διὰ σκοπιῶν, εἰ σύμφωνον ὁ ἀρρόπλοτα ἐκείνῳ (with more to this purpose). *Plot.* <sup>m</sup> V. Mor. nebok. 3. 12. <sup>n</sup> Πολυμῆς ἢ  
<sup>o</sup> Ὁ δὲ ἰσχυρὴ. *Simpl.* <sup>p</sup> Κακία βλάσημα τ' ὄλγος. *Plut.* <sup>q</sup> Ὁ δὲ ἰσχυρὴ. *Simpl.*

Review among Gods is this  
guilt why you there must  
if you have a body is  
you were not created  
without your power  
lies in him who chooses  
not to blame  
I make a pleasure  
body of the part  
to

2 things are contrary  
any one of them  
if you have a body  
you were not created  
without your power  
lies in him who chooses  
not to blame  
I make a pleasure  
body of the part  
to

has provided all kinds of physics & evil is also K. 2 of springs from Malice



a to ask, why he permits a *material* world, or such a being as *man* is<sup>a</sup>; indowd indeed with some noble faculties, but incumberd at the same time with *bodily* passions and propensions. Nay, I know not whether it be not to ask, why He permits any imperfect being; and that is, any being at all: which is a bold demand, and the answer to it lies perhaps too deep for us. If this world be designd for a *palæstra*, where men<sup>b</sup> are to *exercise* their faculties and their virtues, and by that *prepare* themselves for a superior state<sup>c</sup> (and who can say it is not?) there must be *difficulties* and *temptations*, occasions and opportunities for this exercise. Lastly, if there are evils, of which men know not the true *origin*; yet if they would but seriously reflect upon the many marks of *reason*, *wisdom* and *goodness* every where to be observed in instances, which they *do* or *may* understand, they could scarce doubt but the same things prevaild in those, which they *do not* understand. If I should meet with a *book*, the author of which I found had disposed his matter in beautiful order, and treated his subjects with reason and exactness; but at last, as I red on, came to a *few* leaves written in a language which I did not know: in this case I should close the book with a full persuasion, that the same vein of good sense, which shewd itself in the former and much greater part of it, ran thro the other also: especially having arguments *à priori*, which obliged me to believe, that the author of it all was the same person. This I should certainly do, rather than deny the force of those arguments, in order to assert *two* authors of the *same* book. But the evil principle has led me too far out of my way, therefore to return.

VIII. *All other beings depend upon that Being mentiond in the foregoing propositions for their existence.* For since there can be but one perfect and independent being, the rest must be imperfect and dependent: and since there is nothing else, upon which they can, *ultimately*, depend beside Him, upon Him they *must* and *do* depend.

IX. *He is therefore the Author of nature: nor can any thing be, or be done, but what He either causes (immediately, or mediately), or permits.* All beings (by the last) depend upon Him for their existence: upon whom depends their existence, upon him also must depend the intrinsic manner of their existence, or the *natures* of these

a/ As he is Incapable of suffering sin. Ans. be is from our own choice not from any necessity — Therefore some things as he does, who is not bound by necessity. b/ To that question. Why are we not so made, *ὥστε μὴδὲ βελονῶν ἡμῖν πονεῖν τὸ αἵματι;* S. Basil answers, Because *ἀρετὴ ἐν προαιρέσει καὶ οὐ ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίνεται.* And he who blames the Deity because we are not impeccable, *ὅδιν ἔτιον ἢ τὴν ἄλογον φύσιν τῆς λογικῆς προτιμῶ, καὶ τὴν ἀκίνητον καὶ ἀνόρητον τῆς προαιρετικῆς ἐμπράττω.* (Chrysostom) *Ἀδελφαὶ ἀρετῆς,* as Philo. *for virtue* c/ In Chrysostom's style, *ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελειᾶς, ἡ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ παλαιῶτος ἐπὶ τῶν παρόντων βίᾳ ἀγωνίζεσθαι, ἵνα μὴ τὸ λυθῆναι τὸ δάκρυον λαμπρὸν ἀνιδήσῃται ἀμνηστῶν τῶν σίφων.*

of blowing itself, & is void of all appetites, to a free agent, & one that can choose what he will do. beings: e/ To be glorious after virtue, & to strive in this present life, as in a place where Exercises are to be performed; that when we go off stage we may be crowned with a crown of glory.

beings: and again upon whom depend their being and nature, upon Him depend the *necessary effects* and *consequences* of their being, and being such as they are in themselves. Then, as to the *acts* of such of them as may be *free agents*, and the effects of them, He is indeed *not* the Author of those; because by the terms and supposition they proceed from agents, who have no necessity imposed upon them by Him to act either this or that way. But yet however these *free agents* must depend upon Him *as such*: from Him they derive their power of acting: and it is He, who permits them to use their liberty; tho many times, through their own fault, they use it amiss. And, lastly, as to the nature of those *relations*, which lie between ideas or things really *existing*, or which arise from facts already *done and past*, these result from the natures of the *things* themselves: all which the Supreme being either causes, or permits (as before). For since things can be but in one manner at once, and their mutual relations, ratio's, agreements, disagreements, &c. are nothing but their manners of being with respect to each other, the natures of these *relations* will be determin'd by the natures of the *things*.

From hence now it appears, that whatever expresses the existences or non-existences of things, and their mutual relations *as they are*, is true by the *constitution* of nature: and if so, it must also be agreeable to His perfect *comprehension* of all truth, and to His *will*, who is at the head of it. Tho the act of A (some free agent) is the effect of his *liberty*, and can only be said to be *permitted* by the Supreme being; yet when it is once *done*, the relation between the *doer* and the *deed*, the agreement there is between A and the idea of one who has committed such a fact, is a *fixt* relation. From thenceforward it will *always* be predicable of him, that he was the doer of it: and if any one should deny this, he would go counter to nature and that great Author of it, whose existence is now proved. And thus those arguments in sect. I. prop. IV. which turned only upon a *supposition* that there was such a Being, are here *confirmed* and *made absolute*.

X. *The one supreme and perfect Being, upon whom the existence of all other beings and their powers originally depend, is that Being, whom I mean by the word GOD.*

There are other *truths* still remaining in relation to the Deity, which we *may know*, and which are *necessary to be known* by us, if we would endeavour to demean ourselves toward Him according to *truth* and what He is. And they are such, as not only tend to rectify our opinions concerning His nature and attributes; but also may serve at the same time as *further proofs* of His existence, and an amplification of some things touched perhaps too lightly. As,

## XI. GOD



XI. GOD cannot be corporeal: or, there can be no corporeity in God. There are many things in *matter* utterly inconsistent with the nature of such a *Being*, as it has been demonstrated God must be.

*Matter* exists in *parts*, every one of which, by the term, is *imperfect*<sup>a</sup>: but in a *Being* absolutely perfect there can be nothing that is imperfect.

These *parts*, tho they are many times kept closely united by some occult influence, are in truth so many *distinct* bodies, which may, at least in our imagination, be disjoind or placed otherwise: nor can we have any idea of matter, which does not imply a natural discernibility and susceptibility of various shapes and modifications: *i. e.* mutability seems to be *essential* to it. But God, existing in a manner that is perfect, exists in a manner that must be *uniform*, always one and the same, and in nature *unchangeable*.

*Matter* is incapable of *acting*, *passive* only, and *stupid*: which are defects, that can never be ascribed to him who is the First cause or Prime agent, the Supreme intellect, and altogether perfect.

Then, if He is *corporeal*, where ever there is a *vacuum*, He must be *excluded*, and so becomes a being bounded, finite, and as it were full of chasms.

Lastly, there is no *matter* or body, which may not be *supposed not to be*; whereas the idea of God or that *Being* upon whom all others depend, involves in it existence.

XII. Neither infinite space, nor infinite duration, nor matter infinitely extended, or eternally existing, nor any, nor all of these taken together, can be God. For,

*Space* taken separately from the things, which possess and fill it, is but an empty scene or *vacuum*: and to say, that infinite space is God, or that God is infinite space, is to say that He is an infinite *vacuum*: than which nothing can be more *absurd*, or *blasphemous*. How can *space*, which is but a vast void, rather the negation of all things, than positively any thing, a kind of *diffused no-*

<sup>a</sup> Εἰ σῶμα ἐστὶ, φύσις δὲ σώματος περιζυγμένη εἰς πλείον, ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι (f. ἔσαι) τῶν ὅλων, says Plotinus even of the Soul. <sup>b</sup> Διδιχαται δὲ καὶ ὅτι μέγιστον εἶδεν οὐδέχεται ἔχει ταύτην ἰστίαν ἀλλὰ ἀμερὴς καὶ ἀδιαίρετος ἐστίν. *Arist.*

a / If it be made of Matter & if the Property of Matter be divided into a multitude of Parts, Every single Part will not be of same as the whole thing: If it has been shown before that no Body can be of this Nature, It must be something Indivisible, whose Parts cannot be separated from each other. *Arist.*

thing; how can this, I say, be the First cause, &c. or indeed any cause? What attributes beside penetrability and extension, what excellencies, what perfections is it capable of <sup>a</sup>?

As *infinite space* cannot be God, tho He be excluded from no place or space; so tho He is eternal, yet *eternity* or infinite duration itself is not God <sup>b</sup>. For duration, abstracted from all durables, is nothing actually existing by itself: it is the *duration of a being*, not *a being*.

*Infinite space* and *duration*, taken together, cannot be God: because an interminable space of infinite duration is still nothing but eternal space; and that is at most but an *eternal vacuum*.

Since it has been already proved, that corporeity is inconsistent with Divine perfection, tho *matter* should be *infinitely extended*, or there should be an infinite quantity of it, yet still, where ever it is, it carries this *inconsistence* along with it.

If to *matter* be added *infinite duration*, neither does this alter the nature of it. This only supposes it to be eternally what it is, *i. e. eternally incapable* of Divine perfection.

And if to it you add the ideas of *both* infinite extension (or space) and duration too; yet still, so long as matter is matter, it must *always* and *every where* be incapable of Divinity.

Lastly, not the *universe*, or sum total of finite beings, can be God. For if it is, then *every thing* is divine, *every thing* God, or of God; and so *all things* together must make but *one being* <sup>c</sup>. But the contrary to this we see, there being evidently many beings distinct, and separable one from another, and independent each of other. Nay, this distinction and separation of existence, beside what we see without us, we may even *feel* within our selves. We are *severally* conscious to our selves of the individuation and distinction of our own

<sup>a</sup> They, who call God מְקוֹם, do it מְקוֹם הַכֹּל וְאֵין הַכֹּל מְקוֹם הַכֹּל. Tishbi. Or, as Phil. Aquin. from the ancients, הַקֶּבֶד מְקוֹם שֶׁל עוֹלָם וְאֵין עוֹלָמוֹ מְקוֹמוֹ. οὐ γὰρ περιέχεται [ὁ Θεός], ἀλλὰ περιέχεται τὸ πᾶν. Ph. Jud. By which ways of speaking (tho there is a Cabbalistic reason assigned too) they intend chiefly to express his omnipresence and immensity. That in Act. Ap. seems to be of the same kind, Ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ ζῶμεν, καὶ κινούμεθα, καὶ ἵσμεν. <sup>b</sup> Such things as these, how incongruous and wild soever they are, have bin affirmed; that God is infinite duration, space, &c. What can be meant by that, Καλῶς αὖν λέγοιτο ὁ αἰὼν Θεός, in Plotinus?

<sup>c</sup> Were not they, who converse with books, accustomed to such trials, it would be shocking to find Balbus in Cicero asserting, *esse mundum deum*: and yet in another place, that it is *quasi communis deorum, atque hominum domus, aut urbs utrorumque*; and *deorum, hominumque causa factus*: in another, *providentia deorum mundum, & omnes mundi partes & initio constitutas esse, & omni tempore administrari*: in another, *mundum ipsum naturā administrari*: with other like inconsistencies.



minds from all other: nor is there any thing, of which we can be more certain. Were we all the *same* being, and had *one* mind, as in that case we must have, thoughts could not be private, or the peculiar thoughts of any one person; but they must be *common* acts of the whole mind, and there could be but one conscience *common* to us all <sup>a</sup>. Beside, if all things conjunctly are God or the Perfect being (I dread the mention of such things, tho it be in order to refute them), how comes this remarkable instance of imperfection, among many others, to cleave to us, that we should *not know* even our selves, and what we are <sup>b</sup>? In short, no *collection* of beings can be *one* being; and therefore not God. And the universe itself is but a collection of distinct beings <sup>c</sup>.

XIII. *It is so far from being true that God is corporeal, that there could be no such thing as either matter or motion, if there was not some Superior being, upon whom they depended. Or, God is such a being, that without Him there could be neither matter nor motion.* This must be true of *matter*: because it has been proved already, that there can be *but one* independent being; that he is *incorporeal*; and that the existence of all other beings must *depend upon Him*. But the same thing may be proved otherwise. If *matter* (I mean the existence of it) does not depend upon something above it, it must be an independent being; and if an independent being, a necessary being; and then there could be no such thing as a *vacuum*: but all bodies must be *perfectly solid*; and, more than that, the whole world could be but *one such* body, five times as firm as brass, and incapable of all motion. For that being which *exists necessarily* does *necessarily exist*: that is, it cannot *not exist*. But in a *vacuum* matter does not exist.

Moreover, if *matter* be an independent, necessary being, and exists of itself, this must be true of *every particle* of it: and if so, there could not only be no *vacuum*

<sup>a</sup> Ἀποκρίνεται μία ἢ ἐμὴ [ψυχὴ] καὶ ἡ ὅτιον ἄλλων ἐχούσῃ ἢ ἐμῇ ἀποταγομένη, καὶ ἄλλων ἀποτάσσουσα, — καὶ ὅλως ὁμοπαθεῖν ἡμᾶς τε πρὸς ἄλλήλους, καὶ πρὸς τὸ πᾶν. Plot. Here this author is clear, tho at some other times very dark.

<sup>b</sup> Cur quidquam ignoraret animus hominis, si esset Deus? Cic. <sup>c</sup> The system of Spinoza is so apparently false, and full of impieties and contradictions, that more needs not be said against it: tho much might be. What Velleius says in Cicero, is not only true, *Si mundus est deus, — dei membra partim ardentia, partim refrigerata dicenda sunt*: but, if there is but one substance, one nature, *one being*, and this being is God, then all the follies, madneses, wickedneses that are in the world, are in God; then all things done and suffered are both done and suffered by Him; He is both cause and effect; He both willes and nilles, affirms and denies, loves and hates the same things at the same time, &c. That such gross Atheism as this should ever be fashionable! *Atheism*: for certainly when we inquire, whether there is a God, we do not inquire, whether we ourselves and all other things which are visible about us do *exist*: something different from them must be intended. Therefore to say, there is no God different from them, is to say, there is no God at all.

*It is absurd that my Soul & Soul of any other Person should be One & Same; for then it must be that when I perceived any thing, He would perceive it also, — & He & I & all; what Universe would be?*

but every particle must be *every where*. For it could not be limited to occupy only a place of such certain dimensions by its *own nature*; since this confinement of existence within certain bounds implies non-existence in other places beyond those bounds, and is equal to a negation of existence; and when *existence* is essential to any being, a *negation of existence* cannot be so. Nor, in the next place, could its existence be limited by *any thing else*, because it is supposed to have its existence only of itself; *i. e.* to have a *principle* of existence in itself, or to have an existence that is not dependent upon or obnoxious to any other.

And I may add still, if *matter* be self-existent, I do not see, not only how it comes to be restrained to a place of some certain capacity, but also how it comes to be limited in *other respects*; or why it should not exist in a manner that is in *all respects* perfect. So that thus it appears, *matter* must derive its existence from some other being, who causes it to be just what it is. And the being, *who can do this*, must be God.

It is to no purpose to object here, that one cannot *conceive*, how the existence of matter can be derived from another being. For God being *above our conceptions*, the manner in which He operates, and in which things depend upon him, must also be *unconceivable*. Reason discovers, that this visible world must owe its existence to some invisible Almighty being; *i. e.* it discovers this to be fact, and we must not deny facts because we know not *how* they are effected. It is far from being new, that our faculties should disclose to us the existence of things, and then drop us in our inquiry *how* they are. Thus much for *matter*.

As for *motion*; without a First cause, such as has been described, there could be none: and much less *such* motions as we see in the world. This may be immediately deduced from the foregoing paragraphs. For if *matter* itself could not be without such a cause, it is certain *motion*, which is an affection of matter, could never be.

But further, there could be no *motion*, unless either there be in matter itself a power of *beginning* it; or it is communicated from body to body in an *infinite succession*, or in a *circle*, and so has no beginning; or else is *produced* by some incorporeal being, or beings. Now as hardy as men are in advancing opinions that favor their vices, tho never so repugnant to reason, I can hardly believe any one will assert, that a parcel of *mere matter* (let it be great or small, of any figure whatsoever, &c.) left altogether to itself, could ever of itself *begin* to move. If there is any such bold assertor, let him fix his eyes upon some lump of matter, *ex. gr.* a *stone*, piece of *timber*, or a *clod* (cleard of all animals), and peruse it well; and then ask himself seriously, whether it is possible for him in earnest to *believe*, that that *stone*, *log*, or *clod*, tho nothing corporeal or incorporeal should excite or meddle with it, might some time or other of itself begin to *creep*. However, to be short, a power of *beginning* motion



is not in the idea of matter. It is passive, as we see, to the impressions of motion, and susceptible of it; but *cannot* produce it. On the contrary, it will always persist uniformly in its *present state*, either of rest or motion, if nothing stirs, diverts, accelerates, or stops it. Nor is there any thing in all physics better settled than that, which is called *vis inertiae*, or the *inertia* of matter.

The propagation of motion from body to body, *without any First mover*, or immaterial cause of motion, has been proved impossible, prop. I.

The supposition of a perpetual motion in a *circle* is begging the question. For if A moves B, B moves C, and so on to Z, and then Z moves A; this is the same as to say, that A moves A, by the intervention of B, C, D, --- Z: that is, *A moves itself*, or can *begin* motion <sup>a</sup>.

It remains then, that all corporeal motions come originally from some mover *incorporeal*: which must be either that Supreme and self-existing *spirit* himself, who is God; or such, as will put us into the way how to find, that there is such a Being. Turn back to p. 65.

If we consider *ourselves*, and the voluntary motions begun by us, we may there see the thing exemplified. We move our bodies or some members of them, and by these move other things, as they again do others; and know these motions to spring from the operations of our minds: but then we know also, that we have not an independent power of creating motion. If we had, it could not be so limited as our loco-motive faculties are, nor confined to small quantities and certain circumstances only: we should have had it from eternity, nor could we ever be deprived of it. So that we are necessitated to look up and acknowledge some Higher being, who is able not only to *produce* motion, but to impart a *faculty of producing it*.

And if the *petty* motions of us mortals afford arguments for the being of a God, much more may those *greater* motions we see in the world, and the *phenomena* attending them: I mean the motions of the *planets* and *heavenly bodies*. For *these* must be put into motion, either by one common mighty Mover, acting upon them immediately, or by causes and laws of His appointment; or by their respective movers, who, for reasons to which you can by this time be no stranger, must depend upon some *Superior*, that furnishd them with the power of doing this. And granting it to be done *either* of these ways, we can be at no great distance from a demonstration of the *existence* of a Deity.

<sup>a</sup> What *Censorinus* charges upon many great men (but upon some of them surely unjustly) is to me unintelligible. He says, they believed *semper homines fuisse, &c.* and then, *Itaque & omnium, quae in sempiterno isto mundo semper fuerunt, futuraeque sunt, aiunt principium fuisse nullum; sed orbem esse quemdam gen:rantium, nascentiumque, in quo uniuscujusque geniti initium simul & finis esse videatur.* *Round*

It may perhaps be said, that tho matter has not the power of moving itself, yet it hath an *attractive* force, by which it can move other parts of matter: so that all matter equally *moves* and is *moved*. But, allowing those things which are now usually ascribed to *attraction*, we shall still be necessitated to own some Superior being, whose *influence* mixes itself with matter, and operates upon it; or at least who, some way or other, *imparts* this force. For *attraction*, according to the true sense of the word, supposes one body to act upon another at a distance, or where it is not; but nothing can be an agent, where it is *not* at all. Matter can act only by *contact*, impelling contiguous bodies, when it is put into motion by something else, or resisting those which strike against it, when it is at rest. And this it does *as matter*; i. e. by being impenetrable to other matter: but attraction is not of the nature or idea of matter. So that what is called *attraction*, is so called only because the same things happen, as if the parts of matter did mutually attract: but in truth this can only be an effect of something, which acts upon or by matter according to a certain law. The parts of matter seem not only to gravitate *towards* each other, but many of them to *fly* each other. Now these two *contrary* motions and seeming qualities cannot *both* proceed from matter *quâ* matter; cannot *both* be of the nature of it: and therefore they must be owing to some *external* cause, or to some *other* being, which exists in them this, as it were love and discord.

Beside, as to the *revolution* of a planet about the sun, *mere gravitation* is not sufficient to produce that effect. It must be compounded with a motion of *projection*, to keep the planet from falling directly into the sun, and bring it about: and from *what hand*, I desire to know, comes this other motion (or direction)? Who impressed it?

What a vast field for *contemplation* is here opened! Such regions of matter about us, in which there is not the *least particle* that does not carry with it an argument of God's existence; not the *least* stick or straw, or other *trifle* that falls to the ground, but shews it; not the slightest motion produced, the *least whisper* of the air, but tells it.

XIV. The frame and constitution of the world, the astonishing magnificence of it, the various phenomena and kinds of beings, the uniformity observed in the productions of things, the uses and ends for which they serve, &c. do all shew that there is some Almighty designer, an infinite wisdom and power at the top of all these things:

\* So what we call attraction and aversion (centripetal and centrifugal forces) seem to have been called by Empedocles:  $\phi\iota\lambda\iota\alpha$  &  $\sigma\upsilon\gamma\kappa\epsilon\iota\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$  [ $\tau\alpha$   $\sigma\epsilon\iota\chi\iota\alpha$ ],  $\epsilon$   $\nu\iota\sigma\epsilon$  &  $\delta$   $\delta\iota\alpha\kappa\epsilon\iota\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ . Diog. L. (v. Emp.) V. Arist. Cic. & al.

a kind of friendship by which Elements are L 2 united together, & a sort of discord, whereby they are separated from each other.



such marks there are of both<sup>a</sup>. Or, God is that Being, without whom such a frame or constitution of the world, such a magnificence in it, &c. could not be. In order to prove to any one the grandness of this fabric of the world, one needs only to bid him consider the sun with that insupportable glory and lustre that surrounds it: to demonstrate the vast distance, magnitude, and heat of it: to represent to him the chorus of planets moving periodically, by uniform laws, in their several orbits about it; affording a regular variety of aspects; guarded some of them by secondary planets, and as it were emulating the state of the sun; and probably all possess by proper inhabitants: to remind him of those surprising visits the comets make us; the large trains, or uncommon splendor, which attends them; the far country they come from; and the curiosity and horror they excite not only among us, but in the inhabitants of other planets, who also may be up to see the entry and progress of these ministers of fate<sup>b</sup>: to direct his eye and contemplation, through those azure fields and vast regions above him, up to the fixt stars, that radiant numberless host of heaven; and to make him understand, how unlikely a thing it is, that they should be placed there only to adorn and bespangle a canopy over our heads (tho that would be a great piece of magnificence too), and much less to supply the places of so many glow-worms, by affording a feeble light to our earth, or even to all our fellow-planets: to convince him, that they are rather so many other suns, with their several regions and sets of planets about them: to shew him, by the help of glasses, still more and more of these fixt lights, and to beget in him an apprehension of their unaccountable numbers, and of those immense spaces, that lie retired beyond our utmost reach and even imagination: I say, one needs but to do this, and explain to him such things as are now known almost to every body; and by it to shew that if the world be not infinite, it is *infinito similis*<sup>c</sup>; and therefore sure a magnificent structure, and the work of an infinite Architect. But if we could take a view of all the particulars contained within that astonishing compass, which we have thus hastily run over, how would wonders multiply upon us? Every corner, every part of the world is as it were made up of other worlds. If we look upon this our seat (I mean this

<sup>a</sup> So far is that from being true, *Nequaquam—divinitus esse creatam Naturam mundi, qua tantâ est prædita culpa*. Lucret. Men rashly (impiously) censure what they do not understand. Like that king of Castile, who fancied himself able to have contrived a better system of the world; because he knew not what the true system is, but took it to be as ascribed to him by R. Is. ab. Sid. and other astronomers of those times.

<sup>b</sup> Since they have, or may have great effects upon the several parts of the solar system, one may speak thus without falling into the superstition of the multitude, or meaning what is intended by that, *Nunquam calo spectatum impune cometen* (in Claud.), or the like.

<sup>c</sup> *Fi-*  
*nitus, & infinito similis*. Plin.

*but for some Putschers*

earth),

earth), what scope is here for admiration? The great *variety* of mountains, hills, valleys, plains, rivers, seas, trees, plants! The many tribes of different *animals*, with which it is stocked! The multifarious *inventions* and *works* of one of these; that is, of us *men*, &c. And yet when all these (heaven and earth) are survey'd as *nicely* as they can be by the help of our unassisted senses, and even of telescopical glasses, by the assistance of good *microscopes* in very *small* parts of matter as many *new* wonders \* may perhaps be discover'd, as those already observed; new *kingdoms* of animals; new *architecture* and curiosity of work. So that as before our senses and even conception faint'd in those *vast* journeys we were oblig'd to take in considering the expanse of the universe; so here again they fail us in our researches into the *principles* and constituent parts of it. Both the *beginnings* and the *ends* of things, the *least* and the *greatest*, all conspire to baffle us: and which way ever we prosecute our inquiries, we still fall in with *fresh* subjects of amazement, and *fresh* reasons to believe that there are indefinitely still *more* and *more* behind, that will for ever escape our eagerest pursuits and deepest penetration.

This mighty *building* is not only thus grand, and the appearances stupendous in it, but the *manner* in which things are effected is commonly unintelligible, and their causes *too profound* for us. There are indeed many things in nature, which we know; and some, of which we seem to know the *causes*: but, alas! how *few* are these with respect to the whole sum? And the causes which we assign, what are they? Commonly such, as can only be expressed in general terms, whilst the *bottoms* of things remain unfathomable. Such, as have been collected from *experience*, but could scarcely be known beforehand, by any arguments *à priori*, to be capable of rendering such effects: and yet till causes are known after that manner, they are not *thoroughly* understood. Such, as seem disproportionate and *too little*, and are so insufficient and unsatisfactory, that one cannot but be inclined to think, that something *immaterial* and *invisible* must be immediately concerned. In short, we know many times, that such a thing will have such an effect, or perhaps that such an effect is produced by such a cause, but the manner *how* we know not; or but grossly, and if such an *hypothesis* be true. It is impossible for us to come at the true *principles* of things, or to see into the oeconomy of the *finest* part of nature and workings of the *first* springs. The causes that appear to us, are but *effects* of other causes: the *vessels*, of which the bodies of plants and animals consist, are made up of *other*, *smaller* vessels: the *subtilest* parts of matter, which we have any notion of (as animal spirits, or particles of light), have *their* parts, and may for ought we know be *compound* bodies: and as to the *substances*

*Variety of surprising Things*  
\* Ποικίλη θαυματουργία. Plot.

them-



themselves of all these things, and their *internal constitution*, they are hid from our eyes. Our philosophy dwells in the surface of nature.

However, in the next place, we ourselves cannot but be witnesses, that there are *stated methods*, as so many set forms of proceeding, which things punctually and religiously keep to. The same *causes*, circumstanced in the same manner, have always the same success: all the *species* of *animals*, among us, are made according to one general *idea*; and so are those of *plants* also, and even *minerals*: no *new* ones are brought forth or arisen any where: and the old are preserved and continued by the *old ways*.

Lastly, it appears I think plainly enough in the parts and model of the world, that there is a *contrivance* and a respect to certain reasons and *ends*. How the *sun* is posited near the middle of our system for the more *convenient* dispensing of his benign influences to the *planets* moving about him; how the plain of the earth's *equator* intersects that of her *orbit*, and makes a proper angle with it, in order to diversify the *year*, and create a useful variety of *seasons*, and many other things of this kind, tho a thousand times repeated, will *always* be pleasing meditations to good men and true scholars. Who can observe the *vapors* to ascend, especially from the sea, meet above in clouds, and fall again after condensation, and not understand this to be a kind of *distillation* in order to clear the water of its grosser salts, and then by rains and dews to supply the fountains and rivers with fresh and wholsom liquor; to nourish the vegetables below by showers, which descend in drops as from a *watering-pot* upon a garden, &c. who can view the *structure* of a plant or animal; the *indefinite* number of their fibres and fine vessels, the *formation* of larger vessels and the several members out of them, and the apt *disposition* of all these; the way laid out for the reception and distribution of *nutriment*; the *effect* this nutriment has in extending the vessels, bringing the vegetable or animal to its full growth and expansion, continuing the *motion* of the several fluids, repairing the *decays* of the body, and preserving *life*: who can take notice of the several *faculties* of animals, their *arts* of saving and providing for themselves, or the ways in which they are provided for; the *uses* of plants to animals, and of some animals to others, particularly to mankind; the care taken that the several *species* should be *propagated* out of their proper seeds (without confusion<sup>a</sup>), the strong *inclinations* implanted in animals for that purpose, their *love of their young*, and the like: I say, who can do this, and not see a *design*, in such *regular* pieces, so nicely wrought, and so preserved? If there was but *one* animal, and in that case it could not be doub-

*Marching over fields in Rank & file*

<sup>a</sup> If any one, sitting upon mount *Ida*, had seen the Greek army coming on in proper order [*πολλὸν κόσμον ἐ τάξει τοῖς ποδῶν προσέεισαν*], he ought most certainly, notwithstanding what *Seneca* says, to have concluded, that there was some commander, under whose conduct they moved.

ed but that his eyes were made that he might see with them, his ears that he might bear with them and so on, through at least the most considerable parts of him; if it can much less be doubted, when the same things are repeated in the individuals of all the tribes of animals; if the like observations may be made with respect to vegetables, and other things: and if all these kinds of things, and therefore much more their particulars, upon and in the earth, waters, air, are unconceivably numerous (as most evidently they are), one cannot but be convinced from that, which is so very obvious to every understanding, and plainly runs through the nobler parts of the visible world, that not only they, but other things, even those that seem to be less noble, have their ends too, tho not so well understood.

And now since we cannot suppose the parts of matter to have contrived this wonderful form of a world among themselves, and then by agreement to have taken their respective posts, and pursued constant ends by certain methods and measures concerted (because these are acts, of which they are not capable), there must be some other Being, whose wisdom and power are equal to such a mighty work, as is the structure and preservation of the world. There must be some almighty Mind, who models and adorns it; lays the causes of things so deep; prescribes them such uniform and steady laws; destines and adapts them to certain purposes; and makes one thing to fit and answer to another <sup>a</sup>.

That such a beautiful scheme, such a just and geometrical arrangement of things, composed, of innumerable parts, and placed as the offices and uses and wants of the several beings require, through such an immense extent, should be the effect of chance only, is a conceit so prodigiously absurd, that certainly no one can espouse it heartily, who understands the meaning of that word. Chance seems to be only a term, by which we express our ignorance of the cause of any thing. For when we say any thing comes by chance, we do not mean, that it had no other cause; but only, that we do not know the true cause, which produced it, or interposed in such a manner, as to make that fall out which was not expected. Nor can I think, that any body has such an idea of chance, as to make it an agent or really existing and acting cause of any thing, and much less sure of all things. Whatever events or effects there are, they must proceed from some agent or cause, which is either free or not free (that is, necessary). If it be free, it wills what it produces: and therefore that which is produced is produced with design, not by chance. If it acts necessarily, the event must necessarily be, and therefore it is not by accident. For that, which is by accident or chance only, might not have been; or it is an accident only, that

*who was it that killed David by the sword of Goliath?*

<sup>a</sup> Τίς ὁ ἀετιώζων τὴν μάχαιραν πρὸς τὸ κολεῖν, ἢ τὸ κολεῖν πρὸς τὴν μάχαιραν, κτλ; Arr. Even such a thing as this doth not come by accident.

it



it is. There can be therefore *no such cause* as chance. And to omit a great deal that might yet be said, *matter* is *indefinitely* divisible, and the first particles (or atoms) of which it consists must be small beyond all our apprehension; and the chances, that must all hit to produce *one* individual of any *species* of material beings (if only chance was concerned), must consequently be *indefinitely many*: and if *space* be also *indefinitely* extended, and the number of those individuals (not to say of the *species* themselves) which lie dispersed in it *indefinite*, the *chances* required to the production of them all, or of the universe, will be the rectangle of one *indefinite* quantity drawn into *another*. We may well call them *infinite*. And then to say, that any thing cannot happen, unless *infinite* chances coincide, is the same as to say, there are *infinite* chances against the happening of it, or odds that it will not happen: and this again is the same as to say, it is *impossible* to happen; since if there be a possibility that it *may* happen, the hazard is *not* infinite. The world therefore cannot be the child of *chance*<sup>a</sup>. He must be little acquainted with the works of nature, who is not sensible how delicate and fine they are: and the *finer* they are, the *grosser* were those of *Epicurus*<sup>b</sup>.

If it should be objected, that many things seem to be *useless*, many births are *monstrous*, or the like, such answers as these may be made. The *uses* of some things are known to *some* men, and not to *others*: the uses of some are known *now*, that were not known to any body *formerly*: the uses of many may be discovered *hereafter*: and those of some other things may *for ever* remain unknown to all men, and yet *be in nature*, as much as those discovered were before their discovery, or are now in respect of them who know them not. Things have not therefore no uses, because they are conceal'd from us. Nor is *nature* irregular, or without method, because there are some *seeming* deviations from the common rule. These are generally the effects of that influence, which free agents and various circumstances have upon natural productions; which may be deformed, or hurt by external *impressions*, heterogeneous *matter* introduced, or disagreeable and unnatural *motions* excited: and if the case could be *truly* put, it would no doubt appear, that nature proceeds as *regularly* (or the laws of nature have as regular an effect), when a *monster* is produced, as when the *usual* issue in common cases. Under these circumstances the monster is the *genuine* issue: that is,

<sup>a</sup> Hoc qui existimat fieri potuisse, non intelligo cur non idem putet, si innumerabiles unius & viginti forma literarum, — aliquò conjiciantur, posse ex his in terram excussis annales Ennij, ut deinceps legi possint, effici: quod nescio anne in uno quidem versu possit tantum valere fortuna. Cic. But alas, what are Ennius's annals to such a work as the world is! <sup>b</sup> He was πολυγραφώτατος, πάντος υπερβαλλόμενος πλῆθους βιβλίων. D. L. But that part of his physics is here meant, in which he treated of the origin of the world; or rather of *infinite* worlds; which makes his thought the grosser still. For infinite worlds require *infinite* chances *indefinitely* repeated.

*E/a great Writer exceeds all others in the Quantity of Books. in*

in the same circumstances there would always be the same kind of production. And therefore if things are now and then mis-shaped, this infers no unsteadiness or mistake in nature. Beside, the magnificence of the world admits of some perturbations; not to say, requires some variety. The question is, Could all those things, which we do know to have uses and ends, and to the production of which such wonderful contrivance and the combinations of so many things are required, be produced, and method and regularity be preserved *so far as it is*, if nothing but blind chance presided over all? Are not the innumerable instances of things, which are undeniably made with reference to certain ends, and of those which are propagated and repeated by the same constant methods, enough to convince us, that there are ends proposed, and rules observed, even where we do not see them. And, lastly, if we should descend to particulars, what are those seemingly useless or monstrous productions in respect of the rest, that plainly declare the ends, for which they were intended, and that come into the world by the usual ways, with the usual perfection of their several kinds? If the comparison could be made, I verily believe these would be found to be almost infinite of the other; which ought therefore to be reputed as nothing.

They, who content themselves with words, may ascribe the formation of the world to fate or nature, as well as to chance, or better. And yet fate, in the first place, is nothing but a series of events, considered as necessarily following in some certain order; or, of which it has always been true, that they would be in their determinate times and places. It is called indeed a series of causes<sup>a</sup>: but then they are such causes as are also effects, all of them, if there is no First cause; and may be taken for such. So that in this description is nothing like such a cause, as is capable of giving this form to the world. A series of events is the same with events happening *seriatim*: which words declare nothing concerning the cause of that concatenation of events, or why it is. Time, place, manner, necessity are but circumstances of things that come to pass; not causes of their existence, or of their being as they are. On the contrary, some external and superior cause must be supposed to put the series in motion, to project the order, to connect the causes and effects, and to impose the necessity<sup>b</sup>.

<sup>a</sup> Series implexa causarum. Sen.

<sup>b</sup> Seneca says himself, that in this series God is *prima omnium causa, ex qua cetera pendent*. Indeed it is many times difficult to find out what the ancients meant by fate. Sometimes it seems to follow the motions of the heavenly bodies and their aspects. Of this kind of fate is that passage in Suetonius to be understood, where he says that Tiberius was *addictus mathematica, persuasionisque plenus cuncta fato agi*. Sometimes it is confounded with fortune. So in Lucian we find *την τύχην πράττειν τὰ μεμνημένα, καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκείνη ἐπεκλώθη*. And sometimes it is the same with God: as when the Stoics say, *ὅτι τε εἶναι θεὸν καὶ νῦν καὶ ἰμμεμνημένον καὶ Δία*, ap. Diog. L. and the like elsewhere.

*Things that are determined  
That & made fate are all same.*



Then for *nature*, 1. If it be used for the *intrinsic manner* of existing; that constitution, make, or disposition, with which any thing is produced or *born*, and from which result those properties, powers, inclinations, passions, qualities, and manners, which are called *natural* (and sometimes *nature*), in opposition to such as are *acquired*, adventitious, or forced (which use is common): then to say, that nature formed any thing, or gave it its manner of existence, is to say, that it formed itself, or that the *effect* is the *efficient*<sup>a</sup>. Beside, how can *manner* (manner of existing) be the cause of existing, or properly do any thing. An agent is an acting being, some substance, not a *manner* of being. 2. If it be used in that other sense, by which it stands for the *ideas* of things, what they are in themselves, and what in their circumstances, causes, consequences, respects; or, in short, that which determines them to be of this or that kind (as when we say, the *nature* of justice<sup>b</sup> requires this or that; *i. e.* the idea of justice requires or supposes it: a crime is of such a *nature*; that is, bears such a respect to the law, and is attended with such circumstances, or the like): then none of *these* senses can do an atheist any service. 3. If it be used for the *world*<sup>c</sup> (as, the laws of *nature* may be understood to be the laws of the world, by which it is governed, and the *phenomena* in it produced; after the same manner of speaking as when we say, the laws of *England, France, &c.*) then it stands for *that very thing*, the former and architect of which is the object of our inquiry; and therefore cannot be that architect *itself*. Under this sense may be comprehended that, when it denotes *reality of existence*, as when it is said that such a thing is not in *nature* (not to be found in the *world*). 4. If it signifies the forementioned *laws* themselves; or that course, in which things by virtue of these laws proceed (as when the effects of these laws are styled the works of *nature*): then, laws suppose some legislator, and are posterior to that of which they are the laws. There can be no laws of any nation, till the people are of which that nation consists. 5. If it be used after the same manner as the word *habit* frequently is; to which many things are ascribed (just as they are to nature), though it be nothing existing distinct from the *habits*, which *particular* men or beings contract: then nature is a kind of *abstract* notion, which can *do* nothing. Perhaps *nature* may be put for *natures*, all *natures*, after the manner of a collective noun; or it may be mentioned as an *agent*, only as we personify virtues and attributes, either for variety, or the shorter and more convenient expressing of

<sup>a</sup> As when Strato Lamps. according to Tully, docet omnia esse effecta naturâ.

*natura justitia.* Cic.

<sup>b</sup> Vis &

<sup>c</sup> Almost as if it stood for *nata*, or *res nata*; all things, that are produced. (So *fatura* seems to be put sometimes for *factus*.) *Sunt, qui omnia natura nomine appellant; — corpora, & inane, quaque his accidunt.* Cic.

things. Lastly, if it denotes the *Author of nature*, or God<sup>a</sup> (the effect seeming, tho by a hard metonymy in this case, to be put for the *efficient*): then, to Him it is that I ascribe the formation of the world, &c. To all which I must subjoin, that there is an unaccountable *liberty* taken in the use of this word: and that frequently it is used merely as a *word*, and nothing more, they who use it not knowing themselves, what they mean by it<sup>b</sup>. However, in *no sense* can it supersede the being of a Deity.

XV. *Life, sense, cogitation, and the faculties of our own minds shew the existence of some superior Being, from whom they are derived. Or, God is that Being, without whom neither could these be, any more than the things before mentiond.* That they cannot flow from the nature of any *matter* about us as matter, or from any modification, size, or motion of it, if it be not already apparent, may perhaps be proved more fully afterwards. And that our *souls* themselves are not self-existent, nor hold their faculties independently of all other beings, follows from pr. IV. and VII. Therefore we must necessarily be indebted for what we have of this kind to some great Benefactor, who is the *fountain* of them. For since we are conscious, that we have them, and yet have them not of our selves, we must have them from *some other*.

A man has little reason, God knows, to fancy the *suppositum* of his life, sense, and cogitative faculties to be an independent being, when he considers how *transitory* and *uncertain* at best his life and all his enjoyments are; *what* he is, *whence* he came, and *whither* he is going<sup>c</sup>. The mind acts not, or in the most imperceptible manner in *animalculo*, or the seminal state of a man; only as a principle of vegetation in the state of an *embryon*; and as a sensitive soul in the state of *infancy*, at least for some time, in which we are rather below, than above, many other animals. By degrees indeed, with age and exercise and proper opportunities, it seems to open itself, find its own *talents*, and *ripen* into a rational being. But then it reasons not without labor, and is forced to take many tedious steps in the pursuit of truth; finds all its powers subject to great *eclip-*

<sup>a</sup> *Natura, inquit, hac mihi prestat. Non intelligis te, cum hoc dicis, mutare nomen Deo? Quid enim aliud est Natura, quam Deus, & divina ratio, &c.?* Sen. When it is said, *Necesse est mundum ipsum natura administrari*, ap. Cic. what sense are those words capable of, if by *nature* be not really meant *God*? For it must be something different from the world, and something able to govern it.

<sup>b</sup> *Alii naturam censent esse vim quandam sine ratione, cientem motus in corporibus necessarios, &c.* says Balbus in Cic. What can this *vis* be: *vis* by itself, without the mention of any subject, in which it inheres; or of any cause, from whence it proceeds? A *soul* of the world, *plastic nature*, *hylarchic principle*, שכל פועל, and the like, are more intelligible than that.

<sup>c</sup> רע. Principle. Search out from whence you came, & whither you are going. P. Ab. כֵּאֵין בָּאָרֵךְ וְלֵאן אֶתֶרֶךְ הוֹלֵךְ וְכוּ



*ses* and diminutions, in the time of sleep, indisposition, sickness, &c. and at best reaching but a *few* objects in respect of all, that are in the immensity of the universe; and, lastly, is obnoxious to many painful sensations and reflexions. Had the *soul* of man the principle of its own existence and faculties *within itself*, clear of all dependence, it could not be liable to all these *limitations* and *defects*, to all these *alterations* and *removes* from one state to another: it must certainly be constant to itself, and persist in an *uniform* manner of being.

There may be perhaps who will say, that the *soul*, together with life, sense, &c. are propagated by *traduction* from parents to children, from them to their children again, and so from eternity<sup>a</sup>: and that therefore nothing can be collected from the nature of them as to the existence of a Deity. *Ans.* If there could be such a *traduction*, yet to suppose one *traduced* to come from another *traduced*, and so *ab eterno*, without any further account of the original of mankind, or taking in any author of this *traductive* power, is the same as to suppose an infinite series of *moveds* without a *mover*, or of *effects* without a *cause*: the absurdity of which is shewn already prop. I. But concerning this matter I cannot but think, further, after the following manner. What is meant by *tradux animæ* ought to be clearly explained: for it is not easy to conceive how thought, or thinking substances, can be propagated after the manner of *branches*, or in any manner that can be *analogous* to it, or even warrant a *metaphorical* use of that phrase<sup>b</sup>. It should also be told, whether this *traduction* be made from *one* or from *both* the parents. If from one, from *which* of them is it? And if from both, then the same *tradux* or branch must always proceed from *two* stocks: which is a thing, I presume, that can no where else be found, nor has any parallel in nature. And yet such a thing may much better be supposed of vines, or plants, than of *thinking* beings, who are simple and uncompounded substances<sup>c</sup>.

<sup>a</sup> For I cannot think that any body will now stand by that way of introducing men first into the world, which is mentiond by *Diodorus Sic.* but asserted by *Lucretius*. *Ubi quaque loci regia opportuna dabatur, Crescebant usuri terra radicibus apti, &c.*

<sup>b</sup> What by *Tertullian* in one place is called *anima ex Adam tradux*, in another is *velut furculus quidam ex matrice Adam in propaginem deducta*, and equally unintelligible. Nor doth he explain himself better, when he confesses there to be *duas species seminis, corporalem & animalem* (al. *corporis semen & anima*): or more fully *semen animale ex anima distillatione, sicut & virus illud, corporale semen, ex carnis defecatione*.

<sup>c</sup> According to the fore-cited author the soul is derived from the father only, & *genitalibus famina fovetis commendata*: and all souls from that of *Adam*. *Definimus animam*, says he, *Dei flatu natam, ex una redundantem*: and in another place, *ex uno homine tota hæc animarum redundantia agitur*. But this doth not well consist with his principal argument for *traduction*, that *children take after their parents*. For beside what will here be said by and by, if there is a *traduction* of all men from one man, and *traduction* causes likeness; then every man must be like the first, and (consequently) every other.

This

This opinion of the *traduction* of souls seems to me to stand upon an unsound foundation. For I take it to be grounded chiefly on these two things: the *similitude* there is between the features, humors, and abilities of children and those of their parents<sup>a</sup>; and the difficulty men find in forming the *notion* of a *spirit*<sup>b</sup>. For from hence they are apt to conclude, that there can be no other substance but *matter*: and that the *soul* resulting from some disposition of the body, or some part of it, or being some merely material appendix to it, must *attend* it, and come along with it from the parent or parents; and as there is a derivation of the *one*, so there must be also of the *other* at the same time.

Now the former of these is not always *true*; as it ought to be, to make the argument valid. Nothing more common than to see children *differ* from their parents, in their understandings, inclinations, shapes, complexions, and (*I am sure*) one from another. And this *dissimilitude* has as much force to prove there is *not* a *traduction*, as *similitude*, whenever that happens, can have to prove there is. Besides, it seems to me not hard to account for *some* likeness without the help of *traduction*. It is visible the meat and drink men take, the air they breath, the objects they see, the sounds they hear, the company they keep, &c. will create *changes* in them, sometimes with respect to their intellectuals, sometimes to their passions and humors, and sometimes to their health and other circumstances of their bodies: and yet the *original stamina* and fundamental parts of the man remain still the *same*. If then the *semina*, out of which animals are produced, are (as I doubt not) *animalcula* already formed<sup>c</sup>; which being distributed about, especially in some opportune places, are *taken in* with aliment, or perhaps the very air; being separated in the bodies of the *males* by strainers proper to every kind, and then lodged in *their* seminal vessels, do *there* receive some kind of addition and influence; and being thence transferred into the wombs of the *females*, are *there* nourished more plentifully, and grow, till they become too big to be longer confined<sup>d</sup>: I say, if this be the case, why may not the

<sup>a</sup> Unde, oro te, says the same author, *similitudine anima quoque parentibus de ingeniis respondemus*,—*si non ex anima semine educimur?* Then to confirm this, he argues like a father indeed, thus: *in illo ipso voluptatis ultimo actu quo genitale virus expellitur, nonne aliquid de anima quoque sentimus exire?* I am ashamed to transcribe more.

<sup>b</sup> Therefore the said father makes the soul to be corporeal.

<sup>c</sup> This might seem to be favored by them who hold, that all souls were created in the beginning (an opinion mentioned in *Nabb. ab. & al.* often), did not the same authors derive the body מִשֶּׁמֶת סְרוּחָה: as may be seen in *P. Abb. & pass.* Particularly R. D. *Qimhi* says of man, נִפְּחוּ נְבִרָה מְשִׁיפֵת הָרוּעַ אֲשֶׁר תִּהְיֶה לָרֵם וּמִשֶּׁם יִגְרַל מֵעַם עַד שִׁישְׁתַּלְמוּ אִיבְרֵיוֹ.

<sup>d</sup> This account destroys that argument, upon which *Censorinus* says many of the old philosophers asserted the eternity of the world: *quod negent omnino posse reperiri, avesne ante, an ova generata sint*

produced out of a small seed converted into blood.

the small seed  
this body is  
is first  
the miracle

By Depraes till all members are complete.



the *nutriment* received from the parents, being prepared by their vessels, and of the same kind with that with which they themselves are nourished, be the same in great measure to the *animalcula* and *embrya* that it is to *them*, and consequently very much assimilate their young, without the derivation of any thing else from them? Many impressions may be made upon the *fetus*, and many tinctures given to the *fluids* communicated to it from the parents; and yet it, the *animal itself*, may not be originally begun in them, or traduced from them. This hypothesis (which has long been mine) suggests a reason, why the *child* is sometimes more like the *father*, sometimes the *mother*: viz. because the vessels of the *animalculum* are disposed to receive a greater proportion of aliment sometimes from the *one*, sometimes from the *other*: or the fluids and spirits in one may ferment and operate *more strongly* than in the other, and so have a *greater* and more signal effect. (Here it ought to be observed, that tho what the *animalculum* receives from the father, is in quantity little in respect of all that nutriment, which it receives by the mother; yet the former, being the first accretion to the original *stamina*, adhering immediately, and being early interwoven with them, may affect it more.)

Since there cannot be a proper *traduction* of the child (*one* mind, and *one* body) from both the *two* parents, all the similitude it bears to *one* of them must proceed from some such cause as I have assigned, or at least not from *traduction*. For the child being *sometimes* like the father, and *sometimes* the mother, and the traduction either *always* from the father, or *always* from the mother, there must sometimes be *similitude*, where there is no *traduction*: and then if the child may resemble one of them without it, why not the other too? The account I have given, appears, many times at least, to be true in *plants*, which raised from the *same* seed, but in *different* beds and soil, will differ. The different nutriment introduces some diversity into the seed or original plant, and assimilates it in some measure to the rest raised in the same place.

The other thing, which I take to be one of the principal supports to this doctrine of *traduction* (a supposition, that the *soul* is merely material, or but the result of some disposition in matter) has been undertaken to be refuted hereafter. But I may premise this here: tho we can have no *image* of a *spirit* (because no being can be portraied or represented by an image, but what is material), yet we may have reason to assert the existence of *such* a substance<sup>a</sup>. *Mutter* is a thing, which we converse with, of which we know pretty well the nature, and pro-

*sint; cum & ovum sine ave, & avis sine ovo gigni non possit.* This question was once much agitated in the world, as may be seen by *Macrobius* and *Plutarch*; who calls it, τὸ ἀπορον ἢ ποικίλα πράγματα τοῖς ζητητικοῖς περιέχον—πρόβλημα. *a Problem that cannot be solved, which perplexes the Greek Philosophers.*

<sup>a</sup> This is as much as *Epicurus* had to say for his atoms: for they were only σώματα λόγῳ διαγεγνῆα, κλ. *Just. M. Imaginary Bodies*

perties; and since we cannot find among them any that are *cogitative*, or such a thing as *life*, but several things *inconsistent* with them, we are under a necessity of confessing that there is some *other* species of substance beside that which is corporeal, and that our *souls* are of that kind (or rather of one of those kinds, which are not merely corporeal: for there must be more than one), tho we can draw no image of it in our own minds. Nor is it at all surprising, that we should not be able to do this: for how can the mind be the object of itself? It may contemplate the body which it inhabits, may be conscious of its own acts, and reflect upon the ideas it finds: but of its own substance it can have no adequate notion, unless it could be as it were *object* and *spectator* both. Only that perfect Being, whose knowledge is infinite, can thus *intimately* know himself.

They, who found the *traduction* of the soul upon this presumption, that it is *material*, and attends the body as some part or affection of it, seem further to be most wofully mistaken upon this account: because the body *itself* is not propagated by traduction. It passes indeed *through* the bodies of the parents, who afford a transitory habitation and subsistence to it: but it cannot be *formed* by the parents, or *grow out* of any part of them. For all the *vital* and *essential* parts of it must be one *coeval* system, and formed *at once* in the first article of the nascent *animalculum*; since no one of these could be *nourished*, or ever come to any thing, without the rest: on the contrary, if any one of them could prevent and be before the rest, it would soon wither and decay again for lack of nourishment received by proper vessels; as we see the limbs and organs of animals do, when the supply due from the animal œconomy is any way intercepted or obstructed. And since an organized body, which requires to be thus *simultaneously* made (fashioned as it were at one stroke) cannot be the effect of any natural and *gradual* process, I cannot but conclude, that there were *animalcula* of every tribe originally formed by the almighty Parent, to be the *seed* of all future generations of animals. Any other manner of production would be like that, which is usually called *equivocal* or spontaneous generation, and with great reason now generally *exploded*. And it is certain, that the analogy of nature in other instances, and microscopical observations do abet what I have said *strongly*.

Lastly, if there is no *race* of men that hath been from eternity, there is no man who is not descended from two *first parents*: and then the souls of those two first parents could be traduced from *no other*. And that there is no such race (none that has been upon this earth from eternity), is apparent from the face of earthly things, and the *history* of mankind<sup>b</sup>, arts, and sciences. What is objected

<sup>a</sup> Οὐδ' ἐν τῷ διασπῆσαι τὸ δαῖτυν. Plot.

<sup>b</sup> Si nulla fuit genitalis origo Terrarū & cali—

Cur supra bellum Thebanum & funera Troja Non alias alii quoque res cecinere poeta. Lucr.



against this argument from fancied *inundations, conflagrations, &c.*<sup>a</sup> has no weight with me. Let us suppose some such great calamity to happen now. It must be either universal, or not. If *universal*, so that no body at all could be saved, then either there must never be any more men, or they must begin again in some *first parents*. If it was only *topical*, affecting some one tract of the globe, or if the tops of mountains more eminent, or rocks more firm remaind unaffected, or if there were *any* natural means left by which men might escape, considerable numbers must certainly *survive*: and then it cannot be imagined, that they should all be *absolutely* so *ignorant* of every thing, that no one should be able to give an account of such things as were *common*; no one able to write, or read, or even to recollect that there were such things as letters; none, that understood any trade; none, that could tell what kind of habitations they had, how they used to be clothed, how their meat drest, or even what their food was: not can it be thought, that *all* books, arms, manufactures of every kind, ships, buildings, and all the product of human skill and industry now extant in the world should be so *universally* and *utterly* abolisht, that no part, no *vestigium* of them should remain; not so much, as to give a hint toward the speedy restoration of necessary arts at least. The people escaping must sure have clothes on, and many necessaries about them, without which they could not escape, nor outlive such a dreadful scene. In short, no *conflagration*, no *flood*, no *destruction* can serve the objectors purpose, to reduce mankind to that state, which by ancient memoirs and many undeniable symptoms we find them to have been in *not many* thousands of years since; I say, no destruction can serve his purpose, but such an one as makes *thorough* work, only sparing two or three couples, stript of every thing, and the most stupid and veriest blocks<sup>b</sup> to be picked out of the whole number: natural fools, or mere *homines sylvestres* would retain habits, and fall to their old way of living, as soon as they had the opportunity to do it. And suppose they never should have such an opportunity; yet neither would *this* serve him effectually: since without some *supernatural* Power interposing such a revolution could not be brought about, nor the naked creatures preserved, nor the earth reformed out of its ashes and ruins after such a calcination, or dissolution, such a *total* demolition of every thing. To this give me leave to add, that tho many inundations, great earthquakes, vulcano's and fiery eruptions have been in particular countries; yet there is no memory or testimony of any such thing, that has ever been *universal*<sup>c</sup>, except per-

<sup>a</sup> There hath been great Destruction made of Mankind many times, & in many Places & will be so again, the greatest of them have been by Fire.

Πολλὰ καὶ κατὰ πολλὰ φθοραὶ γέγονεν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἴσονται, περὶ ἃ καὶ ὑμεῖς μύριται. Πλάτο. Τὲς ἀγραμμάτους καὶ ἀμύτους, as Plato speaks.

<sup>b</sup> For what has been said only in general, and presumptively, to serve a cause, signifies nothing: no more than that testimony in Arnobius, where he seems to allow, that there have been universal conflagrations. Quando, says he, mundus incensus in favillas & cineres dissolutus est? Non ante nos?

<sup>c</sup> Such as could not tell their letters, or distinguish one sound from another? haps

haps of one deluge: and as to that, if the *genius* of the language in which the relation is deliverd, and the manner of writing history in it were well understood, some labord and moliminous attempts to account for it might have been prevented. And beside that, the same *record*, which tells the thing was, tells also how immediately God was concernd in it; that some persons actually were saved; and that the people who then perishd, as well as they who survived, all descended from two *first parents*: and if that authority be a sufficient proof of *one part* of the relation, it must be so of the *rest*.

We may conclude then, that the *human soul* with its faculties of cogitation, &c. depends upon a *Superior* being. And who can this be but the *Supreme* being, or God? Of whom I now proceed to affirm, in the next place, that,

XVI. *Though His essence and manner of being is to us altogether incomprehensible, yet we may say with assurance, that He is free from all defects: or One, from whom all defects must be removed.*

This proposition hath in effect been proved already<sup>a</sup>. However I will take the liberty to enlarge a little further upon it here. As our minds are *finite*, they cannot without a contradiction comprehend what is *infinite*. And if they were enlarged to ever so great a capacity, yet so long as they retain their general nature, and continue to be of the *same kind*, they would by that be only renderd able to apprehend *more and more finite* ideas; out of which, howsoever increased or exalted, no positive idea of the *perfection* of God can ever be formed. For a *Perfect* being must be *infinite*, and perfectly *One*: and in such a nature there can be nothing *finite*, nor any *composition* of finites.

How should we comprehend the nature of the Supreme incorporeal being, or how He exists, when we comprehend not the nature of the most *inferior spirits*, nor have any conception even of matter itself divested of its accidents? How should we attain to an *adequate* knowledge of the Supreme author of the world, when we are utterly incapable of knowing the *extent* of the world itself, and the numberless undescried regions, with their several states and circumstances, containd in it, never to be frequented or visited by our philosophy; nor can turn our selves any way, but we are still accosted with something *above* our understanding? If we cannot penetrate so far into *effects*, as to discover them and their nature throughly, it is not to be expected, that we should, that we *can* ever be admitted to see through the mysteries of His nature,

<sup>a</sup> Prop. V, VI.



who is the *Cause*, so far *above them all*. The Divine perfection then, and manner of being must be of a *kind* different from and above all that we can conceive.

However, notwithstanding our own defects, we may positively affirm there can be *none* in God: since He is *perfect*, as we have seen, He cannot be *defective* or *imperfect*. This needs no further proof. But what follows from it, I would have to be well understood and remembered: *viz.* that from Him must be removed *want of life and activity, ignorance, impotence, acting inconsistently with reason and truth*, and the like. Because these are *defects*; defect of knowledge, power, &c. These are defects and blemishes even in *us*. And tho his perfection is above all our ideas, and of a different *kind* from the perfections of men or any finite beings; yet what would be a defect in *them*, would be much more such in *Him*, and can by no means be ascribed to Him <sup>a</sup>.

Though we understand not His manner of knowing things; yet *ignorance* being uniform and the *same* in every subject, we *understand* what is meant by that word, and can literally and truly *deny* that to belong to Him. The like may be said with respect to His power, or manner of operating, &c. And when we speak of the *internal essential* attributes of God positively, as that He is omniscient, omnipotent, eternal, &c. the *intent* is only to say, that there is no object of knowledge or power, which He does not know or cannot do, He exists without beginning and end, &c. and thus we keep still within the limits allowd by the proposition <sup>b</sup>. That is, we may speak *thus* without pretending to *comprehend* His nature. And so,

XVII. *We may consider God as operating in the production and government of the world, and may draw conclusions from His works, as they are called, notwithstanding any thing which has been said* <sup>c</sup>. Because this we can do without comprehending the manner of His existence. Nay, the contemplation of His works leads us into a necessity of owning, that there must be an incomprehensible Being at the head of them.

Though I do not comprehend the *mode*, in which the world depends upon Him, and He influences and disposes things, because this enters into His *nature*, and the one cannot be understood without the other: yet if I see things, which I know cannot be *self-existent*, and observe plainly an *oeconomy* and *design* in the disposition of them, I may conclude that there is *some Being*, upon whom their existence doth depend, and by whom they are *modeld*; may call this

<sup>a</sup> If that in *Terence* had been (not a question, as it is there, but) an affirmation, *Ego homuncio hoc non facerem*, what a bitter reflexion had it been upon the heathen deity? <sup>b</sup> Λέγομεν ὅτι  
μή τίς ἐστιν ὁ θεὸς ἴσως, ἢ λέγομεν. *Plotin.*      אֵין רַךְ לְהַשְׁגִּיחוֹ אֱלֹהִים מִמַּעַשָׁיו. *Maim.*

<sup>c</sup> There is no knowing what sort of being he is, but by his works.

Being GOD, or the Author and Governor of the world, &c. without *contradicting* my self or truth : as I hope it will appear from what has been said, and is going to be said in the next proposition.

XVIII. *God, who gives existence to the world, does also govern it by His providence.* Concerning this grand question, *Whether there is a Divine providence, or not*, I use to think, *for my self*, after the following manner.

*First*, The world may be said to be *governed* (at least cannot be said to be *ἀνεξέτητον*, or left to fluctuate fortuitously), if there are *laws*, by which *natural causes* act, the several *phenomena* in it succeed regularly, and, in general, the constitution of things is preserved : if there are *rules* observed in the production of *herbs*, *trees*, and the like : if the several kinds of *animals* are, in proportion to their several degrees and stations in the animal kingdom, furnished with *faculties proper to direct* and determin their actions ; and when they act according to them, they may be said to follow the *law* of their nature : if they are *placed* and *provided for* suitably to their respective natures and wants <sup>a</sup>, or (which amounts to the same thing) if their natures are adapted to their circumstances <sup>b</sup> : if, lastly, *particular cases* relating to *rational beings* are taken care of in such a manner, as will at last agree best with *reason*.

*Secondly*, If there are such *laws* and *provisions*, they can come originally from no other being, but from Him who is the *Author of nature*. For those laws, which result from the *natures* of things, their properties, and the use of their faculties, and may be said to be written upon the things themselves, can be the laws of no other : nor can those things, whose very *being* depends upon God, exist under any condition *repugnant* to His will ; and therefore can be subject to no laws or dispositions, which He would not have them be subject to ; that is, which are not *His*. Beside, there is *no other* being capable of imposing laws, or any scheme of government upon the world ; because there is no other, who is not himself *part* of the world, and whose own existence doth not *depend* upon Him.

*Thirdly*, By the *providence of God* I mean His governing the world by *such* laws, and making *such* provisions, as are mentiond above. So that if there are *such*, there is a Divine providence.

*amongst Horns of Unicorns by Fall of Lee*  
• מקרני ראמים ער ביצי כנים, as the *Jews* speak.

with particular cases relating to *inanimate* or *irrational* beings ; such as are mentiond in *Mo. nebok.* (a leaf's falling from a tree, a spider's catching a flie, &c.) and which are there said to be במקרה גמור. Tho it is hard to separate these many times from the cases of rational beings ; as also to comprehend what במקרה גמור, *perfect accident*, is.

<sup>b</sup> I shall not pretend here to meddle

*By mere accident*



*Lastly*, It is not *impossible*, that there should be *such*: on the contrary, we have just reasons to believe there are. It would be an absurd assertion to say, that any thing is *impossible* to a being whose nature is infinitely above our comprehension, if the terms do not *imply a contradiction*: but we may with confidence assert, that it is *impossible* for any thing, whose *existence* flows from such a being, ever to grow so far out of His reach, or be so emancipated from under Him, that the *manner* of its existence should not be regulated and determind by Him.

As to *inanimate substances*, we see the case to be really just as it was supposed before to be. The heavenly and greater bodies keep their stations, or persevere to go the same circuits over and over by a *certain law*. Little bodies or particles, of the same kind, observe continually the same *rules* of attracting, repelling, &c. When there are any seeming variations in nature, they proceed only from the different circumstances and combinations of things, acting all the while under their ancient *laws*. We are so far acquainted with the *laws* of gravitation and motion, that we are able to calculate their effects, and serve ourselves of them, supplying upon many occasions the defect of power in our selves by mechanical powers, which never fail to answer according to the *establishment*. Briefly, we see it so far from being *impossible*, that the *inanimate* world should be governd by *laws*, that all the parts of it are obnoxious to *laws* by them *inviolable*.

As to *vegetables*, we see also how they are determind by *certain methods* prescribed them. Each sort is produced from its *proper* seed; hath the *same* texture of fibres; is nourishd by the *same* kind of juices out of the earth, digested and prepared by the *same* kind of vessels, &c. Trees receive annually their *peculiar* liveries, and bear their *proper* fruits: flowers are dress'd, each family, in the *same* colors, or diversify their fashions after a certain manner *proper* to the kind, and breath the *same* essences: and both these and all other kinds *observe* their seasons; and seem to have their several professions and trades *appointed them*, by which they produce such food and manufactures (pardon the *catachresis*), as may *satisfy the wants* of animals. Being so very necessary, they, or at least the most useful, grow *easily*: being fixt in the earth, insensible, and not made for society, they are generally *disperdund*: being liable to a great consumption both of them and their seeds, they yield *great quantities* of these, in order to repair and multiply their race, &c. So that here is evidently a *regulation*, by which the several orders are preserved, and the ends of them answerd according to their first *establishment* too.

Then as to *animals*, there are *laws*, which *mut. mutand.* are common to them with inanimate beings and vegetables, or at least such as resemble<sup>a</sup> their laws. The

<sup>a</sup> Pliny in his chapter *De ordine natura in satis*, &c. treats of trees in terms taken from animals.

individuals of the several kinds of those, as of these, have the *same* (general) shape and members, to be managed after the *same* manner: have the *same* vessels replenishd with the *same* kinds of fluids, and furnishd with the *same* glands for the separation and distribution of such parts of them, as answer the *same* intentions in them all: are stimulated by the *same* appetites and uneasinesses to take in their food, continue their breed, &c. And whatever it is, that proceeds thus in a manner so like to that of vegetables, according to *fixed* methods, and keeps in the *same* general track as they do, may be said to observe and be under some *like rule* or *law*, which either operates upon and limits it *ab extra*, or was given it with its nature. But there are, moreover, certain obligations resulting from the several degrees of reason and sense, or *sense only*, of which we cannot but be conscious in our selves, and observe some faint indications in the kinds belows us, and which can be lookt upon as nothing less than *laws*, by which animals are to move and manage themselves: that is, otherwise exprest, by which the Author of their natures *governs* them. 'Tis true *these laws* may not impose an absolute necessity, nor be of the *same* rigor with those of inanimate and merely passive beings, because the beings which are subject to these (men at least) may be supposed in some measure free, and to act upon some kind of principles or motives: yet still they may have the nature of *laws*, tho they may be broken; and may make a part of that *providence* by which God *administers* the affairs of the world. Whatever advantages I obtain by my own free endeavours, and right use of those faculties and powers I have, I look upon them to be as much the effects of God's *providence* and government, as if they were given me *immediately* by Him, without my acting; since all my faculties and abilities (whatever they are) depend upon *Him*, and are as it were *instruments* of His providence to me in respect of such things as may be procured by them<sup>a</sup>.

To finish this head: it is so far from being *impossible*, that the several tribes of *animals* should be so made and placed, as to find proper ways of supporting and defending themselves (I mean, so far as it is consistent with the general oeconomy of the world: for some cannot well subsist without the destruction of some others), that, on the contrary, we see men, beasts, birds, fishes, insects all have organs and faculties adapted to their respective circumstances and opportunities of finding their proper food or prey, &c. even to the astonishment of them who attend to the history of nature. If *men*, who seem to have more wants than any other kind, meet with difficulties in maintaining life, it is because they themselves, not contented with what is *decent* and *convenient* only, have by their luxuries and scandalous neglect of their reason *made* life expensive.

<sup>a</sup> Therefore if those *Essenes* in *Josephus*, who are said *ἐν μὲν Θεῷ καταλιπὼν τὰ πάντα*, excluded human endeavours, they must be much in the wrong.



The *world* then being not left in a state of confusion or as a chaos, but reduced into *order* and *methodized* for ages to come; the several species of beings having their offices and provinces *assign'd* them; plants and animals subsistence *set out* for them; and as they go off, successors *appointed* to relieve them, and carry on the *scheme*, &c. that the *possibility* only of a general providence should be allow'd, is certainly *too modest* a demand. We see, or may see, that *in fact* there is *such* a providence<sup>a</sup>.

The great difficulty is, how to account for that *providence*, which is called *particular*; or that, which respects (principally) *particular* men. For rational beings and free agents are capable of doing and deserving *well*, or *ill*. Some *will* make a right use of their faculties and opportunities, some *will not*: the vicious may, or may not *repent*, or repent and *relapse*: some fall into evil habits through inadvertence, bad examples, and the like, rather than any design: and these want to be reclaim'd: some may be supposed to worship God and to crave His protection and blessing, &c. and then a proper answer to their prayers may be humbly expected. Hence many and great differences will arise, which will require from a governor *suitable* encouragements, rewards, correptions, punishments; and that some should be protected and fortunate, others not, or less. Now the *good* or *ill* state of a man here, his safety or danger, happiness or unhappiness depend upon many things, which seem to be scarce *all capable* of being determin'd by providence. They depend upon what he does *himself*, and what naturally follows from his own behaviour: upon what is done by *others*, and may either touch him at the same time, or reach him afterward: upon the *course* of nature, which must affect him: and, in fine, upon many *incidents*, of which no account is to be given<sup>b</sup>. As to what *he does himself*, it is impossible for him, as things are in this maze of life, to know always what tends to happiness, and what not: or if he could know, that, which ought to be done, may not be within the compass of his powers. Then, if the actions of other men are *free*, how can they be determin'd to be only *such*, as may be either good or bad (as the *case requires*) for some other particular man; since such a determination seems inconsistent with liberty? Beside, numbers of men acting every one upon the foot of their own *private* freedom, and the several *degrees* of sense and ability which they *respectively* have, their acts, as they either conspire, or cross and obliquely impede, or perhaps directly meet

<sup>a</sup> Ut si quis in domum aliquam, aut in gymnasium, aut in forum venerit, cum videat omnium rerum rationem, modum, disciplinam, non possit ea sine causa fieri judicare, sed esse aliquem intelligat, qui praesit, & cui pareatur, &c. Cic.

<sup>b</sup> Little things have many times unforeseen and great effects: & contra. The bare sight of a fig, shewn in the senate-house at Rome, occasion'd Carthage to be destroy'd: quod non Trebia, aut Trasymenus, non Canna busto insignes Romani nominis perficere potuere; non castra Punica ad tertium lapidem vallata, portaque Collina adequitans ipse Hannibal. Plin.

and *oppose* each other, and have different effects upon men of different *makes*, or in different *circumstances*, must cause a strange embarras, and intangle the plot<sup>a</sup>. And as to the *course of nature*, if a *good* man be passing by an infirm building, just in the article of falling, can it be expected, that God should *suspend* the force of gravitation till he is gone by, in order to his deliverance; or can we think it would be increased, and the fall hastend, if a *bad* man was there, only that he might be caught, crushd, and made an example? If a man's safety or prosperity should depend upon winds or rains, must *new* motions be imprest upon the atmosphere, and *new* directions given to the floating parts of it, by some *extraordinary* and *new* influence from God? Must clouds be so precipitated, or kept in suspension<sup>c</sup>, as the *case* of a particular man or two requires? To which add, that the differing and many times contrary interests of men are scarce to be *reconciled*. The wind, which carries one into the *port*, drives another back to *sea*; and the rains, that are but just sufficient upon the *hills*, may drown the inhabitants of the *valleys*<sup>d</sup>. In short, may we expect *miracles*<sup>e</sup>: or can there be a particular providence, a providence that suits the *several cases* and prayers of individuals, without a continual *repetition* of them, and force frequently committed upon the laws of nature, and the freedom of intelligent agents? For my part, I verily believe there may. For,

1. It seems to me not *impossible*, that God should know *what is to come*: on the contrary, it is highly reasonable to think, that He does and must know things *future*. Whatever happens in the world, which does not come immediately from Him, must either be the effect of *mechanical* causes, or of the motions of living beings and *free* agents. For *chance* we have seen already is no cause. Now as to the former, it cannot be *impossible* for Him, upon whom the being and nature of every thing depends, and who therefore must *intimately* know all their powers and what effects they will have, to see through the whole *train* of causes and effects, and whatever will come to pass in *that*

Of God's Providence

While every one pushes his own designs, they must interfere, and hinder one another. *Ad summum succedere honorem Certantes, iter infestum fecere viam*. Lucian<sup>b</sup> Or is it not more likely, *πρὸς τὴν δόξαν ἀποδομίας, ἢ ὑποπεσόντα δαδανῶν, ὁ ποῖός ποτ' ἂν ᾖ* (in Plotinus's words)? <sup>c</sup> Something more than this we meet with in *Onq.*'s paraphrase, where it is said, that upon *Moses's* prayer *מִשְׁרָא דְּהוּדָה נְחִית לֵאמֹר מִשְׁרָא עַל אֶרְעָא*. Which same place *Rashi* explains after the same manner; *מִשְׁרָא לֵאמֹר הַגִּיעַ [אַרְצָה] . וְאִם אוֹתָן שֶׁהָיוּ בְּאוּרֵי לֵאמֹר הַגִּיעוּ לְאַרְץ*. <sup>d</sup> In *Lucian*, τῶν πλεόντων ὁ μὲν βορρᾶν ὑπὸ χεῖρὶ ἐπιπνύσται. ὁ δὲ νότον ὁ δὲ γεωργὸς ἤτοι ἐστὸν ὁ δὲ καλλιῆς, ἢ λῶν. <sup>e</sup> Some have talked to this purpose. So *R. Albo* says of some prophets and *bbafidim*, אוֹ שִׁישְׁנו הַשְׁבַּע אוֹ יִשְׁתְּנוּ בַעֲבוּרָם. So *R. If. Abuh.* that the good or evil, which happens to a man in this world by way of reward or punishment, הֵנּס וְהוּא נִסְתֵּר יַחֲשׁוּב בּוֹ הַרְוָא. שהוא מְנוּהָגוּ שֶׁל עוֹלָם מוֹרִים אֲנַחְנוּ עַל נֶסֶךְ שֶׁבְּכָל יוֹם עִמָּנוּ. Accordingly in *Sed. teph.* we find this thanksgiving:

*The Rain if it was falling did not reach to Earth* with *Rashi* explains after same manner *way* *The Rain came not to the Earth & also that if it was in air, did not fall by ground* *if in Lucian* *Some of sailors pray for South wind* *Country in wishes for wet weather, & fuller for sun-shine* *So R. Albo says, of some Holy M. that they can alter course of Nature, or that it will be altered for them* *Is not only by plain Miracles, but also by obscure marks; as any one may imagine who sees the manner of world* *So Abarb.* *It is that Power of which changes Nature by his Providence, and accordingly in Sed. teph. we find this Thanksgiving - We praise Thee for thy wonders which we hold every day*



way<sup>a</sup>: nay, it is *impossible*, that He should *not* do it. We our selves, if we are satisfied of the goodness of the materials of which a machine is made, and understand the force and determination of those powers by which it is moved, can tell what it will do, or what will be the effect of it. And as to those things which depend upon the *voluntary* motions of free agents, it is well known, that men (by whom learn how to judge of the rest) can only be free with respect to such things as are within their *sphere*; not great, God knows: and their freedom with respect to these can only consist in a liberty either to act, without any incumbent necessity, as their *own reason* and judgment shall determin them; or to *neglect* their rational faculties, and not use them at all, but suffer themselves to be carried away by the tendencies and inclinations of the body, which left thus to itself acts in a manner *mechanically*. Now He, who knows what *is* in mens power, what not; knows the make of their bodies, and all the *mechanism* and propensions of them; knows the *nature* and *extent* of their understandings, and what will determin them this or that way; knows all the process of natural (or second) causes, and consequently how these may work upon them<sup>b</sup>: He, I say, who knows all this, may know *what* men will do, if He can but know this one thing more, *viz.* whether they *will use* their rational faculties or *not*. And since even we our selves, mean and defective as we are, can in *some measure* conceive, how so much as this may be done, and seem to want but one step to finish the account, can we with any shew of reason deny to a *Perfect* being this one article more, or think that He cannot do that too; especially if we call to mind, that this very power of *using* our own faculties is held of Him<sup>c</sup>?

Observe what a sagacity there is in some *men*, not only in respect of physical causes and effects, but also of the future actings of mankind; and how very easie it is many times, if the persons concernd, their characters, and circumstances are given, to foresee what they will do: as also to foretel many general events, tho the intermediate transactions upon which they depend are not known<sup>d</sup>. Consider how much more remarkable this penetration is in *some men*, than in *others*: consider further, that if there be any *minds* more perfect than the human, (and who can be so conceited of himself as to question this?) they must have it in a still more eminent degree, *proportionable* to the excellence of their natures: in the last place, do but allow

*god who formed all living creatures understands his own works thoroughly*

<sup>a</sup> What Seneca says of the Gods (in the heathen style), may be said of the true God. *Nota est illi operis sui series: omniumque illi rerum per manus suas iturarum scientia in aperto semper est; nobis ex abdito subit, &c.*

<sup>b</sup> Ο ὁ ζωοπλάστης θεὸς ἐπιστάται τὰ ἑαυτοῦ καλῶς διμικρογνήματα. Ph. Jud.

<sup>c</sup> Ipsa nostra voluntates in causarum ordine sunt, qui certus est Deo, ejusque praescientia continetur, &c. S. Aust.

<sup>d</sup> Etsi quem exitum acies habitura sit, divinare nemo potest; tamen belli exitum video, &c. and after, quem ego tam video animo, quam ea, qua oculis cernimus. Cic.

## Truths relating to the Deity. 101

(as you must) this power of discerning to be in God *proportionable* to His nature, as in lower beings it is proportionable to *theirs*, and then it becomes *infinite*; and then again, the *future* actions of free agents are at once all unlocked, and exposed to His view. For that knowledge is not infinite, which is limited to things *past* or *present* or which come to pass *necessarily*.

After all, what has been said is only a feeble attempt to shew, how far *even we* can go toward a conception of the *manner*, in which future things may be known: but as we have no adequate idea of an infinite and perfect Being, His powers, and among them His *power of knowing*, must infinitely pass all our understanding. It must be something different from and *infinitely* transcending all the modes of apprehending things, which we know any thing of<sup>a</sup>.

We know matters of fact by the help of our *senses*, the strength of *memory*, impressions made upon *phancy*, or the *report* of others (tho that indeed is comprehended under *senses*. For that, which we know only by report, in proper speaking we only know the report of, or we have heard it); and all these ways do suppose those matters either to be *present*, or once to *have been*: but is it therefore *impossible*, that there should be any *other* ways of knowing? This is so far from being true, that, since God has no organs of sensation, nor such mean faculties as the best of ours are, and consequently cannot know things in the way which we know them in, if He doth not know them by some *other* way, He cannot know them *at all*, even tho they were present: and therefore there must be *other* ways, or at least *another* way of knowing even matters of fact. And since the difficulty we find in determining, whether *future* matters of fact may be known, arises chiefly from this, that we in reality consider, without minding it, whether they may be known in *our* way of knowing; it vanishes, when we recollect, that they are and must be known to God by some other way: and not only so, but this must be some way, that is perfect and worthy of Him. *Future*, or what to us is future, may be as truly the object of Divine knowledge, as *present* is of ours: nor can we<sup>b</sup> tell, what respect *past*, *present*, *to come*, have to the Divine mind, or wherein they differ. To deaf men there is no such thing as *sound*, to blind no such thing as *light* or *color*: nor, when these things are defined and explained to them in the best manner, which their circumstances admit, are they capable of knowing *how* they are apprehended. So here, we cannot tell *how* future things are known perhaps, any more than deaf or blind people what sounds or colors are, and *how* they are perceived; but yet there may be a way of knowing *those*,

<sup>a</sup> His knowledge is not such a sort of knowledge as *larger* man has. It differs not only in degree but in kind. *Deum*  
 • אין זה ידיעה ממין ידיעתנו. *Maim.* It differs not במין המציאה ברב ובמעט לבר אבל במין ידיעתו. *Id.*

<sup>b</sup> *Ignari, quid queat esse, Quid nequeat*: to use *Lucretius's* words more properly.



as well as there is of perceiving *these*. As they want a *fifth* sense to perceive sounds or colors, of which they have no notion: so perhaps we may want a *sixth* sense, or *some faculty*, of which future events may be the proper objects. Nor have we any more reason to deny, that there is in nature *such* a sense or faculty, than the deaf or blind have to deny, that there is such a sense as that of *hearing* or *seeing*.

We can never conclude, that it is *impossible* for an infinitely perfect Being to know what a free agent will *choose* to do, till we can comprehend *all* the powers of such a Being, and that is till we our selves are infinite and perfect <sup>a</sup>. So far are we from being able to pronounce with any shew of reason, that it is *impossible* there should be such knowledge in God.

In the last place, this knowledge is not only not *impossible*, but that which has been already proved concerning the Deity and His perfection doth necessarily infer, that nothing can be hid from Him. For if *ignorance* be an imperfection, the ignorance of *future* acts and events must be so: and then if *all* imperfections are to be denied of Him, *this must*.

There is indeed a common prejudice against the *prescience* (as it is usually called) of God; which suggests, that, if God foreknows things, He foreknows them infallibly or *certainly*: and if so, then they are *certain*; and if certain, then they are no longer matter of *freedom*. And thus prescience and freedom are inconsistent. *But sure* the nature of a thing is not *changed* by being known, or known before hand. For if it is known truly, it is known to be what it is; and therefore is not altered by this. The truth is, God foresees, or rather sees the actions of free agents, because they *will be*; not that they will be, because He *foresees* them <sup>b</sup>. If I see an object in a certain place, the veracity of my faculties supposed, it is *certain* that object is there: but yet it cannot be said, it is there *because* I see it there, or that my seeing it there is the *cause* of its being there: but because it *is there*, therefore I *see* it there. It is the object, that determines my sensation: and so in the other case, it is a future *choice* of the free agent, that determines the prescience, which yet may be infallibly true <sup>c</sup>.

Let us put these two contradictory propositions, *B (some particular man) will go to church next Sunday, and B will not go to church next Sunday*; and let us suppose <sup>female</sup> *what he is* <sup>at his knowledge of any thing that is future does not produce a thing that</sup> *is possible in nature*.

<sup>a</sup> To attempt to comprehend the manner of God's knowing is the same as to endeavour שוהיה אנוחנו הוא. Maim. יריערו במה שיהיה לא יוציא הרבר האפשר משבעו. Maim. Much might be inserted upon this subject (out of *Abarb.* particularly) which I shall omit. <sup>c</sup> *Sicut enim tu memoriâ tuâ non cogis facta esse qua praterierunt; sic Deus prescientiâ suâ non cogit faciendâ qua futura sunt.* S. Aust.

pose withall, that B is *free*, and that his going or not going depends merely upon his *own will*. In this case he may indeed do either, but yet he can do but *one* of these two things, either *go*, or *not go*; and one he must do. One of these propositions therefore is now *true*; but yet it is not the truth of that proposition, which forces him *to do* what is containd in it: on the contrary, the *truth* of the proposition arises from what he shall *choose* to do. And if that truth doth not force him, the *foreknowledge* of that truth will not. We may sure suppose B himself to *know certainly* before hand, which of the two he will choose to do, whether to go to church or not (I mean so far as it depends upon his choice only): and if so, then here is B's own *foreknowledge* consistent with his freedom: and if we can but, further, suppose God to know *as much* in this respect as B does, there will be God's *foreknowledge* consistent with B's *freedom*.

In a word, it involves no *contradiction* to assert, that God certainly knows what any man will choose; and therefore that he should do this cannot be said to be *impossible*.

2. It is not *impossible*, that such *laws* of nature, and such a *series* of causes and effects may be *originally* design'd, that not only general provisions may be made for the several species of beings, but even *particular cases*, at least many of them, may also be provided for without *innovations* or *alterations* in the course of nature<sup>a</sup>. It is true this amounts to a prodigious scheme, in which all things to come are as it were comprehended under one view, estimated, and laid together: but when I consider, what a mass of *wonders* the universe is in other regards; what a Being God is, *incomprehensibly* great and perfect; that He cannot be ignorant of any thing, no not of the *future* wants and deportments of *particular* men; and that all things, which derive from Him as the First cause, must do this so as to be *consistent* one with another, and in such a manner, as to make *one compact* system, befitting so great an Author: I say, when I consider this, I cannot deny such an *adjustment* of things to be within His power<sup>b</sup>. The order of events, proceeding from the settlement of nature, may be as compatible with the due and reasonable success of *my* endeavours and prayers (as inconsiderable a part of the world as I am<sup>c</sup>), as with any other thing or *phenomenon* how great soever.

*According to their Natural Course, & according to Reason: Every most minute thing we ought to think as duly regulated & connected with each other.*

\* Things come to pass & κατὰ φυσικὰς ἀκολουθίας & κατὰ λόγον and even τὰ σμικρότερα δὲ σωτὴ-  
τέχεται & συνφέρονται νομίζεν. Plot. That in Seneca looks something like this: Hoc dico, fulmina  
non mitti a Jove, sed sic omnia disposita, ut ea etiam, quæ ab illo non fiunt, tamen sine ratione non  
sunt: quæ illius est. — Nam etsi Jupiter illa nunc non facit, fecit ut fierent. <sup>b</sup> This seems  
to be what Eusebius means, when he says, that Divine providence does (among other things) τοῖς  
ἐκτὸς συμβαίνειν τὴν δὲσαν τάξιν ἀντιτείνειν. <sup>c</sup> Τὴν ὅτι ἐξ ὧν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ μετέωρον ἰσχυρὰν, in Philo's  
words. *For I have learnt w<sup>th</sup> a more nothing I am.*



Perhaps my meaning may be made more intelligible thus. Suppose M (some man) certainly to *foreknow* some way or other that, when he should come to be upon his death-bed, L would *petition* for some *particular legacy*; in a manner so earnest and humble, and with such a good disposition, as would render it proper to grant his request: and upon this M makes his *last will*, by which he devises to L that which was to be asked, and then locks up the *will*; and all this many years before the death of M, and whilst L had yet no expectation or thought of any such thing. When the time comes, the *petition* is made, and *granted*; not by making any *new will*, but by the *old* one already made, and without *alteration*: which legacy had, notwithstanding that, never been left had the petition never been preferred. The grant may be called an effect of a future act, and depends as much upon it, as if it had been made after the act. So if it had been foreseen, that L would not *so much as ask*, and had therefore been left out of the will; this *preterition* would have been caused by his carriage, tho much later than the date of the will. In all this is nothing hard to be admitted, if M be allowd to *foreknow* the case<sup>a</sup>. And thus the *prayers*, which good men offer to the *All-knowing* God, and the *neglects* of others, may find fitting effects *already* forecasted in the course of nature. Which *possibility* may be extended to the labors of men, and their behaviour in general.

It is obvious to every one's observation, that in *fact* particular men are very commonly (at least in some measure) rewarded or punished by the *general* laws and methods of nature. The *natural* (tho not constant) attendents and consequences of virtue are peace, health, and felicity; of vice, loss of philosophical pleasures, a diseased body, debts, and difficulties. Now then, if B be *virtuous* and *happy*, C *vitious* and at last *miserable*, laboring under a late and fruitless remorse; tho this comes to pass through the *natural tendence* of things, yet these two cases, being supposed such as require, the one that B should be favored, the other that C should suffer for his wickedness, are as effectually *provided for*, as if God exerted his power in some peculiar way on this occasion.

3. It is not *impossible*, that men, whose natures and actions are foreknown, may be introduced into the world in such *times*, *places*, and other *circumstances*, as that their acts and behaviour may not only coincide with the *general plan* of things, but also answer many *private cases* too<sup>b</sup>. The *planets* and bigger parts of the world

<sup>a</sup> The case here put may perhaps supply an answer to that, which is said in *Mishn. mass. Berak.* 'צוּעַק לְשַׁעֲבֵר הָרִי זֶה תַּפְלַח שְׂוֵא וְכוּ'.

<sup>b</sup> If Plato had not been born in the time of *Socrates*, in all probability he had not been what he was. And therefore, with *Lactantius's* favor, he might have reason to thank God, *quod Atheniensis [natus esset]*, & *quod temporibus Socratis*. Just as *M. Antoninus* ascribes, gratefully, to the Gods τὸ γένεσθαι Ἀπολλωνίου, Ῥωμαίου, Μάξιμου.

with Apollonius Maximus his Tutor, Apollonius Rhodius

we cannot but see are disposed into such places and order, that they together make a noble system, without having their natural powers of attraction (or the force of that which is equivalent to attraction) or any of the laws of motion restrained or altered. On the contrary, being rightly placed, they by the observation of these become subservient to the main design. Now why may there not be in the Divine mind something like a projection of the future history of mankind, as well as of the order and motions and various aspects of the greater bodies of the world? And then why should it not be thought possible for men, as well as for them, by some secret law, tho of another kind, or rather by the prescience and guidance of an unseen governing power, to be brought into their places in such a manner as that by the free use of their faculties, the conjunctions and oppositions of their interests and inclinations, the natural influence and weight of their several magnitudes and degrees of parts, power, wealth, &c. they may conspire to make out the scheme? And then again, since generals consist of particulars, and in this scheme are comprehended the actions and cases of particular men, they cannot be so situated respectively among the rest of their species as to be serviceable to the principal intention, and fall properly into the general diagram of affairs, unless they and their several actings and cases do in the main correspond one to another, and fit among themselves, or at least are not inconsistent.

+ Every of men

Here is no implication of any contradiction or absurdity in all this: and therefore it may at least be fairly supposed. And if so, it will follow, that a particular providence may be compatible with the natural freedom of mens actions. Such a supposition is certainly not beyond the power of an almighty, perfect Being: it is moreover worthy of Him, and what they, who can dwell a while upon those words, and take their import, must believe.

The ancients I am persuaded had some such thoughts as these. For they were generally fatalists, and yet do not seem to have thought, that they were not masters of their own actions<sup>a</sup>.

4. It is not impossible (for this is all that I contend for here), that many things, suitable to several cases, may be brought to pass by means of secret and sometimes sudden influences on our minds<sup>b</sup>, or the minds of other men, whose acts may affect us. For instance; if the case should require, that N should be de-

Popular connection of causes, & those things which are in our power, belong to this connection. So y some things are not

<sup>a</sup> Plato and the Stoics, ap. Plut. make fate to be συμπλοκή αιτιών τεταγμένη, εἰς ἣν συμπλοκήν καὶ τὸ κατ' ἡμᾶς ὥστε τὰ μὴ ἐμάρθαι, τὰ δ' ἐμάρθαι. <sup>b</sup> The Heathen were of this opinion: otherwise Homer could have had no opportunity of introducing their Deities as he doth. Τῷ δὲ ἄρ' ἵππε φρεσὶ δῖκε δαῖα γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη Ἀλλὰ τις ἀθανάτων τρέψῃ φρένας and the like often. Plutarch explains these passages thus. Οὐκ ἀναιρῶντα ποιεῖ [Ὁμηρ.] τὸ θεόν, ἀλλὰ κινῶντα τὴν προαίρεσιν ἐπὶ ὁμοῦ ἐργαζόμενον, ἀλλὰ φαντασίας ὁρῶν ἀγωγὴν and afterwards the Gods are said to help men, καὶ ψυχῆς τὸ πρακτικὸν καὶ προαιρετικὸν ἀρχαῖς τισι καὶ φαντασίαις καὶ ἐπινοαῖς ἐγχεόντες, ἢ τὰν αἰτίων ἀπεστέφοντες καὶ ἐσάλλες.

Homer can put it into their mind, but some God altered their mind. — Homer lived does not make of his own will of m. but only to move him to will; nor does he produce Appetites them in m. but only causes such Imaginations as are capable of producing them. — By exciting Powers & Faculties of Soul, by some secret Principles, or Imaginations or Thoughts, or influences, by Diverging or stopping the



liverd from some threatening *ruin*, or from some *misfortune*, which would certainly befall him, if he should go such a way at such a time, as he intended: upon this occasion some *new* reasons may be presented to his mind, why he should not go *at all*, or not *then*, or not *by that road*; or he may forget to go. Or, if he is to be deliverd from some dangerous *enemy*, either some new turn given to his thoughts may divert him from going where the *enemy* will be, or the enemy may be after the same manner diverted from coming where *he* shall be, or his [the enemy's] resentment may be *qualified*, or some proper method of *defence* may be suggested, or degree of resolution and vigor excited. After the same manner not only deliverances from dangers and troubles, but advantages and successes may be conferred: or on the other side, men may, by way of punishment for crimes committed, incurr mischiefs and calamities. I say, these things and such like *may be*. For since the motions and actions of men, which depend upon their wills, do also depend upon their judgments, as these again do upon the *present appearances* or *non-appearances* of things in their minds; if a *new* prospect of things can be any way produced, the lights by which they are seen *alterd*, *new* forces and directions imprest upon the spirits, passions *exalted* or *abated*, the power of judging *inlivend* or *debilitated*, or the attention taken off, without any suspension or alteration of the standing laws of nature, then without that *new* volitions, designs, measures, or a cessation of thinking may also be produced, and thus many things prevented, that otherwise would *be*, and many brought about, that would *not*. But that this is far from being *impossible*, seems clear to me. For the operations of the mind following in great measure the present disposition of the *body*, some thoughts and designs, or absences of mind, may proceed from *corporeal* causes, acting according to the common laws of matter and motion themselves; and so the case may fall in with n. 2. or they may be occasiond by something said or done by *other men*; and then the case may be brought under n. 3. or they may be caused by the suggestion, and impulse, or other silent communications of some *spiritual being*; perhaps the Deity himself. For that such imperceptible influences and still whispers may be, none of us all can positively deny: that is, we cannot know certainly, that there are no such things. On the contrary, I believe there are but few of them who have made observations upon themselves and their affairs, but must, when they reflect on life past and the various adventures and events in it, find many instances, in which their usual judgment and sense of things cannot but seem to themselves to have been *over-ruled*, they knew not *by what*, nor *how*<sup>a</sup>, nor *why* (i. e. they have done things,

*The young man by mistake some way, I know not how, gave poison to me, what is it?*  
 Σφαλις [ὁ μετακίσας] σὺ οἶδ' ὅπως, ἐμοὶ μὲν τὸ φάρμακον, Πτοιοδώρῳ δὲ ἀφάρμακτον [κύλικα] ἐτίδωκε, says Callidemidas, who designd the poison for Ptoodorus, in Lucian.

which afterwards they wonder how they came *to do*); and that these actions have had consequences very *remarkable* in their history<sup>a</sup>. I speak not here of men dementated with wine, or enchanted with some temptation: the thing holds true of men even in their sober and more considering seasons.

That there may be *possibly* such inspirations of new thoughts and counsels may perhaps further appear from this; that we so frequently find thoughts arising in our heads, into which we are led by *no* discourse, *nothing* we read, *no* clue of reasoning; but they surprise and come upon us from we *know not* what quarter<sup>b</sup>. If they proceeded from the mobility of spirits, straggling out of order, and fortuitous affections of the brain, or were of the nature of *dreams*, why are they not as wild, incoherent, and extravagant as they are? Not to add, that the world has generally acknowledged, and therefore seems to have *experienced* some assistance and directions given to good men by the Deity; that men have been many times infatuated, and lost to themselves, &c. If any one should object, that if men are thus over-ruled in their actions, then they are deprived of their *liberty*, &c. the answer is, that tho man is a free agent, he may not be free as to *every thing*. His freedom may be restrained, and he only accountable for those acts, in respect of which he *is free*.

If this then be the case, as it seems to be, that men's minds are susceptible of such *insinuations* and *impressions*, as frequently by ways unknown do affect them, and give them an inclination toward this or that, how many things may be brought to pass by these means without *fixing* and *refixing* the laws of nature: any more than they are unfixed, when one man alters the opinion of another by throwing a book, proper for that purpose, in his way? I say, how many things may be brought about thus, not only in regard of *our selves*, but *other people*, who may be concerned in our actions, either *immediately*, or *in time* through perhaps many intermediate events? For the prosperity or improsperity of a man, or his fate here, does not intirely depend upon his *own* prudence or imprudence, but in great measure upon his *situation* among the rest of mankind, and what *they* do. The natural effect of his management meeting with such things, as are the natural effects of the actions of other men, and being blended with them, the result may be something not intended or foreseen.

5. There *possibly* may be, and most probably are beings *invisible*, and *superior* in nature to us, who may by *other* means be in many respects *ministers* of

<sup>a</sup> When Hannibal was in sight of Rome, *non ausus est obsidere*. S. Hier. — Sed religione quadam abstinuit, quod diceret, capienda urbis modo non dari voluntatem, modo non dari facultatem, ut testatur Orosius. Schol.

<sup>b</sup> Non enim cuiquam in potestate est quid veniat in mentem. S. Aust.

<sup>c</sup> They who call'd Simonides out from Scopas and his company, as if it were to speak with him, saved his life. The story known.



God's providence, and authors under Him of many events to particular men, without *altering* the laws of nature. For it implies no *contradiction* or *absurdity* to say there are such beings: on the contrary we have the greatest reason to think what has been intimated already; that such imperfect beings, as we are, are far below the *top* of the scale. Tho *pictures* of spiritual beings cannot be drawn in our imagination, as of corporeal; yet to the upper and reasoning part of the mind the idea of *spiritual substance* may perhaps be as clear, as that of *corporeity*. For what *penetrability* is, must be known just as well as what *impenetrability* is: and so on.

And since it has been proved (p. 77, 78), that all corporeal motions proceed originally from something *incorporeal*, it must be as certain, that there are incorporeal substances, as that there is motion. Beside, how can we tell but that there may be above us beings of greater powers, and more perfect intellects, and capable of mighty things, which yet may have *corporeal* vehicles as we have, but *finer* and *invisible*? Nay, who knows but that there may be even of these many *orders*, rising in dignity of nature, and amplitude of power, one above another? It is no way below the *philosophy* of these times, which seems to delight in enlarging the capacities of matter, to assert the *possibility* of this. But however, my own defects sufficiently convince me, that I have no pretension to be one of the *first* rank, or that which is *next under* the All-perfect.

Now then, as *we our selves* by the use of our powers do many times interpose and alter the course of things within our sphere from what it would be, if they were left intirely to the laws of motion and gravitation, without being said to alter those *laws*; so may these *superior* beings likewise in respect of things within their spheres, much larger be sure, the least of them all, than ours is: only with this difference, that as their knowledge is more extensive, their intellects purer, their reason better, they may be much *properer* instruments of Divine providence with respect to *us*, than we can be with respect *one to another*, or to the *animals* below us. I cannot think indeed, that the power of these beings is so large, as to alter or suspend the *general laws* of the world; or that the world is like a bungling piece of clock-work, which requires to be oft set backward or forward by them; or that they can at pleasure change their condition to ape us, or inferior beings; and consequently am not apt hastily to credit stories of *portents*, &c. such as cannot be true, unless the natures of things and their manner of being be

\* They, who believe there is nothing but what they can handle or see (οἱ ἐδὲν ἄλλο οὐρόμφοι εἶναι ἢ ὅ ἂν δύνανται ἀπὲρ τῶν χειρῶν λαβεῖν. — πᾶν ὃ τὸ αἰσθητὸν οὐκ ἀποδιδόμφοι ὡς ἐν εἰσίας μίσει) are by Plato reckoned to be void of all philosophy, ἀμύνητοι, σκληροὶ, ἀντίτυποι, μάλ' ἢ ἄμωστοι.

and do not allow any thing that is invisible, to have any real existence, are by Plato reckoned to be quite void of philosophy & not so much as Michael, stupid obstinate & entirely illiterate.

quite renverſed : yet (I will repeat it again) as men may be ſo placed as to become, even by the free exerciſe of their own powers, *inſtruments* of God's particular providence to other men (or animals); ſo may we well ſuppoſe, that theſe *higher* beings may be ſo *diſtributed* through the univerſe, and ſubject to ſuch an æconomy (tho I pretend not to tell what that is), as may render *them alſo* inſtruments of the ſame providence; and that they may, in proportion to their greater abilities, be capable, *conſiſtently with the laws of nature*, ſome way or other, tho not in our way, of influencing human affairs in proper places.

*Laſtly*, what I have ventured to lay before you I would not have to be ſo underſtood, as if I peremptorily *aſſerted* things to be juſt in this manner, or pretended to *impoſe* my thoughts upon any body elſe: my deſign is only to ſhew how I endeavour to help my own narrow conceptions. There muſt be *other ways* above my underſtanding<sup>a</sup>, by which ſuch a Being as God is may take care of *private caſes* without interrupting the order of the univerſe, or putting any of the parts of it out of their channels. We may be ſure He regards every thing *as being what it is*; and that therefore His *laws* muſt be accommodated to the true genius's and capacities of thoſe things, which are affected by them. The *purely material* part of the world is govern'd by ſuch, as are ſuited to the ſtate of a being, which is *inſenſible, paſſive only*, and every where and always *the ſame*: and theſe ſeem to be ſimple and few, and to carry natural agents into one conſtant road. But *intelligent active, free* beings muſt be under a government of another form. They muſt, truth requiring it, be conſider'd *as beings*, who may behave themſelves as they ought, or not; *as beings* ſuſceptive of pleaſure and pain; *as beings*, who not only owe to God all that they are or have, but are (or may be) ſenſible of this, and to whom therefore it muſt be *natural* upon many occaſions to ſuppliate Him for mercy, defence, direction, aſſiſtance; laſtly, *as beings*, whoſe caſes admit great variety: and therefore that *influence*, by which He is preſent to them, muſt be different from that, by which gravitation and common *phænomena* are produced in matter. This ſeems to be as it were a public influence, the other private, answering private caſes, and prayers; this to operate directly upon the body, the other more eſpecially upon the mind, and upon the body by it, &c. But I forbear, leſt I ſhould go too far out of my depth: only adding in general, that God cannot put things ſo far out of His own power, as that He ſhould not *for ever govern* tranſactions and events in His own world; nor can *perfect* knowledge and power ever want *proper* means to atchieve

<sup>a</sup> Οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀνθρώποις ἀμύνεται ὁ Θεός. Ph. Jud. & does not afford aſſiſtance in the ſame manner as man does



what is fit to be done. So that, tho what I have advanced should stand for nothing, there *may* still be a *particular providence* notwithstanding the forementioned difficulty. And then, if there *may* be one, it will unavoidably follow, that there *is* one: because in the description of providence, p. 95, nothing is supposed with respect to *particular cases*, but that they should be provided for in such a manner as will at last *agree best with reason*; and to allow, that this may be done, and yet say, that it is not done, implies a blasphemy that creates horror; it is to charge the *Perfect* being with one of the greatest *imperfections*, and to make Him not so much as a *reasonable* being.

I conclude then, that it is as certain, that there is a *particular providence*, as that God is a Being of *perfect reason*. For if men are treated according to reason, they must be treated according to what they are: the virtuous, the just, the compassionate, &c. *as such*, and the vitious, unjust, cruel, &c. according to *what they are*: and their several cases must be taken and considered *as they are*: which cannot be done without *such* a providence.

Against all this it has been, as one might well expect, *objected* of old, that things do not seem to be dealt according to *reason*, virtuous and good men very oft laboring under adversity, pains, persecutions, whilst vitious, wicked, cruel men prevail and flourish \*. But to this an *answer* (in which I shall a little further explain my self) is ready. It might be taken out of that, which has been given to the *Manichean* objection under prop. VII. But I shall here give one more direct: and let *that* and *this* be mutually assisting and supplements each to the other. 1. We are not always certain, who are *good*, who *wicked*<sup>b</sup>. If we trust to fame and reports, these may proceed, on the one hand, from partial friendship, or flattery; on the other, from ill-natured surmises and constructions of things, envy, or malice; and on either, from small matters aggrandized, from mistake, or from the unskilful relation even of *truth* itself. Opposite parties make a merit of blackening their adversaries<sup>c</sup>, and brightening their friends,

a. Evil by righteous & good by wicked

\* Si cures [Dij] homines, bene bonis sit, male malis: quod nunc abest. Ap. Cic. The Jews, who call this case ליריע ורשע ושוב לו, have written many things about it, to be seen in their books: Mo nebok. S. Iqqar. Men. hamma. Nabh. ab. &c. So have the Heathen philosophers too; Seneca, Plutarch, Plostinus, Simplicius, al. But the answers of neither are always just. God forbid that should be thought true, which is asserted by Glauco, ap. Plat. that the just, if they had Gyges's ring, would do as the unjust, and ידעו ויבטלו ויבטלו ויבטלו. Or that in S. Hbafid. and Men. hamma. צדיק ורע לו צדוק בן רשע. The reason assigned for this case in another place is something better: כרי שלא יאמרו אם לא היה בשובה לא היה צדיק. But the way of salving it in Nishm. hhaiy. by נלגול הנשמות, or what the Cabbalists call עיבור, is worst of all. <sup>b</sup> Cadis & Riphens, justissimus unus Qui fuit in Teucris, & servantissimus aqvi. Dis aliter visum. Virg. <sup>c</sup> Virtutes ipsas invertimus. Hor.

That no M is just voluntarily but is forced to be so. "Evil befalls righteous & good by wicked" The Reason a sign for this in another place is better: "Wherefore let them not say, that if good does not befall such one then he is a wicked M" But Way of solving it in Nishm. hhaiy by "a resolution of the soul's transmigration" is worst of all.

# Truths relating to the Deity. III

undeservedly and unmeasurably: and to idle companions and gossips it is diversion, and what makes the principal part of their conversation <sup>a</sup>, to rehearse the characters of men, drest up out of their own *dreams* and *inventions*. And beside all this, the good or bad repute of men depends in great measure upon *mean* people, who carry their stories from family to family, and propagate them very fast: like little insects, which lay apace, and the *less* the *faster*. There are few, very few, who have the opportunity and the will and the ability to represent things *truly* <sup>b</sup>. Beside the matters of fact themselves there are many *circumstances* which, before sentence is passed, ought to be known and weighed, and yet scarce ever can be known, but to the person *himself* who is concerned. He may have other views, and another sense of things, than his judges have: and what he understands, what he feels, what he intends, may be a *secret* confined to his own breast. A man may through bodily indispositions and faults in his constitution, which it is not in his power to correct, be subject to *starts* and *inadvertencies*, or obnoxious to *snare*s, which he cannot be aware of; or through want of information or proper helps he may labor under *invincible* errors, and act as in the dark: in which cases he may do things, which are in themselves wrong, and yet be innocent, or at least rather to be pitied, than censured with severity. Or perhaps the *censurer*, notwithstanding this kind of men talk as if they were infallible, may be mistaken himself in his opinion, and judge that to be *wrong*, which in truth is *right* <sup>c</sup>. Nothing more common than this. Ignorant and superstitious wretches measure the actions of *letterd* and *philosophical* men by the tattle of their nurses or illiterate parents and companions, or by the fashion of the country: and people of differing religions judge and condemn each other by their own tenents; when *both* of them cannot be in the

<sup>a</sup> There is nothing so delightful to many as prating about things that don't belong to them, especially if they are drawn into it by a 'Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἕτως ἥδὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὥς τὸ λαλεῖν τὰ ἀλλότρια· ἔ μάλιστα ἐὰν τύχωσι ἐπ' ἐνός τινος ἢ μίσεως ἐλκόμενοι, ὑφ' ὧν ἔ φιλεῖ κλέπτειν ὥς τὰ πολλαὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια. Greg. Naz. <sup>b</sup> Therefore, with Socrates in Plato, we ought not much to care what the multitude [ἡ πολλὰ] say of us, ἀλλ' ὅ, τι ὁ ἐπαίων ἀεὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ἔ ἀδικον, ὁ εἶς, ἔ αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια. <sup>c</sup> Or, v. v. he may judge that to be *right*, which is *wrong*. This seems to be pretty much the case in that enumeration of good men, who suffer, ap. Cic. Cur duo Scipiones, fortissimos & optimos viros, in Hispania Pœnus oppressit? Cur Maximus ex-tulit filium consularem? Cur Marcellum Annibal interemit, &c. For here they are reckoned *boni*, only because they were *fortes*; that is, because they had been zealous and successful instruments in conquering and destroying them, who happen to be so unfortunate as to be neighbours to the Romans, upon various pretences indeed, but in truth only to enlarge their own territories. Is this to be *good*? Doth it deserve such a particular observation, that F. Maximus buried a son, after he had been Consul too? How doth it appear, that Marcellus was a better man than Hannibal? Is it such a wonder, if they, who spend their lives in slaughter, should at length be slain themselves? If the margin permitted, more remarks might be made upon this catalogue: as also some upon that, which follows in the same place, of others, quibus improbis optime evenit.

simile on Sunday

6

There is nothing so delightful to many as prating about things that don't belong to them, especially if they are drawn into it by a 'Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἕτως ἥδὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὥς τὸ λαλεῖν τὰ ἀλλότρια· ἔ μάλιστα ἐὰν τύχωσι ἐπ' ἐνός τινος ἢ μίσεως ἐλκόμενοι, ὑφ' ὧν ἔ φιλεῖ κλέπτειν ὥς τὰ πολλαὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια. Greg. Naz. <sup>b</sup> Therefore, with Socrates in Plato, we ought not much to care what the multitude [ἡ πολλὰ] say of us, ἀλλ' ὅ, τι ὁ ἐπαίων ἀεὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ἔ ἀδικον, ὁ εἶς, ἔ αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια. <sup>c</sup> Or, v. v. he may judge that to be *right*, which is *wrong*. This seems to be pretty much the case in that enumeration of good men, who suffer, ap. Cic. Cur duo Scipiones, fortissimos & optimos viros, in Hispania Pœnus oppressit? Cur Maximus ex-tulit filium consularem? Cur Marcellum Annibal interemit, &c. For here they are reckoned *boni*, only because they were *fortes*; that is, because they had been zealous and successful instruments in conquering and destroying them, who happen to be so unfortunate as to be neighbours to the Romans, upon various pretences indeed, but in truth only to enlarge their own territories. Is this to be *good*? Doth it deserve such a particular observation, that F. Maximus buried a son, after he had been Consul too? How doth it appear, that Marcellus was a better man than Hannibal? Is it such a wonder, if they, who spend their lives in slaughter, should at length be slain themselves? If the margin permitted, more remarks might be made upon this catalogue: as also some upon that, which follows in the same place, of others, quibus improbis optime evenit.



right, and it is well if *either* of them are. To which may be added, that the true characters of men must chiefly depend upon the *unseen* part of their lives; since the truest and best religion is most private, and the greatest wickedness endeavours to be so <sup>a</sup>. Some are modest, and hide their virtues: others hypocritical, and conceal their vices under shews of sanctity, good nature, or something that is *specious*. So that it is many times hard to discern, to which of the two sorts, the *good* or the *bad*, a man ought to be aggregated. 2. It rarely happens, that we are competent judges of the *good* or *bad* fortune of other people <sup>b</sup>. That, which is disagreeable to one, is many times agreeable to another, or disagreeable in a less degree. The misery accruing from any affliction or bad circumstance of life is to be computed as in p. 32, 33: or according to the resistance and capacity of bearing it, which it meets with. If one man can carry a weight of four or five hundred pounds as well as another can the weight of one hundred, by these *different* weights they will be *equally* loaded. And so the same poverty or disgrace, the same wounds, &c. do not give the *same* pain to all men. The apprehension of but a *vein* to be opened is worse to some, than the *apparatus* to an execution is to others: and a *word* may be more terrible and sensible to tender natures, than a *sword* is to the senseless, or intrepid breed. The same may be said with respect to enjoyments: men have different tastes, and the use of the same things does not beget *equal* pleasure in all. Beside, we scarce ever know the whole case. We do not see the *inward* stings and secret pains, which many of those men carry about them, whose *external* splendor and flourishing estate is so much admired by beholders <sup>c</sup>: nor perhaps sufficiently consider the *silent* pleasures of a lower fortune, arising from temperance, moderate desires, easy reflexions, a consciousness of knowledge and truth; with other pleasures of the *mind*, much greater many times than those of the *body* <sup>d</sup>. Before one can pronounce another happy or otherwise, he should know all the other's

*That Part of which they keep secret from the World*

<sup>a</sup> *Vita postscenia celant* (in *Lucr.*) may be aptly applied to the wicked. *Multi famam, conscientiam pauci verentur.* Plin. jun.

<sup>b</sup> *Neq; mala vel bona, qua vulgus putat: multi, qui conflictari adversis videntur, beati; ac pleriq; quanquam magnas per opes, miserrimi, &c.* Tacit.

<sup>c</sup> *Felliciozem tu Mecanatem putas, cui amoribus anxio, & morosa uxoris quotidiana repudia desenti, somnus per symphomiarum cantum, ex longinquo bene resonantium, quaritur? Mero se licet sopiat, —; tam vigilabit in plumâ, quàm ille [Regulus] in cruce. — ut dubium [non] sit, an electione fati datâ, plures*

<sup>d</sup> *Reguli nasci, quàm Mecanates velint.* Sen. *Isti, quos pro felicibus aspicitis, si non, qua occurrunt, sed qua latent, videritis, miseri sunt.* Id.

<sup>d</sup> *Archimedes*, having found the way of solving a problem (*examinandi, an corona aurea prorsus esset*), ran in an ecstasy out of the bath, crying *Eûgenia*: but who ever heard of a man, that after a luxurious meal, or the enjoyment of a woman, ran out thus, crying *Βίβρακα, or Πισίλνα*? *Plut.*

*I have glutted myself. I have enjoyed her.*

enjoy-

injoyments and all his sufferings <sup>a</sup>. Many misfortunes are compensated <sup>b</sup> by <sup>a. b</sup> some larger indowments, or extraordinary felicities in other respects. But suppose the pleasures of some, and the sufferings of some others, to be just as they appear: still we know not the *consequences* of them <sup>c</sup>. The pleasures of those men <sup>c</sup> may lead to miseries greater than those of the latter, and be in reality the greater misfortune: and, again, the sufferings of these may be preludes to succeeding advantages <sup>d</sup>. So that indeed we know not how to name these outward appearances of particular men, nor which to call *happiness*, which the *contrary*; unless we knew the inward sense of the persons themselves, all their true circumstances, and what will be hereafter consequent upon their present success or adversity. 3. Men ought to be considered as *members* of families, nations, mankind, the universe, from which they cannot be separated: and then from the very *condition of their being* it will appear, that there must be great inequalities <sup>e</sup>; that the innocent cannot but be sometimes involved in general calamities or punishments, nor the guilty but share in public prosperities <sup>f</sup>; and that the good of the *whole* society or kind is to be regarded preferably to the present pleasure of any *individual*, if they happen to clash <sup>g</sup>. *Lastly*, if the *virtuous* man has undergone more in *this life*, than it would be reasonable he should suffer, if there was *no other*; yet those sufferings may not be unreasonable, if *there is* another. For they may be made up to him by such injoyments, as it would be reasonable for him to prefer, even with those previous mortifications, before the pleasures of this life with the *loss of them*. And moreover, sometimes the *only* way to the felicities of a better state may lie through dark and difficult passes, discipline to some men being necessary, to bring them to reflect, and to force them into such *methods* as may produce in them proper improvements; such, as otherwise and of themselves they would never have fallen into. On the other side, if *vitious* and wicked men do prosper and make a figure; yet it is possible their sufferings hereafter may be such, as that the *excess* of

*Balancing of Loss determined by One state, with Prospect of Good determined by another.*  
<sup>a</sup> *Fatis contraria fata rependens.* Virg. See what Pliny writes of Agrippa, the other great favorite and minister of Augustus, whom he reckons to be the only instance of felicity among them who were called Agrippa. *Is quoque adversa pedum valetudine, misera juvenia, exercito avo inter arma mortisque, — infelici terris stirpe omni, — praterea brevitate avi, — in tormentis adulteriorum conjugis, focique pragravi servitio, luisse augurium praposteri natalis existimatur.* <sup>b</sup> Ὁφθαλμῶν μὲν ἀμείρεται δὲ ἰδίαν αἰσιν. Hom.  
<sup>c</sup> Zeno reckoned he made a good voyage, when he was shipwrecked. Diog. L.

<sup>d</sup> If a good man labors under poverty, sickness, or the like, *εἰς ἀγαθόν τι τελευτήσῃ, ζῶντι ἢ ἐδιδραμόντι*, for how can he be neglected of God, who studies according to his poor abilities to be like Him? Plato.  
<sup>e</sup> Who blames a *drama*, because all the persons are not heroes? Plot.  
<sup>f</sup> העולם נידון אחר רובו. Abarb. & pass.

<sup>g</sup> εἰς ὅλον μέρες ὥσπερ ἀπεργάζεται, κτλ. Plato. *The plot is made for sake of whole, & not whole for sake of Part.* Plato  
 them

*The loss of his eyes was by gift of sweet harmony*

*off words according to it is*  
*off sake of Part*



# 114 The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. V.

them above their past enjoynments may be equal to the *just mult* of their villanies and wickedness. And further, their worldly pleasures (which must be supposed to be such as are not philosophical, or moderated and governed by reason and habits of virtue) being apt to fill the mind, and ingross the whole man, and by that means to exclude almost all right reflexions, with the proper applications of them, may be the very causes of their ruin; whilst they leave them under such defects *at the end of their days*, as we shall see afterward tend to unhappiness.

If what is objected be in many instances true, this only infers the *necessity* of a future state: that is, if good and bad men are not respectively treated according to reason in *this life*, they may yet be so treated, if *this* and *another* to follow be taken together into the account<sup>a</sup>. And perhaps it is (as I have been always apt to think) in order to convince us of the certainty of a future state, that instances of that kind have been so *numerous*. For he must not only be guilty of blasphemy, but reduced to the greatest absurdity, who, rather than he will own there is such a state, is forced to make God an *unreasonable Being*<sup>b</sup>: which I think amounts to a strong demonstration, that *there is one*. But of that more hereafter.

XIX. *If we would behave ourselves as being what we cannot but be sensible we are, towards GOD as being what He is according to the foregoing propositions; or, if we would endeavour to behave our selves towards him according to truth, we must observe these following and the like particulars.*

1. *We must not pretend to represent Him by any picture or image whatsoever*<sup>c</sup>. Because this is flatly to deny his incorporeity, incomprehensible nature, &c.<sup>d</sup>

2. *We ought to be so far from doing this, that even the language we use, when we speak of Him, and especially of His positive nature and essential properties, ought not only to be chosen with the utmost care, but also to be understood in the sublimest sense: and the same is true with respect to our thoughts, mut. mutand*<sup>e</sup>. Or thus:

Divine providence and immortality of the soul must stand and fall together. Θάτερον ἢ τὸ ἀπολιπὼν ἀναιρέοντα θάτερον. *Plut.* <sup>b</sup> Τὸ τοιαῦτον ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ οἶσθαι εἶναι Θεόν· ἢ ὅντα μὴ προνοεῖν· ἢ προνοεῖν μὴ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι & δίκαιον. *Hierocl.* <sup>c</sup> Sure no body ever did in reality pretend to do this. According to *Diog. L.* the Egyptians set up ἀγάλματα in their temples τῷ μὴ εἶδέναι τὴν ἑοῦς μορφῇ: for that very reason, because they did not know his shape; or, how to represent Him. Their images seem to have been symbols or hieroglyphics, expressing something of their sense or opinion concerning Him. For, as *Maimonides* observes, no man ever did or ever will worship an idol, made of metal, stone, or wood, as that Being who made heaven and earth. <sup>d</sup> Non est dubium, quin religio nulla sit, ubicunq; simulachrum est. *Lact.* <sup>e</sup> Ὡς ὅτι ἔργον σώματος τὸ σαματικῶς τι ἐπιτελεῖσθαι, ἔτω καὶ ψυχῆς ἔργον τὸ ταῖς ἐνοσίαις τὰς ἀρεσκύσας φαντασίας τελεσιτελεῖσθαι ὡς θεῶν, διὸ καὶ τὰς ἐνοσίας ἀμαρτίας μὴ ὡς φαντασίας ἀπλῶς, ἀλλ' ὡς ἔργα ἐν ψυχῇ γινόμενα δίκαιον κρίνειν. *S. Bas.*

*e/* For as when any thing is done by body 'tis done grossly, so, when any thing is done by soul, it is done according to its own will, & by such representations as are agreeable to its own thoughts, to here 'tis but reasonable to think, that sins in our thoughts are not mere imaginations only, but really done in the soul. *I. Basil.*

we must endeavour to *think* and *speak* of Him in the most *reverent* terms and most proper manner *we are able*<sup>a</sup>; keeping withal this general conclusion, and as it were habitual reflexion in our minds, that, tho we do the best we can, He is still something *above all our conceptions*; and desiring, that our faint expressions may be taken as aiming at a *higher* and more *proportionable* meaning. To do otherwise implies not only, that His mode of existence and essential attributes are comprehensible by us, but also (which is more) that our words and phrases, taken from among ourselves<sup>b</sup> and the objects of our faculties, are adequate expressions of them: *contrary to truth*.

To explain myself by a few instances. When we ascribe *mercy* to God, or implore His *mercy*, it must not be understood to be *mercy* like that, which is called *compassion* in us. For tho this be a very distinguishing affection in human nature<sup>c</sup>, to which we are made subject for good reasons, the constitution of the world and circumstances of our present state making it necessary for us to *compassionate* each the sufferings of another; yet it is accompanied with *uneasiness*, and must therefore not be ascribed strictly to God in that *sense*, in which it is used when ascribed to our selves. It perhaps may not be amiss to call it *Divine mercy*, or the like; to distinguish it: and to shew, that we mean something, which, tho in our low way of speaking and by *way* of analogy we call it by the same name, is yet in the perfect nature of God very different. Or we may consider it in general as the manner, in which God *respects* poor suppliants and proper objects *for their good*. For certainly the *respect* or relation, which lies between God, considered as an *unchangeable* Being, and *one* that is humble and supplicates and endeavours to qualify himself for mercy, cannot be the *same* with that, which lies between the same *unchangeable* God and *one* that is obstinate, and will not supplicate, or endeavour to qualify himself<sup>d</sup>: that is, the same thing, or Being, cannot respect *opposite* and *contradictory* characters in the same manner; him who does behave himself as before, and him who does not. Therefore when we apply to the mercy of God, and beg of him to pity our infirmities and wants, the design is not to move His *affections*, as good speakers move their auditors by the pathetic arts of rhetoric, or hearty beggars theirs by importunities and tears; but to express our own sense of ourselves and circumstances in such a manner, as may render us more *capable* of the emanations of Divine goodness, and fit

<sup>a</sup> Οἰοπεπῶς πάντα νοῦντις. S. Chrys.

inculcate, (כלשון בני אדם) only ἀπορία οἰκτίας προσηγορίας. — τὰ ὀνόματα παρ' ἡμῶν ἀγαπῶμενα μεταφίκοις. Plot.

<sup>c</sup> Mollissima corda Humano generi dare se natura fatetur. Qua lacrymas dedit, hac nostri pars optima sensus. — separat hoc nos à grege mutorum, &c. Juv.

<sup>d</sup> The ratio of G to M + q is different from that of G to M — q: and yet G remains unaltered.

*Mercy in G*

*nothing but what is worthy of God. / according to the language of M Only for want of proper words, — we convert our favourite words into Metaphors Plot.*



to receive such instances of His beneficence, as to us may seem to be the effects of *compassion*, tho they proceed not from any alteration in the Deity. For it may be, and no doubt is agreeable to perfect reason *always* and *without alteration*, that he, who labors under a sense of his own defects, honestly uses his best endeavours to mend what is amiss, and (among other things) flies for relief to Him, upon whom his being and all that he has do depend, should have many things granted *him*, which are not given to the careless, obdurate, *unasking*<sup>a</sup> part of mankind; tho his expressions and manner of address, with all his *care*, are still *inadequate*, and below the Divine nature. In short, by our applications we cannot pretend to produce any alteration in the Deity, but by an alteration in our selves we may alter the relation or respect lying between him and us.

As God is a pure, uncompounded Being, His attributes of *mercy*, *justice*, &c. cannot be as we conceive them: because in him they are *one*. Perhaps they may more properly be called together *Divine reason*: which, as it exerts itself upon this or that occasion, is by us *variously* denominated.

Here it must not be forgot, that *mercy* or *mercies* are many times taken for advantages or benefits enjoyd by us: and then they are *properly* ascribed to God, from whom they proceed as the effects of His beneficence and providence.

When we speak of the *knowledge* of God, we must not mean, that He knows things *in the way that we do*: that any intention or operation of His mind is requisite to produce it: that He apprehends things by any impressions made upon Him: that He reasons by the help of ideas: or even that the knowledge, which in us is most *intuitive* and *immediate*, does in any degree come up to the mode in which He knows things. We must rather intend, in general, that there is nothing, of which He is, or can be *ignorant*: which has been said already; and is, I am afraid, as much as we can *safely* say.

When *glory*, *honor*, *praise*<sup>b</sup> are given to God; or He is said to do any thing for His own *glory*, or we to propose the *glory* of His name in what we do; those words should not be taken as standing for *that kind* of glory and applause, which is so industriously sought, and capriciously<sup>c</sup> distributed among us mortals, and which I will take this opportunity to handle a little more *largely*, in order to give here a specimen of the world, and save that trouble in another place. Among us some are celebrated

<sup>a</sup> Πῶς ἂν δόη τὰ πρὸς τὰς ἀρετὰς αὐτεξούσιον μὴ αἰτῆναι ὁ δίδουσι πεφυκῶς Θεός; Hierocl. <sup>b</sup> Τῶν ἀρίστων οὐκ ἔστιν ἕκαστος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τι καὶ βέλτιον. Therefore ὁ Θεός καὶ τὰ γὰρ ἄθροισμα are above praise. Arist. Οἱ τῆς θείας ἐπαινήντας γελοῖοι εἰσιν. ἡμῶν αὐτὸς ἐξιστάντες. Andron. Rh. <sup>c</sup> Cleon, only a songster [ἀοδός], had a statue at Thebes, kept as sacred, when Pindar himself had none. See the story in Athenaus.

a/ why shd I who is in his own beneficence, give any thing to him? we apprehend are in his own For Power, if He does not ask it? Hierocl. b/ Something greater & better than Praise belongs to that which is perfectly good. Therefore I & perfect Goodness are above Praise. "They who praise I & Gods make themselves ridiculous, for that is to Equal them with Ourselves. Andron. Rh.

for small matters, either through the ignorance of the multitude, the partiality of a faction, the advantage of great friendships, the usual deference paid to men in eminent stations, or mere good luck <sup>a</sup>; and others for atchieving *such things*, as if they were duly weighed, and people were not imposed upon by *false notions*, first introduced in barbarous times, and since polishd and brought into fashion by historians, poets, and flatterers, would appear rather to be a disgrace to *savages* than any recommendation of rational and *civilized* natures. Strength, and courage, and beauty, and parts, and birth are followd with *encomiums* and honors, which, tho they may be the felicities and *privileges* of the possessors, cannot be their *merit*, who received them *gratis*, and contributed nothing <sup>b</sup> themselves toward the acquisition of them: whilst real virtue and industry (which, even when unsuccessful, or oppressed by ill health or unkind fortune, give the *truest title* to praise) lie disregarded. Thirst after glory, when that is desired merely for its own sake, is founded in *ambition* and *vanity* <sup>c</sup>: the thing itself is but a *dream*, and imagination; since, according to the differing humors and sentiments of nations and ages, the same thing may be either *glorious* or *inglorious*: the *effect* of it, considerd still by itself, is neither more health, nor estate, nor knowledge, nor virtue to him who has it; or if that be any thing, it is but *what must cease* when the man <sup>d</sup> dies: and, after all, as it lives but in the *breath* of the people, a little fly envy or a new turn of things extinguishes it <sup>e</sup>, or perhaps it goes quite out of itself <sup>f</sup>. Men please themselves with notions of *immortality*, and fancy a perpetuity of fame secured to themselves by books and testimonies of historians: but, alas! it is a stupid delusion, when they imagin themselves *present*, and *injoying* that fame at the reading of their story after their death. And, beside, *in reality* the man is not known ever the more to posterity, because his name is transmitted to them: *he* doth not live, because his *name* does. When it is said, *J. Cæsar* subdued *Gaul*, beat *Pompey*, changed the *Roman* commonwealth into a monarchy, &c. it is the same thing, as to say, the conqueror of *Pompey*, &c. was *Cæsar*: that is, *Cæsar* and the conqueror of *Pompey* are the same thing; and *Cæsar* is as much known by the one designation as by the other. The amount then is only this: that the conqueror of *Pompey* conquerd *Pompey*; or some body conquerd *Pompey*.

<sup>a</sup> What *Seneca* says of *Alexander*, is true of many an other heroe: *pro virtute erat felix temeritas.*

<sup>b</sup> *Tumes alto Druforum sanguine, tanquam Feceris ipse aliquid, &c. Juv.*

*via quantalibet quid erit, si gloria tantum est? Juv.*

<sup>d</sup> *היום כאן ומחר בקבר היום חי* *S. Hhas.* *Κτήμα σφαλρώτατον. Ph. Jud.*

<sup>e</sup> *Even the great pyramid in Egypt, tho it still remains, hath not been able to preserve the true name of its builder; which is lost, one may justly wonder how.*



pey; or rather, since *Pompey* is as little known now as *Cæsar*, *some body* conquer *some body*<sup>a</sup>. Such a *poor business* is this boasted immortality<sup>b</sup>: and such, as has been here described, is the thing called *glory* among us! The notion of it may serve to excite them, who having abilities to serve their country in time of real danger, or want, or to do some other good, have yet not *philosophy* enough to do this upon principles of virtue, or to see through the glories of the world (just as we excite children by *praising* them; and as we see many good inventions and improvements proceed from emulation and vanity): but to discerning men this *fame* is mere air, and the next remove from nothing<sup>c</sup>; what they despise, if not shun. I think there are two considerations, which may justify a desire of *some glory* or honor: and scarce more. When men have performed any *virtuous* actions, or such as sit easy upon their memories, it is a *reasonable pleasure* to have the testimony of the world added to that of their own consciences, that they have done well<sup>d</sup>: and more than that, if the *reputation* acquired by any qualification or action may produce a man any *real* comfort or advantage (if it be only protection from the insolencies and injustice of mankind; or if it enables him to do by his authority more good to others), to have this privilege must be a great satisfaction, and what a *wise* and *good* man may be allowd, as he has opportunity, to propose to himself. But then he proposes it no farther than it may be *useful*: and it can be no farther useful than he *wants* it. So that, upon the whole, *glory*, *praise*, and the like, are either mere *vanity*, or only valuable in proportion to our *defects* and *wants*. If then those words are understood according to the import and value they have *among men*, how dares any one think, that the Supreme being can propose such a *mean* end to Himself as our praises? He can neither *want*, nor *value* them. *Alexander*, according to his taste of things, it may well be supposed would have been proud to have heard that he should be the subject of *some second Homer*<sup>e</sup>, in whose sheets his name might be imbalmed for ages to come; or to have been celebrated at *Athens*, the mother of so many wits and captains: but sure *even he*, with all his vanity, could not propose to himself as the end of all his fatigues and dangers only to be praised by *children*, or rather by *worms* and *insects*, if they were capable of shewing some faint sense of his great-

<sup>a</sup> Τα ὀνόματα τῶν πάλαι πολυσημῶν νῦν τρόπον τινα γλωσσηματὰ ἐστὶ. M. Anton.

<sup>b</sup> Μικρὸν.

<sup>c</sup> ἡ μνηστὴς θεωροφῆμια, καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ κατὰ διαδοχὴν ἀνδραγαθῶν τάχιστα τιμωρομένη, καὶ ἐκ ἐιδότων ἐδὲ ἑαυτῆς, ἕτε γὰρ τὸν πρόπαλαι τιμωρότα. Id.

<sup>c</sup> Expende Hannibalem: quot libras in ducesummo Invenies?

<sup>d</sup> Μέχρι τῆς οὐκ ἐπαινοὶ ἀνικτοὶ ἐστὶν, εἰς ὅσον ἂν ὁ ἐπαινέμενος γινώσκῃ ἑκάστον τῶν λεγομένων προσὸν ἑαυτῶν τὸ ὑπὲρ τούτου, ἀπόδειξις, κλ. Luc.

<sup>e</sup> Μακαρίους αὐτὸν [Ἀχιλλεῖα] ὅτι καὶ ζῶν φίλος πιστῶ, καὶ τελευτήσας μεγάλῃ κίεσσι ἐτυχεν. Plut.

τῆς αὐτῆς μεγάλης κίεσσι ἐτυχεν. Plut.

a/ The Names of those who were formerly very much celebrated, are now some way or other become *obsolete*. M. Anton. b/ The longest fame amongst posterity is but short, by reason of quick succession by mortal decay, who know neither themselves, nor any that died some time ago! c/ Praises may be born so long as person praised knows that all the things w<sup>h</sup> are said belong to him, but all, that is beyond this, is nothing to purpose. d/ He esteemed him (Achilles) happy, b<sup>c</sup> he had a faithful friend while living, & one that celebrated him highly after he was dead. Plutarch.

ness<sup>a</sup>. And yet how far short is this comparison! In conclusion therefore, the men have been accustomed to speak of the *Deity* in terms taken from *princes*, and such things as they have, in their weakness, admired; tho these are now incorporated into the language of Divines; and tho, considering what defects there are in our ways of thinking and speaking, we cannot well part with them all: yet we must remember to *exalt* the sense of them, or annex some *mental* qualification to the use of them. As, if God be said to do things for His own glory, the meaning I *humbly* conceive must be, that the transcendent excellence of His nature may be collected from the form of the world and administration of things in it; where there occur such *marks* of inexpressible wisdom and power, that He needed not to have given us *greater*, had He only intended His own *glory*: or something to this purpose. Or if the glory of what we do, be ascribed to *Him*; by this must be signified, that no glory is due to us, who have no powers, but what originally depend upon Him; and that we desire therefore to acknowledge Him to be the true author of all that, which is *laudable* in us<sup>b</sup>.

When we *thank God* for any deliverance or injoyment, this must not be so understood, as if He could value Himself upon our *ceremonious acknowledgments*, or wanted complements, or any return from us. *It is* rather a profession of the *sense we have* of our wants and defects, of the beneficence of His nature, and the greatness or seasonableness of the mercies received: an effort of a poor dependent being, who desires to own things, as far as he is able, to be *what they are*<sup>c</sup>; and especially to beget in himself such a disposition of mind, as he ought to have towards his Almighty *benefactor*.

When we are said to be *servants of God*, or to *serve Him*, or do Him *service*, these phrases are not to be taken as when *one* man is said to be servant of *another*, or to do him service. For here it implies the doing of something, which is useful and beneficial to the man who is served, and what he *wants*, or fancies he wants: but nothing of *want* can be supposed in God, nor can we any way be *profitable* or serviceable to Him. To *serve Him* therefore must rather be to *worship* or adore Him (of which something by and by). And thus that word in another language, of which our *serve* is but the translation, is frequently used: as to *serve*

<sup>a</sup> As Psaphon was celebrated by the birds, singing Μέγας Θεός Ψάφον. M. Tyr.

<sup>b</sup> Honori-

bus autē—cū diis grātiās agimus, tum nihil nostrae laudi assumptum arbitramur. Cic.

"Οτι δὲ ἀγαθὸν πρῶτης εἰς Θεὸν ἀνέπτυπε. A saying of Bias ap. Diog. L.

<sup>c</sup> Εἰ γὰρ ἡ πόλις

δυναμίδα κατ' ἀξίαν ποτὲ τῆτο ποιῆσαι, — ἀλλ' ὅμως τὴν κατὰ δύναμιν ἀνεργεῖν εὐχαρίστη δίκαιον αὐτῇ. Chrys.

For tho we cannot do any thing as it ought to be done — yet it is but just & fit, that we offer up our Thanksgiving so far as is in our Power. — Q<sup>2</sup>



*a* a graven image <sup>a</sup> is to worship the image; but cannot signify the doing of any thing, which may be serviceable or useful to the dead stone. Or to serve God may be understood in a sense something like that: *Serve the king of Babylon* <sup>b</sup>. For they were said to serve the king of Babylon, who owned his authority, and lived according to his laws, tho they did nothing, nor had any thing perhaps, which could be particularly serviceable to him: and so they may be said to serve God, or to be His servants, who live in a continual sense of His sovereign nature and power over them, and endeavour to conform themselves to the laws which He has imposed upon them <sup>c</sup>. In these senses we pray, that we may live to serve Him: that is, we pray, that we may live to worship Him, and practice those laws of reason and virtue, to which rational natures are by Him subjected <sup>d</sup>.

Many more reflexions might be made upon epithets and ways of speaking, introduced by custom, from rude antiquity, or by necessity following from the narrowness either of men's minds, or their language. It is plain, that love, anger, hands, eyes, &c. when ascribed to God, cannot import such bodily parts or passions as are found in us. Even the pronouns *my*, *thy*, *his* (as His people, His house, &c.) require much temper in the use of them <sup>e</sup>.

3. We shall find our selves bound to worship Him, in the best manner we can. For by worshipping Him I mean nothing but owning Him to be what He is, and ourselves to be what we are, by some more solemn and proper act: that is, by addressing our selves as His dependents to Him as the Supreme cause, and Governor of the world, with acknowledgments of what we enjoy, petitions for what we really want, or He knows to be convenient for us <sup>f</sup>, and the like. As if, *ex. gr.* I should in some humble and composed manner & pray to that Almighty being, upon whom depends the existence of the world, and by whose providence I have been preserved to this moment, and enjoyed many undeserved advantages, that He would graciously accept my grateful sense and acknowledgments of all His beneficence toward me: that he would deliver me from the evil consequences of all my transgressions and follies: that He would indue me with such dispositions and powers, as may carry me innocently and safely

*a* All they who serve Images are worshippers of Images — where Nations served Images —  
*b* עובדי פסל: את פסוליהם היו עובדים. *c* *sim. pass.* Deut. 12. mention is made of the places, אשר עברו שם הגוים וגו', in Chald. par. פלחו, Sept. ἐλάτρευσαν (in the ecclesiastical sense), Vulg. v. coluerunt.

*c* עברו את מלך בבל. *d* Plato applies the word serve even to the laws themselves in that phrase, δαλύνει τοῖς νόμοις. *e* Εὐχόμενοι ἔδωκεν ἡμεῖς φιλοδοξοῦντες γινώμενης παρ' ἑστέας. *f* *Ph. Jud.* Care must be taken how we pray, lest we should ask what may be hurtful to us. Οὐκοῦν δοκεῖ πολλῆς προνοίας γε προσδεῖσθαι, ὅπως μὴ λήσῃ τις αὐτὸν ἐυχόμενος. μαγάλα κακὰ, δοκῶν δ' ἀγαθὰ. *Pl. o.* Evertere domos totas, optantibus ipsis, Dī faciles, &c. is a poet's observation. The author of *S. Hbas.* adds, that we should not pray for that

שיעשה הקב"ה נס בשנוי עולם, or שאינו ראוי, or שאין נעשה כפי השבוע, or שאין אפשר לעשות עיוני למטד: לבי למעלה. *f* — for there seems to be need of great Prudence, lest by not rightly understanding Him, tho' ask for such things as He imagines to be good for him, but which are indeed great evils. For that wch is not possible to be done, or wch cannot be done according to the will of Nature, or wch is not fit to be done, or that Holy Being (if God) sho' work a miracle p'rtly of World & wth my eyes downward & my Heart lifted up.

*d* We give no more to Him than to One whom we acknowledge to have Dominion over through His Ph. *e* "The Wise will understand" *f* — for there seems to be need of great Prudence, lest by not rightly understanding Him, tho' ask for such things as He imagines to be good for him, but which are indeed great evils. For that wch is not possible to be done, or wch cannot be done according to the will of Nature, or wch is not fit to be done, or that Holy Being (if God) sho' work a miracle p'rtly of World & wth my eyes downward & my Heart lifted up.

through all future trials; and may inable me upon all occasions to behave my self conformably to the laws of reason, piously, and wisely: that He would suffer no being to injure me, no misfortune to befall me, nor me to hurt myself by any error or misconduct of my own: that He would vouchsafe me clear and distinct perceptions of things; with so much health and prosperity, as may be good for me: that I may at least pass my time in peace, with contentment, and tranquillity of mind: and that, having faithfully discharged my duty to my family and friends, and endeavourd to improve myself in virtuous habits and useful knowledge, I may at last make a decent and happy exit, and then find my self in some better state. Not to do this, or something like it, will certainly fall among those criminal *omissions* mentiond sect. I. prop. V. For never to acknowledge the enjoyments and privileges we have received, and hold of God, is in effect to *deny* that we receive them from Him; not to apply to Him for what we want is to *deny*, either our wants, or His power of helping us; and so on: all contrary to truth <sup>a</sup>.

It must ever be own'd, that no worship can be proportionable to the Divine nature and perfections; but yet that we are obliged to do what we can: therefore I added those words *in the best manner we can*. And it must be acknowledged further, that those words do not oblige us to be *always* at our devotions neither <sup>b</sup>. For as in the worship of God we own Him to be *what He is*, so must we do this as not denying our selves to be *what we are*: beings not capable of bearing continual *intention* of mind; beings, that are incompass'd with many *wants*, which by the constitution of our nature require to be supplied, not without *care* and *activity* join'd to our prayers; beings, that are made for many *harmless enjoyments*; beings, that have *many offices* to perform one for another; and beings, in whom, all things consider'd, it would be *left respect* to be constantly in the formal act of devotion, than it is to address our selves to Him with prepared minds, at certain times, or upon certain occasions. To be *always* thus engaged, if it could be, would be to make God *what He is not*: since it seems to suppose, that He wants it and we merit of Him by it; or that He is bound to give what we ask, without our endeavouring; or, at least, that He is a Being obnoxious to importunity and teasing. For these reasons I have also in the explication of my meaning insert'd that limitation, *by some solemn and proper act*.

Tho every man knows best his own opportunities and circumstances, and therefore may be most able to judge for himself, how he may *best* perform this duty;

<sup>a</sup> כל מאמין בהשגחה יאמין שהתפלה מועיל לו וכו' *Albo.* התפלה ענף מסתעף מן ההשגחה.

<sup>b</sup> Like those *Ἀκοιμηταί* at Constantinople particularly, who continued divine service night and day without intermission. Or the *Messalians* perhaps (מצלין, *Ευχταί*), who placed (or pretended to place) all religion in prayer, *μόνη χαράζον τῇ προσηυχῇ προσποιούμενοι* V. *Smic. h.* as never will *abstain* for any thing else but prayer.

yet



yet in general it may be said, that to the doing of it *solemnly* and in the best manner we can these things are required: an intent *mind*<sup>a</sup>, proper *times* and *places*, a proper *form* of words, and a proper *posture*. For if the *mind* be absent, or attends not to what is said, it is not the *man* that prays: this is only as it were the noise of a machine, which is put into motion indeed, but without any consciousness of its own act. To repeat one's prayers with moving *lips*, but alienated *thoughts*, is not to pray in the *best* manner we can: because it is not in a manner agreeable to what we are, or to *truth*. For this is to do it only as *speaking*, and not as *thinking* beings.

Upon this account it will be certain, that *all* times and places cannot be equally proper<sup>b</sup>. Some times are ingrossed by the business of life, and some places lie exposed to interruptions. Those of *retreat* and *silence* ought to be sought, and, as far as fairly it may be, contrived. And for this further reason, because the farther we are removed from the notice of others, the clearer we stand of all *ostentation*: that is, the more we do it upon the score of *truth* and *duty*; and this is again, the more *truly* and *dutifully* we do it.

Our next care is a proper *form* of words. All prayer must either be vocal, or mental. Now even that which is called *mental* can scarce be made without words<sup>c</sup>, or something equivalent<sup>d</sup>. (I believe, that even the *deaf* and *dumb* form to themselves some kind of language: I mean something, which supplies the room of language.) For thoughts in their naked state, divested of all words, and taken *merely by themselves*, are such subtle and fleeting things, as are scarce capable of making any *appearance* in the mind; at least of being detain'd, compared together, and rang'd into *sentences*. If a sentence may be so made up of sensible ideas as to subsist in the mind by the help of those images which remain in the phantasy, after the manner of a sentence express'd in *pictures*, or by *hieroglyphics*: yet such a sentence must be very imperfect, through the *want* of grammatical inflexions, particles, and other additions necessary to modify and connect the ideas, of which

a/ If a Prayer is not performed with Earnestness, it is no Prayer. *Maimonides* a Prayer suspend'd by Mind. כל תפלה תלויה בלב. *Maim.* כל תפלה תלויה בלב. *S. Hhasf.* and the like every where.

b This in general is true: notwithstanding which I do not deny but there may be occasions, when *even*

καλοῖται τόπος, ὅδ' ἐμποδίζει καιρός· ἀλλὰ καὶ γινώσκει μὴ κλίνει, — διανοίαν δὲ μόνον ἐπιτελεῖν θεῶν, τὸ πᾶν ἀπῆλπισας τῆς εὐχῆς· ἔχεις ἑ γυνῆκα ἡλακάνην κατέχευαν τὴν ἰσχυρῶσαν ἀναβλέψαι εἰς τὸν ἕραν τῇ διανοίᾳ, ἑ καλίσσαι μετὰ θερμότητος τὸν θεόν· ἔχεις ἑ ἀνδρῶπον εἰς ἀγορᾶν ἐμβάλλοντα ἑ κατ' ἐαυτὸν βαδίζοντα εὐχὰς ποιεῖν ἐκτενῶς, κλ. *S. Chryf.* c Ὁ μὲν λόγος ἐρητύς διανοίας πρὸς ἀνδρῶπον· ἡ δὲ διανοία γινώσκει τῷ λόγῳ τὰ πρὸς τὸν θεόν. *Ph. Jud.* d Cogitation itself, according to *Plato*, is a kind of speech of the mind. For he calls τὸ διανοεῖν (cogitation) λόγον, ὃν αὐτὴ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἢ ψυχὴ διεξέρχεται, ὡς ἂν ἀν' σκοπῆς. And so *Plotinus*, Ὁ ἐν φωνῇ λόγος μίμημα ἔσ' ἐν ψυχῇ.

even whilst she is spinning or weaving, may in her thoughts look up to Heaven & call upon *God*, & as he is going to Market, & walking by himself, may pray very intensively. *S. Chryf.* c/ words are & interpreters of our thoughts to M, & We also make known our thoughts to God by words. *Plotinus*. The vocal words are an imitation of those of Soul.

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upon God's account that we speak, since he would know even our thoughts:  
 "A Prayer without Intention of the Mind is like a body without a Soul." / The Words of Job in Plato are These.  
 "Multa sunt verba, quae, quasi articuli, connectunt membra orationis, quae formari similitudine nulla  
 possunt." Cic. חפלה בלא כונה נגוף בלא נשמה. Nabh. ab. Alcib. 2. רבור ארים הוא בכונה וכו' gives these Things if  
 Abarb. That in S. Hared. quoted out of סמ"ק explains this thus: ודקק בכל מלה ומלה כאלו מונה we ask for them or no;  
 "Ur eos [deos, in the style of the Heathens] semper pura — mente & voce veneremur. Cic. that are hurtful to be kept  
 may for them"

I inserted from *Shulhh. aruk.*) The same occurs in Or *hhadash*, & *pass.*  
When *M.* speaks distinctly it is always w<sup>th</sup> *Intense* *ss* 4. — I shared out of *Leper Book* but of Precept explains this. Thus  
"He will consider every word exactly as if He was looking over his Deeds" *ss* 14 as thou *Q<sup>d</sup>* hast made us be hear  
of *Q<sup>d</sup>* *ss* 14, so it becomes the more to praise thy greatness," says Solomon. *ss* 14 It is necessary in all *Q<sup>d</sup>* Prayers to speak as to  
be heard by *Q<sup>d</sup>* *ss* 14. — adds. In general *Q<sup>d</sup>* judges agree in this *ss* 14 if He does not hear his own self, He is guilty of a crime.  
He who not only pray in his mind, but pronounce words distinctly w<sup>th</sup> his lips, perhaps so as to hear him



but it is upon *our own* account, and to make our *adorations*, tho imperfect at the best, as compleat as we are able. (Which, by the way, is an answer to them, who object against prayer the *impertinence* of talking to God.) This being premised, and it being found that we must make use of *words*, it cannot be denied that we ought to use the *best* and *propereſt* we can. This cannot be done in *extemporaneous* effusions : and therefore there must be forms *premeditated* ; the *best*, that we are capable of making or procuring, if we would worship God to the best of our capacity. As a prayer ought to have all the marks of seriousness and being in earnest, it ought to be the *plainest*, and at the same time is perhaps the *hardest* of all compositions. It ought to take in a general view of what we have *injoyd*, what we *want*, what we have *done*, &c. and every thing ought to be exprest with *method*, in phrases that are *grave* and *pointing*, and with such a *true* eloquence, as engages all our attention, and represents our *deepest* sense, without *affectation* or *needless repetitions*. These considerations have caused me many times to wonder at those men, who dispute against pre-conceived forms of prayer. They, who talk so much of the spirit of prayer, seem to know but little of it.

As to the *posture*, that is best, which best *expresses* our humility, reverence<sup>a</sup>, and earnestness, and affects us most. Tho perhaps some regard is to be paid to the customs of the *place* where we are ; or of our own *country*, to which we have been most used. Several nations may denote the same thing by different gestures : and we may take these, as we do their words ; *i. e.* as having that signification which they put upon them.

Tho I have not hitherto mentiond it, there ought to be also a *public worship* of the Deity. For a man may be considerd as a member of a *society*, and *as such* he ought to worship God (if he has the opportunity of doing it : if there are proper prayers used publicly, which he may resort to ; and his health, &c. permit). Or the *society* may be considerd as *one body*, that has common interests and concerns, and *as such* is obliged to worship the Deity, and offer one common prayer. Beside, there are many, who know not of themselves, *how* to pray ; perhaps cannot so much as read. These too must be taken *as they are*, and consequently some time and place *appointed*, where they may have suitable prayers red to them, and be guided in their devotions. And further, toward the keeping mankind in order, it is *necessary* there should be some religion profest, and even establisht ; which cannot be without some public worship. And were it not for that sense of virtue, which is *principally* preserved (so far as it is preserved) by national *forms* and *habits* of religion, men would soon lose it *all*, run wild, prey upon one another, and do what else the worst of savages do.

*a/He that prays, sh<sup>d</sup> think abo<sup>t</sup> it as much as if Divine Presence co<sup>d</sup> appear to him.*  
 \* יחשוב כאילו שכינה כנגדו וכו' . . . המתפלל . Or *khaiy*.

But

But how does this *public* worship, it may be demanded, comport with that retreat and *privacy* recommended above? *Ans.* I spoke there of prayer *in general*, to which those circumstances give a great advantage: but then they are recommended no farther, than they can be had, and the nature of the prayer admits of them. Excuse a short reflexion here, which if it be not directly for the purpose, is not altogether foreign to it. Tho he who reads the form of public prayer reads it to *all* at the same time, that *all* may unite in one common act, which otherwise they could not do: yet still every *particular* person, who minds the prayers at all, has a separate perception of the words in his *mind*, and *there* he offers them, or the sense contained under them, with more or less application and ardor. And since no man can be said to *pray* any further than he *does this*; and it cannot be known to any body in the congregation beside himself, how far he *doth do it*; his prayer is in reality as *private*, as if he was inclosed within a thousand walls. So that, though there are reasons for a public worship, yet I will venture to affirm, that all *true* prayer is *private*: and the true seat of it being in the *mind*, toward the interesting of whose powers all the circumstances of worship are mainly designed to contribute, it may be said upon that account to be always made in the most retired and *undiscerned* of all retreats <sup>a</sup>: nor can more be said in respect of a worship, which by the terms is in other respects *public*. A man may be present in a congregation, and either pray the same prayer in which others seem to join, or some other, or none at all <sup>b</sup>, for ought any body there can tell besides himself.

I am not insensible how much I may expose myself by these things to the laughter of some, who are utter strangers to all this language. What a stir is here, *say they*, about *praying*? Who ever observed, that they who pray are more *successful* or happy, than they are who do not? *Ans.* All observations of this kind must be very *lubricous* and uncertain. We neither *know* what other men are inwardly and really <sup>c</sup>, nor how they pray <sup>d</sup>, nor what to call success <sup>e</sup>. That, which is *good* for one, may be *bad* for another: and that, which seems good at present, may at length be evil, or introduce something which is so <sup>f</sup>. And as to the *prosperity* of them,

<sup>a</sup> 'Εν τῷ ἵστω οἶον νεῶν. Plotin. S. Chrysostom says some are so unmindful of what they are about, that they know not so much as what they say themselves. Εἰσέρχονται πολλοὶ εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, καὶ ἐξέρχονται, καὶ οὐκ οἶδασιν τί ἔπουν τὰ χεῖλη κινεῖται, ἡ δὲ ἀκοὴ οὐκ ἀκούει. <sup>c</sup> The very Heathens thought, that the Gods would not hear the prayers of wicked men. Bias happening to be with some such in the same ship, when a great storm arose and they (being now frightened) began to invoke their deities, cries out, Σιγᾶτε, μὴ ἀκοῦσαντες ὑμᾶς ἐνθάδε πλείοντας. D. L. <sup>d</sup> C. Cestius ap. Tac. says, principes quidem instar deorum esse: sed neque a diis nisi juxta supplicum preces audiri. <sup>e</sup> Sometimes πλεον ἡμῖν παντός: that is, as Plato paraphrases those words of Hesiod, Τὸ ἡμῖν ἔ παντός πολλῶν ἐστὶ πλεον, ὅποταν ἢ τὸ μὲν ὅλον λαμβάνειν ζημιῶδες, κλ. <sup>f</sup> Quid quod iste culi candore laudatus dies originem mali habuit? Quam multos accepta afflicere imperia? quam multos bona perdidere, & ultimis mergere suppliciis? Plin.

of the private Retreat as in a Temple — a great many come to go home again, without so much as knowing it  
They'll take notice of us  
Many times 1/2 is better y<sup>e</sup> whole, & w<sup>h</sup> it is R so to receive whole is an injury who tells



who endeavour to worship God in a proper and reasonable manner, *whatever it is*, perhaps it might be *less*, if they did not; or their misfortunes might be *greater*: who can be certain of the contrary? If these gentlemen have any way of discovering it, I wish they would impart their *secret*. In the mean time sure they cannot expect, that even in the most imperfect sketch of *natural religion* the *worship of the Deity* should be omitted: that very thing, which hath been principally intended by the word *religion*<sup>a</sup>.

4. And lastly, to deliver what remains, summarily; *Rational beings, or they, to whom reason is the great law of their nature, if they would behave themselves as above, should consider in earnest, what a mighty being He is, who by the constitution of their nature has laid them under an obligation of being governed by it, and whose laws the dictates of right reason may be said to be.* They ought to keep it well impressed upon their minds, that He is the being, upon whom their very *existence* depends: that it is He who superintends and administers the affairs of the world by His *providence*: that the effects of His *power* and *influence* are visible before their faces, and round about them, in all the *phenomena* of nature, not one of which could be without Him: that they are always in His *presence*: that He is a being of *perfect reason*: that, if it be *reasonable*, that the transgressors of *reason* should be punished, they will most certainly, *one time or other*, be punished, &c. And then, if they do this, it is easy to see what effect it must have upon all their *thoughts, words*<sup>b</sup>, and *actions*.

By what is said here, no *superstition* is intended to be introduced: it is only the practice of *reason* and *truth*, which is required: and any thing, that is *not inconsistent with them*, may be freely done, though under the inspection of our great Lawgiver himself.

<sup>a</sup> Religio deorum cultu pio continetur. Cic. Qui omnia, qua ad cultum deorum pertinerent, diligenter retractarent, & tanquam relegerent, sunt dicti religiosi, &c. Id.

<sup>b</sup> Particularly with respect to *customary swearing*; which, beside the ill consequences it has in making oaths cheap, &c. is a great instance of disregard and irreverence. For they, who use themselves to it do, *at least*, make the tremendous name of God to serve for an *expletive* only; and commonly to rude, passionate, or debauched discourse (λόγους ἀναπλήρωμα ποίεμενοι τὸ ἁγιώτατον καὶ θεῖον ὄνομα. Ph. Jud).

SECT. VI. Truths respecting Mankind in general, antecedent to all human laws.

IN this and the following sections I shall proceed as in the foregoing.

I. Every man hath in himself a principle of individuation, which distinguishes and separates him from all other men in such a manner, as may render him and them capable of distinct properties in things (or distinct subjects of property). That is, B and C are so distinguished, or exist so distinctly, that if there be any thing which B can call his, it will be for that reason not C's: and v. v. what is C's will for that reason not be B's. The proof of this I put upon every man's own conscience. Let us see then whether there is any thing, which one man may truly call his.

II. There are some things, to which (at least before the case is altered by voluntary subjection, compact, or the like) every individual man has, or may have, such a natural and immediate relation, that he only of all mankind can call them his.

The life, limbs, &c. of B are as much his, as B is himself<sup>a</sup>. It is impossible for C, or any other to see with the eyes of B: therefore they are eyes only to B: and when they cease to be his eyes, they cease to be eyes at all. He then has the sole property in them, it being impossible in nature, that the eyes of B should ever be the eyes of C.

Further, the labor of B cannot be the labor of C: because it is the application of the organs and powers of B, not of C, to the effecting of something; and therefore the labor is as much B's, as the limbs and faculties made use of are his.

Again, the effect or produce of the labor of B is not the effect of the labor of C: and therefore this effect or produce is B's, not C's; as much B's, as the labor was B's, and not C's<sup>b</sup>. Because, what the labor of B causes or produces, B produces

<sup>a</sup> Οὐδὲν ἄλλως ἡμῶν ἐστιν, ὥς ἡμεῖς ἡμῶν αὐτοῖς. Xen.

And therefore the produce of a man's labor is often still called his labor. So יבנו זרים יגיעו: and יגיע כפיד האכל, in Psalm. י. al. passim.—Ilindumque labor vestes. Virg. So Strangers devour his labour" and Thou shalt eat Labour of thine

Hands.



by his labor; or it is the product of B by his labor: that is, it is B's product, not C's, or any other's. And if C should pretend to any *property* in that, which B only can truly call *his*, he would act contrary to *truth* <sup>a</sup>.

Lastly, there may be *many* things, which B may truly call *his* in some such *sense*, or upon some such account, as *no other* can; and to which C has no more right than D, nor D than F, &c. the *property* of which will therefore be in B. Because C has no more title than D, nor D than F, &c. and that, to which every one *besides B* has an *equal* title, no one besides B can have *any title* to at all <sup>b</sup>, their pretences mutually balancing and *destroying* each other, whilst his only *remains*. And in this case a small matter, being opposed to nothing, will be strong enough to maintain the claim of B.

III. *Whatever is inconsistent with the general peace and welfare (or good) of mankind, is inconsistent with the laws of human nature, wrong, intolerable.* Those maxims may be esteem'd the natural and true laws of any particular society, which are most proper to procure the *happiness* of it. Because *happiness* is the end of society and laws: otherwise we might suppose *unhappiness* to be proposed as the right end of them; that is, unhappiness to be desirable, contrary to *nature* and *truth*. And what is said of a *particular* society is not less true, when applied to the *universal* society of mankind. Now those things are *most apt* to produce happiness, which make the *most men* happy. And therefore those maxims or principles, which promote the general *tranquillity* and *well being* of mankind, if those words express the *happiness* of mankind, must be the *true* laws of humanity, or the basis of them: and all such practices, as interfere with these, must also interfere with those. It is contradictory to say, that any thing can be a *general* law of *human* nature, which tends only to favor the pleasures of *some particulars* to the prejudice of the rest, who partake of the same common nature; and especially if these pleasures are of the lower and *brutal* kind. As a *million* of men are more than *one*; so in fixing the public laws of human nature, and what ought to be, or not to be, they must in reason be more regarded by a *million* of times: for here we consider men only as men.

It will be easy now to shew, that the *transgression* of these laws, conducing to the general good of the world, is *wrong* and *morally evil*. For if mankind may be said in general to be a *rational animal*, the general welfare of it must be the welfare of a *rational nature*: and therefore that, and the laws which advance it,

<sup>a</sup> If B works for another man, who pays him for his work, or labor, that alters not the case. He may commute them for money, because they are *his*. <sup>b</sup> *Tanquam Sparti illi poetarum, sic se invicem jugulant, ut nemo ex omnibus resset*, as Lactantius says in another case.

must

must be founded in *reason*; nor can be opposed by any thing, but what is opposite to *reason*, and consequently to *truth*.

Let us suppose *some* rule, by which if all mankind would agree to govern themselves, it would be in general good for the world: that is, such a practice would be agreeable to the *nature* and *circumstances* of mankind. If *all* men should transgress this rule, what would be the consequence of such an *universal* revolt? A general *evil*, or something disagreeable to our *nature* and the *truth* of our circumstances: for of contrary practices there must be contrary effects; and contraries cannot both be agreeable to the same thing. This then would be *wrong* by the terms. And as wrong it would be in any *one* man: because all the individuals have *equal* right to do it, one as much as another; and therefore *all* as much as any *one*. At least it is certain, that whoever should violate that *rule*, would contribute his share towards the introduction of universal *disorder* and *misery*; and would for his part *deny* human circumstances to be what they are, public happiness to be what it is, and the rule to be what it really is, as much as if all others conspired with him in this iniquity and madness.

With what face can any *particular* man put his own humor or unreasonable pleasure into the scale against such a weight of happiness as that of *all the world*? Does not he, who thus centers in *himself*, disregards the good of *every body else*, and intirely separates his enjoyments and interests from those of the *public*; does not he, I say, strike himself out of the roll of *mankind*? Ought he to be owned as one of them? Ought he not rather to be repelled, and treated as an *alien* and *enemy* to the common happiness and tranquillity of our *species*?

IV. *Whatever is either reasonable or unreasonable in B with respect to C, would be just the same in C with respect to B, if the case was inverted*<sup>b</sup>. Because reason is universal, and respects cases<sup>c</sup>, not persons. (See sect. III. pr. II.)

Cor. Hence it follows, that a good way to know what is right or wrong in relation to *other men*, is to consider what we should take things to be were we in their circumstances<sup>d</sup>.

V. *In a state of nature men are equal in respect of dominion*<sup>e</sup>. I except for the present the case of *parents* and their *children*, and perhaps of some few other near relations.

<sup>a</sup> Ἄνθρωπος ὁμοῖον ἀνθρώπῳ. Ph. Jud. <sup>b</sup> Nec enim aquus iudex aliam de sua, aliam de aliena causa, sententiam fert. Sen. <sup>c</sup> Ἀπὸ ταῦτα πᾶσι γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν γίνωσκει. Isocr. <sup>d</sup> אל תרין

חברך ער שתגיע למקומו. P. Aboth. Eo loco nos constituamus, quo ille est, cui irascimur. Sen.

<sup>e</sup> He was a mere flatterer, who told Cyrus, βασιλεὺς μὲν ἔμοι γὰρ δοκῶς σὺ φῶσαι πεφυκῶσαι ἐδὲν ἥτις ἡ ἐν τῷ σμήνῃ φέρονται. ἢ μελίστων ἡγεμόν, Xen.

<sup>d</sup> You must not judge of Compassion till you have put y<sup>r</sup>self in his Place  
<sup>e</sup> "you seem to me to be born a K as much by fire, as He who is born by fire is of Koff-Bees"



ons. Here let me be understood to mean only those, between whom there is no family relation (or between whom all family relation is vanishd).

In a state, where no *laws* of society make any subordination or distinction, *men* can only be considerd *as men*, or only as individuals of the same *species*, and equally sharing in one common definition<sup>a</sup>. And since by virtue of this *same* definition B is the *same* to C, that C is to B; B has no more *dominion* over C than C *reciprocally* has over B: that is, they are in this regard *equal*.

*Personal* excellencies or defects can make no difference here: because, 1. Who must *judge*, on which side the advantage lies? To say B (or D, or any body else) has a right to judge to the disadvantage of C, is to *suppose* what is in question, a dominion over him; not to *prove* it. 2. Great natural or acquired *indowments* may be privileges to them who have them: but this does not deprive those, who have less, of *their title* to what they have; or, which is the same, give any one, who has greater abilities, a *right* to take it, or the use of it from them. If B has better *eyes* than C, it is well for him: but it does not follow from this, that C should not therefore see for himself, and use *his eyes*, as freely as B may *his*. C's eyes are accommodated by nature to his use, and so are B's to his; and each has the sole property in his own: so their respective properties are *equal*. The case would be parallel to this, if B should happen to have better *intellectual faculties* than C. And further, if B should be *stronger* than C, he would not yet for that reason have any right to be his *lord*. For C's less degree of strength is *as much his*, as B's greater is *his*: therefore C has as much *right* to his, and (which is the natural consequence) to use his, as B has to use his: that is, C has as much right to *resist*, as B has to impose or *command*, by virtue of his strength: and where the *right* (tho not the power) of resisting is equal to the right of commanding, the right of commanding or *dominion* is nothing. 3. Since strength and power are most apt to pretend a title to dominion<sup>b</sup>, it may be added further, that *power* and *right*, or a power of doing any thing, and right to do it, are quite different ideas: and therefore they may be separated, nor does one infer the other. *Lastly*, if *power*, *quà* power, gives a right to dominion, it gives a right to *every thing*, that is obnoxious to it; and then nothing can be done that is wrong. (For nobody can do any thing which he has not the *power* to do.) But this is not only contrary to what has been proved in sect. I. but to assert it would be to advance a plain *absurdity* or *contradiction*.

<sup>a</sup> Nihil est unum uni tam simile, tam par, quàm omnes inter nosmet ipsos sumus.—Quacunque est hominis definitio, una in omnes valet. Cic.

<sup>b</sup> When the Romans, in Livy, asked the Galls, Quodnam id jus esset, agrum à possessoribus petere, aut minari arma, they answerd, se in armis jus ferre, & omnia fortium virorum esse. Like barbarians indeed!

rather.

rather. For then to oppose the man who has this *power*, as far as one can, or (which is the same) as far as one has the *power* to do it, would not be wrong: and yet so it must be, if he has a right to dominion, or to be not opposed. Moreover, that a man should have a *right* to any thing, merely because he has the *power* to take it, is a doctrine indeed, which may serve a few tyrants, or some *banditi* and rogues, but directly opposite to the peace and general good of mankind; and therefore to be exploded, by prop. III. It is also what the powerful themselves could not allow, if they would but imagine themselves to be in the state of the *weak* and more *defenceless*; and therefore unreasonable, by prop. IV <sup>a</sup>.

VI. *No man can have a right to begin to interrupt the happiness of another.* Because, in the first place, this supposes a dominion over him, and the most *absolute* too that can be. In the next, for B to begin to disturb the peace and happiness of C is what B would think *unreasonable*, if he was in C's case. In the last, since it is supposed, that C has never invaded the happiness of B, nor taken any thing from him, nor at all meddled with him, but the *whole transaction* begins originally from B (for all this is couched in the word *begin*), C can have nothing that is B's; and therefore nothing, to which C has not at least *as good a title* as B has; or, in other words, nothing, which C has not as much right to *keep* as B to *claim*. These two rights being then *at least* equal, and counterpoising each other, no alteration in the present state of things can follow from any superiority of right in B: and therefore it must of right remain as it is; and what C has must, for any right that B has to oppose this settlement, remain with C in his *undisturbed* possession. But the argument is still stronger on the side of C: because he seems to have such a *property* in his own happiness, as is mention'd in prop. II. such a one as no other can have <sup>b</sup>.

VII. *Tho no man can have a right to begin to interrupt another man's happiness, or to hurt him; yet every man has a right to defend himself and his against violence, to recover what is taken by force from him, and even to make reprisals, by all the means that truth and prudence permit* <sup>c</sup>. We have seen already, that there are some things, which

<sup>a</sup> Josephus, when he says, νόμον γε μὴν ἀγέμεν, & παρὰ δύναμιν ἐκτελέσμεν, & παρὰ ἀνδραγαθίαν, ἡμῶν τοῖς διωκτοτέροις, can only mean, that necessity, or perhaps prudence, obliges to do this; not any law in the stricter sense of that word.

<sup>b</sup> Societatis [inter homines] arctissimum vinculum est magis arbitrari esse contra naturam, hominem homini detrahere, sui commodi causa, quam omnia incommoda subire, &c. Cic. <sup>c</sup> All this is supposed to be in a state of nature and the absence of human laws.



a man may truly call *his*; and let us for the present only suppose, that there may be *more*. This premised, I proceed to make good the proposition.

To deny a man the privilege mentiond in it is to assert, contrary to *truth*, either that he *has not* the faculties and powers, which he *has*; or that the Author of nature has given them to him in vain. For to what end has he them, if he may not *use* them? And how may he use them, if not for his own *preservation*, when he is attacked, and like to be abused, or perhaps destroyd.

All *animals* have a principle of *self-preservation*, which exerts itself many times with an uncontrollable impetuosity. Nature is *uniform* in this, and every where constant to itself. Even *inanimate* bodies, when they are acted upon, react. And one may be sure, that no position can have any foundation *in nature*, or be consistent with *it* and *truth* (those inseparable companions), which turns upon nature itself, and tends to *its destruction*.

Great part of the general happiness of mankind depends upon those *means*, by which the innocent may be saved from their cruel invaders: among which the opportunities they have of *defending* themselves may be reckond the chief. Therefore to debar men of the use of these opportunities, and the right of defending themselves against injurious treatment and violence must be inconsistent with the laws of nature by prop. III.

If a man has no right to *defend* himself and what is his, he can have no right to *any thing* (the contrary to which has been already in part, and will by and by be more amply proved); since that cannot be his right, which he may not *maintain* to be his right.

If a man has no right to *defend* himself against insults, &c. it must be because the aggressor has a right to *assail* the other, and *usurp* what is his: but this pretension has been prevented in the foregoing proposition. And, more than that, it includes a great absurdity, to *commence* an injury, or to *begin* the violence, being in nature more than only to *repell* it. He, who begins, is the true cause of all that follows: and whatever falls upon him from the opposition made by the defending party, is but the effect of his own act: or, it is that violence, of which he is the author, *reflected* back upon himself. It is as when a man spits at heaven, and the spittle falls back upon his own face.

Since he, who begins to violate the happiness of another, does what is *wrong*, he, who endeavours to obviate or put a stop to that violence, does in that respect what is *right*, by the terms.

Lastly, since every man is obliged to consult his own happiness, there can be no doubt but that he not only *may*, but even *ought* to defend it (sect. II. prop. IX.);  
in

in such a manner I mean, as does not interfere with *truth*<sup>a</sup>, or his own design of *a* being happy. He ought indeed not to act *rashly*, or do *more* than the end proposed requires: that is, he ought by a prudent carriage and wise forecast to shut up, *if he can*, the avenues by which he may be invaded; and when that *cannot be done*, to use arguments and persuasives, or perhaps withdraw out of the way of harm: but when these measures are ineffectual or impracticable, he must take such other as he can, and confront *force* with *force*. Otherwise he will fail in his duty to himself, and deny happiness to be happiness.

By the same means, that a man may *defend* what is his, he may certainly endeavour to *recover* what has been by any kind of violence or villainy taken from him. For it has been shewn already, that the *power* to take any thing from another gives *no right* to it. The *right* then to that, which has been taken from its owner against his will, remains still where it was: he may still truly call it *his*: and if it be *his*, he may use it as *his*: which if he who took it away, or any other, shall hinder him from doing, that man is even here the aggressor, and the owner does but *defend* himself and what is his. Besides, he, who uses any thing as *his*, when it is *his*, acts *on the side* of truth: but that man, who opposes him in this, and consequently asserts a right to that, which is not his, acts *contrary* to truth. The former therefore does what cannot be amiss: but what the latter does, is wrong by that fundamental proposition, sect. I. prop. IV.

Then further, if a man hath still a *right* to what is forceably or without his consent taken from him, he must have a right to the *value* of it. For the thing is to him what it is *in value* to him: and the right he has to it, may be considered as a right to a thing of *such a value*. So that if the very thing which was taken be destroyed, or cannot be retrieved, the proprietor nevertheless retains his right to a thing of *such a value to him*; and something must be had *in lieu* of it: that is, he has a right to make *reprisals*. Since every thing is to every man what it is *in value* to him, things of the same *value* to any one may be reckoned as to him *the same*, and to recover the *equivalent* the same as to recover the *thing itself*: for otherwise it is not an equivalent. If the thing taken by way of reprisal should be *to the man*, from whom it is taken, of *greater value* than what he wrongfully took from the recoverer, he must charge himself with that loss. If injustice be done him, it is done by himself, the other has no more than what he has a right to. To which add, that as a man has a right to recover *what is his*, or *the equivalent*, from an invader; so he seems for the same reasons to have a right to an equivalent for the *expense* he is at in recovering his own, for the loss of *time* and *quiet*, and for the *trouble, hazards, and dangers* under-

<sup>a</sup> For ἐὶς ὁ ἀδικῶν κακῶς ποιεῖ, ὁ ἀντιποιῶν κακῶς ἐδὲν ἥτις ποιεῖ κακῶς, καὶ ἀμύνεται. Max. T.

He who does an act of injustice does an ill thing, He who returns injustice, does a thing equally ill, (He does it by way of Retaliation)

gone:



gone : because all these are the effects of the invasion, and therefore to be added to the invader's account.

VIII. *The first possession of a thing gives the possessor a greater right to it, than any other man has, or can have, till he and all, that claim under him, are extinct.* For, 1. till then no other man can be the *first possessor* again : which is more than *nothing* ; since he comes into it by God's providence, and as it were *donation*. 2. That, which no man has yet any title to <sup>a</sup>, the finder may take without the violation of *any truth*. He doth not *deny* that to be another man's, which is another man's : he doth not *begin* to interrupt the happiness of any body, &c. Therefore to possess himself of it is *not wrong*. So far from it, that, since every man is *obliged* to consult his own happiness (that is, his own interest and advantages, whenever he can do it without the violation of truth) not to act consonantly to this *obligation* is an omission that would be *wrong*. What he does therefore is *right*. And then if he does right in taking possession of it, he must from thence be the *rightful possessor* ; or, it becomes his. 3. There are many things, which cannot be possessed without *cultivation* and the contrivance and labor of the first possessor. This has generally been the case of *lands* : and these are indeed more eminently meant by the word *possessions*. Now to deprive a man of the fruit of *his own* cares and sweat, and to enter upon it, as if it was the effect of the *intruder's* pains and travel, is a most manifest violation of *truth*. It is asserting in fact that to be his, which cannot be his. See prop. II. 4. The contrary doctrine, *viz.* that *prime occupancy* gives no right, interferes with prop. III. for it must certainly be inconsistent with the *peace* and *happiness* of mankind in general to be left in endless wars and struggles for that, which *no man* can ever have any right to. And yet thus it must be, if that doctrine was true : because it has been demonstrated, that *power* confers no right ; and therefore the *first right* to many things can only accrue from the first possession of them. 5. If B should endeavour by force (or fraud) to eject C out of the possession of any thing, which C enjoys, and obtained without *expelling* or *disturbing* any body, he would certainly do that, which he himself would judge *unreasonable*, were he in C's place. Therefore he acts, as if that was not reason with respect to C, which would be reason in respect of B ; contrary to the nature of *reason*, and to prop. IV. 6. To endeavour to turn a man violently out of his possessions is the same as to *command* him to leave them, upon pain of suffering for non-obedience. But this is usurping a *dominion*, which he has no right to ; and is contrary to prop. V. 7. No man can expell another out of his

<sup>a</sup> Nam propria telluris herum natura neq; illum, Nec me, nec quenguam statuit. Hor.

possession without *beginning* to interrupt his happiness: nor can any one do this without contravening the *truth* containd in prop. VI. This therefore secures the possessor in his possession for ever: that is, it confirms his *right* to the thing possesst. *Lastly*, the *first possessor*, of whom I have been speaking, has undoubtedly a right to defend *his person*, and such other things as can *only be his*, against the attempts of any aggressor (see prop. II.): therefore these no one can have a right to violate. And therefore again, if he cannot be forceably dispossess without violence offerd to *these*, no one has any right to dispossess him. But this must be the case, where the possessor does not quit his possession *willingly*. The *right* consequently must remain solely in him, unless he consents to quit it.

N. The *successors* of an invader, got into possession wrongfully, may acquire a right *in time*<sup>a</sup>, by the failure of such, as might claim under him who had the right. For he, who happens to be in possession, when all these are extinct, is in the place of a *prime occupant*.

IX. *A title to many things may be transferred by compact or donation*<sup>b</sup>. If B has the sole right in lands, or goods, no body has any right to the disposal of them besides B: and he has a right. For disposing of them is but using them as *his*. Therefore the act of B in *exchanging* them for some thing else, or *bestowing* them upon C, interferes not with *truth*: and so B does nothing that is wrong. Nor does C do any thing against *truth*, or that is wrong, in taking them: because he treats them as being *what they are*; as things, which come to him by the act of that person, in whom is lodged the sole power of *disposing* of them. Thus C gets the title *innocently*.

But in the case of *compact* the reason, on which this transaction stands, is more evident still. For the contractors are supposed to receive each from other the *equivalent* of that which they part with, or at least what is equivalent *to them respectively*, or perhaps by each party *preferable*. Thus neither of them is hurt: perhaps both advantaged. And so each of them treats the thing, which he receives upon the innocent exchange, as being *what it is*: better for him, and promoting his convenience and happiness. Indeed he, who receives the *value* of any thing, and what he likes as well, in effect has it still. His *property* is not diminishd: the situation and matter of it is only alterd.

<sup>a</sup> Τὰς κτήσεις, & τὰς ἰδίας καὶ τὰς κοινὰς, ἢ ἐπιγίνονται πολλὸς χρόνον, κυρίας καὶ πατρῷας ἀπαρίεσθαι νομίζουσιν. *Isocr.*

<sup>b</sup> To this may be reduced that title to things, which *Tully* mentions as conferred by some law (*lege*); and even those, which accrue *conditione*, or *sorte*. For I suppose the government to have a right of giving them thus.



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Mankind could not well subsist without *bartering* one thing for another: therefore whatever tends to take away the benefit of this intercourse, is inconsistent with the *general good* of mankind, &c. If a man could find the *necessaries* of life without it, and by himself, he must at least want many of the *comforts* of it.

*a* X. There is then such a thing as property, founded in nature and truth<sup>a</sup>: or, there are things, which one man only can, consistently with nature and truth, call his: by prop. II, VIII, IX.<sup>b</sup>

XI. Those things, which only one man can truly and properly call his, must remain his, till he agrees to part with them (if they are *uh*, as he may part with) by compact or donation; or (which must be understood) till they fail, or death extinguishes him and his title together, and he delivers the lamp to his next man. Because no one can deprive him of them without his approbation, but the *depriver* must use them as *his*, when they are *not his*, in contradiction to *truth*. For,

XII. To have the property of any thing and to have the sole right of using and disposing of it are the same thing: they are equipollent expressions. For when it is said, that P has the property, or that such a thing is proper to P, it is not said, that P and Q or P and others have the property (*proprium* limits the thing to P only): and when any thing is said to be *his*, it is not said that *part of it only* is his. P has therefore the *all* or all-hood<sup>c</sup> of it, and consequently *all the use* of it. And then, since the *all* of it to him, or *all* that P can have of it, is but the *use* and *disposal* of it<sup>d</sup>, he who has this has the thing itself, and it is his<sup>e</sup>.

## Laws

<sup>a</sup> Which must not give way to opinions of *finess*, &c. The master was in the right, who corrected *Cyrus* for adjudging the great coat to the great boy, and the little one to the little. He was not *τὸ ἀριστοτελεστερον*, but of property. *Omnium, quæ in hominum doctorum disputatione versantur, nihil est profecto præstabilius, quàm planè intelligi nos ad justitiam esse natos, neque opinione, sed naturâ constitutum esse jus.* Cic.

<sup>b</sup> There is another way of acquiring a title mentiond: which is, by the right of war, as it is called. *Sunt privata nulla naturâ: sed aut veteri occupatione, ut qui quondam in vacua venerunt; aut victoriâ, ut qui bello potiti sunt, &c.* Cic. And so in *Xenophon* it is said to be an eternal law among men, that if a city be taken in war, the bodies and goods of the people in it are the conqueror's; and they may possess them as their own, not *ἀλλοτρία*. But sure this wants limitations.

<sup>c</sup> *Allodium.* <sup>d</sup> Πολλὰκις ἐγγέλασα διαδίκας ἀναγινώσκων λεγόμενος ὁ δίκην μὲν ἐχέτω τὴν διαδοτικὴν τῶν ἀγρῶν, ἢ τῆς οἰκίας, τὴν δὲ χρῆσιν ἑαλθῶ. Πάντες γὰρ τὴν χρῆσιν ἔχουσιν, διαδοτικὴν δὲ ἐδίδε. — <sup>e</sup> ἰκόντες, <sup>e</sup> ἀκόντες ἐν τῇ τελευταίᾳ παραχαρῆσιν ἐτίρουν, τὴν χρῆσιν καρποσάμενοι μόνον. S. Chryl. Τέτων μὲν φύσει ἐδίδε ἴσμεν κύριοι, νόμῳ δὲ

*d* / I have often times laughed when I read any of those wills, in wch it is said Let such or such an one be the real Owner of Lands or Houses; & let another person have the use of them, for use is all y<sup>e</sup> belongs to any of us. We are not real Owners. — After Death they go to Others, w<sup>ch</sup> we will or no, when we have enjoyed the use only. S. Chrys. We are not by the law the real Owners of any of these things, but are invested by law or by Succession w<sup>th</sup> the use of them for an uncertain time, & are therefore called Temporary Tenants, & w<sup>ch</sup> time prescribed is passed then they go to another & he enjoys the same Title.

# Truths respecting Mankind, &c. 137

Laws indeed have introduced a way of speaking, by which the *property* and the *usufruct* are distinguish'd; but in truth the usufructuary has a *temporary*, or *limited* property; and the proprietary has a *perpetual* usufruct, either at present, or in reversion. Propriety without the *use* (if the use is never to come to the proprietary) is an empty sound.

I have before upon some occasions taken it as granted, that he, who uses any thing as *his*, when it is *not his*, acts against *truth*, &c. but now I say further, that,

XIII. *He, who uses or disposes of any thing, does by that declare it to be his.* Because this is all, that he, whose it *really* is, can do. *Borrowing* and *hiring* afford no objection to this. When the borrower or hirer uses the thing borrow'd or hired, he uses what is *his own* for the time allow'd: and his doing so is only one of *those ways*, in which the true proprietary disposes of it.

XIV. *To usurp or invade the property of another man is injustice: or, more fully, to take, detain, use, destroy, hurt, or meddle<sup>a</sup> with any thing that is his without his allowance, either by force or fraud or any other way, or even to attempt any of these, or assist them, who do, are acts of injustice. The contrary; to render and permit quietly to every one what is his, is justice.* Def.

XV. *He that would not violate truth, must avoid all injustice: or, all injustice is wrong and evil.* It interferes with the truths<sup>b</sup> here before laid down, and perhaps more. It denies men to be *subjects* capable of distinct properties: in some cases it denies them to have a property even in their own *bodies, life, fame*, and the like: the practice of it is incompatible with the *peace* and *happiness* of mankind: it is what every man thinks unreasonable in *his own case*, when the injury is done to himself: to take any thing from another only because I think I want it, or because I have power to take it, and will have it, without any title

Ἡ διαδοχὴ τὴν χεῖρσιν αὐτῶν εἰς ἀόριστον παραλαμβάνοντες, ὀλιγοχρόνοι δισπόται νομιζόμεθα. καί ποθεν ἡ προδοσιμὰ παρέλθῃ τῆς αὐτῶν παραλαβῶν ἀλλ' ὁπλοῦσι τῷ ὀνόματι. Luc. <sup>c</sup> Qui te nascitur ager, tuus est, &c. Horace, alluding to this truth. Περὶ πάντες, says Plato, ἐν ἐξήδων τοιόνδε δέ τι νόμι-

μον βιάωνται πρὶν τῶν ἀπογόνων μηδὲν φέρειν μηδ' ἀγεῖν and then proceeds, μηδ' αὖ χεῖρσιν μηδὲ τῶν ὀπίσθας, εἰ μὴ πείσῃ τὸν κεκτημένον, κτλ. In Plutarch the thing is carried farther: where it is said, that a man passing by another man's door ought μὴ βλέπειν ἕσω, κλ. according to a saying of Xenocrates, μηδὲν διαφέρειν ἢ τὰς πόδας ἢ τὰς ὀφθαλμοὺς εἰς ἀπογόνων οὐκίαν τιθέναι.

<sup>a</sup> Furtum fit, — cum quis alienam rem invito domino contrectat. Just. inst. <sup>b</sup> On the contrary נעשה אמת — נעשה דין. A saying of ר' יובל. And Cicero more than once uses *venire* for *justum*, and *veritas* for *bonitas* or *probitas*. We shall make justice — We shall make truth. a saying of Rabbi Joshua of

There is only some such  
vict. if no m. shd plunder, or  
take any thing y belongs to and  
of any thing y comes into

to Son of Levi



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to it, is the highest pretence to *dominion*, and denial of our *natural equality*: it is setting up a right to *begin* to disturb the happiness of others: and lastly, it is to deny there is any such thing as *property, contrary to truth*.

Briefly, if there be any thing which P can truly and properly call *his*, then, if T takes or uses it without the consent of P, he declares it to be *his* (for if it was *his* he could do no more) when it is *not his*, and so acts a lie<sup>a</sup>: in which consists the *idea* and *formal ratio* of moral evil.

The very *attempting* any instance of injustice, or *assisting* others in such an attempt, since it is attempting and promoting what is *wrong*, is being in the wrong as much as one is *able* to be; or doing what one *can* to achieve that which is *evil*: and to do this, by the *terms*, must be *wrong* and *evil*.

Even the *desire* of obtaining any thing unjustly is evil: because to desire to do *evil*, by the terms again, is an *evil* or criminal *desire*. If the act follows such a desire, it is the child and product of it: and the desire, if any thing renders the fulfilling of it impracticable, is the act obstructed in the beginning, and stifled in the womb.

Let it be observed here by way of *scholion* concerning the thing called *covetousness*, that there seem to be three sorts of it. One is this here mentiond: a desire of getting from others, tho it be *unjustly*. This is wrong and wicked. Another is an immense desire of heaping up what one can by just methods, but without any *reasonable end* proposd<sup>b</sup>, and only in order to *keep*<sup>c</sup>, and as it were bury it<sup>d</sup>: and the more he accumulates, the more he craves<sup>e</sup>. This also intrenches upon truth, and seems to be a vice. But to *covet* to obtain what is another man's by *just means*, and with his consent, when it may contribute to the happiness of our selves or families, and perhaps of the other person too, has nothing surely that looks *unfriendly* upon truth, or is blameable, in it. This, if it may be called covetousness, is a virtuous *covetousness*.

*6/9 The Miserable Wretch is reported to have pined away till He died.*

<sup>a</sup> Account τὸ σὸν μὲν σὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀλλότριον, ὥσπερ εἰς, ἀλλότριον. Epict.'s words. *Iustitia primum munus est, ut ne cui quis noceat, nisi lacesitus injuria; deinde, ut communibus pro communibus utatur, privatis ut suis.* Cic. This is to use things as being what they are. <sup>b</sup> Blepsias ὁ δα- νεισῆς, in *Lucian*, dies of hunger (λιμὸν ἄθλιον ἐλέγετο ἀπισκληνέαι). Ridiculous enough. <sup>c</sup> Or only πρὸς τὸ ἀριθμῶν, as *Anacharsis* said of some Greeks. *Athen*.

<sup>d</sup> As that man, in *Athe- naus*, endeavourd literally to do; of whom it is reported, that, being much in love with his money, before he died he swallowd as much of it as he could (καταπιόντα ἐκ ὀλίγης χειρὸς ἀποθανεῖν). <sup>e</sup> Of such it is, that *Diogenes* used to say, Ὁμοίως τὰς φιλαργύρους τοῖς ὑδρωπικαῖς, κλ. *Stob*. The *Mamshilim*, mentiond in *Nahh. Ab*. compare them מְהַמְשִׁלִּים כִּי כָל עוֹד שִׁישָׁתָה לְצַמֵּן שִׁישָׁתָה יוֹסִים צַמֵּן.

*i.e. Writer of proverbs*

I

XVI. When

*e/ That Covetous M were like M that had f Dropsy - compare them to Thirsty People drinking Saltwater, the more they drink f Thirst they are.*

XVI. *When a man cares not what sufferings he causes to others, and especially if he delights in other men's sufferings and makes them his sport, this is what I call cruelty. And not to be affected with the sufferings of other people, tho they proceed not from us, but from others, or from causes in which we are not concerned, is unmercifulness. Mercy and humanity are the reverse of these.*

XVII. *He, who religiously regards truth and nature, will not only be not unjust, but (more) not unmerciful, and much less cruel. Not to be affected with the afflictions of others, so far as we know them, and in proportion to the several degrees and circumstances of them, tho we are not the causes of them, is the same as to consider the afflicted as persons not in affliction; that is, as being not what they are, or (which is the same) as being what they are not: and this contradicts matter of fact.*

One can scarce know the *sufferings* of another without having at least some image of them in his mind: nor can one have these images without being conscious of them, and as it were feeling them. Next to suffering itself is to carry the representation of it about with one. So that he, who is not affected with the calamities of others, so far as they fall within his knowledge, may be said to know and not to know; or at least to cancel his knowledge, and contradict his own conscience.

There is something in *human nature*<sup>a</sup> resulting from our very make and constitution, while it retains its genuine form, and is not *altered* by vicious habits; not *perverted* by transports of revenge or fury, by ambition, company, or false philosophy<sup>b</sup>; nor *oppressed* by stupidity and neglecting to observe what happens to others: I say, there is *something*, which renders us obnoxious to the pains of others, causes us to sympathize with them, and almost comprehends us in their case. It is grievous to see or hear (and almost to hear of) any man, or even any animal whatever, in *torment*. This *compassion* appears eminently in them, who upon other accounts are justly reckoned among *the best of men*<sup>c</sup>: in some degree it appears in *almost* all; nay,

<sup>a</sup> Properly called *humanity*; because nothing of it appears in brutes. בהמה אינה מקפדת וחוששת בצער חברתה. S. Hhas.

<sup>b</sup> When Seneca says, *Clementiam—omnes boni prestabunt, misericordiam autem vitabunt*, he seems only to quibble. He has many other weak things upon this subject. That, *succurret [sapiens] alienis lachrymis, non accedet*,<sup>c</sup> shows one use of tears: they obtain succour even from a Stoic.

<sup>c</sup> Ἀγαθοὶ ἀπιδάκνυντες ἄνδρες. They, who of all writers undertake to imitate nature most, oft introduce even their heroes weeping. (See how Homer represents Ulysses Od. i. 151.—2.—7.—8.) The tears of men are in truth very different from the cries and ejaculations of children. They are *silent streams*, and flow from other causes; commonly some tender, or perhaps philosophical, reflexion. It is easy to see how hard hearts and dry eyes come to be fashionable. But for all that, it is certain the *glandula lacrymales* are not made for nothing.

even



even sometimes, when they more coolly attend to things, in those hardend and execrable *monsters* of cruelty themselves, who seem just to retain only the least tincture of humanity that can be. The *Pheræan* tyrant, who had never wept over any of those murders he had caused among his own citizens, *wept* when he saw a tragedy but acted in the theatre<sup>a</sup>: the reason was, his attention was caught here, and he more observed the sufferings of *Hecuba* and *Andromache*, than ever he had those of the *Pheræans*; and more impartially, being no otherwise concerned in them but as a common spectator. Upon this occasion the principle of *compassion*, implanted in human nature, appeared, overcame his habits of cruelty, broke through his petrification, and would shew that it could not be totally eradicated. It is therefore according to *nature* to be affected with the sufferings of other people; and the contrary is *inhuman* and *unnatural*.

Such are the *circumstances* of mankind, that we cannot (or but very few of us, God knows) make our way through this world without encountering *dangers* and suffering many *evils*: and therefore since it is for the good of such, as are so exposed or actually smarting under pain or trouble, to receive comfort and assistance from others, without which they must commonly continue to be miserable, or perish, it is for the common good and welfare of the *majority at least* of mankind, that they should *compassionate* and *help* each other<sup>b</sup>. To do the contrary must therefore be contrary to nature and *wrong* by prop. III. And beside, it is by one's behaviour and actions to affirm, that the circumstances of men in this world are *not* what they are; or that peace, and health, and happiness, and the like, are not what *they* are.

Let a man *substitute himself* into the room of some poor creature dejected with invincible poverty, distracted with difficulties, or groaning under the pangs of some disease, or the anguish of some hurt or wound, and without help abandond to want and pain. In this distress what reflexions can he imagine *he should have*, if he found that every body neglected him, no body so much as pitying him, or vouchsafing to take notice of his calamitous and sad condition? It is certain, that what it would be reasonable or unreasonable for others to do in respect of *him*, he must allow to be reasonable or unreasonable for him to do in respect of *them*, or deny a manifest *truth* in prop. IV.

If unmercifulness, as before defined, be wrong, no time need to be spent in proving that *cruelty* is so. For all that is culpable in unmercifulness is containd in cruelty, with *additions* and *aggravations*. Cruelty not only denies due regard to the suffer-

<sup>a</sup> *Plut.*

<sup>b</sup> A generous nature pities even an enemy in distress. 'Εποικτίρω δὲ τὴν Δύσγνωσιν ἑμῆν, καίπερ ὄντα ἐσθμῶν. *Soph.* "I always pity a man in misery altho he be my Enemy" ings

## Truths respecting Mankind, &c. 141

ings of others, but *causes* them; or perhaps *delights* in them, and (which is the most insolent and cruel of all cruelties) makes them a *jest* and subject of raillery. If the one be a *defect* of humanity, the other is diametrically opposite to it<sup>a</sup>. If the one does *no good*, the other does *much evil*. And no man, how cruel soever in reality he was, has ever liked to be *reckoned* a cruel man: such a confession of guilt does nature extort; so universally doth it reject, condemn, abhor this character.

XVIII. *The practice of justice and mercy is just as right, as injustice, unmercifulness, and cruelty are wrong.* This follows from the nature of contraries. Beside, not to be just to a man is to be not just, or unjust to him: and so not to be merciful is to be unmerciful, or perhaps cruel.

Here I might end this section: but perhaps it may not be improper to be a little more particular. Therefore,

XIX. *From the foregoing propositions may be deduced the heinousness of all such crimes, as murder, or even hurting the person of another any how, when our own necessary defence does not require it* (it being not possible, that any thing should be more *his*, than *his own* person, life and limbs); *robbing, stealing, cheating, betraying; defamation, detraction; defiling the bed of another man, et cæt. with all the approaches and tendencies to them.* For these are not only comprised within the definition of injustice, and are therefore violations of those truths, which are violated by that; but commonly, and some of them always, come within the description of *cruelty* too. All which is evident at first sight with respect to murder, robbery, cheating, slandering, &c. especially if a man brings *himself* into the case, and views himself in his own imagination as rendered scandalous by calumniators and liars; stript by thieves; ruined in his fortunes and undone by knaves; struggling to no purpose, convulsed and agonizing under the knife of some truculent ruffian; or the like.

The same is altogether as plain in the case of *adultery*<sup>b</sup>, when any one<sup>c</sup> insnares, and corrupts the wife of another; notwithstanding the protection it gains from false notions, great examples<sup>d</sup>, and the commonness of the crime<sup>e</sup>. For (the nature of *matrimony* being for the present supposed to be such, as it will appear by and by to be) the adulterer denies the *property* a husband has in his wife by compact, the most express and sacred that can possibly be made: he does that, which

*He is a Horrid Creature, but not so bad as an Adulterer.*

<sup>a</sup> *Est hominum natura, quam sequi debemus, maximè inimica crudelitas.* Cic.

<sup>b</sup> *ὁ κλέπτης, ἀλλ' ἐχ' ἔσω ὡς ὁ μοιχός.* Chrys.

<sup>c</sup> *One of the Subjessores alienorum matrimoniorum, as they are called in Val. Max.*

<sup>d</sup> *Palam apparet, adhuc atate Divi Hieronymi adulterium capite solere puniri: nunc magnatum lusus est.* Schol. in S. Hier.

<sup>e</sup> *For hence follows*

*impunity, &c. משרבו מנאפים פסקו מים המרים. Mishn.*

T

tends

<sup>b</sup> *Διὸν μὲν*

*Layers in Wink for o' Mr's Wink*

*e/Hence Overflood of it, I*

*adulterous derive either waters, Mishn.*



tends to subvert the peace of families, confounds relation, and is altogether inconsistent with the *order* and *tranquillity* of the world, and therefore with the laws of human nature: he does what no man in his wits could think *reasonable*, or even *tolerable*, were he the person wrongd<sup>a</sup>: briefly, he impudently treats a woman as *his own woman* (or *wife*<sup>b</sup>), who is *not his*, but *another's*, contrary to *justice, truth* and *fact*<sup>c</sup>. Nor is this simple injustice only, but injustice, for which *no reparation* can be made if the injured man thinks so; as he generally does (see sect. II. prop. I. obs. 4.) injustice accompanied with the greatest *cruelty*; so complicated, as scarce any other can be. The *husband* is for ever robbed of all that pleasure and satisfaction, which arises from the wife's fidelity and affection to him<sup>d</sup>; presuming upon which he took her to be not only the partner of his bed, but the companion of his life, and sharer in all his fortunes<sup>e</sup>: and into the room of them succeed painful and destructive passions. The poor woman<sup>f</sup> herself, tho she may be deluded<sup>g</sup>, and not see at present her guilt, or the consequences of it, usually pays dear for her security and want of guard, the husband becoming cold<sup>h</sup> and averse to her, and she full of apprehensions and fears<sup>i</sup>, with a particular dread of his further resentment. And their *affairs*, in this disjointed and distracted condition, are neglected; *innocent children* flighted, and left unprovided for, without so much as the comfort of any *certain* relations to pity them<sup>k</sup>, &c.

The adulterer may not be permitted to extenuate his crime by such impertinent *smile's* and *rakish* talk, as are commonly used for that purpose<sup>l</sup>. When any one wrongs another of his property, he wrongs him of *what it is to him*, the proprietor: and the value must be set according to what *he* esteems it to be, not what

<sup>a</sup> Is, qui nullius non uxorem concupiscit, — idem uxorem suam aspicere non vult: & fidei acerrimus exactor, est perfidus: & mendacia persequitur, ipse perjurus. Sen.

<sup>b</sup> ἸΝΩΝ, τὴν ἑαυτῆς γυναῖκα.

<sup>c</sup> What a monster in nature must he be, who, as if it was meritorious to dare to act against all these, (to use Seneca's words again) *satis justam causam putat amandi, quod aliena est [uxor]*? <sup>d</sup> Οὐδὲ γὰρ τῆς ἑνὸς ἐστὶν ἐκείνη, ὡς τὸ σῶμα μόνον διαφθείρεται τῆς μοιχευομένης γυναίκας, ἀλλ' εἰ δὲ τὰ ληθῆς ἐκείνη, ἡ ψυχὴ πρὸς τὴν σῶματι εἰς ἀμοιβήν ἐστιζέται, διδασκομένη πάντα τρέπον ἀποτρέφει καὶ μισῶν τὸν ἄνδρα, καὶ ἥτιον ἀν' ἡ δεινόν, εἰ τὸ μῖστος ἐπιδείκνυτο ἐμφανῆς, κτλ. Ph. Jud.

<sup>e</sup> Marriage is κοινωνία παντός & ἑκάστου. Isocr.

<sup>f</sup> Ἀπαλὸν ζῶον. S. Bas. ἡ ἑστὶς. Ἐπιστας, in any other

<sup>g</sup> Ἐκείνη, says the penitent woman in Soph. ap. Plut. ἐκείνη.

<sup>h</sup> Ψυχρὸν παραγκάλισμα — Γυνὴ κακὴ ζῶντι. Soph.

<sup>i</sup> Quid enim salvi est mulieri, amissa pudicitia? Livy.

<sup>k</sup> Οἱ μὲν δὲ ἡδίκη-

<sup>l</sup> Such as Aristippus uses to Diogenes, ap. Athen. Ἀρα γε μή τι σοι ἄτοπον δοκεῖ εἶναι Διογένης οἰκίαν οἰκεῖν, ἐν ᾗ πρότερον ἤκησαν ἄλλοι; & γὰρ ἔφη. τίς γὰρ ἴδεν, ἐν ᾗ πρότερον πεπλευκασιν; ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ ἔφη. ἄρα γε. — Senfeless stuff. Nor is that of the adulterous woman in Prov. S. better:

where בעלמה רחל is placed with the way of an eagle in the air, of a serpent upon a rock, and

of a ship in the sea, וְשָׁלַח יָדָאָהּ בְּרֶשֶׁת׃ וְשָׁלַח יָדָאָהּ בְּרֶשֶׁת׃, and therefore she שָׁלַח פִּיהָ בְּרֶשֶׁת׃

מִשָּׁה, and then thinks that אֶחָד לֹא יִשְׁכַּח לָאָה׃ See Qab venaqi.

<sup>4</sup> The miserable children, who have done nobody any the injury,

will not be owned by any relations, either of married men, or of adulterers.

<sup>5</sup> Do you see any Absurdity Diogenes in living in a House that any person has lived in before? No says He; but in sailing

a Ship where a great Many have sailed? No — We say of a Man, the Maid — who leave no Trait to be seen after them

there! She wipes her Mouth, then thinks, she may say afterwards, We have I done Amis.

the injurer, who perhaps has no taste of virtuous pleasures, may think it to be. (See p. 33. obs. 3, 4.) Nor may these thefts be excused from their secrecy. For 1. the injustice of the fact is the *same in itself*, whether known, or not. In either case *truth* is denied: and a *lie* is as much a lie, when it is *whispered*, as when it is *proclaimed* at the market-cross. 2. It has been shewd (sect. II.) that the rectitude of our actions and way to happiness are coincident; and that such acts, as are disagreeable to *truth*, and wrong in themselves, tend to make men ultimately *unhappy*. Things are so orderd and disposed by the Author of nature, or such a constitution of things flows from him, that it *must* be so. And since no *retreat* can be impervious to his eye, no *corner* so much out of the way, as not to be within his plan, no doubt there is to every wrong and *vitious* act a suitable degree of unhappiness and *punishment* annext, which the criminal will be sure to meet with *some time or other*. For his own sake therefore he ought not to depend upon the darkness of the deed. But *lastly*, it can hardly be, but that it must be *discovered*. People generally *rise* in vice, grow impudent and vain and careless, and discover themselves: the opportunities contrived for it must be liable to *observation*: some *confidants* must be trusted, who may betray the secret, and upon any little distaste probably *will* do it: and beside, *love* is quick of apprehension.

It will be easily perceived from what has been said, that if to *murder*, *rob*, &c. are unjust and crimes of a heinous nature, all those things which have any *tendency* toward them, or *affinity* with them, or any way *countenance* them, must be in their degree criminal: because they are of the same complexion with that which they tend to, tho not of the same growth, nor matured into the gross act, or perhaps do not operate so presently, apparently, or certainly. *Envy*, *malice*, and the like, are *conatus*'s toward the destruction or ruin of the person, who is the object of these unhappy passions. To *throw dust* upon a man's reputation by *innuendo*'s, ironies, &c. may not indeed fully it all at once, as when *dirt* is thrown, or *gross* calumnies; yet it infects the air, and may destroy it by a lingering poison. To *expose* another by the strength of a jesting talent, or harder temper of face, is to wound him, though it be in an *invisible*

*Nemo malus felix: minimè corruptor, &c. Juv.*

*Ἀναπόδρασθαι ὅτι ὁ θῆται νόμον. Plot.*

*Καὶ ὅτι ἂν παρκαυτικά κρύβης, ὕστερον ὀφθήσῃ. Isocr. Μαρτυρήσασιν — ἡ κλίνη καὶ ὁ λύχνος ὁ Μεγαπέδης. Luc.*

*Ἦδον μιν ὅτι ἀπάντων ἀλαζονέστατοι. Plato.*

*Quid non sentit amor? Ov.*

*Ἀγαθὸν ἔστι τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴδὲ ἐδίδειν. A gnōme of Democrates.*

*אבנך לשון הרע.*



place<sup>a</sup>. Many freedoms and reputed civilities of barbarian extract, and especially gallantries<sup>b</sup>, that proceed not to consummate wickedness, nor perhaps are intended to be carried so far, may yet divert peoples affections from their proper object, and debauch the mind<sup>c</sup>. By stories or insinuations to sow the seeds of discord and quarrels between men is to murder, or hurt them, by another hand. Even for men to intermeddle in other peoples affairs, as busy bodies and ἀλλοτριω-  
πίστοι do, is to assume a province, which is not theirs; to concern themselves with things, in which they are not concernd; to make that public, which in itself is private; and perhaps to rob the person, into whose business they intrude themselves, of his quiet, if of nothing else. For indeed this intermeddling looks like setting up a pretence to something further; like an unjust attack begun at a distance. All which declares what an enemy, and how irreconcilable to truth, this pragmatistical humor is. And so on.

If these things are so, how guilty must they be, who are designedly the promoters or instruments of injustice and wickedness; such as mercenary swearers, and false witnesses; traders in scandal; solicitors in vice; they who intend by their conversation to relax mens principles too much, and (as it seems) prepare them for knavery, lewdness, or any flagitious enterprize<sup>d</sup>.

There are other crimes, such as infidelity to friends or them who intrust us with any thing, ingratitude, all kinds of wilful perjury, and the like, which might have been mentiond in the proposition, being great instances of injustice: but because they are visibly such, and their nature cannot be mistaken, I comprise them in the *et.cet.* there. Any one may see, that he, who acts unfaithfully, acts against his promises and engagements, and therefore denies and sins against truth; does what it can never be for the good of the world should become an universal practice; does what he would not have done to himself; and wrongs the man, who depends upon him, of what he justly might expect. So the ungrateful man treats his benefactor as not being what he is, &c. And the false-swearer respects neither things, nor himself, nor the persons affected, nor mankind in general, nor God himself as being what they are. All this is obvious<sup>e</sup>.

• המלבין פני חבירו ברבים אין לו חלק לעה"ב. Main. & sim. pass. For, according to the Jewish doctors, he who does this breaks the sixth commandment. Abarb.

<sup>b</sup> See how chaste the Romans were once. Quo matronale decus verecundia munimento tutius esset, in jus vocanti matronam corpus ejus attingere non permiserunt, ut inviolata manus aliena tactu sola relinqueretur. Val. M.

And it is told of P. Manius, that trifli exemplo precepit [filia sua], ut non solum virginitatem illibatam, sed etiam oscula ad virum sincera perferret. Id.

<sup>c</sup> Quanto autem prastantior est animus corpore, tanto sceleratius corrumpitur. S. Aust.

<sup>d</sup> Ουτοι εισιν οι λοιμοι οι το ιδιον κακον επι παντας αγγιν φιλονικηντες, κλ. S. Bas.

<sup>e</sup> Omnes enim immemorem beneficii oderunt. Cic. And the same may be said of the unfaithful, perjured, &c.

SECT.

a/ He that puts his companion to shame in public, shall have a portion in his next  
d/ These are the pestilent fellows who labour to persuade every body to be guilty of some crime with themselves. S. Bas.

SECT. VII. Truths respecting particular Societies  
of Men, or Governments.

I. **M**AN is a social creature: that is, a single man, or family, cannot subsist, or not well, alone out of all society. More things are necessary to sustain life, or at least to make it in any degree pleasant and desirable, than it is possible for any one man to make and provide for himself merely by his own labor and ingenuity. Meat, and drink, and clothing, and house, and that frugal furniture which is absolutely requisite, with a little necessary physic, suppose many arts and trades, many heads, and many hands. If he could make a shift in time of health to live as a wild man under the protection of trees and rocks, feeding upon such fruits, herbs, roots, and other things, as the earth should afford, and happen to present to him; yet what could he do in sickness, or old age, when he would not be able to stir out, or receive her beneficence.

If he should take from the *other sex* such a help, as the common appetite might prompt him to seek, or he might happen to meet with in his walks; yet still if the *hands* are doubled, the *wants* are doubled too: nay more, additional wants, and great ones, attending the *bearing* and *education* of children.

If we could suppose all these difficulties surmounted, and a family grown up, and doing what a *single* family is capable of doing by it self; supporting themselves by gardening, a little agriculture, or a few cattle, which they have some how got, and tamed (tho even this would be hard for them to do, having no markets, where they might exchange the produce of their husbandry, or of their little flock, or herd for other things; no shops to repair to for tools; no servant, or laborer to assist; nor any public invention, of which they might serve themselves in the preparation of their grain, dressing their meat, manufacturing their wool, and the like); yet still it is only the *cortex* of the man, which is provided for: what must become of the interior part, the *minds* of these people? How would those be fed, and improved<sup>a</sup>? *Arts* and *sciences*, so much of them as is necessary to teach men the use of their faculties, and unfold their reason, are not the growth of single families so imployd. And yet for men to lay out

<sup>a</sup> Quid ergo, anima nullane habet alimenta propria? an ejus esca scientia nobis videtur? S. Aust.



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all their pains and time in procuring only what is proper to keep the blood and humors in *circulation*, without any further views, or any regard to the nobler part of themselves, is utterly incongruous to the idea of a being formed for *rational* exercises.

If all the *exceptions* against this separate way of living could be removed; yet as mankind increases, the *little plots*, which the several families possess, and cultivate, must be enlarged, or multiplied: by degrees they would find themselves straitened: and there would soon be a *collision* of interests, from whence disputes and quarrels would ensue. Other things too might minister matter for these. And beside all this, some men are *naturally* troublesome, vicious, thievish, pugnacious, rabid; and these would always be disturbing and flying upon the next to them: as others are ambitious, or covetous, and, if they happen to have any advantage or superiority in power, would not fail to make themselves yet greater or stronger by eating up their neighbours, till by repeated incroachments they might grow to be *formidable* <sup>a</sup>.

Under so many *wants*, and such *apprehensions*, or *present dangers*, necessity would bring some families into terms of *friendship* with others for mutual comfort and defence: and this, as the reason of it increased, would become stronger, introduce stricter engagements, and *at last* bring the people to mix and unite. And then the weak being glad to shelter themselves under the protection and conduct of the more able, and so naturally giving way for these to ascend, the several sorts would at length *settle* into their places, according to their several weights and capacities with respect to the common concern. And thus some form of a *society* must arise: men cannot subsist otherwise.

But if it was possible for a man to preserve life by *himself*, or with his *petit* company about him: yet no body can deny, that it would be infinitely *better* for him, and them, to live in a society, where men are serviceable to themselves and their neighbours at the same time, by *exchanging* their money, or goods, for such other things as they want more; where they are capable of doing *good offices* each for other in time of need; where they have the *protection* of laws, and a public security against cheats, robbers, assassines, and all enemies to property; where a common force or *army* is ready to interpose between them and foreign invaders; and where they may enjoy those *discoveries* which have been made in arts and learning, may improve their faculties by *conversation* and innocent conflicts of reason, and (to speak out) may be made *men*.

<sup>a</sup> *Alter in alterius exitium levi compendio ducitur. Sen. in the shortest way.*

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If, when we have the *privilege* of society and laws, we can scarce preserve our own, or be safe, what a woful condition should we be in *without them*; exposed to the insults, rapines, and violence of unjust and merciless men, not having any *sanctuary*, any thing to take refuge in? So again, if notwithstanding the help of *friends* and those about us, and such conveniences as may be had in cities and peopled places, we are forced to bear many pains and melancholy hours, how *irksome* would life be, if in sickness or other trouble there was no body to administer either *remedy* or *consolation*?

Lastly, society is what men generally *desire*. And tho *much* company may be attended with much vanity, and occasion many evils<sup>a</sup> yet it is certain, that absolute and perpetual *solitude* has something in it very irksome and hideous<sup>b</sup>. Thus <sup>c</sup> the social life is *natural* to man; or, what his nature and circumstances require.

II. *The end of society is the common welfare and good of the people associated.* This is but the consequence of what has been just said. For because men cannot subsist *well*, or not *so well*, separately, therefore they unite into greater bodies: that is, the *end* of their uniting is their better subsistence; and by how much their manner of living becomes better, by so much the more effectually is this *end* answerd.

III. *A society, into which men enter for this end, supposes some rules or laws, according to which they agree all to be governed, with a power of altering or adding to them as occasion shall require.* A number of men met together without any rules, by which they submit to be governed, can be nothing but an *irregular* multitude. Every one being still *sui juris*, and left intirely to his own private choice, by whatever kind of judgment or passion or caprice that happens to be determind, they must needs *interfere* one with another: nor can such a concurrence of people be any thing different from an indigested *chaos* of dissenting parts, which by their *confused* motions would damnify, and destroy each other. This must be true, if men *differ* in the size of their understandings, in their manner of thinking, and the several turns their minds take from their education, way of living, and other circumstances; if the greatest part of them are under the direction of *bodily affections*; and if these *differ* as much as their shapes, their complexions, their constitutions do<sup>c</sup>. Here then we find nothing but *confusion* and *unhappiness*.

<sup>a</sup> Aristotle says a good man would be neither φιλος, nor πολυφιλος. This is just. Therefore Seneca seems to go a little too far, when he writes, *Omnes amicos habere operosum esse, satis esse inimicos non habere.*

<sup>b</sup> Ζῶον συναγελαστικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος. S. Bas.

<sup>c</sup> Man is, in Greg. Naz.'s

words, τὸ πολυτροπάτατον ἢ ζῶον, καὶ ποικιλώτατον.

Such

6/ M is a Sociable Creature? - One who loves to turn his Thoughts to Variety of Things, & to employ Time in diff. Ways

requires great Pains



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Such a combination of men therefore, as may produce their *common good* and *happiness*, must be such a one as in the first place, may render them *compatible* one with another: which cannot be without *rules*, that may direct and adjust their several motions and carriages towards each other, bring them to some degree of *uniformity*, or at least restrain such *excursions* and *enormities*, as would render their living together inconsistent.

Then, there must be some express declarations and *scita* to *ascertain* properties and titles to things by common consent: that so, when any altercations or disputes shall happen concerning them (as be sure many must in a world so unreasonable and prone to iniquity), the appeal may be made to their *own settlements*; and by the application of a *general undisputed rule* to the *particular* case before them it may appear, on *which side* the obliquity lies, the controversy may be *fairly* decided, and all mouths eternally stopped. And then again, that they may be protected and persevere in this agreeable life, and the enjoyment of their respective properties be *secured* to them, several things must be forecasted by way of precaution against foreign *invasions*; punishments must be appointed for *offences* committed amongst themselves, which being known may deter men from committing them, &c. These rules, methods, and appointments of punishments, being intelligibly and honestly drawn up, agreed to, and published, are the *mutual* compacts<sup>a</sup> under which the society is confederated, and the *laws* of it.

If then to have the members of a society capable of subsisting *together*, if to have their respective properties *ascertaind*, if to be *safe* and *quiet* in the possession of them be for the *general good* of the society, and these things cannot be had without *laws*; then a society, whose foundation and cement is the public good, must have such *laws*, or be supposed at least to design such.

As to the making of any *further* laws, when the public interest and welfare require them, that is but repeating the *same power* in other instances, which they made use of before in making their first laws: and as to *altering* or *repealing*, it is certain the power of making and unmaking here are *equal*. Beside, when men are incorporated and live together for their mutual good, this *end* is to be considered at *one* time as much as at *another*; not only in their first constitution and settlement.

IV. *These laws and determinations must be such, as are not inconsistent with natural justice.* For 1. To ordain any thing that interferes with truth is the same as to ordain, that what is *true* shall be *false*; or *v. v<sup>b</sup>* which is absurd. 2. To pretend by a law to make that to be *just*, which before and in itself was *unjust*, is the same as to ordain that which interferes with truth: because justice is founded in

<sup>a</sup> Πᾶς ἐστὶ νόμος — πόλιως συνθήκη κοινή. Demosth.

<sup>b</sup> Νόμος ἐστὶ τὸ ὅτι ἐνυστερίαι. Stob. à Plat.

a/ Every Law is genl Compact of society

b/ The law is finding out & specifying that which really is

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truth (as before), and every where the same <sup>a</sup>. Therefore, 3. by a law to enact any thing which is *naturally* unjust is to enact that which is absurd; that which by sect. I. is morally evil; and that which is opposite to *those laws*, by which it is manifestly the will of our Creator we should be governed <sup>b</sup>. And to enact what is thus evil must be *evil indeed*. Lastly, to establish injustice must be utterly *inconsistent* with the general good and happiness of any society; unless to be unjustly treated, pillaged, and abused can be happiness <sup>c</sup>. And if so, it is utterly inconsistent with the *end* of society; or, it is to deny that to be the end of it, which is the end of it.

V. *A society limited by laws supposes magistrates, and a subordination of powers: that is, it supposes a government of some form or other.* Because, where men are to act by rules or laws for the public weal, some must of necessity be appointed to judge, when those laws are transgressed, and how far; to *decide* doubtful cases, and the like: there must be some armed with authority to *execute* those judgments, and to *punish* offenders: there must be persons chosen not only to punish and *prevent* public evils, but also to do many other things, which will be required in *advancement* of the public good: and then the power of making *new laws*, and abrogating or mending *old ones*, as experience may direct or the case at any time require, as also of providing presently and legally for the safety of the public in time of *sudden danger*, must be lodged somewhere.

If there are no *executors* of the laws, the laws cannot be executed: and if so, they are but a dead letter, and equal to *none*: and if the society has none, it is indeed *no society*, or not such a one as is the subject of this proposition. Guardians and executors of laws are therefore the *vitals* of a society, without which there can be no *circulation* of justice in it, no care of it taken, nor can it continue. And since men can be but in one place at once, there must be *numbers* of these proportionable to the bigness and extent of it.

*\* Justice is founded in Nature, is unalterable, & is equally in Force every where, in the same Manner as the Fire burns*

*Δίκαιον φύσει, ἀκίνητον, καὶ πανταχῇ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν ὥσπερ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Πέργῃ καὶ ἄλλῃ.* Arist.

*ἅπαντα καὶ σφαλὴ θεῶν νόμιμα,* which mortals ought not to transgress: *ὃ γὰρ τι νῦν γιγνέσθαι ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ποτε ζῆν ταῦτα.* Soph. Nec si regnante Tarquinio nulla erat Roma scripta lex de stupris, idcirco non contra—*legem sempiternam* Sex. Tarquinius vim Lucretia—attulit. Erat enim ratio perfecta à rerum natura, & ad rectè faciendum impellens, & à delicto advocans: qua non tum denique incipit lex esse, cum scripta est, sed tum cum orta est. Orta autem simul est cum mente divina. Cic.

*c* Si tanta potestas est stultorum sententiis atque iussis, ut eorum suffragiis rerum natura vertatur; cur non sanciant, ut, qua mala perniciosaque sunt, habeantur pro bonis, ac salutaribus? aut cur, cum jure ex injuria lex facere possit, bonum eadem facere non possit ex malo? Cic.

*That above all Human "Edicts" there were V Unwritten Unalterable Laws of God, which Mortals ought not to transgress, but they are in Force, not only for a Day or two, but for ever.*



And further, since the concerns of a whole society, and such things as may fall within the compass of a statute book, are *various*, requiring several sorts and sizes of *abilities*, and lying one *above* another in nature; since not only private men want to be *inspected*, but even magistrates and officers themselves, who (tho they oft forget it) are still *but men*; and since the whole society is to be *one*, one compact body: I say, since the case is thus, there must be men to act in several elevations and qualities as well as *places*, of which the *inferior* sort in their several quarters must act immediately under their respective *superiors*; and so this class of superiors in their several provinces under *others above them*; till at last the ascent is terminated in some *head*, where the legislative power is deposited, and from whence spirits and motion are communicated through the whole body. An *army* may as well be supposed to be well disciplined, well provided, and well conducted without either *general* or *officers*, as a society without *governors* and their *subalterns*, or (which is the same) without *some form* of government, to answer the end of its being.

VI. *A man may part with some of his natural rights, and put himself under the government of laws, and those, who in their several stations are intrusted with the execution of them, in order to gain the protection of them, and the privileges of a regular society.* Because by this he doth but exchange one thing for another, which he reckons *equivalent*, or indeed *preferable* by much: and this he may do without acting against *any truth*. For the liberties and natural rights, which he exchanges, are *his own*, and therefore no other man's property is *denied* by this: nor is the nature of happiness *denied* to be what it is, since it is happiness which he *aims at* in doing this. On the contrary, he would rather offend against *truth*, and deny *happiness* to be what it is, if he did not do it; especially seeing, that here his *own* happiness coincides with the *general* happiness and more convenient being of the kingdom or commonwealth, where his *lot* falls, or his *choice* determines him to live.

If the question should be asked, *what* natural rights a man may part with, or *how far* he may part with them; the *general* answer, I think, may be this. Some things are *essential* to our being, and some it is *not in our power* to part with. As to the *rest*, he may depart from them so far as it is consistent with the *end*, for which he does this: not further, because beyond that lies a contradiction. A man cannot *give away* the natural right and property he has in any thing, in order to *preserve* or *retain* that property: but he may consent to contribute *part* of his estate, in order to preserve the *rest*, when otherwise it might *all* be lost; to take his *share* of danger in defence of his country, rather than *certainly* perish, be enslaved, or ruined by the conquest or oppression of it; and the like.

VII. Men may become members of a society (*i. e. do what is mentiond in the foregoing proposition*) by giving their consent, either explicitly, or implicitly. That a man may subject himself to laws, we have seen. If he does this, he must do it either in *his own person*; or he must do it by some *proxy*, whom he substitutes in his room to agree to public laws; or his consent must be *collected* only from the conformity of his carriage, his adhering to the society, accepting the benefits of its constitution, and acquiescing in the establisht methods and what is done by virtue of them. By the *two first* ways he declares himself *explicitly*, and *directly*: nor can he after that behave himself as if he was no member of the society, without acting as if he had *not done* what he *has done*. And this is the case not only of them, who have been concerned in the *first formation* of any government, but also of them, who have in the said manners <sup>a</sup> given their consent to any *subsequent* acts, by which they ownd, confirmed, and came into what their ancestors had done, or who have by *oaths* put themselves under obligations to the public. By the *last* of the three ways mentiond a man's consent is given indeed *implicitly*, and less directly; but yet it is given, and he becomes a party. For suppose him to be *born* in some certain kingdom or commonwealth, but never to have been *party* to any law, never to have taken any *oath* to the government, nor ever formally to have ingaged himself by any *other act*. In this case he cannot methinks but have some *love* and *sympathy* for that place, which afforded him the first air he drew; some *gratitude* towards that constitution, which protected his parents, while they educated and provided for him; some *regard* to those obligations, under which perhaps they have laid him, and with which limitations as it were they (or rather the Governor of the world by them) conveyd to him his very life.

If he *inherits* or takes any thing by the laws of the place, to which he has no indefeasible right in nature, or which, if he had a natural right to it, he could not tell how to *get*, or *keep*, without the aid of laws and advantage of society; then, when he takes this inheritance, or whatever it is, *with* it he takes and owns the *laws* which give it him.

Indeed since the *security* he has from the laws of the country in respect of his person, and rights, whatever they either are, or may happen to be hereafter, is the general *equivalent* for his *submission* to them, he cannot accept *that* without being obliged in equity to pay *this*.

<sup>a</sup> In person, or by proxy.



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Nay, lastly, his very *continuing* and *settling* in any place shews, that either he *likes* the constitution, or likes it *better* than any other, or at least thinks it better in *his circumstances* to conform to it than to seek any other: that is, he consents to be comprehended in it <sup>a</sup>.

VIII. *When a man is become a member of a society, if he would behave himself according to truth, he ought to do these things: viz. to consider property as founded not only in nature, but also in law; and men's titles to what they have, as strengthend by that, and even by his own concession and covenants; and therefore by so much the more inviolable and sacred: instead of taking such measures to do himself right, when he is molested, or injured, as his own prudence might suggest in a state of nature, to confine himself to such ways as are with his own consent marked out for him: and, in a word, to behave himself according to his subordination or place in the community, and to observe the laws of it. For it is contained in the idea of a law, that it is intended to be observed: and therefore he, who is a party to any laws, or professes himself member of a society formed upon laws, cannot willingly transgress those laws without denying laws to be what they are, or himself to be what he is supposed or professes himself to be: and indeed without contradicting all or most of those truths contained in the foregoing propositions.*

IX. *In respect of those things, which the laws of the place take no cognizance of, or when if they do take cognizance of them, the benefit of those laws cannot be had (for so it may sometimes happen. I say, in respect of such things), he who is a member of a society in other respects retains his natural liberty, is still as it were in a state of nature, and must endeavour to act according to truth and his best prudence. For in the former case there is nothing to limit him, by the supposition, but truth and nature. And in the other it is the same as if there was nothing; since in effect there is no law, where no effect or benefit from it is to be had. As, for example, if a man should be attacked by thieves or murderers, and has no opportunity or power to call the proper magistrate or officer to his assistance.*

There is a *third* case, which perhaps may demand admission here: and that is, when laws are plainly contrary to *truth* and *natural justice*. For tho they may pass the usual forms, and be styled laws; yet, since no such law can abrogate that law of nature and reason, to which the Author of our being hath subjected us, or make falsehood to be truth; and two inconsistent laws cannot

<sup>a</sup> Plato says, when any man has seen our form of government, &c. and remains under it, ἢ δὴ φά-  
μαι τῆτον ἀμολογῆναι ἕρως αὐτοῦ. That then we say, such an one does indeed agree with it.  
I both

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both oblige, or subsist together; one of them must give way: and it is easy to discern, *which* ought to do it <sup>a</sup>.

There remains one *truth* more to be annexed here, which may be contradicted by the practices and pretences of Enthusiasts <sup>b</sup>.

X. *The societies intended in this section, such as kingdoms and commonwealths, may defend themselves against other nations: or, war may lawfully be waged in defence and for the security of a society, its members and territories, or for reparation of injuries.* For if one man may in a state of nature have a right to defend himself, (see sect. VI. prop. VII.), two may, or three, and so on. Nay, perhaps two may have a double right, three a threefold right, &c. At least, if the *right* be not greater, the *concern* is greater: and there will be more reason, that two, or three, or more should be *saved*, than one only; and therefore that two, or three, or more should *defend* themselves, than that one should. And if this may be done by men in a state of nature, it may be done by them when confederated among themselves: because with respect to other nations they are still in *that state*. I mean, so far as they have not limited themselves by *leagues* and *alliances*.

Beside, if a man may defend himself, he may defend himself by what *methods* he thinks most *proper*, provided he trespasses against no truth; and therefore, by getting the *aid* and assistance of others. Now when *war* is levied in defence of the public, and the people in general, the thing may be considered as if *every particular man* was defending himself with the assistance of *all the rest*, and so be turned into the same case with that of a *single man*.

In truth the condition of a nation seems to be much the same with that of a *single person* when there is no law, or no benefit of law, to be had: and what one man may do to another in *that position*, may be done by one nation or politic body with respect to another: and perhaps by this rule, regard being had to what has been deliverd in sect. VI. the *justice* of foreign wars may be not untruly estimated.

*Mutual defence* is one of the great ends of society, if not the greatest, and in a particular and eminent manner involves in it defence against *foreign enemies*. And whoever signalizes himself, when there is occasion for his service, merits the grateful acknowledgements and celebrations of his country-men: so far at least as he acts generously and with a *public spirit*, and not in pursuance only of *private views*.

<sup>a</sup> Illud stultissimum, existimare omnia iusta esse, quae scita sint in populorum institutis, aut legibus.— Si populorum iussis, si principum decretis, si sententiis iudicum, jura constituerentur, jus esset latrocinari: jus, adulterare: jus, testamenta falsa supponere, si hac suffragiis aut scitis multitudinis probarentur. Cic.

<sup>b</sup> Manicheans of old, and some moderns.



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As to those wars, which are undertaken by men out of ambition <sup>a</sup>, merely to enlarge empire, or to shew the world, how terrible they are, how many men they are able to slay, how many slaves to make <sup>b</sup>, how many families to drive from their peaceful habitations, and, in short, how much mischief and misery they are able to bring upon mankind; these are founded upon false notions of glory: *imbellishd* indeed by servile wits and misplaced eloquence, but *condemned* by all true philosophy and religion.

## SECT. VIII. Truths concerning Families and Relations.

THIS section shall begin as relation itself does, with marriage.

I. The end of marriage is the propagation of mankind, and joint happiness of the couple intermarrying, taken together; or the latter by itself<sup>c</sup>. The difference of the sexes, with the strong inclination they have each to the enjoyment of the other<sup>d</sup>, is plainly ordaind by the author of nature for the continuance of the species, which without that must be soon extinguishd. And tho people, when they marry, may have many times not so much the increase of their family in their design or wishes, as the gratification of an importunate appetite; yet since nature excites the appetite, and that tends to this end, nature (or rather its great Author) may be said to make this an end of the marriage, tho the bridegroom and bride themselves do not.

Like those particularly of J. Caesar: of whom it is reported, that, *animadversâ apud Herculis templum magni Alexandri imagine, ingemuit; quasi pertasus ignaviam suam, quod nihil dum à se memorabile actum esset in atate quâ jam Alexander orbem terrarum subegisset.* Suet.

<sup>b</sup> Some go to war *ὡς περ ἐπὶ θύγων ἐ κωηγεσίαν ἀνδρῶπαν.* Plut. Not out of necessity, and in order to peace; which is the true end of war. *Πολεμῶμεν, ἵνα εἰρήνην ᾤγαμον.* Arist. *Ita bellum suscipiatur, ut nihil aliud quàm pax quaesita videntur.* Cic.

<sup>c</sup> *Οἱ ἀνδρες ποὶ ἔ μόνον τὸ τεκνοποιῆσαι χάριν σπουδῆς, ἀλλὰ ἔ τῷ εἰς τὸν βίον, κλ.* Arist.

<sup>d</sup> *Ἄνδρι τῷ γυναικὶ φιλία δοκεῖ κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχειν. ἀνδρῶπῳ ᾧ τῇ φύσει συνδυασικὸν μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτικόν.* Id. *Ὡς ᾧ ἡ μαχητὶς λίσσῃ — πρὸς ἑαυτὴν τὸ σιδηρὸν ἔλκει. ἔτω τὸ ἔ θήλειῳ σῶμα — τὸ ἔ ἀρρενῶ σῶμα πρὸς τὴν μίξιν ἔλκει.* E. Baf.

E/ Some go to war to hunt down & worry M — "We go to war that we may procure Peace

C/ M do not marry for sake of children only, but for all & other purposes of life.

d/ It is natural for a M to love a Woman, for M is as much made for Society of a Woman, as for Society of M.

And  
Nor as the Load Stone draws Iron, so Woman attracts M to unite with her.

And then as to that other thing, which either accompanies the aforesaid end of marriage, or is (as in many cases it can only be) the *end itself*<sup>a</sup>, the joint happiness of the *conjuges*, no body can be supposed to marry in order and on set purpose to make him or herself *unhappy*: no nor without a presumption of being *more happy*. For without an apprehension of some *degree* of happiness to accrue, or what presents itself to the imagination as such, and is taken for such, what can induce people to alter their condition? Something there must be, by which (however things prove upon trial) they *think* to better it. And indeed if their *circumstances* are such, as may inable them to maintain a family, and provide for children, without difficulties and an over-burden of cares, and if they in *good earnest* resolve to behave themselves as they ought, and *reciprocally* to be helpful and loving each to other, *much* comfort and happiness<sup>b</sup> may justly be expected from this intimate union<sup>c</sup>, the interchange of affections, and a conspiracy of all their counsels and measures<sup>d</sup>, the qualities and abilities of the one sex being fitted and as it were tallying to the wants of the other. For to pass over in silence those joys, which are truest when most conceal'd<sup>e</sup>, many things there are, which may be useful, perhaps necessary to the *man*, and yet require the delicates hand or nicer management and genius of the *woman*<sup>f</sup>: and so, *vicissim*,

*I have no familiarity with a woman, without wishing for success of it. — This is an affirmative Reciprocal part of a Husband is Incapable of Anger*

That sure is a hard law in Plato, which enjoins ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὰς θηλείας πάσης, ἐν ᾗ μὴ βούλοιο ἐν σοὶ φέρεσθαι τὸ σπασίν. That mention'd in S. Hhared. says otherwise: מ"ע לקיים מצותו עונתו וכו' כשאשתו מעוברת וכו'. Many opinions are taken up upon slight reasons. When Ocellus Lucanus says, 'Αὐτὰς τὰς δυνάμεις, ἃ τὰ ὄργανα, καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς τὰς πρὸς τὴν μίξιν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ δεδομένας ἀνδράποισ, ἔχοντες ἐνέκα τοῦ ἀνδρὸς συμβεβηκεν, ἀλλὰ τῆς εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον διαμοῦν τῶ γυναι, how doth he know that they were not given for both these ends, in a regular way? And so when Clemens Alex. shews his zeal against τὰς ἀκατέργους σποράς, τὴν πρὸς τὰς ἐγκύους οὐμίαν, &c. adding, ψιλὴ γὰρ ἡ δόξα, καὶ ἐν γάμῳ παραληφθῆ, παράνομός ἐστι, κλ. he does this because ὁ Μωσῆς ἀπάγει τὰν ἐγκύων τὰς ἀνδρας; and then cites a text to prove this, which is nothing to the purpose, nor I believe any where to be found: Οὐκ ἔδοξαι τὴ λαγών, ἐδὲ τὴν ὕαναν. (Quem interpretem secutus sit Clemens nescio. Gent. Herv.) Certainly the Jews understand their lawgiver otherwise. See how that mentioned in the law is explained by Maim. in hilk. ish. Nor are the suffrages of Christians wanting. Deus, cum ceteras animantes, suscepto fecti, maribus repugnare voluisset, solam omnium mulierem patientem viri fecit; — ne feminis repugnantibus, libido cogeret viros aliud appetere, &c. that is, that the man and wife might be kept inseparably together. Last.

<sup>b</sup> Καὶ τὸ χεῖρισμον εἶναι δοκίμ, καὶ τὸ ἔδδ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ. Arist. <sup>c</sup> Ἐγὼς — καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ζῶν <sup>d</sup> True love is to be found in marriage, or no where. <sup>e</sup> Quod facere turpe non est modò occultà, id dicere obscenum est. Cic. <sup>f</sup> Ἐὰν γὰρ ἡ κοσμία καὶ ἐπιεικής, ἡ μόνον τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς κοινωνίας παραμυθίαν παρῇ τῷ ἀνδρὶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀλλοῖς ἀπασι πολλὴν τῆς αὐτῆς χεῖρας ἐπιδείξεται, κλ. S. Chrysf.

<sup>a</sup> Ocellus Lucanus says "That Powers, & Organs, & Desire of Procreation, were given by God not for sake of Pleasure but for perpetual Continuation of Mankind" How doth He know? They were not given for both these Ends. —

<sup>b</sup> There seems to be both profit & pleasure in this sort of Friends — w<sup>ch</sup> me & wife behave themselves towards each other as they ought, They are then most intimately united — Love — is like two Parts of same living Creature united into One. <sup>c</sup> No real Love in Whoring; Nothing but ensnaring One another — They discover their Nakedness, but hide their real Sentiments. <sup>d</sup> For if she be neat & good-natured, she will not only in general be a comfort to her Husband, but will be very useful to him in every particular. Chrysf.



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the woman cannot but want many things, which require the more robust and active powers or greater capacity of the man<sup>a</sup>. Thus, in lower life, whilst the wheel, the needle, &c. employ her, the plough or some trade perhaps demands the muscles and hardiness of him: and, more generally, if she inspects domestic affairs, and takes care, that every thing be provided regularly, spent frugally, and enjoyd with neatness and advantage, he is busied in that profession, or the oversight and improvement of that estate, which must sustain the charge of all this; he presides, and directs in matters of greater moment; preserves order in the family by a gentle and prudent government, &c.<sup>b</sup>

As then I founded the greater societies of men upon the mutual convenience, which attends their living regularly together; so may I found this less, but stricter alliance between the man and the woman in their joint-happiness<sup>c</sup>. Nature has a further aim, the preservation of the kind.

II. That marriages are made by some solemn contract, vow, or oath (and these perhaps attended with some pledge, or nuptial rites)<sup>d</sup>, by which the parties mutually ingage to

a/ Their Business is diff<sup>t</sup>, there is one sort of Employ<sup>t</sup> for M, & another for Woman; so that they are assist<sup>d</sup> to each other by joining their forces.

Διγέται τὰ ἔργα, καὶ ἑστὶν ἕτερον ἀνδρὸς, ἔτι γυναικὸς. ἐπαχύνει ἑν ἀλλήλοις εἰς τὸ κοινὸν ταῖς τέχαις τὰ ἴδια. Arist.

<sup>b</sup> See the conversation between Ischemachus and his wife in Xenophon. <sup>c</sup> Tho Plato (like most of the old Greeks and Romans) among many very fine things hath now and then some that are weak, and even absurd; yet I cannot think, that by his community of women he meant any thing like that, which is said, ap. Athen. to have been practis'd παρὰ Τυρρηνοῖς ἐκείνῳ τρυφῆσαν; or that his thought could be so gross, as Lactantius represents it: - Sci'cet ut ad eandem mulierem multi viri, tanquam canes, confluerent. For thus, property being taken out of the world, a great part of virtue is extinguish'd, and all industry and improvements are at an end. And beside that, many of the most substantial comforts and innocent delights of this life are destroy'd at once. Si omnes omnium fuerint & mariti, & patres, & uxores, & liberi, qua ista confusio generis humani est? — Quis aut vir mulierem, aut mulier virum diligit, nisi habitaverint semper unà? nisi devota mens, & servata invicem fides individuum fecerit caritatem, &c. Id. However it must be confess'd, that Plato has advanced more than was consistent with his own gravity, or with nature. The best excuse to be made for him, that I know of, is that in Athenaus, "Εοικα ὁ Πλάτων μὴ τοῖς ἔστιν ἀνδράσι: ἡρώδης τὸς νόμους, ἀλλὰ τὰς ὑπ' αὐτῶν διαπλετομένους: or perhaps to say, that he was so intent upon strengthening and defending his common-wealth, that he forgot, if men must live after his manner, there would be little in it worth defending. After all, his meaning to me is not perfectly clear.

<sup>d</sup> Every one knows how marriages were made among the Romans, *confarreatio*, *coemptio*, *usu*: of which ways the two former were attended with many ceremonies: and the *legitima tabella* or at least consent of friends (which could not be given without some solemnity) preceded all, *auspicia* were usually taken, public notaries and witnesses assisted, &c. Among the Greeks men and women were espoused by mutual promises of fidelity: beside which there were witnesses, and dotal writings (τερονόμια);

y Plato seems to have made for such M as now are, but own imagination.

exactly delineated

his laws for M of the

live together in love, and to be faithful, assisting, and the like, each to other, in all circumstances of health and fortune, till death parts them<sup>a</sup>, I take for granted. For all nations have some form or other upon these occasions: and even private contracts cannot be made without some words in which they are containd, nor perhaps without some kind of significant, tho private, ceremony between the lovers; which lose nothing of force with respect to them by their being both parties and witnesses themselves. Something must pass between them, that is declarative of their intentions, expresses their vows, and binds them each to the other. There is no coming together after the manner of man and wife upon any other foot.

III. That intimate union, by which the conjuges become possessors each of the other's person<sup>b</sup>, the mixture of their fortunes<sup>c</sup>, and the joint-relation they have to their children<sup>d</sup>, all strengthen the bonds and obligations of matrimony. By every act done in pursuance of a covenant, such as the matrimonial is, that covenant is own'd, ratified, and as it were made *de integro*, and repeted.

Possession is certainly more than nothing. When this therefore is added to a former title, the title must needs be corroborated.

When two persons throw their all into one stock as joint-traders for life, neither of them can consistently with truth and honesty take his share out and be gone (*i. e.* dissolve the partnership) without the concurrence of the other; and sometimes it may not be easy, perhaps possible, to do it at all. Each therefore is even by this bound, and becomes obnoxious to the other.

And as to the present case, if the marriage be not altogether unfruitful, since both the parents are immediately related to the same child, that child is the medium of a fixt, unalterable relation between them. For, being both of the same blood with

and they became one flesh, for it is the custom for men & women to come together, & that they be no more divided  
(*συνωμία*); at the wedding, sacrifices to Diana and other deities, and the *γαμήλιοι εὐχαὶ*; and after that, perhaps the being shut up together, eating the *κυδάνιον*, a formal *λόγος ζώνης*, &c. The *קדושין* of the Jews have been performed *בכסף*, or *בשטר*, or *בביאה*: the ceremonies accompanying which may be seen particularly in *Shulbb. ar.* with the additions of R. Mo. *Iserles* (*Eben ez.*) And (to pass by other nations) the form of solemnization of matrimony, and the manner, in which persons married give their troth each to other among us, are extant in our public offices: where they may be seen by such, as seem to have forgot what they are.

*Connubio stabili.* Virg.

*והיו לבשר אחד רכך ררכה לאת ייחרצ דכר ונוקבא בקירוב בשר—דלא יהא דבר חוצץ וכו'.*

In *Resh. bhokm.*

*Ἡ αὐτὴ χρημάτων κοινωνία προσήκει μάλιστα τοῖς γαμῶσι, εἰς μίαν ἔσσαν πάντα καταχευόμενοι καὶ ἀναμύζαντες, μὴ τὸ μίεσθαι ἴδιον, καὶ τὸ μίεσθαι ἀλλότριον, ἀλλὰ πᾶν ἴδιον ἔχειν.*

*Ἄρα, καὶ μὴδὲν ἀλλότριον. Plut.*

*Ἡ σύνδεσμος τὰ τέκνα δοκεῖ εἶναι. Arist.*

belongs chiefly to married persons to mix their fortunes together, so as to have but one common stock.

the

children seem to be of Bond of Matrimony



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the child<sup>a</sup>, they themselves come to be of the *same blood*: and so that *relation* which at first was only moral and legal, becomes *natural*; a relation in nature, which can never cease, or be disannulled. It follows now that,

IV. Marrying, when there is little or no prospect of true happiness from the match<sup>b</sup>, and especially if there are plain presages of unhappiness; after marriage adultery; all kinds of infidelity; transferring that affection, which even under the decays of nature ought to preserve its vigor, and never to degenerate (at worst) but into a friendship of a superior kind<sup>c</sup>, and the like, are all wrong<sup>d</sup>. Because the first of these is belying ones own sense of things, and has an air of *distraction*; or however it is to act as if that was the *least* and most trifling of all transactions in life, which is certainly one of the *greatest* and most delicate. And to offend in any of the *other* ways is to behave, as if the *end* of marriage was not what it is; as if no such *league* had been made between the persons married, as has been made, *actually*, and *solemnly*, and is still *subsisting* between them; as if they were not *possest* each of the other; their *fortunes* not interwoven; nor their children so equally related to them, as they are; and therefore the misbehaviour, being repugnant to *truth*, is a sin against it, and the mighty Patron of it.

If the most *express* and *solemn* contracts, upon which persons, when they marry, do so far depend, as in confidence of their being *religiously* observed to *alter quite* their condition, begin a new *thred* of life, and *risque* all their fortune and happiness: I say, if such sacred compacts as *these* are allowd to be broken, there is an end of all *faith*; the obligation of *oaths* (not more binding than *marriage vows*) ceases; no *justice* can be administerd; and then what a *direful influence* must this have upon the affairs of mankind upon *that*, and other accounts<sup>e</sup>?

a/ Nature by means of our Bodies. It intermixes us, that what is produced becomes common to both being a Part of each when united together. b Socrates ab

In respect of which that in *Plutarch* particularly is true, ἡ φύσις μίγνυσι Δὲ τὰ σώματα ἡμῶν, ἢ ἐξ ἑκατέρων μίξεσθαι, καὶ τελέεσθαι, κοινὸν ἀμφοτέροις ἀπιδὼ τὸ γινώσκειν. *adolefcentem quodam consultus, uxorem duceret, an se omni matrimonio abstineret, respondit, Utrum eorum fecisset, acturum poenitentiam. Hic te, inquit, solitudo, hic orbitas, hic generis interitus, hic habitus alienus excipiet: illic perpetua sollicitudo, contextus querelarum,—incertus liberorum eventus.* Val.M.

c Χρόνῳ συνθείας ἐντελέσεις πάσθαι εὐσθάνεται τῷ λογισμῷ τὸ φίλεν καὶ τὸ ἀγαπᾶν ἐπιτείνονται. *Plut.*

d It is visible that *polygamy*, *pellicate*, &c. must be included here. They are not only inconsistent with our forms and the very letter of the marriage-contract, but with the *essence* of marriage, which lies in such a union and love as can *only* be between *two*. *Aristotle* doth not allow there can be even perfect *friendship* between more than two: much less therefore, perfect *love*. Πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλον, κατὰ τὴν τελείαν φιλίαν, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πολλῶν ἀγαπᾶν. *Eth.* "Ἐστὶ γὰρ φίλος ἕνα μόνον. *Ibid.*

e Facunda culpa sacula nuptias Primum inquinavere, & genus, & domos. Hōa fonte derivata clades In patriam, populumque fluxit. *Hor.*

Allowance,

c/ when by living a long while together their mutual Affection is established, we find that, what was at first a friendship is by Reason become Friendship & Love.

d — It is impossible to be a Friend to a great Many, I mean, to be in perfect Friendship with them, as it is impossible to have a love for a great Many at same time. Nor a Friend is a second Self.

*Allowance*, by sect. IV. ought to be made for inabilities, and involuntary failings. A person's age, health, estate, or other circumstances may be such, and without any fault, that he or she cannot do what they would; or perhaps instead of that one of them may come to want the *pity* and *assistance* of the other. In this case (which requires the philosophy and submission proper in afflictions) it is the duty of the one not only to *bear with*, but also to *comfort*, and do what may be done for the other. This is part of the happiness *proposed*, which consists not only in *positive* pleasures, but also in *lessening* pains and wants; whilst the pair have each in the other a refuge at hand.

N. I have designedly forbore to mention that *authority* of a husband over his wife, which is usually given to him, not only by private writers, but even by laws; because I think it has been carried *much too high*. I would have them live so far upon the *level*, as (according to my constant lesson) to be govern'd *both* by reason <sup>a</sup>. If the *man's* reason be stronger, or his knowledge and experience greater (as it is commonly supposed to be), the *woman* will be obliged upon that score to pay a *deference*, and submit to him <sup>b</sup>.

Having now consider'd the *man* and *woman* between themselves, I proceed in the order of nature to consider them as *parents*; and to see (in a few propositions following) how things will be carried between *them* and their *children*, as also between other *relations*, coming at first from the same bed, if *truth* and *matters of fact* (to be named, where the argument shall call for them) are not denied.

V. *Parents ought to educate their children, take the best care of them they can, endeavour to provide for them, and be always ready to assist them*. Because otherwise they do not carry themselves towards their children as being what they are, *children* and *theirs*: they do not do what they would desire to have done to *themselves*, were they again to pass through that feeble and tender state; or perhaps what has been done to them <sup>c</sup>: and beside, they transgress the *law* established by nature for the preservation of the race, which, as things are, could not without a parental care and affection be continued; a *law*, which is in force among all the other tribes of *animals*, so far as there is occasion for it.

\* Κρατὴν δὲ τὸ ἄνδρα τὸ γυναικὸς ἔχει ὡς δισπότιν κτήματι, ἀλλ' ὡς ψυχὴν σώματι, συμπαιδύοντα ἔνι συμπεφυκότα τῇ ἐνότητι. Plut. (A sentence, which deserves to be written in letters of gold.) Ὅπως σὺ Γαίῳ, ἐγὼ Γαίᾳ.—ὅπως σὺ κύριος καὶ οἰκοδισπότης, ἔγωγε κυρία καὶ οἰκοδισποινα. Ap. eund. <sup>b</sup> Καὶ φύσιν οἱ ἄρρενες ἔμμενον ἐν τοῖς ἀνδράποισι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις ἄρχουσι. Plato ap. Diog. L. <sup>c</sup> Πελοπίδης δὲ σοὶ γυνίης Λέϊψω. πατὴρ ᾧ ταῦτ' ἐδιδάμην πάρα. Eur. Parentes vos alendo nepotum nutriendorum debito (si quis est pudor) alligaverunt. V. M.

X 2

Not

life nature has appointed the Males to govern, not only amongst Mankind, but amongst all other living creatures. I shall leave you a very good Estate, for I had such a One from my Father.



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Not to do what is here required, is not *barely* to act against truth and nature, not *only* such an omission as is mentiond in sect. I. pr. V. but a heinous instance of *cruelty*. If any one can deny this, let him better consider the case of an *infant*, neglected, helpless, and having nothing so much as to solicit for him, but his *cries* and (that which will do but little in this world) his *innocence*: let him think what it would be to turn a *child*, tho a little grown up, out of doors, destitute of every thing, not knowing whither to fly <sup>a</sup>, or what to do; and whether it is not the same thing, if he be left to be turned out by any body else *hereafter*, or (in general) to conflict with *want* and *misery*: let him reflect a while upon the circumstances of poor *orphans* <sup>b</sup> left unprovided for, to be abused by every body <sup>c</sup>, &c. and then let him say, whether it is *possible* for a *parent* to be so void of bowels, as not to be moved with these considerations; or what *epithet* he deserves, if he is not. If any of them who have been thus abandond, and turned adrift, have *done well*, those instances ought to be placed among *particular providences*: as when a vessel at sea, without pilot or sailer, happens to be blown into the port.

Not only the *care*, but the *early care* of parents is required, lest death should prevent them; death, which skips none, and surprises many. Not to remember this, and act accordingly, is in practice to contradict one of the most *certain* and *obvious* of all truths.

VI. *In order to the good of children, their education, &c. there must be some authority over them lodged by nature in the parents*: I mean, *the nature of the case is such, as necessarily requires there should be in the parents an authority over their children in order to their good*. At first if some body did not nurse, feed, clothe, and take care of *children*, the interval between their first and last breath would be very short. They, on whom it is incumbent to do this, are undoubtedly their *parents*: to do this is their duty by the foregoing proposition. But then they must do it as they can, and according to their judgment: and this is plainly an act of *authority*, to order and dispose of another according to one's judgment, tho it be done according to the *best* of one's judgment.

As the child *grows up*, the case is still the same in some degree or other, till he arrives at the age reckond *mature*; and very often longer. He is become able perhaps to walk by himself, but what *path* to choose he knows not; cannot

<sup>a</sup> *Incertus quò fata ferant, ubi sistere detur*, in the poet's language.

description of the ἦμαρ ὀρφανῶν in Homer. <sup>b</sup> See that moving <sup>c</sup> I could never think of that *Arabic* saying without pity, *The barber* [אלחגגא] *learns to shave upon the head of an orphan*.

distinguish his safety and his danger, his advantages and disadvantages; nor, in general, good and evil: he must be warned, and directed, and watched still by his *parents*, or some body intrusted by them, or else it might have been possibly much better for him to have *expired* under the midwife's hands, and prevented the effects of his own ignorance.

When he not only runs about, but begins to fancy himself capable of governing himself, by how much the *more* he thinks himself capable, by so much the *less* capable may he be, and the *more* may he want to be governed. The avenues of *sense* are open: but the *judgment*, and *intellectual faculties* are not ripened but with time and much practice. The *world* is not easily known by persons of *adult* abilities; and, when they become tolerably acquainted with it, yet they find things in it so intricate, dubious, difficult, that it is many times hard for *them* to resolve, what measures are fittest to be taken: but they, who are not, or but lately, past their *nuts*, cannot be supposed to have any extent of knowledge, or to be, if they are left to themselves, any thing else but a *prey* to the villain who first seizes upon them. Instead of judgment and experience we find *commonly* in youth such things as are remotest from them, childish appetites, irregular passions, peevish and obstinate humors; which require to be *subdued*, and taught to give way to wholsom counsels. Young people are not only obnoxious to their *own* humors and follies, but also to those of their *companions*. They are apt to hearken to them, and to imitate one another's misconduct: and thus folly mingles with folly, and increases prodigiously. The judgment therefore of the *parents* must still interpose, and preside, and *guide* through all these *stages* of infancy, childhood, and youth; *according to their power* improving the minds of their children, breaking the strength of their inordinate passions, cultivating rude nature, forming their manners, and shewing them the way which they *ought* to be found in.

These things are so in *fact*, and a *parent* cannot acquit himself of the duty imposed upon him in the preceding proposition, if he acts so as to *deny* them: but then he cannot act so as *not to deny* them (*that is*, so as to subdue the passions of the child, break his stomach, and cause him to mind his instructions) without some sort of *discipline*, and a proper severity; at least very rarely.<sup>a</sup>

To all this, and much more that might be urged, must be superadded, that the *fortunes* of children, and their manner of setting out in the world

<sup>a</sup> For certainly, when it can be, *Hoc patrum est, potius consuefacere filium sua sponte recte facere, quam alieno metu. Ter.*

depending



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depending (commonly) upon their parents, their parents must upon this account be their *directors*, and govern their affairs.

N. 1. It appears now from the premisses, that even *parents* have not properly a *dominion* over their *children*, such as is intended sect. VI. prop. V. from which this *parental authority* is a very different thing. This only respects the *good* of the children, and reaches not beyond the means, which the *parents*, acting according to the best of their skill, abilities, and opportunities, find most conducive to *that end*: but dominion only respects the *will* of the lord, and is of the same extent with his *pleasure*. Parents may not, by virtue of this authority, command their children to do any thing which is in itself *evil*: and if they do, the children ought not to obey <sup>a</sup>. Nor may they do *any thing*, what they please, to them. They may not kill, or maim, or expose them <sup>b</sup>: and when they come to be *men* or *women*, and are possessors of estates, which either their parents (or any body else) have given them, or they have acquired by their own labor, management, or frugality, they have the same *properties* in these with respect to *their parents*, which they have with respect to *other people*: the parents have no more right to take them by force from them, than the rest of the world have <sup>c</sup>. So that what occurs in the place abovementioned remains *firm*, notwithstanding any thing that may be objected from the case of *parents* and *children*. And moreover,

N. 2. They, who found *monarchy* in paternal authority, gain little advantage with respect to *despotic* or *absolute* power. A power to be exercised for the *good* of subjects (like that of parents for the *good* of their children), and that principally, where they are *incapable* of helping themselves, can only be derived from hence. The *father* of his countrey cannot by this way of reasoning be demonstrated to be the *absolute lord* <sup>d</sup> of the lives, and limbs, and fortunes of the people, to dispose of them as he *pleases* <sup>e</sup>. The authority of parents goes *not this length*. Beside, if a parent hath an authority over his children, it doth not follow, that the *eldest son* should have the same authority, be it what it will, over his *brothers*

<sup>a</sup> Πρὸς ταῦτα μόνον ἀπειθόντες γινώσκει, πρὸς ἃ καὶ αὐτοὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἡμίως ἐπειθόνται. Hierocl.

<sup>b</sup> The barbarity of the thing at length put a stop to the custom of exposing children: but it had been practised by the *Persians*, *Greeks*, &c. *Romulus's* law only restrained it, but did not abolish it. For it enjoined his citizens only, ἀπασαν ἄρρενα γενεὴν ἐντρέφειν, καὶ θυγατέρας τὰς πρωτογόνους ἀπαλινύσκειν ἢ μὲν τῶν γενεόμενων νεώτερον τριτῆς, πλὴν εἴ τι γένοιτο παιδίον ἀνάπηρον, κλ. Dion. Halicarn. And beside, ἀπασαν, ὡς εἰπὼν, ἔδωκεν ἑξασίαν πατρὶ καὶ υἱῷ, καὶ παρὰ πάντα τὸ β. κ. χρεῖνον, κλ. Id. <sup>c</sup> Ῥωμαίοις ἐδόν ἰδίον ἐς κτήρια ζώγων ἔτι τὴν πατέρα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ χρήματα καὶ τὰ σώματα τῶν παίδων οὐ τι βέλων διὰ τὴν πατέρα ἀποδέδοται. Id. These are instances of such laws, as should not be, by prop. IV. sect. VII.

<sup>d</sup> Roma patrem patria Ciceronem libera dixit. Juv. <sup>e</sup> Ὡς λογικῶν

ἡμῶν ἄξιον. Arr. That she govern us as Rational Creatures

<sup>f</sup> *Romulus's* law enjoined his citizens only. to bring up all males, & first born off Dauris; & not to destroy any of them, after they were 3 years old unless they were maimed. The father had absolute power given him over his Son, & that during his whole life. Amongst the Romans, child had nothing of their own whilst their fathers were alive; but goods & bodies of the children were entirely at disposal of the fathers to do w<sup>t</sup> they wou<sup>d</sup> with them.

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and sisters: and much less, that the *heir* of the *first* parent should in succeeding generations have it over all the *collaterals*. The very *relation* between them soon vanishes, and comes at last in effect to nothing, and this *notion* with it.

VII. *As parents are obliged to educate their children, &c. so children ought to consider parents as the immediate authors (authors under the first and great Cause<sup>a</sup>) of their being; or to speak more properly, of their being born.* I know children are apt (not very respectfully, or prudently) to say; that their parents did not beget them for *their* sakes, whom they could not know before they were born, but for their *own* pleasure. But they, who make this a pretext for their disobedience, or disregard, have not sufficiently thought, what *pain*, what *trouble*, how many *frights* and *cares*<sup>b</sup>, what *charges*, and what *self-denials* parents undergo upon the score of their children: and that all these, if parents only rush'd into pleasure, and consulted *nothing* else, might easily be avoided, by *neglecting* them and their welfare<sup>c</sup>. For as to those parents, who do this, let them speak for themselves: I shall not be *their* advocate.

VIII. *A great submission and many grateful acknowledgements, much respect and piety are due from children to their parents.* For if there is an authority in parents (as before) this must be answer'd by a proportionable submission on the other side: since an authority, to which *no* obedience is due, is equal to *no* authority.

If the thought of *annihilation* be generally disagreeable, as it seems to be, then merely to be conscious of *existence* must have in it something desirable<sup>d</sup>. And if so, our parents must be consider'd as the authors, or at least the instruments of *that* good to us, whatever it is: which cannot be done, unless they are treated with *distinction* and great regard, being to us what no other *is*, or *ever* can be.

God, as the first cause of all beings, is often styl'd metaphorically, or in a large sense of the word, the *Father* of the world, or of us all: and, if we behave our selves towards Him as *being* such, we cannot (according to sect. V. pr. XIX. n. 3.) but *adore* Him. Something *analogous*, tho in a low degree, to the case between God and his offspring there seems to be in the case between *parents* and *their* children. If that requires *divine* worship, this will demand a great *respect* and reverence<sup>e</sup>.

שלשתן שותפין ביצירתם. S. Hared.

patrias intus deprendere curas.

<sup>c</sup> I confess, in Seneca's words, *minimum esse beneficium patris matrisque concubitum, nisi accesserint alia, qua prosequerentur hoc initium muneris, & aliis officiis hoc ratum facerent.*

<sup>d</sup> Το αὐθάδινον ὅτι ἔστι ἡδὺν κατ' αὐτό. φύσις δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἢ ζῆν. Arist. The sense of life (of being alive) seems to be something more than what Seneca calls *muscarum ac vermium bonum*.

<sup>e</sup> Οἱ παλαιοὶ τῶν Ῥωμαίων νόμοι, κλ. — οἱ δὲ ἔτι παλαιότεροι τοσούτου τῆς γούρας ἐπέφθησαν, ὥς καὶ θεὸς αὐτὸς ἐβμήται καλεῖν. Simpl.

2 Parents, as to oblige us to call them God Nor

*a/ all the three had a share in the formation of them. d/ To feel that we are alive is a real pleasure of itself. e/ first is really a good thing. Key that are Old.*



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Nor can I believe, that a child, who doth not honor his parent, can have any disposition to worship his Creator<sup>a</sup>. The precept of *honoring parents*, to be found in almost all nations and religions, seems to proceed from some such sentiment: for in books we meet with it commonly following, or rather adhering to that of *worshipping the Deity*<sup>b</sup>. In laying children under this obligation they have all conspired, tho scarce in any thing else<sup>c</sup>.

The *admonitions* of a parent must be of the greatest weight with his children, if they do but remember, that he hath lived longer, and had repeted occasions to *consider things*, and *observe events*; hath *cooler passions*, as he advances in years, and sees things more *truly* as they are; is able in a manner to predict what *they themselves* will desire to have done, when they shall arrive at his age; may upon these accounts, ordinarily, be presumed to be a more competent *judge* than themselves<sup>d</sup>; and lastly from his relation to them must be more *sincerely* inclined to tell them truth, than *any other person* in the world can be supposed to be<sup>e</sup>. I say, if young people reflect well upon these things, they cannot in *prudence*, or even kindness to *themselves*, but pay the utmost *deference* to the advertisements and directions of a parent.

And to conclude, if *parents* want the assistance of their *children*, especially in the declension of their age, and when they verge towards a *helpless* condition again they cannot deny or withhold it, but they must at the same time *deny* to requite the care and tenderness shewd by their parents towards them in *their* helpless and dangerous years; that is, without being *ungrateful*; and that is, without being *unjust*, if there be injustice in ingratitude<sup>f</sup>. Nor (which is more still) can they do this with-

Meo judicio pietas fundamentum est omnium virtutum. Cic. The same author reckons among those things, that are laudable, *parentem vereri ut deum* (neq; enim multo secus parens liberis). Οὐδ' αὖ πάλιν μίαν ἐπιδείξει ἀδίου γίγνοι τ' ἀδελ γονεὺς ὀλιγαρίας καὶ πλημμελίας. Plut. τες — λίγυσι καὶ ἄδυσιν, ὡς γονεῦσι τιμὴν μετὰ θεῶς πρώτῃ ἐ μεγίστην ἢ τε φύσει, ὃ, τε τὴν φύσιν σώζων νόμος ἀπέδωκε. Plut. Γονίαν τιμὴν μετὰ τὴν πρὸς Θεὸν διυτέραν ἔταξ. [Μαῦσος]. Jof. We indeed usually divide the two tables of *Moses's* law so, that the fifth commandment (*Honor thy father and thy mother*) falls in the second: but the Jews themselves divide them otherwise; ὡς εἶναι τ' μὲ μίαν γραφὴν τὴν ἀρχὴν Θεὸν καὶ πατέρα — Ἐ πατὸς, τὸ δ' εἰς γονεῖς, καλ. Ph. Jud. Agreeably to this, *Josephus* says that αἱ δίκαι λόγοι were written upon two tables, ἀνὰ πέντε μὲν εἰς ἑκατέραν [πλάκα]: *Abarbanel* reckons the fifth commandment the last of the first table; and says their *Hhakamim* do so: and in the offices of that nation these commandments are mentiond as written חמשה חמשה הלוחות by.

igitur Ἐ optima rerum natura pietatis est magistra, &c. Val. Max. Ὁ χρῆσ, τὰ δα πάντα ἀφαιρᾷ, τῷ γὰρ προσθήσει τὴν ἐπισήμην. Plut. Ἐ ἀνὴρ ἀβὴν ὡς ἀνὴρ: ask thy father, and he will shew thee. Deut. Δόξῃ δ' ἂν προσθῇ γονεῦσι διὸν μάλισ' ἐπαρκέω. ὡς ὀφειλοντας, καὶ τοῖς αἰτίοις εἶναι. — καὶ τιμὴν δ' ἀνάπαρ τοῖς. Arist. Among the ancients *θεοπείθεια* and *τροφεία* were reckond due. And he, who doth not requite to his parents רשע ב'הורוה is called κατ' ἐσχ' in S. Hbar. wicked

The Rewards of Education of Parents were reckond due. Fine with takes away every thing else from us, add Knowledge to College. We ought in first place to supply necessities of our Parents, as a debt due to them, who are Authors of our Being, & to reverence them as Gods.

out denying what they may *in their turn* require of their children <sup>a</sup>. In effect they do thus by their actions *deny* that to have been, which has been; and those things to be possible, which may be hereafter.

Not only *bodily* infirmities of parents, but such decays of their *minds* as may happen, ought to be pitied, their little hastinesses and mistakes dissembled, and their defects supplied, *decently* <sup>b</sup>.

IX. That *σφρν* or affection on both sides, which naturally and regularly is in parents towards their children, and vicissim <sup>c</sup>, ought to be observed and followed, when there is no reason to the contrary.

We have seen before, and it is evident from the terms, that *sense* ought to govern, when *reason* does not interpose; *i. e.* when there is *no reason*, why it should not. If then this *σφρν* or mutual affection be an inward *sense* of the case between parents and children, which, without much thinking upon it, is *felt* by them, and sits upon their natures <sup>d</sup>, it may be comprised in prop. XIV, and XV. of sect. III. But whether it is or not, the same may be said (which must be repeted in another place) of every *affection*, passion, inclination in general. For when there is no reason, why we should not comply with them, their own very sollicitation, and the agreeableness we apprehend to be in complying, are *preponderating* arguments. This must be true, if *something* is more than *nothing*; or that ought to be granted, which there is no reason to deny. So that if this *σφρν* be only taken as a kind of *attraction*, or *tendence*, in the mere matter of parents and children; yet still this physical motion or *sympathy* ought not to be over-ruled, if there be not a *good* reason for it. On the contrary, it ought to be taken as a *suggestion* of nature, which should always be regarded, when it is not superseded by something *superior*; that is, by *reason*. But further, here reason doth not only not gainsay, by its silence consent, and so barely leave its right of commanding to this bodily inclination; but it comes in strongly to *abet* and *inforce* it, as designed for a reasonable end: and therefore not to act *according* to it is not to act according to reason, and to deny that to be which is.

X. The same is true of that affection, which other relations naturally have, in some proportion or other, each for other. To this they ought to accommodate themselves

<sup>a</sup> Τοῦτ' οὖν γινεσθαι τὰς γονεῖς, οἷς ἀν' ἑαυτοῖς ἀλλήλων τὰς αὐτῶν παῖδας. *Isocr.* <sup>b</sup> That epithet *pious* (*pious Aeneas*) shines in *Virgil*.

<sup>c</sup> *Posita est inter parentes ac liberos honesta contentio, dederint majora, an receperint.* *Sen.*

<sup>d</sup> That is, methinks, a moving description in *S. Basil* (Περὶ πλεονεξίας) of a conflict which a poor man had within himself, when he had no other way left to preserve life but by selling one of his children.

Y

where



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where reason does not prohibit. The proof of this assertion is much the same with that of the foregoing *mut. mutand.*

The foundation of all *natural relation* is laid in *marriage* <sup>a</sup>. For the *husband and wife* having solemnly attachd themselves each to other, having the same children, interests, &c. become so intimately related as to be reckond united, *one flesh*, and in the laws of nations many times *one person* <sup>b</sup>. Certainly they are such with respect to the posterity, who proceed from them jointly <sup>c</sup>. The *children* of this couple are related between themselves by the mediation of the parents. For every one of them being of the *same blood* with their common parents, they are all of the same blood (truly *consanguinei*), the relations, which they respectively bear to their parents, meeting there as in their *center*. This is the *nearest* relation that can be <sup>d</sup>, *next* to those of man and wife, parents and their children, who are *immediately* related by contact or rather continuity of blood, if one may speak so. The relation between the children of these children grows more *remote* and *dilute*, and in time wears out. For at every *remove* the natural tincture or sympathy may be supposed to be weakend; if for no other reason, yet for this. Every *remove* takes off *half* the common blood derived from the grand parents. For let C be the son of A and B, D the son of C, E of D, F of E: and let the *relation* of C to A and B be as 1: then the *relation* of D to A and B will be but  $\frac{1}{2}$ ; because C is but one of the parents of D, and so the *relation* of D to A and B is but the half of that, which C bears to them. By proceeding after the same manner it will be found, that the *relation* of E to A and B is  $\frac{1}{4}$  (or half of the half), of F  $\frac{1}{8}$ : and so on. So that the *relation*, which *descendents* in a direct line have by blood to their grand parents, *decreasing* thus in geometrical proportion <sup>e</sup>, the *relation* between them of *collateral* lines, which passes and is made out through the grand parents, must soon be reduced to an inconsiderable matter <sup>f</sup>.

<sup>a</sup> Prima societas in ipso conjugio est: proxima in liberis, &c. Cic.

<sup>b</sup> Mulier conjuncta viro

concessit in unum. Lucr. כְּחֶדְרֵם בְּשֵׁרֵם יוֹשֵׁבִים. Ap. R. Elaz. Azq. & pass.

<sup>c</sup> Ἡ συγγενική

[Φιλία] φαίνεται πολυειδής εἶναι, καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι πάντα ἐν τῇ πατρικῇ. οἱ γονεῖς μὲν γὰρ εἰσὶν οἱ τέκνα, ὡς αὐτῶν τι ὄντα. τὰ δὲ τέκνα τὰς γονεῖς, ὡς ἀπ' αὐτῶν τι ὄντα. — Ἀδελφοὶ δὲ ἀδελφὸς [φιλεῖται] τῷ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν πεφυκέναι. — Ἀνέψιοι δὲ οἱ λοιποὶ συγγενεῖς — τῷ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι γίνονται δὲ οἱ ἰσὺν δικαιοτέροι, οἱ δὲ ἀδικοτέροι, κτλ. Arist.

<sup>d</sup> Quam copiosa suavitatis illa recordatio est!

<sup>e</sup> In eodem domicilio, antequam nascerer, habitavi: in iisdem incunabulis infantia tempora peregi: eosdem appellavi parentes, &c. Val. Max.

<sup>f</sup> There is no name for any descendent, who is more

than trinepos.

<sup>g</sup> It becomes ἀμυνδία. Andr. Rhod. — very obscure

c/ There are a great many sorts of friends amongst Relations, all of them depending upon Parents. for Parents have a tender affection for their children, but they are a part of themselves, & so have children. If for instance because they are derived from them. — Brothers also love one another, but they are born off some Parents. — For this also & other Relations, — because they proceed from same Parents also. — And they are some nearer related & some further off.

If then we suppose this *affection* or sympathy, when it is permitted to act regularly and according to nature, no reason intervening to exalt or abate it, to operate with a strength nearly *proportionable* to the quantity or degree of relation, computed as above, we may perhaps nearly discern the *degrees* of that obligation, which persons related lie under, to assist each other, *from this motive*.

But there are many circumstances and incidents in life capable of affecting this obligation, and altering the degrees of it. A man must weigh the wants of *himself* and his own *family* against those of his *relations*: he must consider their *sex*, their *age*, their *abilities* and opportunities, how *capable* they are of good offices, how they will take them, what use they will make of them, and the like. He, who designs to act agreeably to *truth*, may find many such things demanding his regard; some justly moving him to compassion, others holding back his hand. But however this may in general be taken as evident, that *next after* our parents and own offspring <sup>a</sup> nature directs us to be helpful, in the *first place* to brothers and sisters, and *then* to other relations according to their respective distances in the genealogy of the family, *preferably* to all foreigners <sup>b</sup>. And tho our power, or opportunities of helping them in their wants should be but little; yet we ought to preserve our affection towards them, and a disposition to serve them, as far as we *honestly* and *prudently* can, and whenever the proper opportunity shall present itself. This *nature* and *truth* require.

## SECT. IX. Truths belonging to a Private Man, and respecting (directly) only himself.

I. **EVERY** man knows (or may <sup>c</sup> know) best, what his own faculties, and personal circumstances are, and consequently what powers he has of acting, and governing himself. Because he only of all mankind has the *internal* knowledge of himself, and what he is; and has the only opportunity by *reflexion* and *experiments* of himself to find, what his own abilities, passions, &c. truly are <sup>d</sup>.

<sup>a</sup> Man and Wife are supposed to be *one*, and therefore have no place here; any more than a man and his *self*. Otherwise considered distinctly, the one of them ought always to be the *first* care of the other.

<sup>b</sup> Μηδὲ κασιγνήτῳ ἴσον ποιεῖν ἑταίρον. Hes.

<sup>c</sup> For many I acknowledge there are, who seem to be without reflexion, and almost thought. Τίς ἀγνοεῖ τὴν οἰκίαν φύσιν; πολλοὶ τάχα ὅ πάντες πλὴν ὀλίγων. S. Chrys.

<sup>d</sup> Nec se quæverit extra.

II. He truly, may all but every

Y 2 *Who is there that does not understand himself? a great many*

*few."*



II. *He, that well examines himself, I suppose, will find these things to be true<sup>a</sup>.*

1. That there are *some* things *common* to him not only with *sensitive animals* and *vegetable*, but also with *inanimate matter*: as, that his body is subject to the general law of gravitation; that its parts are capable of being separated, or dislocated; and that therefore he is in danger from falls, and all impressions of violence.

2. That there are *other* things *common* to him with *vegetables* and *sensitive animals*: as, that he comes from a seed (such the original *animalculum* may be taken to be); grows, and is preserved by proper matter, taken in and distributed through a set of vessels; ripens, flourishes, withers, decays, dies; is subject to diseases, may be hurt, or killed; and therefore wants, as they do, nourishment, a proper habitation, protection from injuries, and the like.

3. That he has *other* properties *common* only to *him* and the *sensitive tribe*: as, that he receives by his senses the notice of many external objects, and things; perceives many affections of his body; finds pleasure from some, and pain from others; and has certain powers of moving himself, and acting: *that is*, he is not only obnoxious to hurts, diseases, and the causes of death, but also *feels* them<sup>b</sup>; is not only capable of nourishment, and many other provisions made for him, but also *injoys* them; and, beside, may *contribute* much himself to either his enjoyments, or his sufferings.

4. That *beside these* he has *other faculties*, which he doth not apprehend to be either in the inert mass of matter, or in vegetables, or even in the sensitive kind, at least in any considerable degree; by the help of which he investigates truth, or probability, and judges, whether things are agreeable to them, or not, after the manner set down in sect. III. or, in a word, that he is *animal rationale*<sup>c</sup>.

5. That he is conscious of a *liberty* in himself to act or not to act; and that therefore he is *such a being* as is described sect. I. prop. I. a being, whose acts may be *morally good or evil*. Further,

6. That there are in him many *inclinations* and *aversions*; from whence flow such affections, as desire, hope, joy, hatred, fear, sorrow, pity, anger, &c. all which *prompt* him to act this or that way.

7. That he is sensible of *great defects* and *limitations* in the use of his rational faculties, and powers of action, upon many occasions: as also, that his passions

<sup>a</sup> Illud γνῶσις σιάντων noli putare ad arrogantiam minuendam solum esse dictum, verum etiam ut bona nostra norimus. Cic. ad Qu. fr.

<sup>b</sup> Non sentire mala sua non est hominis: & non ferre non est viri. Sen. who condescends here to be something like other men. As also when he says, *Alia sunt, qua sapientem feriunt, etiamsi non pervertunt; ut dolor capitis, &c. Hac non nego sentire sapientem, &c.*

<sup>c</sup> Qui se ipse norit, aliquid sentiet se habere divinum, &c. Cic.

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are many times apt to take wrong turns, to grow warm, irregular, excessive<sup>a</sup>. In other words, that he is in many respects fallible, and infirm<sup>b</sup>.

Lastly, that he desires to be happy: as every thing must, which understands what is meant by that word.

III. If he doth find these things to be so, then if he will act as he ought to do (that is, agreeably to truth and fact) he must do such things as these.

I. He must subject his sensual inclinations, his bodily passions, and the motions of all his members<sup>c</sup> to reason; and try every thing by it. For in the climax set down he cannot but observe, that as the principle of vegetation is something above the inertia of mere matter, and sense something above that again; so reason must be something above all these<sup>d</sup>: or, that his uppermost faculty is reason<sup>e</sup>. And from hence it follows, that he is one of those beings mention'd sect III. prop. XI. and that the great law impos'd upon him is to be governed by reason.

Any man may prove this to himself by experiment, if he pleases. Because he cannot (at least without great violence to his nature) do any thing, if he has a greater reason against the doing of it than for it. When men do err against reason, it is either because they do not (perhaps will not) advert, and use their reason, or not enough; or because their faculties are defective.

And further, by sect. III. prop. X. to endeavour to act according to right reason, and to endeavour to act according to truth are in effect the same thing. We cannot do the one, but we must do the other. We cannot act according to truth, or so as not to deny any truth, and that is we cannot act right, unless we endeavour to act according to right reason, and are led by it.

Therefore not to subject one's sensitive inclinations and passions to reason is to deny either that he is rational, or that reason is the supreme and ruling faculty in

*a/Nature which is backward & a will (interrupted) are (in Jewish language) "the Leaven in the Lump."*

• שבע החומר ויצר הרע are (in Jewish language) שצור בעיסה.

<sup>b</sup> Ἀμύχανον ἔχει ἄν-

δρωτόν τινα ἀναμύχανον. Chrys.

<sup>c</sup> The author of S. Hared. reckons eight, the right use of which comprehends all practical religion: the heart, the eye, the mouth, nose, ear, hand, foot, and ראש הגויה. The duties respecting these are the subject of that (not bad) book.

<sup>d</sup> Cum tria sint hac, esse, vivere, intelligere: & lapis est, & pecus vivit, nec tamen lapidem puto vivere, aut pecus intelligere: qui autem intelligit, eum & esse & vivere certissimum est. Quare non dubito id excellentius judicare, cui omnia tria insunt, quam id cui duo vel unum desit. S. Aug. Thus reason sets man above the other visible orders of beings, &c.

<sup>e</sup> Praesto est domina omnium & regina ratio. —. Hac ut imperet illi parti animi, qua obedire debet, id videndum est viro. Cic.

*It is next to impossible for a M to be free from all Sin*



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<sup>a</sup> his nature: and that is to desert mankind<sup>a</sup>, and to *deny* himself to be what he knows himself by experience and in his own conscience upon examination to be, and what he would be very angry if any body should say he was not.

*Smile*  
If a *beast* could be supposed to give up his *sense* and activity; neglect the calls of hunger, and those appetites by which he (according to *his nature*) is to be guided; and refusing to use the powers, with which he is indued in order to get his food and preserve his life, lie still in some place, and expect to grow, and be fed like a *plant*; this would be much the same case, only not so bad, as when a *man* cancels his *reason*, and as it were strives to metamorphize himself into a *brute*. And yet this he does, who pursues only sensual objects, and leaves himself to the impulses of appetite and passion. For as in that case the *brute* neglects the law of *his nature*, and affects that of the order *below* him: so doth the *man* disobey the law of *his nature*, and put himself under that of the *lower* animals; to whom he thus makes a defection<sup>b</sup>.

If this be so, how wretchedly do they violate the *order* of nature, and transgress against *truth*, who not only *reject* the conduct of reason to follow sense and passion, but even make it *subservient* to them<sup>c</sup>; who use it only in finding out means to effect their wicked ends<sup>d</sup>, but never apply it to the consideration of those ends, or the nature of those means, whether they are just or unjust, *right* or *wrong*? This is not only to *deviate* from the path of nature, but to *invert* it, and to become something *more* than brutish; *brutes with reason*, which must be the most enormous and worst of all brutes. When the *brute* is governed by sense and bodily appetites, he observes *his proper* rule; when a *man* is governed after that manner in defiance of reason, he *violates* his; but when he makes his rational powers to *serve* the brutish part, to assist and promote it, he heightens and increases the *brutality*, enlarges its field, makes it to act with greater force and effect<sup>e</sup>, and becomes a *monster*.

His duty then, who is *conscious* to himself of the truth of those things recounted under the foregoing proposition, is to examine every thing carefully, and to see

*a/whom are we distinguish'd from by our Reason. From Beasts take care then that you do not imitate the Beasts in any thing*  
Abiecto homine in sylvestre animal transire. 'Εν τῷ λογικῷ τινὸν χειζόμεθα; τῶν θηρίων. —  
Ὅσα ἐν μὴ τι πῶς ὡς θηρίον ποιήσης. Arr. Pertinet ad omnem officii questionem semper in promptu habere, quantum natura hominis pecudibus reliquisque belluis antecedit. Cic. <sup>b</sup> Πρὸς τὴν τῶν θηρίων ἀλογίαν ἐκπεσών. Chrys.  
<sup>c</sup> A thing too often done. Qua enim libido, qua avaritia, quod facinus aut suscipitur nisi consilio capto, aut sine—ratione perficitur? Cotta ap. Cic. <sup>d</sup> Something like him, who in Chrysostom's words, Ὁ μὲν οὖν οἰάκων καταδύει τὸ σκάφος.  
*made use of the Rudder*  
Cotta say, Satiis fuit nullam omnino nobis à diis immortalibus datam esse rationem, quàm tanta cum perniciè datam: with other bitter things. Tho an answer to this may be given in the words which follow afterward: A deo tantum rationem habemus, si modò habemus: bonam autem rationem, aut non bonam, à nobis.

*e/To sink into as little Reason as a Beast.* I

that

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that he complies with no corporeal inclination at the expense of his reason; but that all his affections, concupiscible and irascible, be directed towards such objects, and in such measure, time, and place, as that allows. Every word<sup>a</sup> and action, every motion and step in life should be conducted by reason<sup>b</sup>. This is the foundation and indeed the sum of all virtue.

2. He must take care not to bring upon himself<sup>c</sup> want, diseases, trouble; but, on the contrary, endeavour to prevent them, and to provide for his own comfortable subsistence, as far as he can without contradicting any truth<sup>d</sup> (that is, without denying matters of fact, and such propositions, as have been already or will in the sequel here be shewn to be true, concerning God, property, the superiority of reason, &c.) To explain this limitation: if a man should consider himself as obnoxious to hunger, weather, injuries, diseases, and the rest; then, to supply his wants, take what is his neighbour's property; and at last, in vindication of himself, say, "I act according to what I am, a being obnoxious to hunger, &c. and to act otherwise would be in compliance with truth"; this would not be sufficient to justify him. The grand rule requires, that what he does, should interfere with no truth: but what he does interferes with several.

For by taking that, which (by the supposition) is his neighbour's, he acts as if

This certainly excludes all that talk, which familiarizes vice, takes off those restraints which men have from nature or a modest education, and is so utterly destructive of virtue, that Aristotle banishes it out of the commonwealth. *Ὅλως μὲν ἀχρεολογίαν ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὥσπερ ἀλλό τι, διὰ τὸ νομοθετεῖν ἐξορίζει ἐν τῇ εὐχρηστῶς λέγειν ὅτι ἐν τῇ ἀχρεῖ καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν σύνεργον.*

<sup>b</sup> True, manly reason: which is a very different thing from that superstitious preciseness, which carries things too far. As v. g. when the Jews not contented to condemn רבור נבלה or נבלות הפה, and every where to express גורל האסור, go so far as to comprehend under it אפי שיחה קלה שארם משיח, go so far as to comprehend under it אפי שיחה קלה שארם משיח; and to add, מוציא מלך לבשרה כמוציא זרע לבשרה וכו'. There are other sayings of this kind to be seen, many of them, among those, which R. El. de Vidas has collected: as that particularly, כן ענין ראות צריך שלא להוציא לבשרה וכו'. What *Ælian* reports of *Anaxagoras* and others, belongs to this place; that they never laughed: with many other unnecessary au-

sterities, which might be added. *ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἀνδρώπων βίῳ κύριος ἐστὶν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν εὐεργεταὶ τῇ εὐδαιμονίας.* *Arist.* They, who treated the body and things pertaining to it as merely ἀλλότεια, distinguishing between τὰ ἡμέτερα and τὰ ἑσώματα, making these latter to be ἑδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, and leaving the body as it were to itself (αὐτὸ [σωμάτων] μεμιμνᾶτω, — εἰ τι πάχῃ): they, I say, might enjoy their own philosophy; but they would scarce gain many proselytes now a days, or ever persuade people, that the pains they feel are not theirs, or any thing to them. Nor indeed do I much credit many stories that are told of some old philosophers: as that of *Anaxarchus*, when he was put to a most cruel death

by *Nicocreon*; ἔφροντίσαντα τῇ τιμωρίας, ἱππῶν — Πτόσι τῇ Ἀναξάρχῃ δούλον, Ἀναρχὸν ὃ ἔπληθεις.

See *Epist. Arr. Simpl. Anton. D. Laert.* and others.

but you cannot strike *Anaxarchus* Himself. *Comprehend under it, "that trifling Discourse with passes betwixt a Man & his Wife, &c. add "That bringing forth an Idle Word is like bringing forth Idle Food". That a Man should not make an Idle Use of his Eyes.*

These External goods are necessary to Life of Man, but Virtuous actions are necessary to his Happiness



it was not *his neighbour's*, but *his own*, and therefore plainly contradicts *fact*, and those *truths* in sect. VI, VII. respecting property: when by not taking what is his neighbour's, he would contradict no truth, he would not deny himself to be obnoxious to hunger, &c. There are other ways of furnishing himself with conveniences, or at least necessities, which are consistent with *property* and all *truth*: and he can only be said to deny himself to be *what he is* by *omitting* to provide against his wants, when he omits to provide against them by some of *those ways*; and then indeed he doth do it. (See p. 28. Ans. to Obj. 3.)

So again, when a man does any thing to *avoid* present suffering or dangers *contrary* to the express dictates of reason, and the tenor of forementioned truths, he acts as a *sensitive* being only, not as being what he *really is*, *sensitive-rationalis*. But when there is no good argument *against* his doing of any thing, that may gain him protection from evil, or a better condition of life, he may then look upon himself *only* as a being, who needs that which is to be obtained by doing it: and *in that case*, if he should not do it, he would be false to himself, and deny the circumstances of his own nature.

Certainly when a man may *without transgressing* the limits prescribed consult his own safety, support, and reasonable satisfaction, and does not; and especially when he takes a counter-course, and exposes himself<sup>a</sup>, he forgets *many* of the foregoing *truths*, and treats himself as *not being* what he is. This is true with respect to *futurity*, as well as the *present time*: and indeed by how much future time is more than the present, by so much the more perhaps ought *that* to be regarded. At least enjoyments ought to be taken and adjusted in such a manner, that no one should preclude, or spoil *more*, or *greater* to come.

It may easily be understood here, that *those evils*, which it is not in a man's power to prevent, he must endeavour to bear *patiently* and *decently*, i. e. as such; and moreover, such as are made by this means *lighter*<sup>b</sup>: for when they cannot be totally prevented, as much of the *effect* must be prevented, or taken off, as can be. And in order to this it is good to be prepared for all attacks; especially the *last*, *great* one<sup>c</sup>.

3. He must consider even *bodily and sensual affections, passions, and inclinations as intimations, which* many times *he not only may, but ought to hearken to*. What is said before of the subjection of passions and appetites to *reason* must always be remembered. They are not to proceed from unjustifiable causes, or terminate in wrong objects;

<sup>a</sup> Ne offeramus nos periculis sine causa: quo nihil potest esse stultius. — In tranquillo tempestatem adversam optare dementis est. Cic.

<sup>b</sup> Levius fit patientia, Quicquid corrigere est nefas. Hor.

<sup>c</sup> Μαλίτη θανάτου was a great man's definition of *philosophy*. a meditation upon death

not be unseasonable or immoderate. Being *thus regulated*, set to a true bias, and freed from all eruptions and violence, they become *such as are here intended*; gentle ferments working in our breasts, without which we should settle in inactivity<sup>a</sup>; and what I think may be taken for just *motives* and *good arguments* to act upon.

For if a man finds, that he has *not only* a superior faculty of reason, but *also* an inferior appetitive faculty, under which are containd many propensions and aver-  
sions, *these* cannot be denied *to be* any more than *that*; tho they must be taken in-  
deed for what they *really are*, and not *more*. When they are checked by reason  
and truth, or there lies a reason *against* them (as there always will, when they are  
not within the foresaid restrictions), they must be taken *as clogd* with this circum-  
stance, as things *overruled* and *disabled*: but when they are under no prohibition  
from the *superior powers* and *truth*, then they are to be considerd as unfetterd and  
free, and become governing principles. For (as it has been observed upon a par-  
ticular occasion before p. 165.) when there is *no reason against* the complying  
with our senses, there is always *one for* it by prop. XIV. sect. III. the inclinati-  
on itself, being precluded by nothing above it, is in this case *uppermost*, and in  
course takes the commanding post: and then a man must act as being what he  
is in n. 3. under prop. II. of this section.

The *springs* of all human actions are in fact, either a sense of *duty*, or a prospect of some *pleasure* or *profit* to be obtained, some *evil* or *danger* to be avoided; that is, either the reasonableness of what is done, or the manner, in which something doth or is like to affect the agent: and that is again, human actions are founded either in *reason*, or *passion* and *inclination*. (I need not add they may be in both.) This being so, what should hinder, when *reason* does not work, but that the *inferior springs* should retain their nature, and act.

*Bodily inclinations and passions, when they observe their due subordination to reason, and only take place, where that leaves it open for them, or allows them to be as it were assessors to it upon the throne, are of admirable use in life, and tend many times to noble ends. This is applicable to the irascible, as well as the concupiscible affections and the whole animal system. Love of that which is amiable, compassion<sup>b</sup> toward the miserable and helpless, a natural abhorrence and resentment<sup>c</sup>*

<sup>a</sup> ὁ ἄρχων—ὁ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις διενέχων. Chryf. <sup>b</sup> When the Stoics say, that a wise man may relieve one, who wants his help, without pitying him; I own indeed he *may*, but I very much doubt whether he *would*. If he had not some compassion, and in some measure felt the ills or wants of the other, I scarce know how he should come to take him for an object of his charity. <sup>c</sup> Ὁ μὲν ἐστὶν

οἷς δὲ, καὶ οἷς δὲ ὀργιζόμενοι, ἔτι ἢ ἐν ὧς δὲ, ἐν ὅτι, ἐν ὅσον χρόνον, ἵπαισιν. *Arist.* To be angry under these conditions is a different thing from *rage*, and those transports which perhaps scarce comply with any one of them: such as that of *Alexander*, who, because his ἱζόμενος died, commanded the Ἀσκληπιεῖα to be all burnt. *Arr.* Temples of Aesculapius *lost all burnt*



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of that which is villainous or vitious or base<sup>a</sup>, fear<sup>b</sup> of evils, are things, which duly temperd have laudable effects: and without them mankind could not well subsist. By which it appears, that the Author of nature has placed these *conatus's*, these tendencies, and reluctancies in us, to dispose us for action, when there are no arguments of a *higher nature* to move us. So far are they, *rightly managed*, from being mere infirmities. And certainly the *philosopher*, who pretends to absolute *apathy*, maims nature, and sets up for a half-man, or I don't know what<sup>c</sup>.

I must confess however, that our *passions* are so very apt to grow upon us, and become exorbitant, if they are not kept under an *exact discipline*, that by way of prevention or caution it is advisable rather to affect a *degree* of apathy, or to recede more from the worse extreme<sup>d</sup>. This very proposition itself, which, when *reason* is absent, places *sense* and *inclination* in the chair, obliges not to permit the reins to our passions, or give them their full career; because if we do, they may (and will) carry us into such *excesses*, such *dangers* and *mischiefs*, as may sadly affect the sensitive part of us: that part itself, which now governs. They ought to be watched, and well examin'd; if *reason* is on their side, or stands neuter, they are to be heard (this is all, that I say): in *other cases* we must be deaf to their applications, strongly guard against their emotions, and in *due time* prevent their rebelling against the sovereign faculty.

I cannot forbear to add, tho I fear I shall tire you with repetitions, that from what is said here and just before, not only the *liberty* men take in preferring what they like best, among present enjoymments, meats, drinks, &c. so far as they are *innocent*; but all those *prudential* and *lawful* methods, by which they endeavour to secure to themselves a comfortable and pleasant being, may be justified, and that obs. under prop. XIII. in sect. II. strengthen'd.

*a/We are afraid indeed of such things as are really dreadful, & therof we are afraid of all real Evils, such as Disgrace, Poverty, Diseases, Want of Friends, &c. It is not to be afraid of some, not be afraid*

There is, according to Tully, *Civile odium, quo omnes improbos odimus.*

*b Φοβέμεθα δὲ ὅτι κακὰ εἶεν ἀδοξίαν, πέναν, νόσον, ἀφίλιαν, θάνατον. — ἵνα ᾧ δὲ δὴ φοβέμεθα, ἔ καλόν τὸ δὲ μὴ, ἀισχρὸν, κλ. Arist.* When one called Xenophanes coward, because he would not play at dice with him, ὁμολογεῖ πάνυ δειλὸς εἶναι πρὸς τὰ ἀισχρὰ ἢ ἄτολμῳ. *Plut.* *c* A wise man is not ἀπαθής, but μετριοπαθής. *Arist. ap. Diog. L.* *d* Δὴ τὸ τοχαζόμενον ἔ μίση ἀπχωρεῖν ἔ μάλλον ἐναντίον. — ᾧ ᾧ ἄκρων, τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀμαρτωλοτέρων τὸ δὲ ἥττον. *Arist.*

In the same chapter he gives two other excellent rules, which I cannot but set down here. Σκοπεῖν δὲ πρὸς ἃ αὐτοὶ ἐυκατάφοροί εἰσιν — εἰς τὸ μὲν αὐτὸν δ' ἐαυτὸς ἀφίλειν — ὅπως οἱ τὰ διεσπασμένα ᾧ ζύλαν ὁρῶντες ποιῶσιν. And after, Ἐν παντὶ ᾧ μάλιστα φυλακτεῖν τὸ ἡδὲ, ἔ τὴν ἡδονήν. ἢ ᾧ ἀδίκαστοι κρύνομεν αὐτήν.

*d/He who aims at a Medium shod depart from y<sup>e</sup> 4 Extreme wh<sup>ch</sup> is most Contrary; for One of y<sup>e</sup> 2 Extremes is more of Vice in it than y<sup>e</sup> Other. — We ought to consider, w<sup>h</sup> Vices We are most inclined to, — & to bend Ourselves to y<sup>e</sup> contrary — as They do who endeavour to make Cooked Thicks stait' and after "In Every Thing We shod take great Care of the Pleasure of it; for We are very apt to have our Judgment corrupted by Pleasure".*

If the gratification of an appetite be incompatible with *reason* and *truth*, to treat that appetite according to what it is, is to *deny* it: but if it is not, to use it as it is, is to consider it as an appetite clear of all objections, and this must be to *comply* with it. The humoring of *such appetites*, as lie not under the interdict of truth and reason, seems to be the *very means*, by which the Author of nature intended to *sweeten* the journey of life: and a man may upon the road as well muffle himself up against sun-shine and blue sky, and expose himself bare to rains and storms and cold, as debar himself of the *innocent delights* of his nature for affected melancholy, want, and pain. Yet,

4. He must use what means he can to cure his own defects, or at least to prevent the effects of them; learn to deny temptations, or keep them at a proper distance<sup>a</sup>; even mortify, where mortification is necessary<sup>b</sup>; and always carry about him the sense of his being but a man. He who doth not do this, doth not conform himself to the *seventh* particular under the preceding prop. (doth not own that to be *true*, which he is supposed to have found *true* in himself); denies a *defect* to be what it is, to be something which requires to be supplied, or amended; and is guilty of an *omission*, that will fall under sect. I. prop. V.

I might here mention some *precautions*, with some kinds and degrees of *mortification* or *self-denial*, which men will commonly find to be necessary. But I shall not *prescribe*; leaving them, who best know their own weak places and diseases, to select for themselves the proper *remedies*.

I shall only take notice, that since the *self-denial* here recommended can only respect things in themselves *lawful* and not unreasonable, and in favor of such our bare *inclinations* have been allowd to be taken for arguments and directions, it looks as if this advice to *deny ones self* or *inclinations* inferred a contradiction. But this knot will be quickly untied. For when we deny our inclinations in order to better our natures, or prevent crimes, tho to follow those inclinations might *otherwise* be right; yet in *these circumstances* and under this view there arises a good reason against it, and they, according to the *establishd rule*, must therefore give way: which is all that is intended<sup>c</sup>.

\* Ἀγορεύων μὲν οὖν ὁ φησαλῶν προσελθὼν ὁ ἱεὺς, ἐνταῦθα ἔφη ἐπὶ θύραις τῆς ψυχῆς. Max. Tyr. —

To appoint things, as the Jewish Doctors have done, to be כרי להרוק ארץ, or סייג לחורד, would be right, if they were judiciously chosen, and not so very particular and trifling. Some of their cautions are certainly just: as that לא יסתכל אדם באשת איש ובשאר עריות פן ינקש בהם. Passim.

<sup>b</sup> What should a man do to live? ימיר עצמו. Mishm. No monkey. no superstitious or phantastical mortifications are here recommended.



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The last clause of the proposition takes in a *great compass*. It will oblige men, if they do but think well what *they* are, and consequently what *others* of the same kind with themselves also are, not to be proud, conceited, vain; but modest, and humble, and rather diffident of themselves: not to censure the failings of others too hardly, not to be over-severe in punishing or exacting justice<sup>a</sup>, and particularly not to be revengeful; but candid, placable, mansuete: and so forth.

5. He ought to examine<sup>b</sup> his own actions and conduct, and where he finds he has transgressed<sup>c</sup>, to repent. That is, if the transgression be against his neighbour, and the nature of it admits, to make *reparation*, or at least as far as he can: in other cases, when that which is done cannot be recalled, or repaired, or terminates in *himself* only, to live however under a sense of his fault, and to prove by such acts as are proper, that he desires *forgiveness*, and heartily wishes it undone; which is as it were an essay towards the *undoing* of it<sup>d</sup>, and all that now can be<sup>e</sup>: and lastly, to use all possible care not to relapse. All this is involved in the *idea* of a fault, or action that is wrong, as it presents itself to a rational mind. For such a mind cannot approve what is unreasonable, and repugnant to truth; that is, what is *wrong*, or a *fault*: nay more, it cannot but disapprove it, detest it. No *rational* animal therefore can act according to *truth*, the *true* nature of himself and the idea of a crime, if he doth not endeavour not to commit it; and, when it is committed, to repair it, if he can, or at least shew himself to be *penitent*<sup>f</sup>.

If when a man is *criminal*, he doth not behave himself *as such*; or, which is the same, behaves himself as being *not such*, he opposes *truth* confidently.

And further, to act agreeably to what he is supposed to find himself *to be*, is to act as one who is in danger of *relapsing*: which is to be upon his guard for the future.

6. He must labor to improve his rational faculties by such means, as are (fairly) practicable by him, and consistent with his circumstances. If it be a disadvantage to be obnoxious to *error*, and act in the dark, it is an advantage to know such *truths* as may prevent this: if so, it is a greater advantage to know, or be capable of knowing, *more* such truths<sup>g</sup>: and then again, not to endeavour to improve

*a/ The Merciful Man does good according to best of his judgment. b/ Wherein have I transgressed and where have I failed in what?* חסיד עושה טובה לפני משורר ה' (which words I understand in the sense, that *Rashi* seems to put upon them, Gen. xlv. 10.)

*Am. carm.* c Tis ὅς τις τὴν ἀγάναν τὴν βίαν παρελθὼν ἄπτωτον ἔμεινε; τίς δ' ἐξ ὑποσελεσδεις;

*indaimon o mē pothēnis. Ph. Jud.* d Quem paniter peccasse, penē est innocens. Sen. e Even

*a few says, שקולו כנגד כל הקרבנות. S. Hbafid.* f 'Ελοιδόρησας; εὐλόγησον

*επλοιοιήσας; ἀπόδο· ἐμυθόσας; νήσευσον. S. Baf.* g 'Εστὶ ὃ τῷ ὄντι φιλοσοφία μέγιστον

*αὐτῶν. Jnsf. M.* *True Philosophy is best of all possessions*

*a/ For who has gone thro' circuit of life & kept his legs? Nay who is there that has not fallen quite those down? He*

*a happy m if he has not done so a great many times* e/ *Even a Jew says "That Repentance may be weighty*

*as any sacrifice"* f/ *Have you spoke Evil of any m? Speak well of him for Jndura. Have you over*

*any m? Make him Satisfaction Have you been Drunk? Then Fast.*

those faculties, by which these *truths* are apprehended, is to shut them out, as being not what they are <sup>a</sup>.

And moreover, by the enlargement of our rational faculties we become *more rational*; that is, we advance our natures <sup>b</sup>, and become more attentive to *rational enjoyments*.

The *ordinary* means indeed of improving our minds are the instruction of able men, reading, observation, meditation: but every man has not proper *opportunities*, or *capacity* for these, or but in some low degree; and no man is obliged beyond his abilities, and opportunities (by sect. IV. prop. II.) Therefore that mollification is added, *by such means, &c.*

Beside *health*, a comfortable and suitable provision of *externals* is so necessary to the well-being of the *whole man*, that without it the rational part cannot dwell easy, all pursuits of knowledge will be liable to interruption, and improvements (commonly) imperfect <sup>c</sup>. And so *reason* itself (which cannot betray its own interest) must for its own sake concur in seeking and promoting that, which tends to the preservation and happiness of the *whole*. But the doing of this ingrosses time and industry; and before that which is sought can be obtained (if it is ever obtained), probably the *use* of it is lost: except where men live by the profession of some part of learning.

And as to them who are *more free* from worldly cares, or whose business and employment brings them into a stricter acquaintance with letters, after all their endeavours (such is the great variety of human circumstances in *other respects*) they must be contented with several *degrees* and *portions* of knowledge. Some are blest with clean and strong constitutions, early instructions and other helps, succeeding encouragements, useful acquaintance, and freedom from disturbance: whilst others, under an ill state of body, or other disadvantages, are forced to be their own guides, and make their way as well as they can.

But notwithstanding all this, every man may *in some degree or other* endeavour to cultivate his nature, and possess himself of useful truths. And not to do this is (again) to cast off *reason* (which never can be *reasonable*), apostatize from humanity, and recoil into the bestial life <sup>d</sup>.

<sup>a</sup> And perhaps as if our own minds were not what they are. For πάντες ἄνθρωποι τὸ εἶδέναι ὁρῶνται φύσει. *Arist.*

<sup>b</sup> *Aristotle* being asked, what he got by philosophy, answered, τὸ ἀντιπάρταως ποιεῖν ἢ τινες ἀγῶνι τὸ δὲ τῶν νόμων φόβον ποιῶσιν. And another time, how the learned differed from the unlearned, said; Ὅσοι οἱ ζῶντες τὴν παιδείαν ἔλαβον ἐν μὲν εὐτυχίαις εἶναι κόσμον, ἐν ταῖς ἀτυχίαις καταφυγὴν. *D. Laert.*

<sup>c</sup> Ἀδύνατον γὰρ, ἢ ἔραδιον, τὰ καλὰ πράττειν ἀχορήγητον ἔντα· πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ πρᾶττεται καθάπερ δι' ἐργάνων, κτλ. *Arist.*

<sup>d</sup> Nam fuit quoddam tempus, cum in agris homines passim bestiarum modo vagabantur, &c. *Cic.*

as much as the living do from Learning. He said, was an Ornament to Men. 7. He when they were in Prosperity, & a Refuge for them to flee to when they were in Adversity  
It is impossible at least it is very difficult for a Man to do much good, if he want of Necessaries of Life, for many things are done as it were by Instrument. *Arist.*



a 7. He must attend to instruction<sup>a</sup>, and even ask advice; especially in matters of consequence. Not to do this is to deny, that his faculties are limited and defective, or that he is fallible (which is contrary to that, which he is presumed to be conscious of); and perhaps, that it is possible for another to know what he doth not.

Advice every man is capable of hearing, and the meaner a man's own improvements are, the more doth truth press him to submit to the counsel and opinions of others. Nor is every one only capable, but every one wants upon some occasions to be informed. In how many countrey affairs must the scholar take the rustic for his master? In how many other men of business, traders and mechanics? And on the other side, in respect of how many things does the generality of the world want to be taught by them, who are learned and honest?

There is or should be a commerce or interchange of counsel and knowledge, as well as of other things: and where men have not these of their own growth, they should thankfully receive what may be imported from other quarters.

I do not mean, that a man ought implicitly and blindly to follow the opinion of another<sup>b</sup> (this other being fallible too, as well as himself), unless he has in himself a good reason so to do, which many times happens; but by the assistance of another, and hearing what he has to say, to find out more certainly on which side reason, truth, and happiness (which always keep close together) do lie. And thus it is indeed a man's own reason at last, which governs.

He, who is governed by what another says (or does) without understanding it and making the reason of it his own, is not governed by his own reason, and that is, by no reason that he has. To say one is led by the nose (as we commonly speak<sup>c</sup>) gives immediately the idea of a brute<sup>d</sup>.

c. d. The effect, which Xenocrates's lecture had upon Polemo, is remarkable: *unius orationis saluberrima medicina sanatus, ex infamiganeone maximus philosophus evasit.* Val. M. <sup>b</sup> Likethem,

who submit to their Hhakamim, אפילו יאמרו על ימין שרוא שמאל וכו'. In S. Iqqar. Many more instances might easily be given.

<sup>c</sup> Not only we. Τῆς ῥινὸς ἑλκεῶς was used in the same sense by the Greeks.

<sup>d</sup> Nihil magis praestandum est, quam ne, pecorum ritu, sequamur antecedentium gregem, pergentes non qua eundum est, sed qua itur. Sen. Something may perhaps be expected in this place concerning vogue and fashion, which seem to be public declarations of some general opinion; shewing how far they ought to sway with us. I think, so far as to keep us from being contemned, derided, or marked, where that may lawfully and conveniently be done; especially in respect of trifling and little matters. But further a wise man will scarce mind them.

• That is a good sentence in Demophilus, Ποῖν δὲ κείνους εἶναι καλὰ, καὶ ποῖαν μέλλεις ἀδοξάσειν. Φαῦλον δὲ κρίτης καλὸν πρᾶγματ' ὄχλον. Do those things which you yourself judge to be right, tho' M may have

an ill opinion of you for so doing; for Multitude are very ill judges of what is right? Lastly,

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Lastly, *He must labor to clear his mind of those preoccupations and incumbrances which hang about it, and hinder him from reasoning freely, and judging impartially.* We set out in life from such poor beginnings of knowledge, and grow up under such remains of superstition and ignorance, such influences of company and fashion, such insinuations of pleasure, &c. that it is no wonder, if men get habits of thinking only in *one way*; that these habits in time grow confirmed and obstinate; and so their minds come to be overcast with thick *prejudices*, scarce penetrable by any ray of truth or light of reason. He therefore, who would use his rational faculties, must in the first place disentangle them, and render them *fit* to be used: and he, who doth not do this, doth hereby declare, that he doth not *intend* to use them; that is, he proclaims himself *irrational*, contrary to truth, if supposition the fourth be *true*.

The sum of all is this: it is the duty of every *man*, if that word expresses such a being as is before described, to behave himself in all respects (which I cannot pretend to enumerate) as far as he is able according to reason. And from hence it will follow, further, that,

IV. *Every man is obliged to live virtuously and piously.* Because to practice reason<sup>a</sup>, and truth<sup>b</sup> is to live after that manner. For from the contents of the foregoing sections it is apparent, that one cannot practice reason (or act according to truth) without behaving himself *reverently* and *dutifully* toward that Almighty being, on whom he depends; nor without *justice* and a tender regard to the properties of other men: that is, unless his enjoyments be free from impiety, virtuous and harmless. And as to those virtues, which respect a *man's self*, the same thing<sup>c</sup> will be as apparent, when I have told what I mean by some of the *principal* ones.

*Prudence*, the queen of virtues, is nothing but choosing (after things<sup>d</sup> have been duly weighd) and using the most reasonable means to obtain some end, that is reasonable. This is therefore *directly* the exercise of reason.

*Temperance* permits us to take meat and drink not only as phyfic for hunger and thirst, but also as an *innocent cordial* and fortifier against the evils of life, or even sometimes, reason not refusing that liberty, merely as matter of *pleasure*. It only confines us to such *kinds, quantities, and seasons*, as may best consist with our health<sup>e</sup>.

*Ipsa virtus brevissime recta ratio dici potest. Cic. Qua non aliud est quam recta ratio. Sen. Idem esse dicebat Socrates veritatem & virtutem. Id. Viz. That a man cannot practise reason without practising them. d Tà τ' ἰόντα, τὰ τ' ἰσόμενα, πρὸς τ' ἰόντα. e That saying of Timotheus to Plato, with whom he had supped the night before in the Academy, should be remembered. Ἰππίς ἐν δυνείῳ—εἰς τὴν ὑπερῶν—ἡμέραν. Ap. Athen. This Supper will be of great use to us to-morrow the*

*(the conversation we have had)*



a the use of our faculties<sup>a</sup>, our fortune, &c. and shew, that we do not think our selves made only to eat and drink here<sup>b</sup>; that is, such as speak us to be *what we are*.

Chastity does not pretend to *extinguish* our tender passions, or cancel one part of our nature: it only bids us not to indulge them against *reason* and *truth*<sup>c</sup>; not give up the *man* to humor the *brute*<sup>d</sup>; nor hurt *others* to please *our selves*; to divert our inclinations by business, or some honest amusement, till we can gratify them *lawfully, conveniently, regularly*<sup>e</sup>; and even then to participate of the mysteries of love with *modesty*, as within a veil or sacred inclosure, not with a canine impudence<sup>f</sup>.

Frugality indeed looks forward, and round about; not only considers the man himself, but compassionates his *family*; knows, that, when the exactest computation is made that can be beforehand, there will still be found many unforeseen *defiderata* in the calendar of his expences; is *apprehensive* of the world, and accidents, and new occasions, that may arise, tho they are not yet in being<sup>g</sup>; and therefore endeavours wisely to lay in as much, as may give him some kind of security against *future* wants and casualties, without which provision no man, whose sense is not quite lost, or circumscribed within the present minute, can be very easy<sup>h</sup>. To this end it not only cuts off all *profusion* and *extravagance*, but even deducts something from that, which according to the present appearance might be *afforded*<sup>i</sup>; and chooses rather that he should live upon half allowance now, than be exposed (or expose any body else) to the danger of starving hereafter<sup>k</sup>, when full meals and former plenty shall make poverty and fasting more insupportable. But still it forbids no instance of *generosity*, or even *magnificence*, which is agreeable to the man's station and circumstances, or (which is tantamount) to the *truth* of his case<sup>l</sup>.

<sup>a</sup> Corpus onustum Hesternis vitis animum q: oq; pragravat una, &c. Hor.

<sup>b</sup> Quibus in solo vivendi causa palato est. Juv. Sic prandete commilitones tanquam apud inferos canaturi (Leonid. ap. Val. M.) may be turned to a general memento, no man knowing, how near his death may be.

<sup>c</sup> Τις ἴδης; — καλῶν; Ἐπαγῆς τὸ κανόνα. Arr.

<sup>d</sup> Venerem incertam rapientes, more ferarum Hor.

<sup>e</sup> In which words are comprehended *naturally* (Τὸ μὴ τὰς παρὰ φύσιν ἡδονὰς διώκειν).

<sup>f</sup> Not as Crates and Hipparchia (of whom see Diog. L. Sext. Emp. & al.), and indeed

the Cynics in general are said to have done: quibus in propatulo coire cum conjugibus mos fuit.

Lactant. Of whom therefore Cicero says with good reason, Cynicorum ratio [al. natio] tota est efficienda. Est enim inimica verecundia, sine qua nihil rectum esse potest, nihil honestum. נב' יחנן לנ

נענען [נב' יחנן]. S. Hhas. That in Herodotus, Ἀρμα κιθῶνι ἐνδουμένῳ συνεκδοῦται ἔτι τὴν αἰδῶν γυναι

ought not to be true. Verecundiâ naturali habent provisum lupanaria ipsa secretum. Aug. <sup>g</sup> Εἰς

<sup>h</sup> Simonides was wont to say, Βυλοῖμην ἐν δόμῳ. We consider

<sup>i</sup> Non intelligunt homines quàm

<sup>k</sup> Like them, who ἐν τῇ νιότητι τὰ ἔργα ἡρώεως ἐφ' ὅδ' αὖτε προ-

καταναλίσκονται, as in Athen. <sup>l</sup> Ea liberalitate utamur, quæ profit amicis, noceat nemini.

Cic.

After

After

After

After

After

After

After

After

After

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After the same manner I might proceed upon other *particular* virtues. But my notion of them must by this time be sufficiently understood: and therefore I shall only give this *general* advice. That you may take the truer prospect of any act, place your self in your imagination *beyond it* (beyond it in time), and suppose it *already done*, and then see how it looks; always remembering, that a long *repentance* is a disproportionate price for a *short enjoymēt*. Or, fancy it done by some *other man*, and then view it in that *speculum*: we are commonly sharper-sighted in discerning the faults of others, than of our selves<sup>a</sup>. And further, as to those *virtues*, which are said to consist in the mean, it may be sometimes safer to incline a *little more* to one of the *extremes*, than to the other: as, rather to stinginess, than prodigality; rather to inflexibility, and even a *degree* of ill nature, than to dangerous complaisance, or easiness in respect of vice, and such things as may be hurtful; and so on<sup>b</sup>.

Since then to live *virtuously* is to practise *reason* and act conformably to *truth*, he, who lives so, must be *ultimately happy*, by sect. II. prop. XIV. and therefore not only the commands of reason, but even the desire of happiness (a motive, that cannot but work strongly upon all who *think*) will oblige a man to live so.

It may be collected even from *experience*, that the *virtuous life* compared with the *contrary*, if one looks no further than the present state, is the *happier life*<sup>c</sup>; or, that the virtuous pleasures, when the whole account is made up, are the truer<sup>d</sup>. Who sees not, that the *vitious* life is full of dangers and solitudes, and usually ends ill; perhaps in rottenness and rags, or at least in a peevish and despicable discontent<sup>e</sup>?

I am not of opinion, that *virtue* can make a man happy upon a rack<sup>f</sup>, under a violent fit of the stone, or the like<sup>g</sup>; or that *virtue* and *prudence* can always exempt him from wants and sufferings, mend a strait fortune, or rectify an ill constitution.

*Non est incommodum, quale quodq; — sit, ex aliis judicare: ut si quid dedecet in aliis, vitemus & ipsi. Fit enim nescio quo modo, ut magis in aliis cernamus, quam in nobismet ipsis, si quid delinquitur.* Cic.<sup>h</sup>

<sup>b</sup> Οἷον, ἐν δειπνῷ προπίνει τις ἄδην ἔχει; μὴ δυσωπηθῇς, μὴδὲ προσβιάσῃ σκευτὸν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ποτήριον, κλ. *Plut.* <sup>c</sup> Even Epicurus himself ἀχάριστον φησὶ τὴν ἡδονῆς τὴν ἀρετὴν μόνην and ἀλφ' τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰς ἀρετὰς διὰ ἀρετῶν. *Diog. L.* <sup>d</sup> Isocrates gives one reason for this, where he compares vitious pleasures with virtue. Ἐκεί μὲν πρῶτον ἡδόναις, ὅτερον εὐλυπιδιῶν ἐνταῦθα ὅ μὲν τὰς λύπας τὰς ἡδονὰς ἔχομεν.

<sup>e</sup> Whereas virtue is ἐφ' ὅδιον πρὸς γῆρας. *Like provisions will maintain us till we are old.*

<sup>f</sup> For who can bear such rants as that, Epicurus ait, sapientem, si in Phalaridis tauro peruratur, exclamaturum, Dulce est, & ad me nihil pertinet? Sen. Tully reports the same.

<sup>g</sup> It is in the power of very few to act like him, qui dum varices exsecandas praberet, legere librum perseveravit: or him, qui non desit ridere, cum ob hoc ipsum irati tortores omnia instrumenta crudelitatis experirentur. Sen.

<sup>h</sup> That it is virtue only ὅτι ἐκείνη ἐστὶν ἀρετή — A a stand w<sup>th</sup> Pleasure? & yet we ought to choose virtue for the sake of such Pleasure *Diog. Laert.*

<sup>i</sup> In 3 One case we have the Pleasure first & uneasiness afterwards, viz O' case (y<sup>t</sup> of Virtue) we have the uneasiness first, & Pleasure afterwards.

<sup>j</sup> That it is virtue only ὅτι ἐκείνη ἐστὶν ἀρετή — A a stand w<sup>th</sup> Pleasure? & yet we ought to choose virtue for the sake of such Pleasure *Diog. Laert.*



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tion : amidst so many enemies to virtue, so many infirmities as attend life, he cannot but be *sometimes affected*. But I have said, and say again, that the *natural* and *usual* effect of virtue is happiness ; and if a virtuous man should in some respects be unhappy, yet still his virtue will make him *less unhappy* : for at least he enjoys inward tranquillity, and a breast conscious of no evil. And which kind of life I pray ought one to prefer : that, which *naturally* tends to *happiness*, tho it may be disturbed ; or that, which *naturally* tends to *unhappiness* ? In brief, *virtue* will make a man *here*, in any given circumstances, as happy as a man can be in those circumstances : or however it will make him happy *hereafter* in some other state : for *ultimately*, all taken together, happy he *must be*.

Some may possibly wonder, why among virtues I have not so much as once named one of the *cardinal*, and the only one perhaps which they pretend to : I mean *fortitude*. That *that*, by which so many heroes have triumphed over enemies, even the greatest, *death itself* ; *that*, which distinguishes nations, raises empires, has been the grand theme of almost all wits, attracts all eyes, opens all mouths, and assumes the name of *virtue* by way of excellence ; that *this* should be forgot !

To atone for this omission I will make this *appendix* to the foregoing brief account. If *fortitude* be taken for natural courage (*i. e.* strength, activity, plenty of spirits, and a contempt of dangers resulting from these), this is constitution and the *gift of God*<sup>a</sup>, not any *virtue* in us : because if it be *our* virtue, it must consist in something, which *we* produce, or do our selves<sup>b</sup>. The case is the same with that of fine features and complexion, a large inheritance, or strong walls, which may indeed be *great advantages*, but were never called *virtues*<sup>c</sup>. To *have these* is not virtue ; but to *use them rightly*, or according to reason, if we have them.

That this is justly said, may perhaps appear from what is to be said on the *other side*. It may be a man's *misfortune*, that he has not more courage, a greater stock of spirits, firmer health, and stronger limbs, if he has a just occasion to use them ; but it never can be reckoned a *vice* or fault not to *use* what he *has not* : for otherwise it might be a crime not to be able to carry ten thousand pound weight, or outrun a cannon-ball.

<sup>a</sup> Εἰ μάλ' α κατ' ἑστέ, Διὸς πε σοὶ τὸν ἰδωκεν. Hom.

<sup>b</sup> Propter virtutem jure laudamur, &

in virtute recte gloriamur. Quod non contingeret, si id donum à deo, non à nobis haberemus. Cic.

<sup>c</sup> As that word is used here. For when it is used as in that ap. Luc. Ἀπὸ μὲν σώματος ἰχθὺς, and the like passages, it has another meaning. *Virtue is the strength of Body*

a/ If you are a very valiant m, yet 'tis the gift of God that you are so

a/ If you

b/ If you  
c/ If you  
d/ If you

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*Fortitude* considered as a *virtue* consists in standing and endeavouring to overcome dangers and oppositions, when they cannot be avoided without the violation of *reason* and *truth*. Here it is, that he, who is endowd with natural bravery, a healthful constitution, good bones and muscles, ought to *use* them, and be *thankful* to the *Doner*: and he who is not so favor'd, must yet do *what he can*: if he cannot conquer, he must endeavour to be patient and prudent. And thus he, who is naturally timorous, or weak, or otherwise infirm, *may* have as much, or more of the *virtue* of fortitude, than the *hero* himself; who apprehends little, and feels little, compared with the other, or *possibly* may find pleasure in a scene of dangerous action.

If a man can *prevent*, or *escape* any peril or trouble, *salvâ veritate*, he ought to do it: otherwise he neither considers *himself*, nor *them* as being what they are; them not as *unnecessary*, himself not as capable of *being hurt* by them; and so dashes against truth on the worse side <sup>a</sup>. But where that cannot be done, he must exert himself according to his *abilities*, whether *great* or *little*, and refer the success to the Divine providence. This is the true *virtue* of *fortitude*, which is nothing but *endeavouring* firmly and honestly to act as *truth requires*; and therefore is directly deducible from that notion, on which we have founded the morality of human acts.

It has for its *object* not only adversaries, noxious animals, and bold undertakings, but in general all the *evils of life* <sup>b</sup>; which a man must labor by prudence to ward off, and where this cannot be done to bear with resignation, decency, and an humble expectation of an adjustment of all events in a *future state*: the belief of which I am now going to prove, *in my manner*, to be no vain nor groundless conceit.

V. Every one, that finds himself as before in prop. I. finds in himself at the same time a consciousness of his own existence and acts (which is life), with a power of apprehending, thinking, reasoning, willing, beginning and stopping many kinds and degrees of motion in his own members, &c. <sup>c</sup>. He, who has not these powers, has no power to dispute this with me: therefore I can perceive no room for any dispute here, unless it be concerning the power of *beginning motion*. For they, who say there is always the same quantity of motion in the world, must not allow the production of any *new*; and therefore must suppose the animal spirits not to

<sup>a</sup> Guide the Ship on the Outside of the Smoke & Waves

<sup>a</sup> Κατὰ τὴν καὶ κόματ' ἐκτὸς ἔργε Νῆα. Hom. <sup>b</sup> Εἰσὶ δ' οἱ καὶ ἐν οὐκίᾳ διατρέχοντες, ἃ σαρμάτων αὐτοῖς ἢ μακρῶν νόσος, ἢ ἐπιτόνῃ γῆρᾳ κατεσκελετωμένων, — πῶ' ἀληθῆ διαπονῶσιν ἀνδρῶν, ἀσκηταὶ σοφίας ὄντες. Ph. 7. Non in viribus corporis & lacertis tantummodo fortitudinis gloria est, sed magis in virtute animi. — Fure ea fortitudo vocatur, quando unusquisque seipsum vincit, iram continet, nullis illecebris emolli ut atque inflectitur, non adversis perturbatur, non extollitur secundis, &c. S. Ambr. <sup>c</sup> Qui se ipse norit, primum aliquid sentiet se habere divinum, &c. Cic.

<sup>b</sup> There are some who live retired in their own A a 2 Houses, who have their bodies reduced to mere skeletons, either by wasting Diseases or laborious Old Age; They who labour for true Courage, are such as exercise themselves in true Wisdom



be put into motion by the mind, but only being already in motion to receive from it their directions into these or those canals, according as it intends to move this or that limb. But to this may be answerd, that, if the mind can give these *new directions* and turns to the spirits, this serves my purpose as well, and what I intend will follow as well from it. And besides, it could not do this, if it could not excite those spirits being at rest.

It is plain I can *move* my hand upward or downward or horizontally, faster or slower or not at all, or stop it when it is in motion, *just as I will*. Now if my hand and those parts and spirits, by which it is put into motion, were left to be governed by the law of gravitation, or by any motions already imprest upon them, the effects would be *determin'd* by rules of mechanism, and be *necessary*: the motion or rest of my hand would not attend upon *my will*, and be alterable upon a thought at *my pleasure*. If then I have (as I am sensible I have) a *power of moving* my hand in a manner, which it would not move in by those laws, that mere bodies already in motion or under the force of gravitation would observe, this motion depends solely upon *my will*, and *begins* there <sup>a</sup>.

VI. *That, which in man is the subject or suppositum of self-consciousness, thinks, and has the foresaid faculties, must be something different from his body or carcass.*

For, first, he doth not I suppose find himself to think, see, hear, &c. *all over*, in any part of his body: but the seat of cogitation and reflexion he finds in his *head* <sup>b</sup>: and the nerves, by which the knowledge of external objects are convey'd to him, *all* tend to the same place. It is plainly something, which resides *there* <sup>c</sup>, in the region of the brain, that by the mediation of these nerves governs the body and moves the parts of it (as by so many reins, or wires) <sup>d</sup>, feels what is done to it, sees through the eyes, hears through the ears, &c. <sup>e</sup>.

*a/ If the body be not moved by something external, as things inanimate are; or if it has not a natural motion, as fire has, it is manifest, that it must be moved by something else.*

<sup>a</sup> Εἰ μήτις ἔξωθεν κινῆται [τὸ σῶμα] ὡς τὰ ἀψυχα, μήτις φυσικῶς ὡς τὸ πῦρ, δῆλον ὅτι ὑπὸ ψυχῆς κινῆται, κλ. Greg. Thaum.

<sup>b</sup> Which, ὡς ἐπὶ τῷ, δίκως ἐστὶ τὸ αἰσθῆσαι. Artem.

<sup>c</sup> Ὅπερ ὁ

*b/ as it were seat of sensation*

βασιλεὺς, ἐκτὶ καὶ οἱ δορυφόροι· δορυφόροι δὲ αἰσθήσεις τῆς νῦν, καὶ κεφαλὴν ἔσται. Ph. 7.

<sup>d</sup> Τὰ

<sup>e</sup> Nos ne nunc quidem oculis cernimus ea, quae videmus: neque enim est ullus sensus in corpore, sed—via quasi quadam sunt ad oculos, ad aures, ad nares à sede animi perforata. Itaque saepe aut cogitatione, aut aliqua vi morbi impediti, apertis atque integris & oculis & auribus, nec videmus, nec audimus: ut facile intelligi possit, animum & videre, & audire, non eas partes, quae quasi fenestrae sunt animi: quibus tamen sentire nihil queat mens, nisi id agat, & adsit, Cic.

*c/ Were it is, there are his guards also; how senses are guards of mind, & these are about head*

*d/ The members of body are not endowed with Reason, but, as soon as, any Appetites arise, the Reason Upon direction as a Bridle, & all things are regulated, adjusted & submit to it.*

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Upon amputation of a limb <sup>a</sup> this thing (whatever it is) is not found to be *diminished* <sup>b</sup>, nor any of its faculties *lost*. Its *sphere* of acting, while it is confined to the body, is only contracted, and part of its *instrument* lost. It cannot make use of that which is not, or which it has not.

If the *eyes* be shut, or the *ears* stopt, it cannot then see, or hear: but remove the obstruction, and it instantly appears that the *faculty*, by which it apprehends the impressions made upon the organs of sensation, remaind all that while intire; and that so it might have done, if the eyes, or ears had *never* been opened again; or, if the eyes had been out, or the ears quite disabled. This shews in general, that, when any *sense* or *faculty* seems to be impaired or lost by any bodily hurt, after a fever; or through age, this doth not come to pass, because it is *the body* that perceives and has these faculties in itself; but because the body loses its *instrumentality*, and gives that which is the *true subject* of these faculties no *opportunity* of exerting them, or of exerting them *well*: tho it *retains* them as much as in the case before, when the eyes or ears were only shut <sup>c</sup>. Thus distinct are it and its faculties from the body and its affections. I will now call it the *soul*.

Again, as a man peruses and *considers* his own *body*, doth it not undeniably appear to be something different from the *considerer*? And when he uses this expression *my body*, or *the body of me*, may it not properly be demanded, who is meant by *me*, or what *my* relates to? It cannot be the *body* itself: that cannot say of itself, *it is my body*, or *the body of me*. And yet this way of speaking we naturally fall into, from an inward and habitual sense of our selves, and what we are, even tho we do not advert upon it.

What I mean is this. A *man* being supposed a *person* consisting of *two* parts, soul and body, the *whole person* may say of this or that part of him, *the soul of me*, or *the body of me*: but if he was either *all soul*, or *all body*, and nothing else, he could not then speak in this manner: because it would be the same as to say *the soul of the soul*, or *the body of the body*, or *the I of me*. The pronoun therefore (in that saying *my body*, or *the body of me*) must stand for something else, to which the body belongs <sup>d</sup>; or at least for something, of which it is only a part, <sup>d</sup> viz. the person of the *whole man* <sup>e</sup>. And then even this implies, that there is another part of him, which is not *body*.

<sup>a</sup> Or even *detraeto corpore multo*, as *Lucretius* speaks. <sup>b</sup> Πολλάκις καὶ τῶν χειρῶν καὶ τῶν ποδῶν ἐκκομμέναν, ὁλόκληρον ἐκίνη [ἢ ψυχὴν] μένει. *Chryf.* <sup>c</sup> Therefore *Aristotle* says, if an old man had a young man's eye, βλέπει ὡς ὁ νεώτερος. "Ὡς τὸ γῆρας, καὶ τῶν τῶν ψυχῶν πεπονθέναι τι, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ τὸν ὡς νεώτερος καὶ νόσος, κτλ. <sup>d</sup> *Hierocles* (with others) accounts the soul to be the true man. Σὺ γὰρ εἶ ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ δὲ σῶμα σόν. <sup>e</sup> So *Plato* uses *ἄνθρωπος* for the whole of the man; by which the soul, as one part of it, is called *κτῆμα*.

*very often when Hands & Legs are cut off, yet the Soul remains entire*  
*He would see like a young m. So that in old age Soul is not affected; but is inf same*  
*in Drink, or in any Distemper*



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a/ It is plain there are two *different interests* in men<sup>a</sup>, on the one side reason, on the other passion: which, being many times directly *opposite*, must belong to *different subjects*. There are upon many occasions contests, and as it were wars between the *mind* and the *body*: so far are they from being the *same* thing.

Lastly, there is we may perceive *something within us*, which supports the body (keeps it up), directs its motion for the better preservation of it, when any hurts or evils befall it, finds out the means of its cure, and the like; without which it would fall to the ground, and undergo the fate of common matter. The *body* therefore must be considerd as being under the *direction* and *tuition* of some other thing, which is (or should be) the governor of it, and consequently upon this account must be concluded to be *different* from it.

b/ VII. *The soul cannot be mere matter.* For if it is, then either *all matter* must think; or the difference must arise from the different *modification*, *magnitudes*, *figure*, or *motion*<sup>b</sup> of some parcels of matter in respect of others; or a faculty of thinking must be *superadded* to some systems of it, which is not superadded to others. But,

In the first place, that position, which makes *all matter* to be cogitative, is contrary to all the apprehensions and knowledge we have of the nature of it; nor can it be true, unless our senses and faculties be contrived only to *deceive* us. We perceive not the least symptom of *cogitation*, or *sense* in our tables, chairs, &c.

Why doth the scene of thinking lie in our *heads*, and all the ministers of sensation make their reports to something *there*, if *all matter* be apprehensive, and cogitative? For in that case there would be as much thought and understanding in our *heels*, and every where else, as in our *heads*.

If *all matter* be cogitative, then it must be so *quatenus matter*, and thinking must be of the essence and definition of it: whereas by *matter* no more is meant but a substance extended and impenetrable to other matter. And since, for this reason, it cannot be *necessary* for matter to think (because it may be matter without this property), it cannot think as *matter only*.

If it did, we should not only *continue* to think always, till the matter of which we consist is annihilated, and so the assertor of this doctrine would stumble upon

a/ It is Evidently there is something in us besides Reason, with Wars against Contradict Reason.

<sup>a</sup> Φάνεται ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλλό τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον πνευκός, ὃ μάχεται τε ἔναντι αὐτοῦ τῷ λόγῳ. *Arist.*

<sup>b</sup> Whether any form, modification, or motion of matter can be a human soul, seems to be much such another question as that in one of *Seneca's* epistles, *An justitia, an fortitudo, prudentia, ceteraque virtutes, animalia sint.*

immor-

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immortality unawares; but we must also have thought always *in time past*, ever since that matter was in being; nor could there be any the least intermission of *actual thinking*: which does not appear to be our case.

If thinking, self-consciousness, &c. were *essential* to matter, *every part* of it must have them: and then no *system* could have them. For a system of material parts would be a system of things conscious *every one by itself* of its own existence and individuality, and consequently thinking *by itself*: but there could be no *one act* of self-consciousness or thought common to the *whole*. Juxtaposition in this case could signify nothing: the distinction and individuation of the several particles would be as much retained in their vicinity, as if they were separated by miles.

In the next place, the faculties of thinking, &c. cannot arise from the *size, figure, texture, or motion* of it: because bodies by the alteration of these only become greater or less; round or square, &c. rare, or dense; translated from one place to another with this or that new direction, or velocity; or the like: all which *ideas* are quite different from that of *thinking*; there can be *no relation* between them<sup>a</sup>. These modifications and affections of matter are so far from being *principles* or *causes* of thinking and acting, that they are themselves but *effects*, proceeding from the action of some other matter or thing upon it, and are proofs of its passivity, deadness, and utter incapacity of becoming *cogitative*. This is evident to sense.

They, who place the essence of the soul in a certain *motion* given to some matter (if any such men there really be) should consider, among many other things, that to *move* the body spontaneously is one of the faculties of the soul<sup>b</sup>; and that this, which is the same with the *power of beginning motion*, cannot come from *motion already begun*, and imprest *ab extra*.

Let the materialist examine well, whether he does not feel something within himself, that acts from an *internal principle*: whether he doth not experience some *liberty* some power of governing himself, and *choosing*: whether he does not enjoy a kind of *invisible empire*, in which he commands his own thoughts, sends them to this or that place, employs them about this or that business<sup>c</sup>, forms such and such

<sup>a</sup> Νῦν εἰδὲν σῶμα γενεῖ· πῶς ᾧ ἂν τὰ ἀνόητα νοῦν γενήσιν. Sallust.

<sup>b</sup> That the soul is the principle of motion, or that which begins it in us, is (tho it wants no testimony) often said by the ancients. Φασὶ γὰρ ἦναι, καὶ μάλιστα, ἡ πρώτη ψυχὴ εἶναι τὸ κινῶν. Arist. Ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ ἐνδοθεὶ, κινῶν τὰ σώματα, καὶ αὐτοκίνητον. Simpl. Ἀρχὴ κινήσεως. Plotin.

<sup>c</sup> Ἡ ψυχὴ περιέσσι πᾶσαι γῆν, ἐκ γῆς ἐπ' οὐρανόν, κλ. Max. I.

<sup>a</sup> Nobody can produce a Mind, for how can Understanding come out of that which has no Understanding.

<sup>b</sup> Some affirm that Soul is the Chief & first Mover. Arist. This Soul that moves Body from within, & is a Self-moving Being. Simpl. The Principle of Motion.

<sup>c</sup> The Soul can take a view over the whole Earth, & ascend from thence into Heaven.

designs.



a designs and schemes: and whether there is any thing like this in *bare matter*<sup>a</sup>, however fashion'd, or proportion'd; which, if nothing should protrude or communicate motion to it, would for ever remain fixt to the place where it happens to be, an eternal monument of its own being dead. Can such an *active* being as the *soul* is<sup>b</sup>, the subject of *so many powers*, be itself nothing but an *accident*?

When I begin to *move* my self, I do it for some *reason*, and with respect to some *end*, the *means* to effect which I have, if there be occasion for it, concerted within my self: and this doth not at all look like motion *merely material* (or, in which *matter* is only concern'd), which is all mechanical. Who can imagine *matter* to be moved by *arguments*, or ever placed *sylogisms* and *demonstrations* among levers and pulleys?

We not only *move* our selves upon reasons, which we find in our selves, but upon reasons imparted by *words* or *writing* from others, or perhaps merely at their desire or bare suggestion. In which case, again, no body sure can imagine, that the *words* spoken or written (the sound in the air, or the strokes on the paper) can by any natural or mechanical *efficiency* cause the reader or hearer to *move* in any determinate manner (or at all). The reason, request, or friendly admonition, which is the true *motive*, can make no impression upon *matter*. It must be some *other kind* of being, that apprehends the force and sense of them.

Do not we see in conversation, how a pleasant thing said makes people break out into *laughter*, a rude thing into *passion*, and so on? These affections cannot be the *physical effects* of the words spoken: because then they would have the same effect, whether they were understood, or not. And this is further demonstrable from hence, that tho the *words* do really contain *nothing*, which is either pleasant, or rude; or perhaps words are thought to be spoken, which are not spoken; yet if they are *apprehended* to do that, or the sound to be otherwise than it was, the effect will be the *same*. It is therefore the *sense* of the words, which is an immaterial thing, that by passing through the *understanding* and causing that, which is the subject of the intellectual faculties, to influence the body, produces these *motions* in the spirits, blood, muscles.

*of The Soul is very quick. for it runs every where*

a What a ridiculous argument for the materiality of the soul is that in Lucretius? *Ubi propellere membra, Conripere ex somno corpus, &c. videtur (Quorum nil fieri sine tactu posse videmus, Nec tactum porro sine corpore); nonne fatendum est Corporeâ naturâ animum constare, animamq; ?* If nothing can move the body, but another body, what moves this? The body might as well move itself, as be moved by one that does.

b Τὰ ψυχῶν ὅς ἐστι πάντες ὅς τεταχῆναι. Thal. ap. Diog. L. Soul is very quick for it runs every where

*There*

They, who can fancy, that *matter* may come to live, think, and act spontaneously, by being reduced to a certain *magnitude*, or having its parts placed after a certain *manner*, or being invested with such a *figure*, or excited by such a particular *motion*: they, I say, would do well to discover to us that *degree* of fineness, that *alteration* in the situation of its parts, &c. at which matter may *begin* to find itself alive and cogitative; and which is the *critical minute*, that introduces these important properties. If they cannot do this, nor have their eye upon any *particular crisis*, it is a sign they have no good reason for what they say. For if they have no reason to charge this change upon any *particular degree* or *difference*, one more than another, they have no reason to charge it upon *any* degree or difference *at all*; and then they have no reason, by which they can prove that such a change is made *at all*. Besides all which, since magnitude, figure, motion are but *accidents* of matter, not *matter*, and only the *substance* is truly matter; and since the *substance* of any one part of matter does not differ from that of another, if *any* matter can be by nature cogitative, *all* must be so. But this we have seen cannot be.

So then in conclusion, if there is any such thing as *matter that thinks*, &c. this must be a particular *privilege* granted to it: that is, a *faculty of thinking* must be *superadded* to certain parts or parcels of it. Which, by the way, must infer the existence of some Being able to confer this faculty; who, when the ineptness of matter has been well considered, cannot appear to be less than *omnipotent*, or God. But the truth is, matter seems not to be *capable* of such improvement, of being made to think. For since it is not of the *essence* of matter, it cannot be *made to be so* without making matter *another kind* of substance from what it is. Nor can it *be made* to arise from any of the modifications or accidents of matter; and in respect of what else can any matter *be made to differ* from other matter.

The *accidents* of matter are so far from being made *by any power* to produce cogitation, that some *even of them* shew it incapable of having a faculty of thinking superadded. The very *divisibility* of it does this. For that which is made to think must either be *one* part, or more *parts* joind together. But we know no such thing as a part of matter purely *one* (or indivisible). It may indeed have pleased the Author of nature, that there should be *atoms*, whose parts are *actually* indiscerpible, and which may be the *principles* of other bodies: but still they consist of *parts*, tho firmly adhering together. And if the seat of cogitation be in *more* parts than one (whether they lie close together, or are loose, or in a state of fluidity, it is the same thing), how can it be avoided, but that either there must be so many several minds, or *thinking substances*, as there are *parts* (and then the consequence, which has been mentiond, would return upon us again);



or else, that there must be *something else* superadded for them to center in, to unite their acts, and make their thoughts to be *one*? And then what can this be, but some other *substance*, which is purely *one*?

*Matter* by itself can never intertain *abstracted* and *general ideas*, such as many in our minds are <sup>a</sup>. For could it reflect upon what passes within itself, it could possibly find there nothing but *material* and *particular* impressions; abstractions and metaphysical ideas could not be printed upon it <sup>b</sup>. How could one abstract from *matter* who is himself nothing but *matter*? And then as to *material* images themselves, which are usually supposed to be impressed upon the brain (or some part of it), and stock the *phantasy* and *memory*, that which peruses the impressions and traces there (or any where) must be something distinct from the *brain*, or *that* upon which these impressions are made: otherwise it must contemplate itself, and be both *reader* and *book*. And this other distinct contemplating *being* cannot be merely corporeal, any more than the body can perceive and think without a soul. For such a corporeal being must require *sense*, and suitable *organs*, to perceive and read these characters and *vestigia* of things; and so another organized body would be introduced, and the same questions and difficulties redoubled, concerning the soul of that body and its faculties <sup>c</sup>.

If my *soul* was mere matter, external visible objects could only be perceived within me according to the *impressions* they make upon matter, and not otherwise. *Ex.gr.* the image of a *cube* in my mind (or my idea of a cube) must be always under some particular *prospect*, and conform to the rules of *perspective*; nor could I otherwise represent it to my self: whereas now I can form an idea of it as it is *in itself*, and almost view all its *hedræ* at once, as it were incompassing it with my mind.

I can within myself *correct* the external appearances and impressions of objects, and advance, upon the reports and hints received by my senses, to form ideas of things that are *not extant* in matter. By seeing a *material circle* I may learn to form the idea of a *circle*, or figure generated by the revolution of a ray about its center: but then recollecting what I know of matter upon other occasions, I can conclude there is no *exact* material circle. So that I have an idea, which perhaps was raised from the hints I received *from without*, but is *not truly* to be found there. If I see a *tower* at a great distance, which according to the impressions made upon my

<sup>a</sup> Diogenes, tho he could see the *table*, and the *pot*, could not by his eyes see Plato's τραπέζης, & κувεδότης. Diog. L.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, & οι σοφοί (more generally) say, that the soul indeed perceives objects of sense by the mediation of the body; but there are νοητά, which it doth καθ' αутην ειδυμιαι. Id.

<sup>c</sup> Such a soul must be indeed as Greg. Thaum. has it, σώμα ἑμψυχον. "Ατοπον ὃ ψυχῆς ψυχὴν λέγειν. an animated Body. For 'tis absurd to speak of the Soul of a

material Soul.

a/ Necessity or Possibility, i.e. He could not see it was that constituted them a Table or a Pot.

meditate upon by itself

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material organs seems *little* and *round*, I do not therefore conclude it to be *either*: there is something within, that reasons upon the circumstances of the appearance, and as it were commands my sense, and corrects the impression: and this must be something superior to matter, since a *material soul* is no otherwise impressible itself, but as *material organs* are. Instances of this kind are endless. (v. p. 53, 54.)

If we know any thing of *matter*, we know, that *by itself* it is a lifeless thing, inert, and passive only; and acts *necessarily* (or rather is acted) according to the laws of motion and gravitation. This passiveness seems to be *essential* to it. And if we know any thing of *our selves*, we know, that we are conscious of our own existence and acts (*i. e.* that we *live*); that we have a degree of *freedom*; that we can move our selves *spontaneously*; and in short, that we can, in many instances, take off the effect of gravitation, and impress new motions upon our spirits (or give them new directions), *only by a thought*. Therefore to make *mere matter* do all this is to change the *nature* of it; to change death into life, incapacity of thinking into cogitativity, necessity into liberty. And to say, that God may *superadd* a faculty of thinking, moving itself, &c. to matter, if by this be meant, that he may make matter to be the *suppositum* of these faculties (that substance, in which they inhere), is the same in effect as to say, that God may superadd a faculty of *thinking* to *incogitativity*, of acting *freely* to *necessity*, and so on. What sense is there in this? And yet so it must be, while matter continues to be matter.

That *faculty of thinking*, so much talked of by some as superadded to certain *systems* of matter, fitly disposed, by virtue of God's omnipotence, tho it be so called, must in *reality* amount to the same thing as another *substance* with the faculty of thinking. For a faculty of thinking *alone* will not make up the idea of a human *soul*, which is indued with *many faculties*; apprehending, reflecting, comparing, judging, making deductions and reasoning, willing, putting the body in motion, continuing the animal functions by its presence, and giving life; and therefore, *whatever it is* that is superadded, it must be *something* which is indued with all those other faculties. And whether that can be a *faculty of thinking*, and so these other faculties be only *faculties of a faculty*<sup>a</sup>; or whether they must not all be rather the faculties of some *sub-*

<sup>a</sup> This is worse than  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$   $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta\varsigma$  in *Max. Tyr.* and the place just before cited. The author of the *Essay conc. Hum. Underst.* has himself exploded it, or what is very like it. To ask, says he, whether the will has freedom, is to ask, whether one power has another power, one ability another ability; a question at first sight too grossly absurd to make a dispute, or need an answer. For who is it that sees not, that powers belong only to agents, and are attributes only of substances, and not of powers themselves? There is, if my memory does not deceive me, another passage some where in the same book as much (or more) to my purpose: but at present I cannot find it.



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*a* *stance*\*, which, being (by their own concession) *superadded* to matter, must be different from it, I do leave the unprejudiced to determin.

If men would but seriously look into themselves, I am persuaded the *soul* would not appear to them as a *faculty* of the body, or kind of *appurtenance* to it; but rather as some *substance*, properly placed in it, not only to use it as an instrument, and act by it, but also to govern it (or the parts of it; as the tongue, hands, feet, &c.) according to its own reason. For I think it is plain enough, that the *mind*, tho it acts under great limitations, doth however in many instances govern the body *arbitrarily*: and it is monstrous to suppose this governor to be nothing but some fit *disposition* or *accident* (superadded) of that matter which is governed. A *ship* it is true would not be fit for *navigation*, if it was not built and provided in a proper manner: but then, when it has its proper form, and is become a *system* of materials fitly disposed, it is not this *disposition* that governs it. It is the *man*, that other substance, who sits at the helm, and they, who manage the sails and tackle, that do this. So *our vessels* without a proper organization and conformity of parts would not be capable of being acted as they are; but still it is not the shape, or modification, or any other accident, that can govern them. The *capacity* of being governed or *used* can never be the *governor*, applying and using <sup>b</sup> that capacity. No there must be at the helm *something distinct*, that commands the body, and without which it would run adrift, or rather sink.

For the foregoing reasons it seems to me, that *matter* cannot think, cannot be made to think. But if a *faculty of thinking* can be superadded to a system of matter, without uniting an immaterial substance to it<sup>c</sup>; I say, if this *can be*, yet a *human body* is not such a system, being plainly void of thought, and organized in such a manner as to transmit the impressions of sensible objects up to the brain, where the *percipient*, and that which *reflects* upon them, certainly resides: and therefore that, which *there* apprehends, thinks, and wills, must be *that system of matter* to which a faculty of thinking is superadded. All the premisses then well considered, judge I beseech you, whether instead of saying, that this *inhabitant* of our heads (the *soul*) is a system of matter, to which a faculty of thinking is superadded, it might not be more reasonable to say, it is a *thinking substance intimately united to some fine material vehicle, which has its residence in the brain*.

\* If the soul is only an accident (or attribute) of the *body*, how comes this accident to have (or be the support of) other accidents, contrary ones too? As when we say, נפש חכמה ונפש סכלה וכו' S. Haemun.

<sup>b</sup> Ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἁπλῶν καὶ τῶν ἁπλῶν. Plato.

<sup>c</sup> Or, if to a thinking sub-

stance can be superadded the modification of solidity. Which way of speaking, tho I do not remember to have met with it any where, nor doth it seem to differ much from the other, yet would please me better.

a wise soul or a foolish soul.

b/c For that which uses, & that which is used are two different things

Tho

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Tho I understand not perfectly the manner, how a *cogitative* and *spiritual* substance can be thus closely united to such a *material* vehicle; yet I can understand this union as well, as how it can be united to the body in general (perhaps, as how the particles of the body itself cohere together), and much better than how a thinking faculty can be superadded to matter: and beside, several *phenomena* may more easily be solved by this *hypothesis*; which (tho I shall not pertinaciously maintain it) in short is this. *Viz.* that the human *soul* is a *cogitative* substance, clothed in a *material* vehicle, or rather united to it, and as it were *inseparably* mixt (I had almost said *incorporated*) with it<sup>a</sup>: that these act in *conjunction*, that, which affects the one, affecting the other: that the *soul* is detain'd in the *body* (the head or brain) by some *sympathy* or *attraction* between this material vehicle and it, till the habitation is spoild, and this mutual tendency interrupted (and perhaps turned into an aversion, that makes it fly off), by some hurt, or disease, or by the decays and ruins of old age, or the like, happening to the body: and that in the *interim* by means of this vehicle motions and impressions are communicated to and from. But of this perhaps something more by and by.

VIII. *The soul of man subsists after the dissolution of his body: or, is immortal.* For,

1. If it is *immaterial*, it is *indiscernible*, and therefore *incapable* of being dissolved or demolish'd, as bodies are<sup>b</sup>. Such a being can only perish by *annihilation*: that is, it will continue to subsist and live, if some other being, able to do this, doth not by a particular act *annihilate* it. And if there is any reason to believe, that at the death of every man there is always such a particular annihilation, let him that knows it produce it. Certainly to reduce any *substance* into *nothing* requires just the same power as to convert *nothing* into *something*: and I fancy they, who deny the immortality of the soul, will be cautious how they admit any such power.

2. If the soul *could* be material; that is, if there could be any *matter*, that might be the subject of those faculties of thinking, willing, &c. yet still, since we cannot but be sensible, that all these are faculties of the *self-same thing*; and that all the several acts of the mind are acts of the *same thing*, each of them *individual* and truly *one*: I say, since it is so, this matter must be so *perfectly united* in itself, so abso-

<sup>a</sup> It is worth our consideration, whether active power be not the proper attribute of spirit, and passive power of matter. Hence may be conjectured, that created spirits are not totally separate from matter, because they are both active and passive. Pure spirit, viz. God, is only active; pure matter is only passive; those Beings, that are both active and passive, we may judge to partake of both. Hum. Underst.

<sup>b</sup> This is Socrates's argument in Plato. The soul is altogether ἀδιάλυτον, and therefore ἀσώρευτον. Which Cicero interprets thus: nec discerpi, nec distrahi potest; nec interire igitur. Indivisible, therefore cannot be destroyed.



lutely *one*, as no matter knowable by us can be. And then the *least* that can be allowd is that it should be truly solid, and not *actually divisible*; that is, such as no *natural cause* could destroy.

To introduce matter with a faculty of thinking, or a *thinking matter*, is to introduce matter with a new and opposite property; and that is to introduce a *new species* of matter<sup>a</sup>, which will differ as essentially from the other common *unthinking* kind, as any species whatsoever doth from its opposite in *scala prædicamentali*, even as *body* doth from *spirit*. For thinking and unthinking differ as corporeal and incorporeal. And if so, this *thinking matter* must always continue to think, till either it is *annihilated*, or there is a *transmutation* of one species into another: and to take refuge in either of these expectations is at least to expect omnipotence should interpose to help out a bad cause.

If any one should say, that God might by virtue of his omnipotence superadd to certain parcels of matter a *fourth dimension*, I should not perhaps dispute the Divine power: but I might say, that such matter, existing under four dimensions, would *essentially* differ from that, which cannot exist under four, or which can exist but *only under three*; and that this four-dimensiond matter must *always* remain such, because no substance can be changed into or become another, essentially different, nor do we know of any, that by the course of nature ceases totally to be, or is reduced to nothing.

3. The next argument shall proceed by way of *objection* and *answer*. Because a removal of the principal objection *against* any thing is a good argument *for it*. *Obj.* It seems as if *thinking* was not essential to the soul, but rather a *capacity of thinking* under certain circumstances. For it doth *not think*, when it lies conceald in the primitive rudiment of the man, in the womb, perhaps in the beginnings of infancy, in sleep, in a swoon: and the reason of this seems to lie in the circumstances of the *body*, which either is not sufficiently extended, and prepared; or for a while employs the spirits wholly in the digestion of its aliment, and other offices in the animal œconomy; or by some external attack, or the working of some enemy got into it, hath its parts disorderd, and the passages so possessd, that the blood and other fluids can scarce break through; or after some such manner is preternaturally affected. And therefore the question to be resolv'd is not, whether the soul is *material* or *immaterial*; and much less, whether it will be *annihilated* at death; but, whether that soul (be it what it will), which ceases to think, when the body is *not fitly disposed*,

<sup>a</sup> *Lucretius* seems to be aware of this. *Fam triplex animi est natura reperta: Nec tamen hac sat sunt ad sensum cuncta creandum, &c. Quarta quoq; his igitur quædam natura necesse est Attribui: ea est omnino nominis experts.*

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can think at all, when the body is *quite dissolved*, and leaves the soul no opportunity of actuating it any more, or operating by it <sup>a</sup>. *Ans.* If this objection cannot be fully answerd, till we know more of the nature of *spiritual* beings, and of that *vinculum*, by which the soul and body are connected, than we do at present, it must not therefore be lookd upon as certainly *unanswerable* in it self; and much less, if only it cannot be answerd *by me*. It may perhaps be possible to turn it even into an argument *for the immortality of the soul*.

The soul it cannot be denied is a limited being, or a being, which acts *under limitations*: these limitations at different times are *different*, its activity and faculties being more obstructed or clogd at *one time* than *another*, and most of all in sleep, or a *deliquium*: as these obstructions are removed, it acts more *clearly* and *freely*: and therefore if the state of the soul in the body (its confinement there) may be considerd as one *general* and *great limitation*, why, when this limitation shall be taken off (this great obstruction removed), may it <sup>b</sup> not be allowd to act with still *greater* freedom and clearness; the *greatest* it is capable of? Whilst it remains in the brain, it can as it were look out at a *few apertures*; that is, receive the notices of many things by those nerves and organs, which are the instruments of *sensation*: but if any of those avenues to it be stopd, that branch of its knowledge is for a time cut off. If those tracks in the brain, or those *marks*, whatever they are, and where ever they are imprinted, upon which our *memory* and *images* of things seem to depend, are filled up or overcast by any vapor, or otherwise darkend, it can read them no more, till the cloud is disperfed. (For it cannot *read* what is not *legible*, and indeed for the present not there.) And since even in *abstracted reflexions* the mind is obliged to make use of *words* <sup>c</sup>, or some kind of signs, to fix its ideas, and to render them tractable and stable enough to be perused, compared, &c. and this kind of *language* depends upon *memory*; whilst this is intermitted, the use of the other is taken away, with all that depends upon it. This is the *present state* of the soul: and from hence the reason appears in some measure, why we do not think in sound *sleep*, &c. but it does not follow from hence, that the soul cannot subsist and act under *more enlarged circumstances*. That, which, being confined to the body, and able to act only according to the op-

<sup>a</sup> If *Lucan* by *sensus* means all manner of apprehension and knowledge, there is no room for that disjunction: *Aut nihil est sensus animis à morte relictum, Aut mors ipsa nihil*. For if the former part be true, the other will follow.

<sup>b</sup> *Velut è diutino carcere emissus [animus]*. Sen.

<sup>c</sup> Those kinds of animals, which do not *speak*, do not *reason*: but those, which do the one, do the other. Therefore מְדַבֵּר (or Arab. ناطق) is a *rational animal*: and λόγιον signifies both *speech* and *reason*, as going together.

*Therest & Living* (for Arab a speaking animal) ya Rahon Animal



portunities this affords, can now perceive visible objects only with *two eyes* (at *a* two windows <sup>a</sup>), because there *are no more*, might doubtless see with *four*, if there were so many properly placed and disposed; or if its habitation were *all eye* (window all round), might see all round. And so, in general, that, which now can know many things by the impressions made at the ends of the nerves, or by the intervention of our present organs, and in this *situation* and *inclosure* can know them no other way, may for all that, when it comes to be *loosed* out of that prison <sup>b</sup>, know them *immediately*, or by some *other medium*. That, which is now forced to make shift with *words* and *signs* of things in its reasonings, may, when it shall be set at liberty and can come at them, reason upon the intuition of *things themselves*, or use a language more *spiritual* or *ideal*. I say, it is not *impossible*, that this should be the case; and therefore no one can say, *with reason*, that it is not: especially, since we find by experience, that the soul is limited; that the limitations are variable; that we know not enough of the nature of spirit to determine, how these limitations are effected: and therefore cannot tell, how far they may be carried on, or taken off. This suffices to *remove the force* of the objection. But further,

A man, when he *wakes*, or *comes to himself* (which phrase implies what I am going to say), immediately knows this, and knows himself to be the *same soul* that he was before his sleep, or fainting away. I will suppose, that he is also conscious to himself, that in those intervals he thought *not at all* (which is the same the objector must suppose): *that is*, if his body had been cut to pieces, or mouldered to dust, he could not have thought *less*: for there is no thinking less than thinking *not at all*. From hence then I gather, that the soul *preserves* a capacity of thinking, &c. under those circumstances and indispositions of the body, in which it thinks *no more*, than if the body was *destroyd*; and that therefore it may, and will *preserve* it, when the body is *destroyd*. And if so, what can this *capacity* be preserved for? Certainly *not*, that it may *never* be exerted. The Author of nature doth not use to act after *that manner*. So that here is this *dilemma* to be opposed to the objection. In sleep and swoonings the soul doth either *think*, or *not*. If it *does*, the objection has no foundation: and if it *doth not*, then all that will follow, which I have just now said.

If we should suppose the *soul* to be a being by nature made to inform some *body*, and that it cannot exist and act in a state of *total separation* from all body; it would not follow from hence, that what we call death, must therefore reduce it

<sup>a</sup> Ουπίδης ἢ ὀφθαλμοὶ ἢ ψυχῆς αἱ ἀπορήσεις. Bas.

Στάτην ἀνθρώπου. Ph. 7.

<sup>b</sup> Ἀναρχὸν ἢ ἀνάπαυσιν ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ παύσει.

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to a state of absolute *insensibility* and *inactivity*, which to it would be equal to *non-existence*. For that *body*, which is so necessary to it, may be some *fine vehicle*, that dwells with it in the brain (according to that *hypothesis* p. 193.) and goes off with it at death. Neither the answers to the objection, nor the case after death will be much altered by such a *supposition*. And since I confess I see no absurdity in it, I will try to explain it a little further. We are sensible of many *material* impressions (impressions made upon us by material causes, or bodies): that there are such we are sure. Therefore there must be *some matter* within us, which being moved or pressed upon, the soul apprehends it *immediately*. And therefore, again, there must be *some matter* to which it is *immediately* and *intimately united*, and *related* in such a manner, as it is *not related* to any other. Let us now suppose this said *matter* to be some refined and spirituous *vehicle*, which the soul doth immediately inform; with which it sympathizes; by which it acts, and is acted upon; and to which it is *vitally* and *inseparably* united: and that this animated vehicle has its abode in the *brain*, among the heads and beginnings of the nerves. Suppose we also, that when any *impressions* are made upon the organs or parts of the body, the effects of them are carried by the *nerves* up to their fountain, and the place, where the soul in its vehicle is; and there they communicate their several motions or tremors to this material *vehicle* (or by their motions, or tendency to motion, press upon it); so that the *soul*, which inhabits it in a peculiar manner, and is thoroughly possess'd of it, shall be apprehensive of these motions or pressures: and moreover, that this *vehicle* so guarded and *incompassed* by the body as it is, can be *come at* or *moved* by external objects no other way, but by the mediation of the nerves; nor the *soul*, by consequence, have any direct intelligence concerning them, or correspondence with them, any *other* way. And as we suppose the *soul* to receive notices of things from without in this manner, so let us suppose, on the other side, that by moving its own *vehicle* it may produce motion in the contiguous *spirits* and *nerves*,

So Hierocles distinguishes τὸ ἀνγοιδὲς ἡμῶν σῶμα, ὃ καὶ ψυχῆς λεπτὸν ὄχημα, from that, which he calls τὸ θνητὸν ἡμῶν σῶμα, and to which the former communicates life. τὰ ἀνγοιδὲς ἡμῶν σώματι προσέφθι σῶμα θνητὸν ὄν. Id. This fine body he calls also ψυχικὸν σῶμα, and πνευματικὸν ὄχημα. In Nishm. bhay. there is much concerning that *fine body*, in which the soul is clothed, and from which it is never to be separated, according to an old tradition. Men. b. Ifr. gives us the sum of it in such words as these. יש גוף רק עד מאד בו מתלבש הנשמה. טרם ביאה לעולם. and afterward, הנשמות המד. בבריאתם הראשונה נקשרות עם גשמים רקים רוחניים מהשבע השמימי בלתי מושגים לחוש הראות. והנשמות לא יתפררו מאותם הגשמים הרקים הרוחניים כל ימי עולם אם קודם בואם לגוף ואם בהיותם עמו וגם אחרי הפרם רק [יותר וך] מן עצם רק עמו; which he says is מן הגלגלים, &c.

in such words as these. There is a very *fine* C c Body, w<sup>ch</sup> the soul is clothed, before it comes into the World, & these Souls at their first Creation, were joined with some thin, spiritual & fleshly Bodies, w<sup>ch</sup> cannot be perceived by the senses. Neither can these thin spiritual Bodies be separated from those souls so long as the World lasts, neither before they come into this (gross) Body nor whilst they remain in it, nor after they are separated from it.



and so move the body: I mean, when nothing renders them unfit to be moved! Let us suppose further, that the *soul* by means of this *vehicle* feels or finds those prints and portraits, or those *effects* and *remains* left by objects on the mind in some manner or other, which cause the *remembrance* of words and things: I mean again, when they are not filled up, or obscured by any thing; or, when there are any such to be felt. And lastly, let us suppose, that if the *soul* in its more *abstracted* and *purser* reasonings, or more spiritual acts, has any occasion for *matter*, to serve it, the matter of this *vehicle* is that which is always with it, and serves it. All which it is easy to understand, and perhaps not very difficult to suppose. On the contrary, by many symptoms it appears most probable, that *that* matter, to which the mind is *immediately* present, and in which is its true *shkinah*, is not the whole gross body, but some *subtile body*, placed (as I have said) in the region of the brain. For *there* all the conveyances of sensible *species* conspire to meet, and *there* in reflexion we find our selves: when a limb is lost, the soul, 'tis true, loses an *opportunity* of receiving intelligence from or by it, and of using it, but perceives no loss *in itself*: and tho the *body*, many parts of it at least, are in a perpetual flux and continually altering, yet I know that the substance, which *thinks* within me *now* (or rather, which is I), is, notwithstanding all the changes my body has undergone, the *very same* which *thought* above fifty years ago, and ever since; when I playd in such a field, went to such a school, was of such a university, performed such and such exercises, &c.<sup>a</sup>. If you would permit me to use a school term, I would say the *egoity*<sup>b</sup> remains. Now to *answer* the objection, and apply all this to our purpose. Why do we not perceive external objects in our *sleep*, or a *fwoon*? Because the *passages* are become impracticable, the *windows* shut, and the *nerves*, being obstructed, or some how renderd for the time useless, can transmit no information to it. Why however does it not reason and think about *something or other*? Because, all the *marks* by which things are remembred being for the present choked up or disorderd, the remembrance of those *objects*, about which it is wont to imploy itself, and even of the *words* (or other signs), in which it uses to reason, and to preserve the deductions and conclusions it makes, is all suspended and lost for the time; and so its tables being coverd, its books closd, and its tools locked up, the requisites for reasoning are wanting, and no subject offers itself, to exercise its thoughts, it having yet had little or no opportunity to

<sup>a</sup> Cum corpora quotidie nostra fluant, & aut crescant aut decrecant, ergo tot erimus homines, quot quotidie commutamur? huc alius fui, cum decem annorum essem; alius, cum triginta; alius cum quinquaginta, alius, cum jam toto cano capite sum? S. Hier. So it must be, if our souls are nothing different from our bodies.      <sup>b</sup> Tully has *Lentulus* and *Appianus*; in the same form, tho not just the like sense.

take in *higher objects* and more *refined matter* for contemplation. And to conclude, if it be demanded, why any one should imagin, that the *soul* may think, perceive, act *after death*, when it doth not do this *in sleep*, &c. the answer is; because those *inclosures* and *impediments*, which occasioned the formentioned intermissions, and those great limitations under which it labors at all times, will be *removed* with its enlargement out of the body. When it shall in its *proper vehicle* be let go, and take its flight into the open fields of heaven, it will then be bare to the *immediate* impressions of objects: and why should not those impressions, which affected the *nerves* that moved and affected the vehicle and soul in it, *affect the vehicle immediately*, when they are *immediately* made upon it, without the interposition of the nerves? The *hand*, which feels an object at the end of a *staff*, may certainly be allowd to feel the same much better by *immediate contact*, without the staff. Nay, why should we not think, that it may admit of *more* objects and the knowledge of more things, than it can now; since being exposed *all round* to the influences of them, it may be moved not only by visible objects just at the extremities of the *optic nerves*, by sounds at the ends of the *auditory*, &c. but become as it were *all eye* to visible objects, *all ear* to audible, and so on? And why should we not think this the rather, because then the *soul* may be also perceptive of *finer* impressions and *ethereal* contacts, and consequently of *more kinds* of objects, such as we are now incapable of knowing? And then, this being so, why should we not presage, that *other indowments*, as faculties of reasoning, communicating thoughts, and the like, will be *proportionable* to such noble opportunities of knowledge? There seems to be nothing in this account *impossible*; and therefore nothing, but what *may be*.

If we do but attend, we must see every where, that *many* things are by ways, which we *do not*, nor *can* understand; and therefore we must be convinced, even from hence, that *more* may be; and therefore that the objection before us, tho we could not salve the *difficulties* in it, and what is supposed here should be all rejected as *chimerical*, yet ought to be no prejudice against the belief of the immortality of the soul, if there is *any* (but *one*) good reason for it.

But if we can in any *tolerable* manner (which in our present circumstances is as much, as can be expected) account for the difficulties objected, and those the *greatest* belonging to this matter, and shew how it is *possible* that they may consist with immortality, this will greatly *corroborate* the arguments for it, if not be one *itself*. This I hope is done: or if I have not spoke directly to *every part* of the objection, from what has been done that defect may easily be supplied.

4. We may conclude the souls of men to be immortal from the *nature of God*. For if he is (which sure no body doubts) a Perfect being, He, as such, can do no-



thing inconsistent with *perfect* or *right reason*. And then no *being*, nor *circumstance* of any being, can come from Him as its cause, which it is not agreeable to *such reason* should be: or (which is the same), He cannot but deal *reasonably* with all His dependents. And then again, if we are in the number of these, and the *mortality* of the human soul does not consist with reason, we may be sure it is *immortal*: as sure as we can be of any thing by the use of our faculties; and that is, as sure as we can be of any thing. Whether therefore that doth *consist* with reason, or *not*, is to be inquired.

To produce a being into a state of *clear happiness*, in any degree, can be no injury to it; or into a state of *mixt happiness*, provided the happiness certainly *overbalances* the contrary, and the unhappy or suffering part be not greater than what that being would *choose* in order to obtain the happiness, or rather than lose it. Nor, again, can any wrong be done by producing a being *subject* to more misery than happiness, if that being hath it in *his own power* to avoid the misery, or so much of it, as may leave the remainder of misery not greater, than what he would rather sustain than miss the proportion of happiness. The only case then, by which wrong can be done in the production of any being, is, when it is *necessarily* and *irremediably* to be *miserable*, without any recompense, or balance of that misery<sup>a</sup>: and this indeed is a case so grievous, so utterly irreconcilable to all *reason*, that the heart of a reasoning and considering man can scarce bear the thought of it. So much every one must understand of the nature of reason and justice as to allow these things for truths incontestable.

Now then he, who says the *soul* of man is *mortal*, must say one of these *two* things: either that God is an unreasonable, unjust, cruel Being; or that no man in respect of this life (which according to him is *all*), has a greater share of misery, *unavoidable*, than of happiness. To say the *former* is to contradict that, which I presume has been proved beyond contradiction. To which I may add here, that this is to avow such an unworthy, impious notion of the *Supreme being*, as one would not entertain without caution even of the *worst of men*; such a one, as even the person himself, who says this, must know to be *false*. For he cannot but see, and must own many instances of the *reasonableness* and *beneficence* of the Deity: not *one* of which could be, if cruelty and unreasonableness were His inclination; since He has power to execute His own inclinations *thoroughly*, and is a Being *uniform* in his nature. Then to say the *latter* is to contradict the *whole story* of mankind, and even *ones own senses*.

<sup>a</sup> That passage in *S. Iqgar*. imports much the same thing, that has been said here: הוּא מְבוֹרָא שֶׁהִדְבֵּר שְׂמִיעָתוֹ טוֹב רָאוּי שִׂמְעָה וְהִדְבֵּר שְׂמִיעָתוֹ רַע אֵין רָאוּי שִׂמְעָה וּמִדָּה שְׂמִיעָתוֹ מְעוּרָב מִן הַטּוֹב וְהָרַע אֵם הַטּוֹב הוּא הַגּוֹבֵר רָאוּי שִׂמְעָה וְאֵם הָרַע הוּא הַגּוֹבֵר אֵין רָאוּי שִׂמְעָה.

*a/ This is Manifest y That thing, whose Existence is good, ought to exist; & That thing, whose Existence is Evil, Consi- ought not to exist  
if the Existence of any thing is made up of a Mixture of good & Evil, if the good prevail it ought to exist; & if Evil prevail it  
ought not to exist!!*

## Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c. 201

Consider well the dreadful effects of many wars, and all those barbarous desolations, which we read of: what cruel tyrants there are, and have been in the world, who (at least in their fits) *divert themselves* with the pangs and convulsions of their fellow-creatures<sup>a</sup>: what *slavery* is<sup>b</sup>, and *how* men have been brought into that lamentable state: how many have been ruined by *accidents* unforeseen: how many have suffered or been undone by *unjust* laws, judges, witnesses, &c.<sup>c</sup> how many have brought *incurable diseases*, or the *causes* of them, and of great torments, into the world with them: how many more, such bodily infirmities and disadvantages, as have rendered their *whole lives* uneasy: how many are born to no other inheritance but *invincible poverty* and trouble? Instances are endless: but, for a *little taste* of the condition of mankind here, reflect upon that story related by *Strabo* (from *Polybius*) and *Plutarch*, where, even by order of the Roman senate, *P. Amylius*, one of the best of them too, at one prefixt hour sacked and destroyed *seventy* cities, unawares, and drove *fifteen myriads* of innocent persons into *captivity*; to be sold, only to raise pay for the merciless soldiers and their own executioners. Peruse that account of the gold-works in the confines of *Egypt* given by *Diodorus*: and think over the circumstances of the unfortunate laborers there, who were not only criminals, or men taken in war, but even such as *calumny*, or *unjust* power had doomed (perhaps for being *too good*) to that place of torment; many times with all their relations

<sup>a</sup> C. Caesar — Senatores & Equites — cecidit, torfit, non quaestionis, sed animi causâ. Deinde quodam ex illis — ad lucernam decollabat. — Torserat per omnia, quæ in rerum natura tristissima sunt, fidiculis, &c. Sen. Homo, sacra res, jam per lusum & jocum occiditur. Id.

<sup>b</sup> Slaves were reckoned among beasts of old. Οὐτε γὰρ γυνὴ πῆφυκος, εὐτ' ἐν ἀνδράσι σὺν γ' ἔστι. Eurip. And sometimes as mere instruments and tools. Ὁ γὰρ δῆλος ἐμψυχον ὄργανον τὸ δ' ὄργανον ἄψυχος δῆλος. Arist. Their sad condition I will set down in *Plato's* words. Οὐκ ἀνδρὸς τὸ τό γ' ἐστὶ τὸ πάθημα, τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἀλλὰ ἀνδραπόδου τινός, ὃ κρείττον τεθνάναι ἐστὶν ἢ ζῆν' ὅστις ἀδικεῖται ἢ προσηλακισζόμενος, μὴ εἴς τε ἐστὶν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν, μηδὲ ἄλλῳ ἢ ἀν κήδηται.

<sup>c</sup> Those ἀρήτοι & ἄπειροι δυσυχίαι, which the *τελώναι* had brought upon the cities of *Asia*, are too many to be transcribed: but some account of them is to be seen in *Plut. v. Luc.* which may serve for one instance out of thousands. It may be reckoned madness indeed, *maximas virtutes, quasi gravissima delicta, punire*; as *Val. M.* says, speaking of *Phocion's* case: but such madness has been very common, and men have suffered even for their virtue. *Ochus* cruelly put to death, *Ochus sororem* —, & *patrum cum centum amplius filiis ac nepotibus* —, *nulla injuria laceratus, sed quòd in his maximam apud Persas probitatis & fortitudinis laudem consistere videbat.* Id. And *Seneca* having recommended the example of *Gracius Julius* (*Julius Gracius*, ap. *Tacit.* the father of *Julius Agricola*), adds, *quem C. Caesar occidit ob hoc unum, quòd melior vir erat, quàm esse quemquam tyranno expediret.*

an Instrument is a lifeless Slave — in *Plato's* words — "To be injured is not the suffering of a man, but of a slave, to whom death is better than life: who if he be unjustly treated & abused, is wholly unable to help himself, nobody else has any concern for him."



and poor children<sup>a</sup>. Or, once for all, take a view of *servitude*, as it is described by *Pignorius*. To pass over the *Sicilian* tyrants, him of *Pheræ*, *Apollodorus*<sup>b</sup>, and the like, of which history supplies plenty; consider those terrible proscriptions among the *Romans*<sup>c</sup>, with the reigns of most of their *emperors*, more bloody than *Lybic* lion, or *Hyrceanian* tiger, even some of the *Christian* emperors not excepted. Read the direful and unjust executions reported by *Amm. Marcellinus*: among hundreds of others that of *Eusebius*<sup>d</sup>. Every whisper in those times or light suspicion brought upon men the question and tortures inconceivable. Men's very dreams were once interpreted to be treason; and they durst scarce own, that they had ever slept<sup>e</sup>. What inhuman punishments were used among the *Persians*<sup>f</sup>, in an arbitrary manner too; and many times extended to whole families, and all the kindred, tho not concerned<sup>g</sup>? But instead of enumerating here burnings, crucifixions, breakings upon the wheel, impalings, σκαφισμός, &c. I choose to refer you to those authors, who have designedly treated of the torments and questions of the ancients. Look into the history of the *Christian Church*, and her martyrologies: examin the prisons of the *inquisition*, the groans of which those walls are conscious, and upon what slight occasions men are racked and tortured by the tormentors there: and, to finish this detail (hideous indeed, but too true) as fast as I can, consider the many massacres, persecutions, and miseries consequent upon them, which false religion has caused, authorized, sanctified. Indeed the history of mankind is little else but the history of uncomfortable, dreadful passages: and a great part of it, however things are palliated and gilded over, is scarcely to be read by a good natured man without amazement, horror, tears. One can scarce look into a *news-paper*, or out at his window, but hardships and sufferings present themselves, in one shape or other. Now among all those millions, who have suffered eminently, can it be imagin'd, that there have not been multitudes, whose griefs and pangs have far outweigh'd all their enjoyments; and yet who have not been able, either by their innocence, their

<sup>a</sup> Some fell either by false accusations, or they were arbitrarily delivered up to Prison, sometimes themselves only, & sometimes all their Relations with them.

<sup>b</sup> Οἱ ἀδικοὶ διαβολαῖς περιπίπτοντες, καὶ διὰ θυμὸν εἰς φυλακὰς παραδεδωμένοι, ποτὶ μὲν αὐτοὶ, ποτὶ δὲ καὶ μετὰ πάσης συγγένειας.

<sup>c</sup> Mention'd by Cicero with Phalaris. He was tyrant of *Cassandria*, and is represented (out of *Polyanus*) as φοινικώτατον ἑσπερίων πάντων, ὅσοι παρ' Ἑλλήσιν ἢ παρὰ Βαρυάροις ἐτυράνησαν. Yet *Ælian* says, Ἐκ τῶν ὑπαναφλεγόμενων ἑσπερίων, ἐγένετο φοινικώτερος, κλ.

<sup>d</sup> It is said of *Sylla's* peace, after *Marius's* party were broken, Pax cum bello de crudelitate certavit, &c. S. *Aust.*

<sup>e</sup> Qui ita evisceratus, ut cruciatibus membra deessent, implorans calo justitiam, torvum renidens fundato pectore mansit immobilis, &c. In the reign of *Constantius*.

<sup>f</sup> Marebantque docti quidam, quod apud Atlantes nati non essent, ubi memorantur somnia non videri.

<sup>g</sup> V. *Plut.*

<sup>h</sup> Ob noxam unius omnis propinquitas perit. *Amm. Marc.*

prudence,

<sup>i</sup> Represented as bloodiest & most cruel of all Tyrants that ever reigned in Greece or amongst Barbarians. Yet *Plut.* says, That when he was heated with wine, then he was still more bloody.

prudence, or any power in them, to escape that *bitter draught*, which they have drunk? And then, how can we acquit the *justice* and *reasonableness* of that Being, upon whom these poor creatures depend, and who leaves them such great losers by their existence, if there be no *future state*, where the proper amends may be made? So that the argument is brought to this undeniable issue; if the *soul* of man is not *immortal*, either there is *no God*, upon whom we depend; or He is an *unreasonable Being*; or there never has been *any man*, whose sufferings in this world have exceeded his enjoyments, without his being the cause of it himself. But surely *no one* of these three things can be said. *Ergo* ---.

That, which aggravates the *hard case* of the poor sufferers mentiond above, if there be no *future state*, in which their past sufferings may be brought into the account, and recompensed, is, that many times their *persecutors* and *tormentors* pass their lives in plenty and grandeur: that is, the *innocent* have not only the portion, that properly belongs to the criminal and unreasonable part of mankind, but the *guilty* have that, which belongs rather to the innocent<sup>a</sup>. Such a *transposition* of rewards and punishments, ending in itself, without any respect to something which is to follow hereafter, can never consist with the nature of a Governor, who is not very much *below* rational: a thought, which *God forbid* any one should dare to admit of Him. To suppose the *virtuous* and *wise* left ultimately but in the same state with the unjust and profligate is to suppose such a *constitution* of nature, as never can flow from a principle of reason, a God of *truth* and *equity*: and therefore such a constitution, as leaves the former in a *worse* condition than the other, can *much less* be supposed.

*Obj.* It hath been said, that *virtue* tends to make men's lives happy even here, &c. and how then can the virtuous be supposed ever to be so *very miserable*? *Ans.* In ordinary cases *virtue* doth produce happiness: at least it has indeed a *natural tendency* to it; is the mean, by which it is most likely to be attained; and is therefore the way, which a wise man would choose for his own sake. But then it doth not follow from hence, that there are no *perturbations* in human affairs; no cases, in which the usual effect of virtue may be *overpowered* by diseases, violence, disasters. It doth not render men *invulnerable*; cannot command the *seasons*; nor prevent many great calamities, under which virtue and vice must fall *undistinguished*. (There may be a *direct road* to a place, and such a one, as he, who sets out for that place, ought to be found in, and yet it is possible he may meet with *robbers* or *accidents* in it, that may incommode, or hurt him in his journey.) On the other side, *vice* and *wickedness* may be so

<sup>a</sup> *Dies deficiet, si velim numerare, quibus bonis male evenierit: nec minus, si commemorem, quibus improbis optime.* Cic. This is justly said; tho I account his instances not the most apposite.



circumstantiated as to be attended with much greater *pleasure* than *pain*, contrary to the tendency of its nature: that is, a *wicked man* may be of a healthful make, born to riches or power, or fortunately placed for attaining them; and from the advantage of a strong body, an ample fortune, many friends, or lucky hits, he may derive *pleasures*, which shall exceed the present *inconveniences* and *sufferings* naturally following from his vices <sup>a</sup>.

Men's *circumstances* have a natural influence with respect to the present pleasures or sufferings, as well as their *virtue* or *vice*. No body sure ever said, that *all* depends *only* upon these: nor, when the natural tendency of *them* is asserted, is the natural tendency or effect of the *other* denied. Therefore indeed, when it is said that virtue *naturally* tends to make men happy even here, the meaning only is, that it tends to make men happy in *proportion* to their circumstances; and vice does the *contrary*. It is naturally productive of that part of happiness, which is in our *own power*, and depends upon *our selves*; makes men more truly happy, whatever their circumstances are, than they could be *without it*, and *commonly* tends to mend their worldly circumstances too: but it is not asserted, that virtue can *always intirely* correct them, or make men so *completely* happy in this life, as that their enjoyments shall exceed their mortifications; no more than the vices of some particular men, tho they bereave them of many solid pleasures, and bring troubles upon them too, do hinder their worldly enjoyments from being greater than their present sufferings. Not only our *being*, but our *place*, with the *time*, and *manner* of our being in this world depend upon the Author of the scheme the manner of *behaving our selves* in our station (according to our endowments, and the talents we have) only depends upon us. And perhaps (which has been hinted already) He has so orderd things on purpose, that from the *various compositions* of men's circumstances with the natural effects of their virtues and vices, and the many *inequalities* arising thence, they might see the *necessity* and *certainty* of another state: and that for this reason there should always be some remarkable instances of *opprest innocence* and *flourishing wickedness*.

The upshot is, that upon comparing *those pleasures*, which are the natural effects of virtue with *those sufferings*, which are the natural effects of ill constitution or other calamity, *these* are many, very many times found to exceed: and *contrario*, upon balancing *those evils*, which are the genuin effects of vice, against the

<sup>a</sup> Yet according to *Aristotle* he cannot be happy for all that. His opinion *Diog. L.* represents thus: τὴν ἀρετὴν μὴ εἶναι αὐτάρακτον πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν προδιδοῦν ὅτι ἢ τε ἀπὸ σώματος ἢ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν—τὴν μὲν τοὶ κακίαν αὐτάρακτον πρὸς κακοδαιμονίαν, καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα παρῇ αὐτῇ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ σώματος.

*of Virtue is not alone sufficient to produce Happiness, (Bec External good Things & Things relating to Body are also necessary—; But Vice is of Itself suff<sup>t</sup> to produce Misery, & especially if External good Things & Things relating to Body are joined with it.*

advantages resulting from a fortunate estate, *these* may often be found to outdo the other. *Both contrary to reason*, if all ends with this life, and after death be nothing. For my part, if there were only some few, nay but *one* instance of each kind in the world (unfortunate virtue, and prosperous wickedness), it would be to me a sufficient argument for a *future state*: because God cannot be unjust or unreasonable in any *one* instance. It must not be forgot here, that many times men of *great vices* have also *great virtues*, and the natural effect of these may qualify that of the other, and being added to their favourable circumstances may help to turn the scale.

If there is no other beside the present being, the *general* and *usual* state of mankind is scarce consistent with the idea of a *reasonable Cause*. Let us consider it a little<sup>a</sup>. Not to mention what we must suffer from the *very settlement* and *condition* of this world by hunger, thirst, heat, cold, and indispositions; like *leaves* one generation drops, and another springs up, to fall again, and be forgotten<sup>b</sup>. As we come into the world with the labor of our *mothers*, we soon go out of it with *our own*. *Childhood* and *youth* are much of them lost in insensibility or trifling, vanity and rudeness; obnoxious to many pains and accidents; and, when they are spent in the best manner, are attended with *labor* and *discipline*. When we reach that *stage of life*, which usually takes us from our nearest relations, and brings us out into the world, with what difficulty are proper *employments* and stations found for us? When we are *got out*, and left to scramble for ourselves, how many *hardships* and *tricks* are put upon us, before we get the sagacity and dexterity to save ourselves? How many *chances* do we stand? How troublesome is *business* made by unreasonableness, ill nature, or trifling and want of punctuality in the persons with whom we deal? How do we find ourselves instantly surrounded with *snare*s from designing men, knaves, enemies (of which the best men have some), opposite interests, factions, and many times from a mischievous breed, whole *childish* or *diabolical* humor seeks pleasure in the uneasiness of other people? Even in many of those *injoyments*, which men principally propose to themselves, they are greatly *disappointed*, and experience shews, how unlike they are to the antecedent images of them. They are commonly mixt<sup>c</sup>: the *apparatus* to most of them is too operose: the completion of them seldom depends upon *ourselves*

*6/ The Soft is like the Leaves of Trees, some spring for the Others wither.*

<sup>a</sup> *Et valet annales nostrorum audire laborum.* For, as Seneca says, *Nulli contigit impunè nasci.*

<sup>b</sup> *Οἷον περ φύλων γενεῶν, τοιούδε ἔ ἀνθρώπων. — ἢ μὲν φύει, ἢ δ' ἀπολύνει. Hom.* This is true not only of single men, but even of cities (famous ones), kingdoms, empires. One may say the same concerning many of them, that Florus says of *Veii*: *Laborat annalium fides, ut Veios fuisse credamus.*

<sup>c</sup> *Labor voluptasq; dissimillima natura, societate quadam inter se naturali sunt juncta. Liv.*



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alone, but upon a concurrence of things, which rarely hit *all* right<sup>a</sup>: they are generally not only less in practice, than in theory, but die almost as soon as they are: and perhaps they intail upon us a tax to be paid after they are gone. To go on with the history of *human life*: tho' affairs go prosperously, yet still perhaps a *family* is increasing, and with it new occasions of *solicitude* are introduced, accompanied with many *fears* and *tender apprehensions*. At length, if a man, through many cares and toils and various adventures, arrives at *old age*, then he feels most commonly his *pressures* rather increased, than diminished, and himself *less able* to support them<sup>b</sup>. The business he has to do grows *urgent* upon him, and calls for *dispatch*: most of his *faculties* and active powers begin now to fail him apace: *relations* and *friends*, who might be helpful to him (and among them perhaps the dear Consort of all his joys, and all his cares<sup>c</sup>) leave him, *never to return more*: wants and *pains* all the while are multiplying upon him: and under this *additional load* he comes melancholy behind, tottering, and bending toward the earth; till he either stumbles upon something which throws him into the grave<sup>d</sup>, or fainting falls of himself. And must he *end here*? Is this the *period* of his being? Is this *all*? Did he come into the world only to *make his way* through the press, amidst many justlings and hard struggles, with at best only a few deceitful, little, fugacious pleasures interspersed, and so *go out of it* again? Can this be an end worthy a first Cause *perfectly reasonable*? Would even any *man*, of common sense and good nature, send another upon a *difficult journey*, in which, tho' he might perhaps now and then meet with a little smooth way, get an interval for rest and contemplation, or be flattered with some verdurs and the smiles of a few daisies on the banks of the road; yet upon the whole he must travel through much dirt, take many wearisome steps, be continually inquiring after some clew or directions to carry him through the turnings and intricacies of it, be puzzled how to get a competent *viaticum* and pay his reckonings, ever and anon be in danger of being lost in deep waters, and beside forced all the while to fence against weather, accidents, and cruel robbers, who are every where lying in wait for him: I say, would any one send a man upon *such a journey* as this, *only* that the man might faint and expire at the end of it, and all his thoughts perish; that is, either for *no end* at all, or for the *punishment* of one, whom I suppose never to have hurt him, nor ever to have been capable

a/ We ought to seek Pleasure from ourselves, & not from others

<sup>a</sup> Sensible of this, Socrates used to say, διὸν τὰς ἡδονὰς, μὴ παρ' ἄλλων, ἀλλὰ παρ' ἑμῶν ζητᾶν. Stob.

<sup>b</sup> Seneca, & levissimis quoq; curis impar: as Seneca, of himself, in Tac.

<sup>c</sup> Rogus aspiciendus

amata Conjugis, &c. Juv.

<sup>d</sup> Σμίκρα παλαιὰ σώματ' ἐνθάδε ῥοπή. Soph.

a small Matter will push

an Old Man into his grave.

Here, a  
something

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of hurting him? And now can we impute to God that, which is below the common size of *men* <sup>a</sup>?

I am apt to think, that even among those, whose state is beheld with envy, there are *many*, who, if at the end of their course they were put to their *option*, whether, without any respect to a *future state*, they would repeat all the pleasures they have had in life, *upon condition* to go over again also all the same disappointments, the same vexations and unkind treatments from the world, the same secret pangs and tedious hours, the same labors of body and mind, the same pains and sicknesses, would be *far from accepting* them at that price <sup>b</sup>.

But here the case, as I have put it, only respects them, who may be reckoned among the *more fortunate* passengers: and for *one*, that makes his voyage so well, *thousands* are tost in tempests, and lost <sup>c</sup>. How many never attain any comfortable settlement in the world? How many fail, after they have attained it, by various misfortunes? What melancholy, what distractions are caused in families by inhumane or vitious husbands, false or peevish wives, refractory or unhappy children; and, if they are otherwise, if they are good, what sorrow by the loss of them? How many are forced by necessity upon drudging and very shocking employments for a poor livelihood? How many subsist upon begging, borrowing, and other shifts, nor can do otherwise? How many meet with sad accidents, or fall into deplorable diseases? Are not all companies, and the very streets filled with complaints, and grievances, and doleful stories? I verily believe, that a great part of mankind may ascribe their deaths to want and dejection. Seriously, the *present state* of mankind is unaccountable, if it has not some connexion with *another*, and be not as it were the porch or entry to it <sup>d</sup>.

There is one thing more, of which notice ought to be taken. To one, who carefully peruses the story and face of the world, what appears to *prevail* in it? Is it not corruption, vice, iniquity, folly at least? Are not debauching <sup>e</sup>, getting

*per fas aut nefas*, defaming one another, erecting tyrannies of one kind or other,

<sup>a</sup> Πάντες ἐσμὶν ἐν ὁδῷ. — ἴδες ἐπὶ τῇ ὁδῷ φυτὸν ἢ πῶαν ἢ ὕδωρ ἢ ὅ, τι ἂν τύχη τῷ ἀξίαν θεάματος. μικρὸν ἐτίεφθης; ἔϊτα παρέδραμες· πάλιν ἐνέτυχες λίθοις καὶ φάραγγι καὶ κήρυκοις καὶ σκοπέλοις, ἢ που καὶ θηρίοις, καὶ. Τοῖς τὸ ὁ βίος. *Baf.*

<sup>b</sup> Non mehercule quisquam accepisset [vitam], nisi daretur insciis. *Sen.*

<sup>c</sup> Paulisper te crede subduci in montis ardui verticem celsiorem; speculari inde rerum infra te jacentium facies; & oculis in diversa porrectis, fluctuantis mundi turbines intueri. Jam seculi & ipse miseraberis, &c. *Cypr.*

<sup>d</sup> העולם הזה רומה לפרורור בפני העולם הבא. *P. Aboth.*

<sup>e</sup> O si possis in illa sublimi specula constitutus oculos tuos inferre secretis, recludere cubiculorum obductas fores, & ad conscientiam luminum penetralia occulta referare, &c. *Cypr.*

<sup>f</sup> Here, are you not a little delighted with it? Then Dd 2 you soon meet with Stones, Vallies, Precipices, Rocks, sometimes with Wild Beasts. Life is very like This. <sup>pro-</sup> This World is only like a Porch of World to come!



propagating empty and senseless opinions with bawling and fury the great business of *this world*? And are not all these contrary to *reason*? Can any one then with reason imagine, that *reason* should be given, tho it were but to a few, only to be run down and trampled upon, and then *extinguish'd*? May we not rather conclude, that there must be *some world*, where *reason* will have its turn, and prevail and triumph? Some kingdom of *reason* to come?<sup>a</sup>

5. In the last place, that *great expectation*, which men have, of continuing to live in another state, *beyond the grave*, has I suppose been commonly admitted as one proof, that they *shall live*; and does seem indeed to me to add some weight to what has been said. That they generally have had such an *expectation*, can scarce be denied. The histories of mankind, their deifications, rites, stories of apparitions, the frequent mention of a *hades*, with rewards and punishments hereafter, &c. all testify, that even the Heathen world believed, that the *souls* of men *survived* their bodies. Their ignorance indeed of the seats and circumstances of the departed has begot many *errors* and *superstitions*; and these have been multiplied by licentious *poets* and idle *visionairs*: but this, being no more than what is usual in the like cases, ought to be no prejudice against the *fundamental opinion itself*.

Cicero<sup>b</sup>, tho he owns there were different opinions among the Greek philosophers about this matter; that, *quod literis extet, Pherecydes Syrus primum dixit, animos hominum esse sempiternos*; that Pythagoras and his school confirmed this opinion; that Plato was the man, who brought a reason for it, &c. yet tells us plainly, *naturam ipsam de immortalitate animorum tacitam judicare*; that *nescio quomodo inheret in mentibus quasi seculorum quoddam augurium*; that *permanere animos arbitramur consensu nationum omnium*; and more to this purpose. Now if this consent was only the effect of some *tradition*, handed from parents to their children; yet since we meet with it in *all the quarters* of the world (where there is *any* civility or sense), and in *all ages*, it seems to be *coeval* to mankind itself, and born with it. And this is sufficient to give a great *authority* to this opinion of the soul's immortality. But this is not all. For it is supported by all the foregoing arguments, and many other reasonings and symptoms which we may find within ourselves. All which, put together, may at least *justify* an expectation of a future state: that is, render it a just or reasonable expectation: and then this *reasonable expectation* grows, by being such, into a further argument, that there *will be* such a state.

*They who are desirous of truth of being things as they really are, can never be fully satisfied here.*  
<sup>a</sup> Beside, there being no satiety of knowledge in this life, we may hope for future opportunities; when our faculties shall be exalted, &c. Τῆς ἀληθείας ἐξέτις ὅτι ἐδὲς ἐνταῦθα ἢ ἐπ' αὐτῶν.  
 ἐπ' αὐτῶν ἐκταῖς, κτλ. Plut. <sup>b</sup> In Inst. disp.

Fancy

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Fancy a man walking in some *retired field*, far from noise, and free from prejudice, to debate this matter with himself: and then judge, whether such *meditations* as these would not be just. "I think I may be sure, that neither *lifeless matter*, nor the *vegetative tribe*, that stone, that flower, that tree have any reflex thoughts: nor do the *sensitive animals*, that sheep, that ox, seem to have any such thing, or but in the lowest degree, and in respect of present objects only. They do not *reason*, nor *discourse*. I may therefore certainly pretend to be something *much above* all these things<sup>a</sup>. I not only apprehend and consider these *external objects* acting at present upon my nerves, but have *ideas* raised within my self of a higher order, and many: I can, not only represent to my self things, that *are*, or *have been*, but *deduce* many other from them, make excursions into *futurity*, and foresee much of what will be, or at least may be; by strict thinking I had almost said, get into *another world* beforehand: and, whether I shall live in some other state after death, or not, I am certainly *a being* capable of such an *expectation*, and cannot but be solicitous about it: none of which things can be said of these *clods*, or those *brutes*<sup>b</sup>. Can I then be designed for *nothing further*, than just to eat, drink, sleep, walk about, and act upon this earth<sup>c</sup>; that is, to have no further being, than what these brutes have, so far beneath me? Can I be made capable of such *great expectations*, which those animals know nothing of (happier by far in this regard than I am, if we must die *alike*), only to be *disappointed at last*? Thus placed, just upon the confines of another better world, and fed with hopes of penetrating into it, and injoying it, only to make a *short appearance* here<sup>d</sup>, and then to be *shut out*, and *totally sunk*? Must I then, when I bid my last farewell to these walks, when I close these lids, and yonder blue regions and all this scene darken upon me and go out, must I *then* only serve to furnish dust to be mingled with the ashes of these *herds* and *plants*, or with this *dirt* under my feet? Have I been set *so far above them* in life, only to be *levelled with them* at death?

This argument grows *stronger* in the apprehension of one, who is conscious of abilities and *intellectual improvements*, which he has had no opportunity here of shewing and using, through want of health, want of confidence<sup>e</sup>, want of pro-

<sup>a</sup> Methinks those philosophers make but an odd appearance in story, who, looking big and fastidious, at the same time professed, that their own souls were not superior to those of gnats, &c. *ἰσχυροὶ ὄφεις ἀνισπανότες μηδὲν κατὰ τιμὴν ἔσσαν διαφέρειν ἀπεφάναντο ἐμπρόσθε τοῦ καὶ ἐνυλῆς, ὁ μύριας, καὶ τοὺς σὺς ψυχῆς*—*τιμὴν σφῶν αὐτῶν φιλοσοφωτάτων ψυχῶν*, as Euseb.

<sup>b</sup> Alexander after death might be in the same state with his *muletier* (M. Anton.), but sure not with his *mule*.

<sup>c</sup> *Brevi est hic fructus homullis*, may be justly said for all Lucretius.

<sup>d</sup> *Ὁ κόσμος σκηνὴ ἀβυσσὸς παράδοξος ἡλιδίς, ἰδίς, ἀπῆλιδίς*. Democrat.

<sup>e</sup> *אִתְּךָ חַכְמָה וְעוֹשֵׂה עֲוֹנוֹת*. Prov.

<sup>f</sup> This World is a Stage, Life is a Play; We come on, look about us, & go off again. Democrat per Wisdom is in Modest Men.



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per place, want of liberty. Such improvements, and the knowledge consequent upon them, cannot ultimately respect *this state*: they can be only an enlargement, and *preparation* for another. That is all they *can be*: and if they are not that, they are *nothing*. And therefore he may be supposed thus, further, to argue within himself. “Can the Author of my *reasoning* faculties be Himself so *unreasonable* “as to give me them, either not to imploy them, or only to weary my self with “*useless* pursuits, and then drop me? Can He, who is privy to all my *circum-* “*stances*, and to these very *thoughts* of mine, be so insensible of my case, as to “have *no regard* to it, and not provide for it?”

It grows *stronger still* upon the mind of one, who reflecting upon the hard treatment he has met with from this world, the little cause he has given for it, the pains and secret uneasiness he has felt upon that score, together with many other sufferings which it was not in his power to prevent, cannot but make a *silent, humble appeal* to that Being, who is his *last* and *true refuge*, and who he must believe will not *desert him thus*.

Lastly, it is *strongest of all* to one, who, besides all this, *endeavours* in the conduct of his life to observe the laws of *reason* (that is, of *his nature*; and that is, of the *Author of nature*, upon whom he depends); laments, and labors against his own *infirmities*; implores the Divine *mercy*; prays for some *better state* hereafter; acts and lives in the *hopes* of one; and *denies* himself many things upon that view: one, who by the exaltation of his *reason* and upper faculties, and that, which is certainly the effect of real and useful philosophy, the practice of *virtue*, is still approaching toward a higher manner of being, and doth already taste something spiritual and above this world. To such a one there must be a strong expectation *indeed*, and the argument built upon it must be proportionable. For can he be indowd with such capacities, and have as it were *overtures* of immortality made him, if after all there is no such thing? Must his *private* acts and *conceald* exercises of religion be all lost? Can a perfect Being have so little regard to one, who however inferior and *nothing* to Him, yet regards Him according to *his best abilities* in the government of himself?

Are such *meditations* and reflexions as these well founded, or not? If they are, it must be reasonable to think, that God will satisfy a *reasonable expectation*.

There are *other arguments* for the immortality of the soul, *two* of which I will leave with you, to be at your leisure ponderd well. The *one* is, that, if the *souls* of men are *mortal* (extinguishd at death), the case of *brutes* is by much preferable to that of *men*. The *pleasures* of brutes, tho but sensual, are more sincere, being

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palled or diminish'd by no diverting consideration: they go *wholly* into them; and when they have them not, they seem less to want them, not thinking of them. Their *sufferings* are attended with no reflexion<sup>a</sup>, but are such as they are said to be p. 34. obs. 8. They are void of *cares*; are under no apprehension for families and posterity; never fatigue themselves with vain inquiries, hunting after *knowledge* which must perish with them; are not anxious about their *future state*<sup>b</sup>, nor can be disappointed of any hopes or expectations; and at last some sudden blow (or a few minutes of *unforeseen* pain) finishes them, having never *so much as known* that they were mortal.

The *other* is, that the soul is a *principle of life*: that, which brings vitality to the body. For how should that, which has been proved to be a substance, and at the same time is also a principle of life, and *as such* (as being what it is) is *alive*; I say, how can that *die*<sup>c</sup>, unless it is annihilated?

Here I begin to be very sensible how much I want a *guide*. But as the religion of *nature* is my theme, I must at present content my self with that light which *nature* affords; my business being, as it seems, only to shew, what a Heathen *philosopher*, without any other help, and almost *αὐτοδιδάκτω*, may be supposed to think. I hope that neither the doing of this, nor any thing else contain'd in this *Delineation*, can be the least prejudice to any other *true* religion. Whatever is immediately *reveald from God*, must, as well as any thing else, be treated as being *what it is*: which cannot be, if it is not treated with the highest regard, *believed* and *obeyd*. That therefore, which has been so much insisted on by me, and is as it were the burden of my song, is so far from undermining true *reveald religion*, that it rather paves the way for its reception. This I take this opportunity to remark to you once for all. And so returning to my *philosopher*, I cannot imagin but that *even he* would have at least some such general thoughts as these, which make up almost the remainder of this last section.

*They are not uneasy as we are whilst they are alive, Imagining of End of them is to die.*

<sup>a</sup> *Fera pericula, qua vident, fugiunt: cum effugere, secunda sunt, &c.* Sen.

<sup>b</sup> *נל*

<sup>c</sup> *יצטערו בהיותם משערים שסופם למור: כאדם וכו' S. Iaquar.*

<sup>c</sup> *Sic mihi persuasi, sic*

*sentio, cum — semper agitur animus, nec principium motus habeat, quia se ipse moveat; ne finem quidem habiturum esse motus, quia nunquam se ipse sit relinquitur.* Cic. That in Greg. Thaum. is like this thought of Tully: *Ἡ ψυχὴ, αὐτοκίνητος ἔσται, ἐδέετο δ' εἶναι διαλείπει ἀκωλύει δ' τῷ αὐτοκινῶν τὸ αὐτὸ κινητὸν εἶναι τὸ δ' αὐτὸ κινητὸν ἀπαυτὸν εἶσι, κλ.* But that in S. Austin comes something nearer to my meaning: *Est animus vita quedam, unde omne quod animatum est vivit. — Non ergo potest animus mori. Nam si carere poterit vita, non animus sed animatum aliquid est.* *Something what a soul.*

*The soul be'd is able to move itself, can never cease to be, for it is a necessary consequence of self motion to be always in motion; & it is always in motion cannot cease to move.*

IX. The



IX. *The soul, when it parts from this gross body, will pass by some law into some new seat, or state, agreeable to the nature of it<sup>a</sup>.* Every species of beings must belong to some region, or state. Because nothing can be, but it must be some where, and some how: and there being different kinds of abodes and manners of subsisting in the universe, and the natures of the things, that are to exist in them, being also different, there will be a greater congruity between these several *natures* respectively and some particular *places*, or *states*, than there is between them and others; and indeed such a one, that out of those perhaps they cannot subsist, or not *naturally*. To those therefore must be their respective *tendencies*: to those they are *adjudged* by the course of nature, and constitution of things, or rather by the Author of them<sup>b</sup>.

While the soul is in the body, it has some powers and opportunities of moving it spontaneously, or otherwise than it would be moved by the meer laws of gravitation and mechanism. This is evident. But yet, notwithstanding this, the weight of that *body*, to which at present it is limited (among other causes) constrains it to act for a while upon *this stage*. That general law, to which bodies are subjected, makes it sink in this fluid of air, so much lighter than itself; keeps it down; and so determines the seat of it, and of the soul in it, to be upon the surface of this *earth*, where, or in whose neighbourhood it was first produced. But then, when the soul shall be disengaged from the gross matter, which now incloses and incumbers it, and either become *naked spirit*, or be only veild in its own fine and obsequious *vehicle*, it must at the same time be either freed from the *laws* of bodies, and fall under *some other*, which will carry it to some *proper* mansion, or state<sup>c</sup>; or at least by the *old ones* be capable of mounting upwards<sup>d</sup>, in proportion to the volatility of its vehicle, and of emerging out of these regions into some *medium* more suitable, and (if the philosopher may say so) *equilibrious*. Thus much as to the *general state* of souls after death. But then,

*E/ of necessity like things must go to each other. c/ The putting off these human affections, & putting on virtues as so many wings, will carry us to a better, where we shall live a divine life.*  
<sup>a</sup> The transmigration of souls has been much talked of: but *ea sententia, — quoniam ridicula, & mimo dignior quam scholâ, ne refelli quidem serîo debet; quod qui facit, videtur vereri, ne quis id credat.* So Lactantius. Indeed who can but laugh, when he reads in Lucian of Homer's having been a camel in *Bactria*, &c.  
<sup>b</sup> Χωρεῖν ὃ ἀνάγκη τὸ ὅμοιον πρὸς τὸ ὅμοιον. Hierocl. <sup>c</sup> Ex humili atque depresso in eum emicabit locum, quisquis ille est, qui solutas vinculis animas beato recipit sinu. Sen. Ἡ τ' ἀνητῆς προσπαθείας ἀπὸ βολῆς, ἢ τ' ἀρετῶν, οἷον πτερῶν τινα, ἐκφυγίς πρὸς τὴν καλὴν καὶ θαρσύνοντόν, εἰς τινα θείαν ἐνζώναν ἡμῶς ἀνάξει. Hierocl. <sup>d</sup> Depositâ sarcinâ, levior volabit ad cælum. S. Hier.





Now the soul, reflecting, finds in itself *two* general faculties, *one*, by which it understands, and judges, and reasons (all which I comprehend under the term *rational faculties*, or *reason*); and *another*, by which it wills, or determines to act, according to the judgments and conclusions made in the upper part of it. And the more *perfectly* it performs these operations (*i.e.* the more *truly* it reasons, and the more *readily* it wills and executes the decisions of reason), the more *perfect* certainly it must be in its kind; and the more imperfectly, the more imperfect. The accomplishments therefore and *perfections* of human souls, and the *contrary*, must be in proportion to the forementioned *differences*.

XII. According to these differences then it is reasonable to think the souls of men will find their stations in the future world<sup>a</sup>. This is but a corollary from what goes before.

Obj. Why should we think, that God causes things to be in such a manner, as that in the *future state* men shall be placed and treated according to their merit, and the progress they have made in reason and virtue, when we see the case to be widely different *in this*? Ans. It must be remembered, that this is one of those very *reasons* on which the belief of the soul's immortality is founded. Now, if it be reasonable to believe there is a future state, because things are dealt *unequally* now, upon that very score it will be reasonable to think, that they are dealt *equally*<sup>b</sup> in that other state.

Here *bodily* wants and affections, and such things as proceed from them, do intermix with human affairs, and do confound *merit* with *demerit*, *knowledge* with *ignorance*: and hence it comes to pass many times, that bad men enjoy much, and good men suffer, and both are, if there is no other state, in their wrong places. But, when the *corporeal causes* of misplacing shall be removed, *spirits* (or spirits and their *σώματα* *πνεύματα*) may be supposed more regularly to take their *due* posts and privileges: the impudent and vitious will have no such *opportunities* of getting into circumstances, of which they are unworthy, nor improved and virtuous minds find such *obstructions* to keep them down in circumstances unworthy of them. Be sure the more advanced and pure any state is, the more *properly* will the inhabitants be ranked, and the *juster* and more *natural* will the subordination of its members be.

Even *here* we commonly find men in that kind of business, for which they are educated and *prepared*; men of the same professions generally keeping together; the virtuous and reasonable *desiring* to be (tho they not always can be) with *their like*<sup>c</sup>;

<sup>a</sup> Τόπος προσηκουστος τῇ ἀρετῇ. Plato.

deserts: equitably.

<sup>b</sup> With an equal or impartial regard to every man's

<sup>c</sup> Ἀγαθὸν ἐν δαίρας ἕκαστον ἑαυτοῦ ἀγαθόν. E. Plat.

and the vitious (as they scarcely cannot be) with *theirs*. And why should we not think, that an *association* and *communion* of souls with those of their own size, disposition, and habits may be more *universal* and *compleat*, when those things, which in great measure hinder it here, shall be no more? If we may think this, certainly those fields or states, in which the *virtuous* and *wise*<sup>a</sup> shall meet, must be different from those in which the *foolish* and *wicked* shall herd together<sup>b</sup>. The very difference of the *company* will itself create a vast difference in the manner of their living.

XIII. *The mansions, and conditions of the virtuous and reasoning part must be proportionably better than those of the foolish and vitious.* The proposition cannot be inverted, or the case be otherwise, if the constitution of things depends upon a reasonable cause: as I have endeavourd to shew it does.

Cor. Hence it follows, that *the practice of reason* (in its just extent) *is the great preparative for death, and the means of advancing our happiness through all our subsequent duration.* But moreover,

XIV. *In the future state respect will be had not only to men's reasoning, and virtues, or the contrary, but also to their enjoyments and sufferings here*<sup>c</sup>. Because the forementiond *inequalities* of this world can by no means be redrest, unless men's enjoyments and sufferings, taken together with their virtues and vices, are compared and balanced. I say, *taken together*: because no reason can be assignd, why a vitious man should be recompensd for the pains and mischiefs and troubles, which he *brings upon himself* by his vices, as the natural consequences of them; nor, on the other side, why any deductions should be made from the future happiness of a good man upon the score of those *innocent* enjoyments, which are the genuin fruit of his moderation, regularity, other virtues, and sound reasoning.

Cor. *Wicked men will not only be less happy than the wise and virtuous, but be really unhappy in that state to come.* For when all the happiness, that answers to those degrees of virtue, which they had, and those sufferings, which they underwent, above what was the natural effect of their wickedness; I say, when

*That Place in which Here are no Evils, will not receive them (the wicked) but they shall be with One and the same*  
*ever to lead them*  
*lost of that they had here*  
*that he justly deserves, shall be accounted for to him.*  
*Ec 2*  
*that*

<sup>a</sup> Οἱ πεφιλοσοφηκότες ὁρῶντες, ὅτι οἱ ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι, in Plato's style.

<sup>b</sup> Τελειωθέντας ἀν-  
 τὸς αἰῶνος μὲν ὁ ἄκακον καθαρόν τόπον οὐ δέχεται, ἐνθαδὲ δὲ πάλιν αὐτοῖς ὁμοίωτα τὸ διαγωγῆς αἰεὶ  
 ἔχουσι, κακοὶ κακῶς συνόντες. Plato.

<sup>c</sup> Εἰ πλέον τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων κολάζεται [ὁ δίκαιος], προσθήκη  
 δικαιοσύνης αὐτῷ λογίζεται. Chryf.



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that is subtracted, what remains upon the account will be something below no-happiness: which must be some quantity of *positive unhappiness*, or misery.

Thus there will be *rewards*, and *punishments* hereafter: and men will be *happy*, or *unhappy*, according to their behaviour, enjoyments, and sufferings in this present life. But,

XV. *If the immortality of the soul cannot be demonstrated, yet it is certain the contrary cannot.* To say, when a *house* is ruinous and fallen, that it once had an *inhabitant*, and that he is escaped out of it, and lives in some other place, can involve no contradiction, or absurdity<sup>b</sup>. And,

XVI. *If the immortality of the soul should be considered only as a probability, or even as a chance possible, yet still a virtuous life is to be preferred before its contrary.* For if the soul be *mortal*, and all perception perishes for ever at our death, what in this case does a good man *lose* by his virtue? Very rarely more than some acts of *devotion*, and instances of *mortification*, which too by custom grow habitual and easy<sup>c</sup>, and it may be *pleasant* by being (or seeming at least to be) reasonable. On the other hand, what does a vitious man *gain*? Only such enjoyments, as a virtuous man *leaves*: and those are such, as most commonly owe their being to a vitiated taste; grow insipid in time; require more trouble and contrivance to obtain them, than they are worth; go off disagreeably;

*The Way to Virtue is long & steep, & very rugged at first; But after you are come off top, it then becomes easy.*

\* Sure those arguments in *Lucretius* can convince no body. *Nunc quoniam, quassatis undique vasis, Diffuere humorem, & laticem discedere cernis; Crede animam quoque diffundi, &c.* And *Præterea gigni pariter cum corpore & una Crescere sentimus, pariterque senescere mentem, &c.* *Quare animum quoque dissolvi fateare necesse est; Quandoquidem penetrant in eum contagia morbi.* Nor those in *Pliny* (N.H. 7. 55.): if there really are any at all. For to plead the *antegenitale experimentum* is to beg the question; which may be put thus, Whether we shall after death be more conscious of our existence, than we were before we were born. And if *Dicaearchus's* *Lesbiaci* were extant, I believe we should find nothing stronger in them. The truth seems to be, *Οὐ βέλτεται ὁ κακὸς ἀθάνατον εἶναι πλὴν αὐτῆς ψυχῆς*: but he comforts himself with this thought, that ἡ μετὰ θάνατον εὐδαιμονία αὐτῆς will prevent future sufferings. This is εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι καταφυγή. *Hierocles*.<sup>b</sup> Nor that the soul still exists *ἐρημον καταλιπῆσα ζωῆς ἢ ἡμέτερον οἶκον*. *Ph. 7. Domus ab habitatore deserta dilabitur*: — & corpus, relictum ab anima, destruit. *Laet.*<sup>c</sup> *Μακρὸς ὃ ἐστὶν οἶμος ἐπ' αὐτὴν [ἀρετὴν], καὶ τρηχὺς τὸ πρῶτον. ἐπὶ δ' εἰς ἀκρον ἵκηται, ῥηιδὴ δ' ἥπιτα πέλει.* *Hes.*

*Annihilation*

*The  
Soul  
Body*

*So the  
Soul  
Body*

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are follow'd many times by sharp reflexions and bitter penances in the rear; and at best after a short time end in nothing, *as if they had never been*. This is all<sup>a</sup>. But then if the soul prove to be *immortal* (as we have all the reason in the world to think it will), what does the virtuous man *gain*? His present pleasures (if not so many) are more *sincere*<sup>b</sup> and *natural*<sup>c</sup>; and the effect of his self-denials and submission to reason, in order to prepare himself for a future state, is the happiness of that state: which, without pretending to describe it, may be presumed to be *immortal*, because the soul is so; and to be purer and of a more exalted nature (*i. e. truer, and greater*) than any of these low enjoyments here, because that state is every way in nature above this. And again, what does the wicked man *lose*? That happiness, which the virtuous gain *as such*; and he sinks, beside, into some degree of the *unhappiness* of that future state: of which one may say in general, that it may be as much greater than the unhappiness or sufferings of this world, as the happiness and joys of that are above those of this.

In a state that is *spiritual* and clear every thing will be purer, and operate more directly and strongly, and (if the expression may be tolerated) *with more spirit*: there will be fewer obstructions to either happiness or unhappiness: the soul will lie *more open*, and have more *immediate* and acute perceptions of either: so that each of them in their kind will be more *intense*, the one nearer to pure or mere happiness, the other to the contrary<sup>d</sup>. But to enter further into the nature and oeconomy of the yet unknown world is too arduous an undertaking for my *philosopher*.

I shall only add, that the *reasoning* and *virtuous* man has at least this advantage over the *foolish* and *profligate*, that, tho his wisdom and virtue cannot *always* rectify that which is amiss in himself or his circumstances, they will find means to *alleviate* his pressures and disadvantages, and support him under all the anomalies of life, with *comforts* of which the other knows nothing: particularly this, the enjoyment of an humble, but well grounded expectation of *felicity hereafter*, sincere and durable<sup>e</sup>.

*He who excels in virtue reaps pleasures that can never be repented off / becomes as virtuous as he can be; reaps being truly blessed happy*  
*Calo profertur Adonis.* <sup>b</sup> 'Ο ἀρετῇ διατρέπων ἐ ἡδονὰς ἀμιταμιλήτους καρπῶται. Hierocl.

*If the soul was mortal, yet the virtuous man τῶν αὐτῶν τελειότητα ἀπλάμψαν, τὸ δικαίον καρπῶ-  
 μινος ἀγαθόν, ἐν δαίμων ὄντως ἐστὶ ἐ μακάριος. ἐ ἥ ἐ τὸ σῶμα, κτλ. Simpl.* <sup>d</sup> 'Ως μὴ  
 μόνον τῇ καλῇ περιεῖναι τ' σπουδαῖον ἔ φάυλε, ἀλλὰ ἐ αὐτῇ τῇ ἡδονῇ νικᾷ, δι' ἣν μόνον δοκεῖ εἰς κακίαν ὁ  
 φάυλος ὑπάγειν. Hier. <sup>e</sup> Οἱ ἥ δίκαιοι τ' ἀδίκων, εἰ μὴδ' ἐν ἄλλο πλεονεκτήσιν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐλπίσι  
 γὰ σπουδαίως ὑπερέχουσιν. Iocr.

*So that a good M excels a bad M not only in goodness, but He exceeds Him in Pleasure* XVII. *He also by alone He*  
*bad M was led to be wicked*  
*If the Righteous do not excel Wicked in any thing else, yet they do in their Expectations of Happiness: Iocr.*



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XVII. *He therefore, who would act according to truth, must, in the last place, not only consider what he is, and how circumstantiated in this present state, and provide accordingly; but, further, must consider himself also as one whose existence proceeds on into another, and provide for that too. How I think this is to be done, by this time I hope you fully apprehend.*

For a *conclusion* of the whole matter; let our conversation in this world, so far as we are concern'd, and able, be such as acknowledges every thing to be *what it is* (what it is in *itself*, and what with regard to *us*, to other *beings*, to *causes*, *circumstances*, *consequences*): that is, let us by no act *deny* any thing to be *true*, which is *true*: that is, let us act according to *reason*: and that is, let us act according to the *law of our nature*. By *honestly endeavouring* to do this we shall express our duty <sup>a</sup> to *Him*, who is the Author of it, and of that law; and at the same time prosecute our own *proper* happiness (the happiness of *rational* beings): we shall do what tends to make us easy here, and be qualifying our selves and preparing for our removal hence to our long home; that great *revolution*, which, at the farthest, cannot be very far off.

And now, *Sir*, the trouble is almost over for the present, not properly which I give you, but which you have brought upon yourself, these being the *Thoughts*, which you *desired*: unless I have any where misrepresented myself through *inadvertence*; which I own may be. At the foot of the page I have in some places subjoin'd a *few little* strictures principally of *antiquity*, after the manner of annotations: such as, when I came to revise these sheets, I could recollect upon the sudden <sup>b</sup>; having no common-place book to help me, nor thought of any such thing before that time. They may serve perhaps sometimes a little to explain the text; and sometimes to add weight; but chiefly to *divert* you, who know very well how to improve any the *least hint* out of the Ancients, and I fear will *want* to be diverted. I have also printed a few copies of this *Sketch*, not with any design to make it public, but merely to save the trouble of *transcribing* <sup>c</sup>; being minded, since I have made it, to leave it not only with *you*, but perhaps also with two or three other *friends*:

*a/ (To be practis'd) is the most sacred manner of worshipping God.*

<sup>a</sup> Τὸν Θεὸν ὡς ὁσιώτατος ἔχει ὁσιώτατος [ἀρκούν ἀρετῆς]. *Jos.*

added in the second impression.

<sup>b</sup> Some more were

ments.

<sup>c</sup> Nothing more was intended at first. See the *advertise-*

or

*Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c.* 219


or however, with my *Family*, as a *private monument* of one that meant well-  
Tho, as to the disposal and fate of it, much will depend upon your judgment  
and manner of acceptance.

WILLIAM WOLLASTON. *Printed A L 7 Decr 44*

מבני מלך

Who is like unto God?

And "Praised before"





Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c. 219

or however, with my family, as a private member of one of our courts well. That as to the hospital and fact of 16 NO 63 will depend upon your judgment and manner of acceptance.

WILLIAM WOLLASTON.

cc: m. d.





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2. 18



EXHIBIT

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Render Him less acceptable to many persons. Particularly to those who perhaps have only just sense and perceive  
their own weakness; or judge of things by the Vogue they bear, or the Respect they have to their own Interest or Party; or  
can neither bear the trouble of an honest Inquiry themselves, nor yet that another should know it. They do not know; In short to every  
prejudiced Person whatever. But he took all Opportunities to assert seriously & inculcate strenuously; Being a perfection  
of God; his Providence both General & Particular; the Obligations we are under to adore Him; the Reasonableness of  
Immortality & Immortality of Soul; Future Rewards & Punishments; & other high & essential Points of Nat-  
Religion & Christian Revelation. In fine, To Reason impartially, & to know where to stop, was; Mark He  
always aimed at. And He loved Truth, not in Speculation only, but also in Practice: for he loved <sup>Honesty</sup> Punctuality.  
He likewise delighted in Method & Regularity: And chose to have his Labour, & Repose, Periodical; & that  
his Family & Friends should observe the proper Seasons of his Revolutions. The Reverse of this being a prevailing  
Temper, or at least Practice of the kind, oftentimes either deprived him of Conversation or rendered it disagreeable  
to him. The general Character of his Temper was, that it was Tender & Sensible. This Tenderness  
disposed him to feel the Compassion & Miseries of Mankind. In many Times suffered more perhaps in our  
Misery & in his own. This Tenderness induced him always to endeavour to satisfy & convince in  
Cases where he might have commanded despotically & absolutely. That it is not improbable that in this He was frequently  
misunderstood as if He meant to chide, when He only intended to explain & convince. To this Tenderness may also  
be ascribed a Presumptive Modesty & Diffidence of Himself, which made Him delight in Privacy & Retirement, in company  
He was in great Measure, from appearing in Public, at all like what He really was: & even occasioned Him sometimes  
to second in Person to those, who exceeded Him in nothing but forwardness & Force. Something of this might  
be owing to the Depression of his Spirits in his younger Days. From some Cause might arise his strong  
Apprehension of the Inconceivable Injustice of those who were designedly & deliberately of Quarrels or Abuse, or treated  
without Provocation and without Cause. The same Tenderness rendered Him in a high manner, sensible of Desertion  
that is, of a Difference of Friends. He never indulged his Passions to the Hurt of any One. If  
any one respected He showed that He was not so complete a Stoic as to have criticised his Passions, or to affect a Philosophy  
as never to be surprised by them; it was if Escape of an hysterical or Excessive new & then, when He was put off  
by his Guilt by Hurries, Indispositions, or such like Occasions. Yet He was not always Ungracious, the force of  
Business, & the Rank of the Importance of the Cause caused Him to talk louder or quicker  
than ordinary; nor often if at all without sufficient Reason; nor ever so ungracious to any One else, as He would be with Himself  
for having been so. In short if every One were restrained his Anger within same bounds as He did, there might be a  
Harsh Word or Expression dropped sometimes upon the least occasion. But there would never be Repentment  
Wrath or Quarrel more if words. He was so remarkably free from any such  
Conversation; & by his Inclination ready, as well as his manner of speaking; & immediately quite like to be serious  
to all sorts of persons. This tenderness & compassion & respect to the feelings of others was his constant & his  
But a General Acquaintance was with him never cultivated: & he was more & more his own person. So that He



*[Faint, mostly illegible handwritten text in a cursive script, likely from a 17th or 18th-century manuscript. The text is organized into several columns across the page.]*

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any How, in order to be considerate of them they are put in some Order. July 4 1723. Underneath which  
has added. They are written at length (noting my short Hand) that so if this last should never be finished, they  
may however not be totally lost. However in this Design I had Opportunity to make out a very  
small Prospect. For it was just about this Time that, at Instances & Persuasion of his Friends, he  
set about revising & publishing the following Work; wherein he had and of 2 part of preparatory  
Resolving, as soon as that should be done, to return to & finish his last of 3<sup>d</sup> Edition.

But in that He was disappointed. For immediately after He had completed the Serial publication  
of following Treatise, an Accident of breaking his Arm increased his Distemper, & accelerated his Death  
which happened upon 29 Oct. 1724. & has absolutely put an End to Expectation of seeing any more of his  
Works in Print. For it would be equally injurious to him, & disrespectful to his Public, if his Family  
had exposed his more imperfect Sketches in Print, after his Death: & He Himself had in his Time  
destroyed several more finished Pieces, because He judged them not sufficiently accurate.

His Body was carried down of great Burial in Suffolk, (one of his Estates, & of Principal Residence of  
his now & last Son) & laid close by the Side of his deceased Wife; agreeably to 2 following Epitaphy  
composed by Him for Her & for Him, & inscribed upon their common Monument.

Hic ad inum Parietem sita est

<sup>Nov. 6. 1724</sup>  
Iuxta Reliquias Catharinae suae

Catherina

Ipsius Gulielmi Wollaston.

Gulielmi Wollaston

Conditi sunt finibus Praemissi.

Hujus Marerii Winburiensis Domini &c.

Muit Is. Si quis avertat Scire.

Uxor Concordia ac dilectissima:

Genere Arbes perantiquas, nec Ignobili;

& qua Prolem Ille numerosa & pulchra suscepit

Academicis Discipulis imbutus transalpinis

Ipsa olim Pulcherrima.

Quibus ibi induit p. Annos plus septuaginta

Ob. Julii 21. Aet. 1720. Aet. 50.

Hereditate ampla humine faciente, Auchus:

Sepulchrumq; occupavit

Valitudine laetens, parum prima,

Conjugi secum commune futurum.

Hominumq; corruptis moribus & Judicis Iniquis

ut qui Conjunctissimi vixerunt,

Diligenter Expensis ac Estimatis

Etiam Mortui misit finibus, Uniaur.

Vita Privata ita sumptu

Suorum Saluti & Commodis prospiciens;

Beneficentis Animi excedens, & oblectans;

Opibus Domæ atq; Honoribus

Etiam oblectis.

Veri Conscientia facili Contentus,

Cum vixisset Ann: 65, di. 217.

Quem Deus deo erat peracto,

Ita cessit 22<sup>da</sup> 1724

From all that has been said concerning Mr Wollaston, it appears that notwithstanding his declining  
 to accept of any Public Employment, yet his Studies were designed for the Public Use: In which I think  
 was far from being employed in vain & trifling Amusements, terminating in Himself alone. His  
 latest Moments were calm & easy, such as might be expected to close a Life spent like this. And the  
 Effluvia, as He is supposed in it, quietly & resignedly. Both, Manner of his Life & that of his Death  
 were well worthy of Imitation. It is scarce worth while to take any Notice of an idle or malicious  
 Reflection, which has been cast out, by some over-zealous Persons, upon this Gent's Memory, as if  
 he had put a slight upon Christianity by laying much the stress upon the Obligations of Truth & Reason. I think  
 or as if He could not have believed a right, but He did not think it necessary to dwell upon this Subject in  
 order to insert his Creed. Surely, a Suspicion thus founded can deserve no Regard. However it is  
 not to be amiss to observe, that it has probably been increased by a vulgar Mistake that Mr Wollaston, the  
 Author of Religion of Nature delineated, was the same Person with Mr Wollaston, who wrote several  
 Pieces, which greatly attacked the Literal Truth of the Miracles of J<sup>h</sup>. And this Mistake & error  
 originally from a Similitude of Names, might happen the further confirmed by Mr Wollaston's  
 writing His "Late Beliefs of Honey Comb in Lamb" at which both our Ant. Hims & A of his Soul  
 were concerned.

The Religion of Nature delineated being a Book in great Esteem with her  
 Majesty & Caroline, she was pleased to command me to translate it into English for her  
 own Use: And there being a Demand for a new Edition, it was the proper way to publish this  
 Translation, as these Notes are Illustrations & Confirmations of the Sentiments of the said Book.  
 Therefore I have consented to Publishing of them.

John Clarke

Salisbury 17 April 1750.